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Summary
This research has been carried out on the basis of a quite short and quite simple 
question: Is the notion o f children's citizenship a reality or romanticism? It looks at 
the status and extent of our knowledge of the position of children over a period of 
about 2500 years in the past and toward an as yet unpredictable time in the future. In 
so doing it looks at not only ‘ourselves’ (Western European societies) but other 
cultures, traditions and beliefs that broaden the question’s base. It considers branches 
of knowledge such as the social sciences, theology and philosophy. Those disciplines 
have examined humanity with varying amounts of reference to children or childhood 
for at least as long as any of them has existed.
The choice of methods includes analytic induction, morphological analysis and 
content analysis cum symptomatic reading. Those choices are governed by the fact 
that most parts of all data are printed texts. Some of the content is also my own work, 
partially field based and other parts published texts. Some of my more recent, 
undocumented field based work has also raised questions that require answers that a 
work of this nature might provide.
This research moves on and away from child participation using a children’s rights 
based argument toward examination of the relationship o f the child with the state, 
thus as a potential full member citizen, including children's rights as part o f the 
broader human rights agenda. In so doing, the conclusions complete research that 
has taken a course in which the intent before examining evidence was to reach a 
position that was partly advocacy for full citizenship. The conclusions bearing the 
weight of historically and geographically widespread data now look at a better 
informed reality of the possibility of that being realised.
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Chapter One: Introduction: the children’s citizenship paradigm
Who is the citizen, and what is the meaning o f the 
term? For here again there may be a difference o f 
opinion. Aristotle, 1999b:52.
This research sets out to examine the question of whether the notion of children’s 
citizenship is realism or romanticism. The nature of citizenship itself is a question 
that is often debated rather than resolved and there is no general agreement on a 
single definition. This research does not attempt to conclude with an unreserved 
solution. That is something which, like examination of many other social phenomena, 
requires time but also depends on substantial evidence for change to be facilitated. 
Then further substantiation needs to be accrued to prove that what may be shown in 
theory can also be proven by practice. I also wish to avoid hubris. I am acutely aware 
of comparable arguments against women ever acquiring rights that make them full 
citizens. Indeed, in some parts of our world that mindset is still the everyday reality 
for many women. Whilst that is a relatively short history, the fact is that progress 
from a child virtually being a ‘chattel’ of the most closely related or, in the absence of 
family, appointed male has been excruciatingly slow. In substantial parts of the world 
it is a process that has not yet begun and may never begin.
What is a child?
Throughout this work the definition of a child is that used by the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) (see also Appendix I):
Parti
Article 1
For the purposes of the present Convention, a child means every human 
being below the age of 18 years unless, under the law applicable to the 
child, majority is attained earlier.
There are many exceptions. Historically, there was no exact point in time at which 
childhood ended. It begins at birth in most cases. Some kind of blessing, acceptance 
ceremony, baptism, circumcision or other ritual has often marked the beginning of 
life. Whilst there are several divisions within the CRC definition, often the best way 
of looking at this question is when a person becomes an adult. Adulthood has been 
primarily determined by the start of puberty (the menarche for women, ability to
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ejaculate for men and the appearance of pubic hair for both sexes). Thus, in the 
modem medical world childhood is the period from birth to puberty.
Since social construction of a notion of adolescence, adulthood has been separated 
into two forms: biological and social adulthood. Thus, biological adults are those 
who have reached and passed puberty and social adults are recognised by cultural and 
legal standards. Historically people normally moved from being a child directly to 
becoming an adult. In many societies that transition was marked by some type of 
ritual, ceremony, rite de passage or coming-of-age test.
The CRC definition is not always universally accepted and practiced. There are many 
different ages at which people attain various markers that describe social adulthood. 
Some traditional ideas conflict with civil legal standards in nations where the CRC 
should be the standard. However, on the basis of the CRC having been ratified and 
adopted into law by all nations but two at the time of writing, age 18 years in the 
contemporary world is the preferred definition. Where exceptions occur and are of 
relevance to this study they will be explained contextually.
Structure
This research is set out in 12 chapters. This chapter, One, introduces and describes the 
task of the research and particularly the arguments and ideas behind it. The other 11 
chapters are set out thus:
o Chapter Two is the research design. It describes the methodology and 
methods chosen for analysis of Chapters Four to Eleven, 
o Citizenship is examined in Chapter Three. It is a discerning examination of 
what is often a contested notion that examines citizenship specifically in the 
context of children and youth. Thus, debates about what citizenship is and 
more recent interest in concepts such as ‘global citizenship’ with implications 
for a notion of a ‘global childhood’ are not examined. They would be a 
divergence from the core question as to whether children have ever been, are 
today or at some point in the future will be full citizens. Chapter Three also 
provides the context for this research rather than data that will be used for 
analysis. It is nonetheless one of the keys to identifying children’s citizenship 
in concluding chapters.
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o Examination then turns to the emergence of childhood with Chapter Four 
looking at accounts of the position of children in the ancient and medieval 
world up to the 16th century. It is in practice almost impossible to divide the 
world into perfect ‘halves’. Thus this chapter looks at the longer of two 
divisions of history up to the early modem period. As with the work of the 
most thorough historians there are very large temporal ‘holes’. These lacunae 
do not suggest an absolute absence of children from history but are disposed 
more toward reflection of the historian’s manner which is to place greater 
emphasis on particular periods and events. Chapter Four thus leads not only 
into Chapter Five but also begins to introduce some of the elements of 
Chapter Six.
o Chapter Five then examines the world from the Enlightenment to the present. 
As with the preceding chapter there are lacunae. Emphasis is necessarily 
placed on key names, places, events and so on throughout a very busy period. 
It begins to prepare the ground for some of the material and contexts used for 
Chapter Seven.
o Both chapters incorporate several types of historical data that include 
elements of demographic, economic, epidemiological and social history. They 
also use some of the bases of philosophical thought that draw on childhoods 
contemporaneous to work of a number of great thinkers. Some names (for 
instance, Plato or Rousseau) and events appear and reappear in Chapters Four 
and Six or Five and Seven respectively. They are used for historical data in 
the former instance and develop on examination of ideas in the latter. 
Repetition is kept to the absolute minimum possible and where it is used, is 
done to place emphasis on the two different contextual uses. The emphasis 
over those chapters is naturally on where children belong in history rather 
than presenting an accurate timeline and portrayal of events over roughly 
2500 years.
o Chapters Six and Seven thus examine relevant elements of intellectual 
discourse, beliefs, moral and ideological positions on children from antiquity 
until the present day.
o Chapter Six covers areas that are inclusive of children from antiquity to the 
high Middle Ages. In common with Chapter Four it also makes large ‘leaps’ 
in time. These particularly reflect the fact that children whilst appearing very
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significantly in the works examined did not appear especially frequently. This 
chapter also leads into the next and short period, 
o Chapter Seven then moves on from the Early Modem period to the present. 
To a greater extent this is the chapter that sets the context for Chapter Eight 
and has been to some extent influential in the development of the New 
Sociology of Childhood, 
o Philosophy and theology are two main sources of data for Chapters Six and 
Seven. There is, as already said, in particular reuse of some of the great 
thinkers included in preceding chapters. Here the emphasis is on the 
intellectual content of their work, where and when it relates to children rather 
than describing significant aspects of the world those people lived in. 
o Chapter Eight then looks at the relatively recent phenomena of child sciences, 
childhood studies and the social sciences. Historically the child sciences are 
very recent, generally beginning a little over a century ago. The study of 
childhood as a specialist topic area is far more recent and the consolidation of 
the position of children in the social sciences an ongoing process at present, 
o Chapter Nine examines children’s rights and the contemporary interest in 
child participation. This is one of the key areas when looking at the present 
and toward the future. Children’s participation has frequently been construed 
to be the same as citizenship and is therefore given particularly close scrutiny. 
During the time this research was carried out, a new trend has been to look at 
participation critically. However, at the time of completion publications are 
for the greater part still ‘forthcoming’. Thus the critical examination of 
participation in this chapter is also intended as a contribution to developing 
and even ‘embryonic’ arguments, 
o Chapter Ten thus turns to legal and welfare views of children that are broadly 
speaking contemporary to this work. This is one of the key areas when 
looking at the present and toward the future. It also looks at children’s 
inclusion and their position in policy making and governance. This is an 
important element. If full citizenship for children is a viable option which the 
world must accept and prepare for, then it must be one of the starting points 
for law makers who will bear ultimate responsibility for opening that door.
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o Chapter Eleven takes in a number of additional issues that are significant in 
terms of a global notion of children’s citizenship and may bear some influence 
on how it develops.
o Chapter Twelve draws Chapters Four to Eleven together for analysis of the 
data the eight chapters describe. It subsequently develops beyond analysis to 
reach conclusions that relate back to the research topic, asking whether the 
notion of children’s citizenship is realism or romanticism. It also attempts to 
search for elements of citizenship described in Chapter Three to that end. If 
they are at all present. The conclusion furthermore projects toward a possible 
future in which children may be citizens. It also attempts to stimulate 
discourse that may offer a significant contribution to the more vexing question 
of definitive resolution to such questions as ‘how’, ‘why’, ‘when’ and ‘where’ 
that might begin.
Arguments and ideas supporting examination of this topic
This research sets out to look at contexts, aims and objectives toward concluding the 
question of realism or romanticism. It also looks at citizenship in the context of this 
work, thus as it relates to children specifically. This is done so in the light of far more 
complex questions that would arise if this was solely about citizenship. The romantic 
view has been most commonly addressed in discussion and debate at conferences, 
seminars and such meetings where opinion is often tested. It has been less frequently 
written, published and subjected to the scrutiny of peer review. Realism has often 
been somewhat obscured by the assumption that children’s full citizenship is 
something that will evolve as an outcome of the advancement of children’s rights 
during the 20th century. Thus two particular lines of argument have been pursued with 
this study. The first is one that compares with the changing position of women over 
just over a century. The second is use of extraordinary children whose names are used 
as exemplars of what all children might be.
Despite increased effort by women and their supporters from the early 20th century 
on, and especially more recent feminist contributions, sizeable vestiges of absolute 
male domination tend to survive in even the most ‘liberal’ European regimes. It is 
inadvisable for any researcher to draw assumptions out of the experience of women 
as a standard for reaching a conclusion about children. There are nonetheless always
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commonalities and parallels that cannot be ignored. Thus, when drawing on 
philosophical and early social scientific texts it is possible to find both women and 
children viewed as ‘property’ o f or o f inferior status to men. I have, however, not 
been tempted to settle for those texts as my starting point but have usually borne them 
in mind whilst further exploring places where children are directly referred to. 
Occasionally this locates them directly under the authority of adults, including 
women who are frequently still ranked below men.
The positions occupied by women and children are fundamentally different despite 
the issues that may be compared. Where no separation is evident, then those become 
starting points for looking toward contemporary views and where dichotomisation 
began. There are notably exceptional women: one might turn to such as Queen 
Elizabeth I of England (1533 - 1603) or Cleopatra VII Philopator (69 -  30 BC), the 
last pharaoh of Ancient Egypt whose rule dominated and rivalled male 
contemporaries. There have been boy and girl monarchs, but they do not have the 
reputation of those monarchs and several other historically strong women. There are 
also women whose standing came with social status, wealth, powerful position in a 
religious order or as a writer, artist of political activist. Most of them have a 
particularly privileged background. For example, one might take Mary Wollstonecraft 
(1759 -97) who is known as a (if not the) founder of feminism. Whilst her childhood 
may have been difficult with a father who speculated away relative economic 
comfort, it was still privileged compared to most other girls and women with the 
benefits of education and an intellectual social environment.
Children are sometimes exceptional, as was Wollstonecraft’s contemporary Wolfgang 
Amadeus Mozart (1756 -  91). His father, Leopold Mozart (1719-1787), was assistant 
Kapellmeister to the court orchestra of the Archbishop of Salzburg, a minor composer 
and also experienced teacher who taught his children languages and academic 
subjects besides music. It is possible that with another father Wolfgang Amadeus 
would not have learned his skills. However, Mozart is nonetheless exceptional, as are 
so-called geniuses in the modem world. Beyond his contribution to music little is 
made of his early life other than that he was a prodigy. He, as too comparable 
children, does not really tend to contribute to changing the status of children as 
extraordinary women most clearly have through political actions and words.
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Where children appear alone, they may well be foundlings, orphans, vagabonds or 
more recently homeless or street children and youth. This places them on the fringes 
of society, more unwanted than wanted, thus less likely to have been fully and 
objectively documented as individuals. As a useful counterbalance here, one has 
fiction where well rounded portrayals of children can be found, consequently authors 
like Charles Dickens and Mark Twain play almost as important a role as more 
‘serious’ authors. When we closely examine the Artful Dodger or Huckleberry Finn 
their activities can be understood as ‘genial’. Yet both boys remain outside of 
mainstream society, perhaps more devious outlaws than geniuses.
Since 1989 the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) has 
brought this topic forward a little. Particular emphasis on the participation of children 
in civil society has been driven by the CRC recently although, despite some 
widespread misunderstanding, it is not the same thing as citizenship. Furthermore, 
children’s participation has been so thoroughly possessed by activists, campaigners 
and researchers that it is gradually becoming bogged down by a plethora of 
definitions, tools for measuring and modelling modes of operation. All of that 
overlooks one simple fact: in one sense or another, children are already participants in 
civil society. That is a key part of the motivation behind this research.
There is also personal frustration with what appears to be a temptation by people who 
one might expect to not be so easily seduced by a ‘romantic’ view of a past in which 
children and adults were somehow ‘indistinguishable’. It is important that we look in 
greater depth to see what one might extrapolate from the past. Likewise, we also need 
to look at a wider geographical perspective to understand what a society into which a 
child is bom actually is. Although that is a simple enquiry that is probably all too 
obvious, it would appear that nobody has attempted to address it. Many people have 
sought knowledge, have most frequently looked principally at Western European 
society and have arrived at unconvincing starting points. They include 
overenthusiastic interpretation of the work of Jean-Jacques Rousseau or the version of 
history Philippe Aries extrapolated from mainly France and to a limited extent the 
rest of Europe. Children existed before the periods they inform us about. Moreover 
such ‘samples’ are generally very limited.
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Neither projects a world view, but summon up rather selective French history, albeit 
some ideas Rousseau expounded have universal appeal. Histories have particularly 
looked at a single cultural environment and many of them have done so within a 
relatively short window in time.
On the other hand some people have examined the ‘other’, often using ethnographies 
of societies in which children share much of every aspect of life with adults. In some 
of these studies children are often barely, if at all, discernible. This research 
nonetheless examines those narrow perspectives to contribute to answering the 
broader question which is necessary given the sparse resources available. There are 
also pseudo-ethnographies that rely on romantic notions supplemented with fact. In 
an attempt to use romantic arguments as part of the means to reaching conclusions on 
reality, it has been necessary to revisit some of the literature that inspires to 
understand the attraction of notions of Golden Age and utopian thought.
Sir Thomas More’s Utopia (1516) does not in fact describe a perfectly egalitarian 
world. There are those who wish it to do so. Utopia appears to be for a large part a 
cleverly modified version of Plato’s Republic. In it the graces of a seemingly 
egalitarian, pacifist society hold sway over the inhabitants of a fictional island. 
Society’s normal tribulations such as poverty and misery are all gone. It has few laws, 
thus no lawyers are necessary. It rarely sends citizens to war although they are all 
ready to fight if necessary. Instead they hire mercenaries from more bellicose 
neighbours. They are sent into perilous situations in the hope that more 
confrontational populations in adjacent countries will be removed, leaving only 
peaceful people.
Utopian society encourages tolerance of all religions except atheism. In Utopia there 
is no private property. Goods are stored in communal warehouses and people simply 
request what they need. There are also no locks on doors however residence at any 
house is rotated between citizens each 10 years. Agriculture is the most essential area 
of occupation on the island. Everybody is taught agricultural work and must live in 
the countryside to work in farming for two years at a time. Women do exactly the 
same work as men. Every citizen must also train in at least one of a number of other 
important occupations whereby weaving is mainly done by women and carpentry,
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masonry and such trades by men. There is methodical minimalism within these trades 
so that all people wear the same types of simple clothes and have no real need for fine 
attire to display rank or privilege. The products of trades are also simple and plain.
All fit citizens must work, thus unemployment is eliminated. The working day is 
minimised so that people only need to work six hours, although many happily work 
longer. Slavery is normal in Utopian life. Every household has two slaves who are 
either from other countries or Utopian criminals. Some people are selected for their 
ability to learn during compulsory primary education and set on course to become 
governing officials or priests. However all citizens are encouraged to apply 
themselves to learning in their generous leisure time.
However, no matter how well we scrutinise Utopia it is hard to see where children fit 
in since it is described through the adults. That includes More’s descriptions of the 
medium of education. Since it is rather more ideal than a real world, the tendency of 
humanity to produce less than perfect other human beings is almost entirely 
overlooked. The exception is only the criminals who become slaves. More rarely 
mentioned children, so their absence means one must make assumptions about them. 
Those suppositions will nearly always be biased because Utopia is presumed to be 
egalitarian. There is also nothing to conclusively prove otherwise.
The central message of Utopia is to emphasise the need for order and discipline 
instead of liberty. It describes an almost totalitarian society that is a long way away 
from contemporary ideals of freedom. It is a world in which any endeavour to discuss 
public policy outside of officially sanctioned forums is punishable by death. One 
paradox is that if children are included on an absolutely equal basis then some of the 
values extolled by supporters of Articles 12, 13, 14 and 15 CRC particularly and 
Articles 16, 35, 36 and 37 (see Appendix 1) could almost undoubtedly never be 
applied in Utopia. Notably, those first four articles have, in their turn, particularly 
been considered utopian by CRC critics.
Utopia takes Plato’s Republic a few steps toward a carefully reconstructed, but 
equally totalitarian paradise, perhaps even some elements of a Garden o f Eden. In 
Utopia even the tree of knowledge of good and evil is metaphorically ever present
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and occasionally visited. That also seems to take in more modest aspects of the 
Germanic Schlaraffenland (Cockaygne in English). That is a land of extravagance 
and excess rather than simplicity and godliness. Everybody is liberated from any kind 
of work and everything essential is free and readily available. In Schlaraffenland 
there is a fountain of eternal youth which keeps everybody young. Because people are 
eternally young, childhood is indistinguishable from adulthood thus only the eternal 
youthful adult is ever described. All in all, it gives an impression that there is a more 
common wish to have at least some element of a golden age in mind when attempting 
to develop a thesis of what might be in the future.
What separates the real and the ‘wished for’ is that history is recorded and selective 
use of that knowledge fills in spaces in a projection of an unforeseeable future. 
Utopia, Schlaraffenland and such wished for  places are mainly constructed out of a 
history that is mainly myth. It recognises a golden age where all human imperfections 
such as inequalities are either absent or carry a punishment of banishment, 
chastisement or death. There is no distinction between adult and child because there 
is no difference. Children are citizens, because without it being explicitly stated 
everybody is assumed to be a citizen. Golden age thought idealises the differences 
between adulthood and childhood out of existence along with all other distinctions.
Utopia and other imagined ‘perfect’ places, selective histories, imagined 
anthropologies and even fiction contribute little to guiding us toward a hypothesis 
about what the future may bring. The recorded past has a great deal more to tell us. 
However, it must be accepted that some of each romantic idea has some value. Indeed 
some philosophy and theology is little more. Thus, my argument is that the greater 
balance is provided by what has occurred in the lives of real and living people but 
romantic views have fuelled imagination and innovation.
Historians of childhood have often supported one of two particular positions. One 
heavily rests on supporting the work of Philippe Aries. The other either looks at his 
work critically or rejects it whilst continuing to refer to his work. Whatever the 
stance, his Centuries o f Childhood (1962) has had a lasting effect. In a volume 
published by Becchi and Julia in 1998 (2004 edition for this work) to celebrate 30 
years since publication of Aries’s work, Julia (2004:85) identifies three emblematic
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representations of childhood that emerged at the end of the 18th century and persisted 
well on into the 20th century. Those three figures of childhood are the abandoned 
child who is reared by animals (i.e.: Victor1 & 2, Mowgli or Tarzan), child prodigies 
(Mozart is again the obvious one) and child heroes (Petit Gavroche3, Jack Dawkins4 
or Huckleberry Finn). These characters and their effect on the image of childhood, 
which reminisces back to a time when children were considered indistinguishable 
from adults, will be more closely examined in turn. However their role in delivering a 
romanticised version of young lives has a key place in this brief introduction to the 
creation of a golden age.
This research thus aims to revisit many of the histories, philosophies, fiction and 
other sources that have contributed to the generation of a romantic view as well as 
providing clues to a realistic view. However, this is complemented by use of more 
prosaic sources that may have been discarded or overlooked because they offered no 
optimistic or ‘resplendent’ contributions about a perfect past that provide data of 
equal import. In all cases, direct or indicative reference to children, childhood or the 
status of young people is the most basic source.
There is, of course, no attempt to write a full vademecum of the many different 
histories, philosophies and so forth where children or reference to childhood may 
appear. There are limitations on the length of this work. Thus there are always going 
to be questions remaining to be answered. Nonetheless, in the space permitted, this 
work will examine the question to be resolved in as much depth as possible without 
leaving too many very obvious lacunae.
11
Chapter Two: Research Design -  Methodology and Methods
This chapter describes the epistemological rationale behind and the choice of 
methods used to analyse material in Chapters Four to Eleven that take us toward a 
conclusion to the original question regarding the realism or romanticism of the notion 
of children’s citizenship. Stress is placed on examination of the past where evidence 
of a time when the status of adult and child was one and the same and takes account 
of the present to not only conclude but project a possible future.
Methodology
This research has been carried out on the basis of a quite short and in itself quite 
simple question: Is the notion o f children's citizenship a reality or romanticism? This 
question looks at the status and extent of our knowledge of the position of children 
over a period of about 2500 years in the past and toward an as yet unpredictable point 
of time in the future. In so doing, it looks at not only ‘ourselves’ but other cultures, 
traditions and beliefs that broaden the base of the question. It also considers particular 
branches of knowledge such as the social sciences, theology and philosophy. They 
have occupied the attention of those examining humanity with any amount of 
reference to children or childhood for at least as long as any of the disciplines 
included and philosophy most particularly have existed. The question, its parts and 
examination of those parts are subjected to the rigours of epistemological scrutiny. 
However, it is acknowledged that to consider only the theory of knowledge to the 
exclusion of practice gives little indication of what is at issue in seeking conclusions.
As the introductory paragraphs of this chapter have already shown, the fact that one 
of the answers this research must conclude is what the differences between a romantic 
and real view are. This places a great deal of weight on the essential difference 
between the romantic or ‘thought’ against real or ‘evident’ use of data which makes 
my own point of view an important part of analysis. This suggests a potential for a 
pretentious or uninformative research that makes only disingenuous assumptions 
rather than reach scholastically proven conclusions. However, it has been accepted 
that human beings have very particular general capacities that are used in the 
acquisition of knowledge. Some of them are my own prejudices, perceptions and
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wish to achieve a particular end, thus must be parts of the epistemology that are 
employed positively and objectively in the choice of method.
Much of this is dependent on a rhetorical stance which reminds me of the Sophist 
philosopher Gorgias’ extant rhetorical work On Non-Existence (McComiskey, 2002: 
32ff). It was a topic taken up by my school debating society in the 1960s. I recall he 
claimed three things. Firstly, nothing exists; secondly, if it did we could not know of 
it; and thirdly, even if we did know of it then we could not communicate that 
knowledge to others. Naturally this research does not reflect Gorgias in the strictest 
sense. It is reflective on the point that rhetoric itself has the weakness of being the 
root of more inconclusive debate such as ‘nothing exists’ than of a conclusive thought 
such as ‘everything exists’. Use of rhetoric is intended to stimulate the potential for 
the development of this thesis into a wider discourse. That is to say, instead of 
attempting to be conclusive to the point of being definitive and in any sense 
irrefutable. However, the parallel with Gorgias for me is that we do not know whether 
or not children are citizens. We often assume they are citizens because they (usually) 
have a nationality. Despite assuming they are citizens because they have nationality, 
the lack of substantive rights such as electoral franchise to give them full citizenship 
shows they are not. So, as Gorgias might have asked: what are they?
Thus, a key part of the rhetorical course is the possibility of looking at children as 
‘citizen becomings’ or ‘potential citizens’5. That bears a remarkable degree of 
similarity to ideas expressed long ago by Aristotle and more recently by Qvortrup that 
that children are ‘human becomings’ which will be visited several times in this work.
Both questions seek to make sense of childhood. We have sought to construct a view 
of what the ‘child’ is throughout the long history of thought. Moral, political and 
social theorists have looked at the adults they will become through the lens of 
particular social environments and their concept of the future of their society. This 
appears to have lasted from the early Socratic dialogues through to more recent 
examinations with an occasional very clear statement of what little we do in fact 
know. In his Preface to Emile Rousseau (1979: i) stated that:
We know nothing of childhood; and with our mistaken notions the further
we advance the further we go astray. The wisest writers devote themselves
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to what a man ought to know, without asking what a child is capable of 
learning. They are always looking for the man in the child, without 
considering what he is before he becomes a man.
Thus, in the longer term and particularly bearing policy making and the eventual 
inclusion of young citizens in governance, the hypothesis out of which this research 
has developed its aims and objectives is as follows. The question of whether or not 
children are citizens or not and whether it is at all possible normally has its origins in 
only a very small set of bases. That is to say that it is usually based on a Western neo­
liberal understanding of citizenship. Whilst there are influences from civic republican 
and feminist perspectives, they are still firmly based in Western discourse. 
Furthermore, part of this perception makes assumptions around an idealised version 
of democracy to the exclusion of other forms of social organisation. Subsequently, it 
has hitherto been culturally very narrow sighted and dismissive of what appears not to 
contribute to the argument.
History has provided a basis for much of the existing thought, however that often 
appears selective. Much the same can be said for philosophy, theology and social 
scientific theory. Law is also so widely open to interpretation that a rights-based 
examination using the CRC as a basis includes numerous possibilities. However, it is 
not only selection of what already exists, but also the narrow vision of what has thus 
far been used to project toward the future that is limited. Children’s rights are a key 
component at the base of this work. However, that is used in a more substantial way 
than using a blossoming interest in ‘children’s participation’ that is largely 
rationalised as a children’s rights issue. This research places emphasis on the fact that 
participation and citizenship is absolutely not one and the same thing.
The intended outcome foresees analysis of data toward conclusions that direct the 
possibility of children enjoying the full benefits of the status of citizenship. Those 
have potential direct input into social policy development and indeed political 
discussion of the means to achieving that end. It examines and questions two and a 
half thousand years worth of focus on children to the widest possible geographical 
extent. It also aims to open the path for a prolonged and thorough discourse that will 
contribute to a resolution of the possibility of children’s citizenship being realised.
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Methods
Following on from the methodology described above, the choice of methods includes 
analytic induction, morphological analysis, also elements of content analysis with an 
eye toward symptomatic reading. The choice of methods is governed by the fact that 
the larger parts of all data used are in the form of printed texts. A very few of those 
texts are also my own work, some of which has been field based and other parts 
entirely theoretical. Those reflect my interest in this topic which emerged after an 
initial related piece of work in 1993. Thereby texts are used with a very small amount 
of previously unused field data where those sources are relevant to the aims and 
objectives, thus provide arguments and evidence for this research.
Thus said, using a wide range of materials that set a very broad range over a relatively 
long period of time that concentrate on the collation of data that relate to children and 
childhood and citizenship eliminates the higher risk of subjective analysis that may 
come with a smaller sample in every sense. The support the hypothesis provides for 
the conclusion is dependent on the number of constituent parts in and the careful 
selection of the sample. Here, if a more substantial library search was made for all 
possible data, the task would almost certainly be unmanageable. The balance here is 
use of a wide range of sources chosen purposefully which has been supported by 
supporting materials that ensure even-handed analysis.
Analytic induction
Analytic induction is used first because it is a systematic examination of similarities 
between various social phenomena out of which concepts can be developed. It is most 
frequently used to search for similarities across a number of data sources that can 
then be used to flesh out sub-classifications. One goal of this research is to make 
general statements chapter by chapter that may need to be modified later, especially 
in the event of exceptions being discovered. In due course it may reflect fairly 
exhaustive knowledge of what is being researched. However, this is mindful of the 
fact that no analysis should ever be considered final, since reality is ‘infinite’ and thus 
constantly changing. Classifications occurring as an outcome of this method are often 
theories in themselves rather than being groundwork for theory.
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The intention is that it will draw together a fairly exhaustive knowledge of the 
question researched. An example of how it might be used is when a social scientist 
examines the category of ‘people who ride bicycles’. He or she then develops 
subcategories such as ‘uses a bike for pleasure’, ‘uses it to get to work’, ‘uses it for 
health reasons or getting fit’ or ‘other uses’. If no relevant similarities can be 
identified, then either the data need to be re-evaluated and the definition of 
similarities changed or the category is too wide and heterogeneous and should be 
narrowed down.
Within that knowledge classifications occurring as an outcome are often theoretical 
rather than being groundwork for theory. There are also superficial similarities 
between fields such as history and philosophy where phenomena and subjects 
described have common origins. Although philosophers are very good chroniclers of 
their time, there are also different points of view that produce different versions of 
same histories. Beside that there is the bias that comes with the desired outcome the 
author is searching for that conditions the interpretation of texts. Induction is a 
process of reasoning in which the basis of an argument is believed to support the 
conclusion without leading to it, in other words does not ensure its integrity. It is thus 
a form of analysis that makes generalisations based on individual examples.
However, this form of inductive work does not work alone in the case of research 
such as this. Coaxing out data from similar types of source should generate a linear 
process in which, for instance, chronological progression should help to draw out 
conclusions. Then again, this research is cognisant of superficial similarities that exist 
between, for example, history and philosophy where phenomena and subjects 
described have common origins. Behind the apparent there will always be the 
extreme of position to which the author belonged and how that conditions 
interpretation of texts.
Children and childhood occupy a relatively small niche in most of the areas that will 
be examined. History, philosophy and theology have most certainly seen children as 
marginal, although the work of historians of childhood is probably ascending the way 
to a more prominent place in their discipline. As yet the historical work is largely 
limited to the western world with Western Europe at the forefront. Likewise, within
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the social sciences there are a few economists, an increasing number of 
anthropologists, steadily growing number of sociologists and clearly many 
psychologists. With exception of the latter, much of the work looks primarily at the 
western world however anthropologists are beginning to cast their net wider. Some of 
the data these disciplines offer are repetitive because they often come from relatively 
small pools of experience and knowledge in which individuals are not infrequently 
working within close proximity to each other intellectually. To some extent that 
reduced the scale of the inductive task.
History provides at least a relatively certain starting point since in the Hellenic world 
citizenship was well enough described by Aristotle in the Politics (1908), early 
childhood in Nicomachean Ethics (1999a), a notion similar to tabula rasa in De 
Anima (1987) and the transition from childhood (youth) to adulthood and citizenship 
in Plato’s (2005) Crito. In contrast to the Athenians, Spartans and Stoics saw human 
beings as something less status bound although neither set children in a position equal 
to that of adults. They were clearly not full citizens. Socrates’ contemporary K’ung 
Fu Tzu saw the primary relationship between adult and child as being the first link 
between individuals within the state. That is to say through the ‘filial piety’ of 
children toward parents which we can justifiably assume has been the norm for many 
generations. He was probably the first philosopher to record the expectation that 
individuals ‘became’ through study and practice of appropriate behaviour. They could 
then take their place within a distinct hierarchy in which one was treated with 
humanity. Fatherhood was the highest value in Chinese society and each person a 
subject of the father and the emperor was the father of all subjects. A child was said 
to be ‘cut, carved, filed and polished’, describing something comparable with the 
Aristotelian ‘becoming’ process.
The tabula rasa notion is a constant throughout history, reappearing very clearly in 
the writings of Aquinas (1981) and reaching its probable maturity in Locke’s (1971) 
work. Of all themes it is the single most pervasive view of infants until recent work 
such as Alderson, et aVs (2005a nd b) research on premature neonates.
Philosophy has contributed much to the stage we are at in the present where children 
are seen as individuals with rights rather than as merely an extension of their parents
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or family. In the 17th century Hobbes (1651) regarded childhood a period of servitude 
comparable with slavery in the modem world whereby the children are absolutely 
subject of parents as servants are to masters. They were property until age and 
maturity delivered privileges and the freedom of adult citizenship. It was part of his 
view of the moral obligations of state towards citizen members in which the notion of 
best interests is emergent. Locke challenged Hobbes’ notion of property when he said 
that they are:
...not bom in (...) full state of equality, though (...) bom to it.
(...) parents have a sort of mle and jurisdiction over them when 
they come into the world, and for some time after, but it is but a 
temporary one. (Locke, 1965:127)
About 120 years after Hobbes, Kant (1996) wrote that a child is not property of 
parents but instead argued having brought a child into the world they “ ...incur an 
obligation to make the child content with his condition so far as they can...” 
(Ibid.\(A). Furthermore: “ ...this duty there must (...) arise the right (...) to manage 
and develop the child” (Ibid.:65). That describes duty o f care comparable with 
present day obligations, but which stems from a child’s satisfaction without the 
necessity of consent. Kant was also considering the child’s best interests. He thought 
children were bom without reason and were educated to become rational agents by 
parents. It is a view comparable with the human becomings thesis that also recognises 
the innate liberty each individual enjoys.
Hegel (2001) believed that there was a proper moral life achieved through absolute
obedience to the laws of the state within which there are two subordinate levels of
social activity to which people had to commit themselves: the family and economic
contribution to civil society. He distinguished between individuals as ‘economic man’
(bourgeois) and ‘political man’ (citizen). However, children are potentially free and
life was the quintessence of potential freedom. They were, he believed, not things and
do not belong to anyone whether parents or others.
As it is with children, so is it with nations under paternal government (...) 
not looked upon as self-dependent or of age (...) services required (...) 
must bear upon their education and promote their good. To ignore (...) 
would destroy the ethical element of the relation, and make the child a 
slave. (Hegel, 2001:148)
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We see the coming together of some of these ideas when compulsory education 
begins. As Corrigan (1979: 33ff) says, it was designed to provide bourgeois moral 
and religious standards for the working class through basic education of their 
children to offset potential revolutionary activity. That moral and religious code 
would shape their behaviour and contribute toward there being a disciplined, punctual 
labour force and establishment of social order based on education which the working 
class would respect although at the bottom of that order. It has been that type of 
moral order that has shaped modem views of the child as ‘inferior’ to the ‘citizen 
adult’ until duties and responsibilities required for full membership of civil society 
are attained.
Zelizer’s (1985) view of the sacralisation of childhood in the transition from the 19th 
to 20th century and birth of child sciences along with progressively changing 
standards in child care, protection and other provisions such as education and health 
has seen childhood fully emerging as separated from adulthood. It is now well 
defined and anchored in legislation and whilst there have been liberal positions from 
as far back as Winstanley (1649b) and Spence (1793), they are far and few between. 
Likewise attempts to ‘democratise’ childhood the way Korczak (1992) attempted 
early in the 20th century or children in organisations like Hitler Jugend in national 
socialist Germany or Pioneers in socialist states (that ostensibly offered direct 
contributions to society and nation) are generally short lived or more tokenistic than 
bona fide full membership.
Morphology
Morphological analysis is a method that enables examination across different sources 
of data, especially where the content of the sources in this research appear either 
similar or even repeated. It is a reliable method to use where there are several 
prevalent factors, most of which cannot be expressed as numerical time series data 
with which one might construct a mathematical or statistical model. The orthodox 
approach would be to break sources down into parts. One would then isolate key parts 
(whilst dropping minor or inconsequential ones) for their input into a wider picture of 
the generally disaggregated topics children and citizenship. One disadvantage in 
using this approach is that real world situations rarely behave rationally. It then 
becomes possible that analysis will fail if the input of less consequential components
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becomes too significant. This will be taken into account in the careful choice of what 
to include or exclude from analysis.
It is particularly used for the identification, analysis and description of the structure of 
words. While words are generally accepted as being the smallest units of syntax, it is 
clear that in most languages words can be related to other words by rules. For 
example, English speakers recognise that the words student and student union are 
closely related. English speakers recognise these relations from a tacit knowledge of 
rules of word formation in English. They infer intuitively that student is to students as 
lecturer is to lecturers and similarly, student is to student union as lecturer is to 
lecture room. Rules understood by authors or speakers reflect specific patterns (or 
regularities) in the way words are formed from smaller units and how those smaller 
units interact in speech and the written word. Thus morphology is the branch of 
linguistics that studies patterns of word formation within and across languages and 
attempts to formulate rules that model the knowledge of the messages of users of 
those languages. For a study crossing time, culture and language it offers a 
complementary but also contrasting approach to analytic induction.
This method has most commonly been used by modem linguists since the term 
morphology was first used by August Schleicher (1859). However, it appears to have 
existed in one form or another for around 30006 years. A recent use has been to 
analyse folklore. Vladimir Propp (1968) analysed folk tales for the function each 
character and action carried out. He concluded that they were composed of 31 
elements and eight character types. Although elements were not all required for all 
stories, when they did appear, it was in invariant order. The exception was that each 
element may be negated twice. The elements or ‘functions’ are assembled as the 
morphology. Theoretically, variant forms of the elements could be used to reconstruct 
an almost infinite number of new tales. Here some of this ‘folkloristic’ approach 
supports the linguistic analysis.
Using the morphology of a number of elements that will be sought in this research, a 
‘model child’ across time and space could be constructed or reconstructed. It can also 
be used to take different components for different routes to analysis so that more than 
a single morphology is available for what Propp classified as character and actions.
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Those taxonomies will especially well show what time and thought tell us a child was 
and, perhaps, still is. The second will look especially at recent observations on the 
development of individuals. It that respect, it is probably the most significant of the 
methods chosen. As a problem structuring and solving method, morphological 
analysis was originally designed for intricate, often unquantifiable problems where 
causal modelling and simulation do not operate especially well or at all. However, for 
the purposes of this research it requires a further supporting method for induction and 
morphology to gain greater substance.
Morphological analysis is used in this work to examine different sources of data, 
especially where their content appears either similar or repeated. It will be used to 
examine recurrent motifs rather than events that can be catalogued taxonomically in 
order to identify the simplest irreducible narrative elements or ‘functions’ that 
construct child citizenship.
The requirement is that these functions occur in a standard, constant sequence that 
can be reassembled as a wider picture of the generally disaggregated topics children 
and citizenship. By using narrative units, or narratemes, from texts it will be possible 
to arrive at a typology of narrative structures and also sentence structures that have 
been deconstructed into analysable elements or morphemes. Analysis of motif and 
event types will reveal how many generic narratemes can be found.
However, since the real world seldom behaves rationally, these analyses take no 
account of exceptional motifs that are narratemes and morphemes that do not repeat 
thus have no place in a taxonomy. For this reason, a further method that supports 
analytic induction and morphology has been chosen to attempt to gain greater 
substance if and where it is available.
Content analysis
Content analysis, here purely textual analysis, has been chosen since it is a standard 
method for the study of content of communication used by social scientists. It is a 
scientific method that includes specific consideration of objectivity and subjectivity, 
consistency, validity, replication and testing the hypothesis but is not limited to 
variables measured or context in which communications are formed or presented.
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It can be used for the study of recorded human communications including books, 
journals, websites, visual representation (film, paintings, photography, etc.) and other 
sources of communicable data. It is usually used as a summarising, quantitative 
analysis of communications. It relies on the scientific method that includes specific 
attention to objectivity and subjectivity, a priori research design, consistency, 
validity, replication and testing the hypothesis. For the purpose of this research, it is 
being used not as a quantitative method but instead as a qualitative one. In this 
respect, use of the method qualitatively and critically makes it more closely resemble 
symptomatic reading which is one of the most universally used critical methods in 
literary studies.
Louis Althusser and Fredric Jameson were both fervent advocates of symptomatic 
reading. It is a depth and surface model of interpretation that defines the precise 
meaning of texts as well as taking into account what they do not say. Thus breaks, 
silences, distractions and omissions become indicative of missing causes and 
formative structures in and behind a text. The critic or reader is left to reconstruct and 
bring to light the other side of a history, philosophy or other form of communication 
in which exclusions construct the untold parts of the story conveyed. The real purpose 
of this method is to suggest which other readings are necessary or possible and what 
forms of interpretation of the textual source are implied. One might use the metaphor 
that one is seeking the virus that causes the undiagnosed disease whereby one looks 
at all other and especially similar viruses that show both commonalities and contrasts. 
When one reads, he or she has to seek information and is confronted with different 
views which force them to consider their own position. In this process the reader is 
subsequently converted to a ‘writer’ whether or not he or she writes or publishes his 
or her own ideas.
However, since this work is governed by a regulated maximum length, the 
interpretive aspect will be used and the suggestion of other readings left to those to 
take the intellectual course of this work forward in their turn.
The purpose in this research is to look for breaks, diversions and omissions that 
suggest missing causes and formative structures in and behind the text. It thus makes 
it possible to reconstruct and elucidate the other side of history, philosophy or other
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forms of communication where exclusions and incomplete accounts put together 
untold parts of the narrative. Here its real purpose was to suggest other readings that 
might have been indispensable or essential and in which forms of interpretation 
sources should be embedded. In this case the objective of this final point is not to 
infinitely extend the range of the research for myself. It suggests, without specifying 
exact authors or titles, a direction for further examination that might be taken up by 
others taking the intellectual direction of this work forward.
An example of the kind of extrapolation of unwritten central parts of a narrative is 
Disney’s animated film Snow White. In the original story collected by the Grimms 
(Grimm and Grimm, 1984:300-10), Schneewittchen is a princess whose own mother, 
the queen, hates her. The mother attempts to kill her daughter, the king finds out and 
is so angry he has his wife executed. Bolte and Polivka (1913) tell us that in the 
original version the King kills her because he is angry about her three attempts to kill 
Snow White. She is put into a pair of red hot shoes and perishes in agony. The 
Grimms did not include this in their version. It was the Grimms who changed the 
mother into a stepmother and then introduced the prince as her ‘prince charming’ 
rescuer. He rescued her with a cart. The jogging dislodged the poisoned apple going 
over a pothole, but there is no kiss. We can guess she is a young woman because they 
marry soon after. Disney took the story a step further in 1937.
In the original story and the Grimm version, the dwarfs do not really feature very 
much at all. We simply know that they are seven kindly, small men who look after 
her. Walt Disney and his team looked for central absences in the story that would 
embellish it. The animated film version explored the possibility of giving names and 
came up with Doc, Dopey, Grumpy, Happy, Sleepy, Sneezy and Bashful. Snow 
White is a girl, probably in early teens. The queen took on a witch ‘alter-ego’. The 
dwarfs became a key part of the story and eventually chase the queen/witch to her 
death when she plunges into the wind and rain swept ravine. Absurdly, what appear 
to be white-backed vultures normally found in East and West Africa follow her down 
to the bottom of the abyss. After the kisses that revive her Snow White rides off into 
the world, and whilst there is a ‘happy-ever-after’ ending we are not told explicitly 
the couple marry. The point in using this example is that what is not in the original 
story can be found in the morphology of other folk tales, thus exploited to fill out and
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modify an otherwise attractive but not very exciting story. Disney induced a story for 
his film from what was not there, borrowed from other motifs in folklore and 
intuitively filled out the rest for the ‘perfect’ storyline. This is exactly the potential 
this method offers to this research and to the support of induction and morphology.
This research sets out to draw together conclusions drawn from those three analytical 
methods to find evidence for there ever having been an equal or at least comparable 
status for adults and children in the past or present.
24
Chapter Three: Citizenship
This research attempts to examine whether children’s citizenship is either realism or 
romanticism. The Introduction has given a definition of childhood that, whilst there 
are a few riders, is relatively easily identified. However, the more complicated part of 
the question is to identify what citizenship is before moving toward the actual 
enquiry. This chapter sets out to make a compact overview of the topic and examine 
the possibility of there being a child specific definition that could henceforth be the 
locus of this research.
There is a tendency to take the simplest path to this ‘definition’ that is broadly 
speaking unsatisfactory when looking at children. However, the simple path is one 
that considers citizenship to be something that is intrinsically egalitarian in the 
modem world and applies to all people to one degree or another. It tends to use the 
language of a neo-liberal model such as that described by Thomas Marshall (1950) in 
his seminal work Citizenship and social class. The disadvantage of taking the simple 
path is that it looks at the present and has a propensity for omission of the many 
people who do not enjoy citizenship rights or have been deprived of some of them. 
Furthermore, it mainly focuses on western liberal democracies. The outcome is that 
history, with the exception of Athens from the fifth to fourth centuries BC, is 
generally overlooked, people with partial or no citizenship are marginalised and other 
versions of citizenship that are neither western nor modem simply passed over. 
Therewith claims of children’s inherent right to citizenship with foundations in the 
past and its inevitability in the future tend to lack substance and owe much more to 
contemporary interest in a very narrow view of their participation in civil society.
Citizenship and nationality
Citizenship is commonly defined as membership o f a political community but the 
basis of that membership is a matter of some debate. Complications begin with 
organisation and structure of that ‘community’. Where do we find its boundaries and 
extent and what is within those limits? Then there is a whole series of questions about 
who may belong and who is included or excluded according to certain criteria. 
Furthermore, one needs to question whether it is only a political community, or may 
it indeed be something far bigger or even without observable limits?
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The neo-liberal view of citizenship assumes each individual has membership in the
political community (originally a city or large town but now usually a national state).
It carries with it the right of political participation, usually through universal and
democratic electoral rights but also including the notion that each individual has a
right to be represented or be elected to represent others. It is most often assumed to be
synonymous with nationality although it is quite possible to have nationality without
citizenship or, indeed, to be without either. In the majority of nations a non-national is
without citizenship rights as Citizenship Laws o f the World (United States Office of
Personnel Management Investigations Service, 2001) shows very clearly. It describes
types of ‘citizenship’ (pp 4-5):
Citizenship by Birth: Citizenship is granted due to birth within the 
country. The legal term for this is “jus solis.” In most cases, there are few 
stipulations on citizenship being granted. Birth in the country 
automatically confers citizenship regardless of the parents’ citizenship or 
status.
Citizenship by Descent: Citizenship of a nation is passed on to a child 
based upon at least one of the parents being a citizen of that nation, 
regardless of the child’s actual country of birth. The term for this is “jus 
sanguinis.”
Though most countries adhere to the principle of citizenship by descent, 
they differ on some factors (father’s vs. mother’s rights, citizenship of one 
or both parents, the marital status of the parents, and others).
As a person reaches an age of maturity, continuing the condition 
of citizenship by birth (jus solis) or citizenship by descent (jus 
sanguinis) may depend on factors unique to the nation of that 
citizenship.
Citizenship by Naturalization: This is a formal process by which persons 
may acquire the citizenship of a country. The process varies and 
citizenship is not guaranteed. Basic rules may include a period of 
residence, renunciation of other citizenship, and familiarity with the 
language and customs of the country.
Citizenship by Marriage: By some nations’ laws, upon marriage, a person 
is entitled to become a naturalized citizen of their spouse’s country 
without having to fulfil other naturalization requirements. These laws are 
often different for males than for females.
Citizenship by Registration: In some instances, a person may acquire 
citizenship by registration with the national government without meeting 
all naturalization requirements for that nation. Usually these persons 
possess blood ties to the country through immediate relatives who are 
citizens, or by marriage to a citizen of that country.
These definitions of citizenship are a summarised version of the details for the 
directory of countries that then follows. However, on closer scrutiny they actually
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only describe nationality since they lack both detail of exclusion from membership of 
a nation from within or the duties of citizens as bearers of full rights.
There is a good example in Germany where, until 2004, 36% of Turkish citizens 
living in that country did not have German nationality despite being bom there. 
Under the prior law, children bom to foreigners in Germany were not entitled to 
citizenship (jus sanguinis) so that a large population of permanently resident non­
citizens grew up with the outcome that over time even the third generation bom there 
remained foreigners. In 2000 legislation was passed (Bos, 2002: 3-8) which allowed 
the possibility of German citizenship for German-born children of foreigners and the 
naturalisation process correspondingly made easier. Dual citizenship is not allowed 
and any person possessing it through birth to foreign parents must choose between 
ages of 18 and 23 years which citizenship she or he wishes to retain. Many people of 
Turkish origin have chosen to retain their nationality and probably others will 
continue to do so thus increasing the number of generations resident in Germany. 
However, the sting in the tail for German bom Turks is that only those (often the first 
generation) actually bom in Turkey have full rights anyway.
Derek Heater (1999: 95) looks at the origins of citizenship as nationality:
For two hundred years citizenship and nationality have been political 
Siamese twins. Before the late eighteenth century the relationship was 
much looser than we have been accustomed to assume, and the connection 
is loosening again in our own age as multiple and world citizenships 
become increasingly evident.
He furthermore describes four central ideas in European political thought in the mid­
eighteenth century helpful for looking at how this came about. They are: 
cosmopolitanism, citizenship, patriotism and nation (Ibid.:95). He describes 
citizenship as ‘an assertion of freedom from arbitrary power, and usually intimately 
bound up with patriotism, the sense of loyalty to and duty to defend one’s state’ and a 
‘nation was a group of people speaking the same language and not necessarily 
synonymous with the population of a state’ (Ibid.:95-96). Certainly the ‘loosening’ 
Heater refers to is very apparent at present. In many countries it is normal that 
refugees and asylum seekers are considered to be stateless people and there are 
considerable numbers of ‘Internally Displaced Persons’ or IDPs around the world 
who are either refugees or migrants within their own country of birth and denied
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either nationality or full entitlements of citizens for a number of sometimes quite 
arbitrary reasons. There are also ethnic minorities who for one reason or another have 
never been given either status.
Heater {Ibid.:96) says that the word ‘nation’ was not commonly used until the mid­
eighteenth century and describes its development in France as being especially 
instructive. ‘Nation’ came to be synonymous with ‘patrie’ and ‘peuple’, connoting 
unity of the people and its territory, fusing classes and provinces as part of the 
conflict between ‘roV (monarchy) and the masses to express the interests of the 
nation against monarchic abuse. Abbe Sieyes constructed the modem French 
definition of nation in 1788 by endowing a clear political connotation that is 
inextricably linked to the concept of citizenship (Ibid. :91).
Citizenship and children’s rights
The CRC Articles 7 and 8 describe nationality thus:
Article 7
1. The child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have the 
right from birth to a name, the right to acquire a nationality and. as far as 
possible, the right to know and be cared for by his or her parents.
2. States Parties shall ensure the implementation of these rights in 
accordance with their national law and their obligations under the relevant 
international instruments in this field, in particular where the child would 
otherwise be stateless.
Article 8
1. States Parties undertake to respect the right of the child to preserve his 
or her identity, including nationality, name and family relations as 
recognized by law without unlawful interference.
2. Where a child is illegally deprived of some or all of the elements of his 
or her identity, States Parties shall provide appropriate assistance and 
protection, with a view to re-establishing speedily his or her identity.
Approximately 10 nations (including the UK7) submitted reservations against full 
implementation of Article 7, however estimates of ‘stateless’ children begin with 
estimates of 50 million unregistered births worldwide annually (e.g. see annual 
editions of UNICEF State o f the World's Children or UN World Development 
Reports). There are numerous reasons why children all over the world do not have a 
nationality. One particular cause stands out: lack of birth registration in countries 
where government funds are insufficient or where poverty dictates priorities other 
than birth registration. Furthermore, children from poor families cannot always afford
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expensive child registration fees and other families from rural areas cannot always 
cover the cost of travel to urban centres where registration is typically carried out. 
Some parents simply do not understand the importance of birth registration or lack 
basic information on how to register their children. There are also legal barriers to 
establishing nationality. That is especially the case in countries where nationality is 
determined by parents’ nationalities or birthplace of the child. Examples of people 
who commonly fall under this classification of statelessness include Roma, Bedouin, 
Karens, Kurds, Palestinians, Tibetans and many other smaller groups who cannot 
obtain an official birth certificate or formal papers declaring nationality. Estimated 
percentages of annual births not registered in 2000 listed by region were Sub-Saharan 
Africa 71%, South Asia 63%, Middle East and North Africa 31%, East Asia and 
Pacific 22%, Latin America and Caribbean 14%, Central and Eastern Europe 
Commonwealth of Independent States and the Baltic States 10%, industrialised 
countries (including EU members, USA, etc) 2%. The worldwide total has been 
estimated at up to 41% of births not being registered (UNICEF, 2002).
The balance of included and excluded embraces an estimated 36% of the world 
population below age 19 years, 32.9 million refugees, asylum seekers, IDPs and other 
stateless persons (2.6%), many of the approximated nine million adult prisoners 
(0.7%) and other people such as those with mental health and legal reasons for 
exclusion. Thus, using basic UN statistics and allowing for double counting of adults 
and children across all categories, an estimated minimum of 40% (nearly three 
billion) of all people do not enjoy full citizenship privileges. Thus, despite over 180 
nation states ratifying the principles contained in Articles 7 and 8 CRC without 
reservation the real situation does not describe a universal standard from which a 
definition of citizenship can be drawn.
Whatever the case, at present in most modem secular nation states there is a close 
legal correlation between the two statuses that usually applies, if only in principle, to 
people of all ages. However what is more specifically definitive of what makes 
modem citizens is found in the rights and duties of citizenship. There are often 
obligatory duties of citizenship that vary from one country to another but often 
include such things as paying taxes or serving in the country’s armed forces when 
conscripted. There are also ethical and moral duties that tend to include
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demonstrating commitment and loyalty to the democratic political community and 
state. A citizen is allowed to constructively view conditions of and participate in the 
improvement of the quality of political and civic life through electoral franchise and 
obedience of the law. He or she should also respect the rights and opinions of others, 
defend their own and the rights of others against those who would abuse them and 
generally exercise their rights. Those responsibilities do not, however, extend to all 
people. There are countries where people who have broken laws are deprived of some 
or all rights and duties whilst imprisoned or for a limited, extended or permanent 
period after having offended. Similarly, people classified as incompetent by mental 
health legislation are often denied many or most privileges of citizenship.
The vast majority of nation states also demand formalities such as birth registration 
documents and a registered ‘fixed abode’. Thus people who have lost registration 
papers or never held them or are without permanent or any accommodation and those 
who are ‘in transit’ are commonly excluded within their own countries. Beyond that, 
most rights and duties of citizenship do not extend to persons below the age of 
majority which is usually 18 years of age in most countries. Some may gradually or 
partially be extended over the period of up to five or six years immediately preceding 
majority and others occasionally extend even beyond that age. It is, for instance, not 
uncommon in the UK for legacies to be age determined and stratification of such 
things as insurance cover up until notional maturity well into the 20s.
Children and youth are thus almost entirely without genuine political and economic 
influence. Therewith they lack the key components of what allows effective 
participation in civil society. Their citizenship is thus, unless withheld for one of the 
kind of reasons already described, limited to nationality and some of the ethical and 
moral duties, even then often under the supervision of adults. Thus children, along 
with the stateless, nationality-less, criminal and mentally ill, disprove the assumption 
that it is intrinsically egalitarian.
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Citizenship in history
The situation in the contemporary world probably is very different to any other 
historical period. To begin with, the status of women has changed radically. 
Moreover, serfdom and vassalage have disappeared and the decline from the late 
medieval to the ostensible end of slavery and similar forms of ‘ownership’ of human 
beings from the early nineteenth century onward has changed what would have been 
an entirely different picture. We now view citizenship as the political bond between 
all people in each state and tend to measure their value as ‘good’ citizens (Milne, 
2005: 277-83) against the less frequently articulated ‘bad’.
There are two main sets of political ideas and values defining good citizen. One has 
origins in Greece during the period 500 to 300 BC. We usually refer to this as the 
civic republican tradition. It is concomitant with an ideal of direct democracy in 
which all citizens take part in political decisions. The second set of ideas and values 
is informed by ideas held in Roman law developed in the Roman Empire from the 
first century AD onward that was more fully formulated in the 17th and 18th centuries 
in Europe. This is the liberal tradition which is linked to the ideal of a parliamentary 
democracy in which citizens elect representatives to represent their interests.
The starting point for scrutiny of citizenship is most commonly found in examination 
of ancient Greece and Aristotle’s first systematic attempt to describe it theoretically 
(Aristotle 1908 and 1992). The Greek polis citizenship was very different in form and 
function to ‘modem’ (western) citizenship. The polis consisted of small-scale organic 
communities. Citizenship was seen as a public matter that was separated from the 
private life of the individual. Obligations of citizenship were profoundly connected 
with each individual’s everyday life in the polis. To be fully human, one had to be an 
active citizen to the community, which Aristotle (1999:6) has famously expressed: 
“.. .he who is unable to live in society, or who has no need because he is sufficient for 
himself, must either be a beast or a god: he is no part of a state”. This nature of 
citizenship was based on the obligations of citizens towards community as opposed to 
rights given to the citizens of the community. This was not a problem since all had a 
strong affinity with the polis. Personal destiny and that of the community were 
strongly linked. Furthermore, citizens of the polis saw their obligations within the 
community as an opportunity to be virtuous as their primary source of honour and
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respect. In Athens citizens were both ruler and ruled whereby significant political and 
judicial offices were rotated and ‘everybody’ had the right to speak and vote in the 
political assembly.
An important facet of polis citizenship was the elitism that delineated boundaries 
between who was and was not one of ‘everybody’. Citizenship in ancient Greece and 
later in Rome and cities that practiced citizenship in the Middle Ages was very 
exclusive and inequality of status was the norm (see Riesenberg 1956 and 1992; 
Faulks, 2000:14). Citizens had a much higher status than those who could not obtain 
the status of a citizen, such as women, children, slaves or ‘barbarians’. Women were, 
for example, not considered rationally capable of political participation although 
some philosophers, especially Plato, disagreed with this principle. Children (boys) 
entered the citizenry by stages (see Chapters Three and Five). There were also other 
means used to determine whether someone could or could not be a citizen (See 
Riesenberg, 1992:35 and Manville, 1994:24). At particular times this principally had 
to do with wealth, usually the amount of taxes a citizen paid, political participation 
and birthright. In fact, both parents had to be bom in the polis for their child to 
become a citizen.
During the Roman Empire polis citizenship changed form (See Hansen, 2006; Heater, 
1990 and 2004; Faulks, 2000). The extent of citizenship was expanded from small 
scale communities to a status throughout the Empire. The Romans found that granting 
citizenship throughout the Empire bestowed legitimacy on Roman rule over 
conquered areas. They also found that taxes were more easily collected and a 
necessity for expensive military power in areas where citizenship was reduced. Thus 
during the Roman era it was no longer a status of political agency but had been 
reduced to a judicial safety measure and articulation of rule and law. After the 
collapse of the Roman Empire the importance of citizenship became even less.
In the 15th century Nicolo Machiavelli described republican citizenship in Florence as 
a tool for asserting citizens’ interests in hard contrast to Aristotle’s view that it was a 
fundamental element of what is required to be human. Thomas Hobbes (1651; 
Plamenatz,1976) was one of the earliest political theorists to draw attention to the 
essential equality of individuals although they lived within a state in which he saw
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absolute power in the hands of sovereigns as the only conceivable means of holding 
society together. John Locke (1965) considered it necessary to balance the Hobbesian 
concern with the security of the state with the principles of the protection of life, 
liberty and property. Hobbes, and more notably Locke, saw the state appearing with 
the unification of all people in a social contract. Locke believed the individual should 
be sovereign and that the explicit role of the state is to defend all individuals’ right to 
life, liberty and property. Thus Locke postulated a view that all men had the same 
liberties and obligations as well as the right to change their government. His ideas 
were very influential on the outcome and aftermath of the American War of 
Independence. The rights and powers of all citizens to vote and stand for office were 
guaranteed by the consequent constitution.
Once we reach the 18th century, in the wake of the American War of Independence 
came the French Revolution. Thereafter came the beginning of the end of colonialism 
as Spanish colonies fought wars of independence. This is when we find the 
citizenship-nationality correlation and identity beginning to emerge in more or less 
the form it is viewed today. Whilst slavery and feudal control of people was in sharp 
decline, it is very important to note that Hobbes, Locke and other political thinkers 
and philosophers normally meant men rather than literally all people. It was 
exceptional that a few changes for women and fewer for children were proposed.
The notion of citizens having liberties, power and equality in front of the law has 
eventually become the norm in the west and in due course nearly all women have 
gained full citizenship. This perception of political citizenship is now the orthodox or 
liberal interpretation but has been constantly challenged. This work accordingly 
contributes to the debate on two counts. Firstly, it examines the exclusion of children 
from the proposition that there is ‘universal’ citizenship in an essentially egalitarian 
society. Secondly, it allows for both the fact that the orthodoxy is itself limited to the 
West and to those places worldwide that have aligned themselves with that concept 
and the vast numbers of individuals including children who are excluded.
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Modern principles and theories of citizenship
Most contemporary, western examinations of citizenship begin with a point of 
reference chosen from one of two models: the liberal or civic republican traditions. 
The liberal model’s origins are more or less recognisable back as far as the Roman 
Empire and early-modern analysis of Roman Law (see Walzer, 1989:211). Expansion 
of the Empire had the consequence of citizenship rights being extended to conquered 
peoples. That profoundly transformed the connotation of the concept. Whereas it 
meant being protected by the law, rather than participating in its making or 
implementation, it now implies membership in a community of common law, which 
may or may not be a territorial community such as a nation state.
Thus the liberal tradition, as it developed from the 17th century onwards, expresses 
citizenship primarily as a legal status. Within that, political liberty is important as a 
means to protecting individual freedoms from interference by other individuals as it is 
from the powers that be. However citizens exercise these freedoms for the most part 
in the world of a more private sphere rather overtly than in the political domain.
Over the last half century a great deal of work on citizenship has been highly 
influenced by the work of Marshall (1950). His argument was that development of 
citizenship since the 18th century has included successive acquisition of civil, political 
and social rights. Civil rights include such improvements as the right to fair trial, 
freedom from arbitrary imprisonment and violence, freedom of speech, right to own 
property and rights of contract. Political rights have come to include the right to vote 
and to stand for election. Social rights embrace rights to health care, education and a 
benefit system that came about with the institutions of the welfare state. He 
considered social rights as of vital importance (in fact, his work was to a certain 
extent aimed at promoting development of the welfare state). He maintained that 
citizenship limited to civil and political rights would exclude many people from full 
membership of society. His argument was that people who were struggling with 
poverty or ill health or who were poorly educated would not have the time, resource 
or ability to exercise citizenship rights in practice.
Marshall, the work of his contemporaries and subsequent theorists of the same school 
of thought have given us what is now generally considered the dominant neo-liberal
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model of citizenship. Neo-liberal citizenship having promoted the importance of 
welfare state appears to be far more inclusive than its liberal predecessor or the civic 
republican model. In fact it is probably far more prescriptive of the position of 
children since it puts a great deal of emphasis on the protection of and provision for 
children in a fashion that is set aside from adult protection and provision. Some 
authors (e.g.: Liebel, 2007:32-43) have expressed far more faith in the civic 
republican model as a natural place for children to attain full citizenship.
The civic republican model’s basis can be found in the writings of numerous authors 
including Aristotle, Machiavelli and Rousseau. It is also found in foremost historical 
accounts of examples of republicanism that include Athenian democracy or the 
Roman Republic through to the medieval Italian city-states and more recently 
workers’ councils.
The principal republican value is political liberty which must be understood as non­
domination or independence from arbitrary power. Pettit (1997) describes 
republicanism as an enterprise that embraces a notion of political liberty that he calls 
‘non-domination’. In line with this concept, we are free in as much as that we do not 
fall under the domination of others, subject to their will and become exposed to the 
vicissitudes of their desires. If we use Isaiah Berlin’s (1969:118-172) taxonomy of 
liberty it would appear that Pettit’s notion of republican freedom may be considered a 
‘negative’ rather than ‘positive’ concept. That is especially so since that idea does not 
indicate the amount of control over which any individual or community exercises its 
own existence. To be free of domination by others is not equivalent to being one’s 
own master because it is a condition which people may benefit from in various ways. 
Those may be in equal measure by allowing themselves to be carried away by 
enthusiasm or allowing themselves to fall under the rule of reason.
Pettit also describes republican freedom as ‘dominion’. That is something close to the 
notion of a capacity to shape one’s own life with a typical example being education. 
Because one version of the concept of education is of an institution that limits 
autonomy at the same time it improves the individual’s life by informing the agent’s 
ability how to shape his or her life. Most certainly one might argue that the
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imposition of compulsory education is that which shapes a child’s future and moulds 
them into future citizenship.
One of a few variants of republicanism is civic republicanism which is essentially 
progressive and liberal with significant distinguishing features. Some of its policy 
propositions deviate from mainstream liberalism in specific ways so that civic 
republicans are sometimes also confused with communitarians. At the core of 
contemporary civic republicanism is the perception of political liberty as non­
domination or independence from arbitrary power. Thus, the individual or group is 
free in a positive sense to the extent that they are able to exercise self-discipline or 
even self-indulgence without interference.
The key principle of the republican model is public self-rule that is deep-rooted in 
classical institutions and practices. Those include rotation of public offices 
underlining Aristotle’s portrayal of the citizen as one capable of ruling and being 
ruled as and when opportunity allows. Citizens are first and foremost individuals who 
share holding office. Public self-rule is likewise at the heart of Rousseau’s notion of 
co-authorship of the law making by way of the general will that makes citizens free 
and lends laws legitimacy. Active participation in negotiation and decision-making 
makes sure that individuals are citizens instead of subjects. Essentially, the republican 
model emphasises the second dimension of citizenship which is political agency.
Neither, however, offers more than a very limited overview of a global representation 
of citizenship that is based only on two originally occidental theses. There are other 
ideas about how citizenship is changing; for instance, feminist citizenship theory 
leads to an assumption that there must be the possibility of a feminist or female 
citizenship. Then there is the notion of global or world citizenship that fits in with the 
convergence of nations (globalisation) and gradual homogenisation of economics, 
business, manufacturing, international migration and so on. Both are far more 
theoretical than practicable at present.
Other ideas such as social and active citizenship have become ‘buzz words’. They 
imply that citizens share a role in working towards the development of their 
communities through economic participation, public service, volunteering and other
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socially beneficial activities to improve life for all citizens. To this end schools in 
England have begun to provide lessons in citizenship and the educational model in 
Wales is referred to as Personal and Social Education. This trend is bom of Home 
Office policy that is inclined toward inculcation of the idea the duties and 
responsibilities of full citizenship. Ideally it contributes to social cohesion rather than 
any altruistic desire to make individuals freer than ever before.
Of course, none of these typologies leads to an assumption of the egalitarian nature of 
citizenship since each operates on the basis of differences. The final one certainly 
assumes the need to learn the qualities of citizenship at school in order to join those 
who have already attained that status. Of course, equality relates to status and 
difference to individuality which are naturally quite compatible. For instance, they 
give us ‘leaders’ in a society that is considered to be entirely egalitarian. Leaders are 
different in that they possess special qualities of one or more type that allow them to 
assume their role.
Thus we can also consider communism which is the ideology that seeks to establish a 
classless, stateless social organisation of people based on common ownership of the 
means of production. It is typically considered to be part of the broader socialist 
movement, inspired by various political and intellectual movements that have a 
shared vision of an egalitarian social state. It is one in which the common rather than 
individual good and common rights and duties are ultimate goals. Despite the 
principle of egalitarianism it usually depends very much on leaders and supporters 
structurally, usually appearing pyramidal between base and leadership. Consequently, 
what has sometimes been considered more an ‘experiment’ than realisation of a 
communal principle, has usually turned into a centrally planned, monopolistic state in 
which anything resembling absolute egalitarianism has yet to emerge.
Extraordinarily though, my work in Viet Nam (see van Beers, et al, 2006) has 
revealed a degree of goodwill toward children that is partially a cultural trait but also 
driven by the Party machinery. However, one of the paradoxes in Viet Nam is that 
despite apparent absolute political control of the nation by the Communist Party, the 
modem business sector and emergent affluent wealthy elite operate absolutely along 
neo-liberal lines and some of the more remote ethnic minorities still live in a more or 
less feudal environment. It is where Party control is for the most part still strongest
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that children enjoy anything resembling adult citizenship. This is as much part of a 
‘tug of war’ between the state and traditional family values as an altruistic attempt to 
change children’s lives. Some ethnic minorities (particularly H’Mong and Van Kieu) 
give children an extraordinary degree of autonomy from very early in life. However 
this is largely because of their dependence on swidden agriculture in remote 
mountainous areas which requires absence from home for several days at a time. 
Then children are left to fend for themselves and look after the home. They also tend 
not to physically or mentally abuse or punish children. The Kinh (Viet) majority, on 
the other hand, is very Confucian and often treats children very harshly allowing 
them little autonomy. The Party has recognised the ‘gift’ of rights for children and 
their increased participation in matters affecting them as a medium for their inclusion 
in the state. In due course this directs much of their loyalty toward the benevolent 
Party and state, thus sustaining its continued existence. Whilst this is superficially 
democratic it also achieves and maintains domination by securing commitment 
through early activism.
There are of course some ‘theocratic states’ in which only members of the state 
religion are allowed full membership. Theocracy means literally ‘the rule of God’ 
whereby government rules by or subject to religious authority. In fact, what we often 
consider theocratic is a state where clergy rule in the name of God and should be 
called either an ‘ecclesiocracy’ or ‘hierocracy’ or is in fact a monarchy (i.e. Saudi 
Arabia). In all cases the definition of citizenship is in line with religious and older 
cultural values (often called ‘tribal practices’) with women and children usually under 
firm patriarchal control. Finally, there are also civilian and martial dictatorships 
which are by and large authoritarian and define citizenship in very controlled terms. 
Those often include the gradual initiation of children into adult membership through 
indoctrination, civil or military service thus excluding those who do not qualify for 
whatever reason.
Social organisation and citizenship
Whilst what are essentially Western ideologies and definitions of forms of citizenship 
dominate, other forms of social organisation within states or parts of states require 
some mention in consideration of the probability of children’s membership of any 
form of citizenry. At present most of the 194 nation states in the world are described
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by one or another of the foregoing definitions. However, it also possible to examine 
historical examples of statehood, most particularly through those that were republics, 
thus had some kind of constitutional structure.
There was the Licchavi state in India in the the Himalayan Gangetic region around 
present day Vaishali in Bihar (Ojha and Jha, 1987 and Sharma, 1968). It was already 
a republic around 600 BC throughout the reign of 34 elected kings. The first was 
Nabhaga, who is said to have abdicated rule on account of a human rights matter. 
Licchavi, in common with the latter Greek republics (Athens, Sparta and Corinth), 
was a city state. City state republics are not entirely uncommon historically (for 
instance, see Finer 1999), the Phoenicians had Carthage, Sidon and Tyre, Central 
Asia saw Bukhara, Qaraqorum and Samarkand, Italy had Florence and Venice, Africa 
had Eko and Abadan, China had several city states during the Shang and Zhou 
dynasties and, albeit without clear evidence, there were the Mesoamerican and South 
American empires of the Aztecs, Incas and Mayans. Many of them have been said to 
have been as much in the hands of their ‘citizens’ as of their rulers who were often 
selected (but not elected) monarchs, priests or ‘political’ leaders.
However, as far as we know, those empires were mostly aggressively territorial, 
dogmatic and internally hierarchal. They also frequently conquered and dominated or 
enslaved enemies or inopportunely surrounding people in attempts to expand their 
territory. However, on balance there is little difference in some cases between 
examples such as Licchavi, Venice or Athens. In them democracy and imperialism 
were considered complementary qualities, which is where we often look toward the 
origins of the notion of modem citizenship. Thus, we see little evidence of a 
membership for all people within the bounds of republics throughout history, let 
alone children, although history may suggest a far more ‘blurred’ distinction between 
adult and child in some of them.
A further consideration should be the ‘tribe’ which has often mistakenly been 
attributed with the character of a ‘nation’ thus assuming a form of membership that 
may be compared with citizenship (for instance, see Selassie, 2003:58-60 and 68-70). 
What has been supposed by some (e.g. Thoreau, 2007) who attach romantic values to 
the concept, is that the tribe is organised as a form of primitive communism as the
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original, hunter-gatherer state of humankind out of which it is said to have come 
about. In fact a tribe is a small, more or less independent subgroup of a larger social 
system. Tribal societies have generally lacked organisational capability beyond the 
local tribe, with each consisting only of a small, localised population.
The internal social structure varies vastly although the small size of tribes has meant 
that they have relatively simple structures with few social distinctions between 
individual members. Some are considered more or less egalitarian with many 
traditionally having a weak concept of property and ownership, occasionally no 
concept at all. They have a strong sense of shared identity and kinship, albeit the 
latter may not describe intergenerational relationships as western people would 
recognise them. Despite a generally egalitarian structure, they normally have a clearly 
identifiable leadership and hierarchy. One aspect of the latter tends to be age 
hierarchy whereby children grow into full membership and often need to pass specific 
markers in life, many of which are celebrated on completion of initiation rituals. 
Broadly speaking, adulthood and full membership tends to correspond with the years 
during which individuals are economically most active and are able to produce 
children, thus often occur far earlier than in western society. Attempts to compare 
citizenship within a larger society and tribal membership are predisposed to the 
criticism that the latter frequently exists within the former in the modem world. What 
we know about that historically often badly accounts for recent change.
Terminology
It is not only history and human organisation that is important when examining 
citizenship but the entire terminology which is part of the socio-linguistic 
understanding of what it is. The word citizen is itself part of understanding what 
citizenship is. Across Western European languages there are two dominant forms. As 
with the English, the French citoyen, Spanish ciudadno, and other essentially Latin 
originating words describe somebody who is an inhabitant (and member) of a city. 
That is very much in the way the Greek concept described a native of a city state such 
as Athens. Northern European languages such as German Burger, Dutch borger or 
Norwegian medborger derive from the Germanic word burg meaning castle. Many 
towns grew up around castles thus coming to mean city although the German word 
for city is, in fact, stadt. Thus one differentiates between, for instance,
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Staatsbiirgerschaft (citizenship) and Stadtbiirgerrecht (civic rights) in German and 
similarly in other Germanic and Nordic languages. However, the understanding of 
citizen in (for instance) English and German is different because the latter has a 
broader application than the former in line with wider usage.
When looking at nationality as a part of citizenship we find similarly divergent forms, 
thus Staatsanhdrigkeit and similar northern European forms describe belonging 
(Anhdrigkeit) to a state rather than being of that state (national). With both 
citizenship and nationality English antonyms alone are complicated. In most English 
speaking nations a non-citizen is also a non-national and referred to as either 
foreigner or alien. This becomes more complicated in federal structures such as the 
United States of America. Since there is state and national citizenship foreign is the 
legal term for someone not a citizen of a state and alien is reserved for someone not a 
citizen of the United States. A New York company is foreign in Illinois while its 
Danish employee is an alien. In German there is Fremder that describes an alien, 
foreigner or stranger and is thus, all degrees between a local stranger and a non­
national. Then there is Ausldnder which is both alien and foreigner and is also the 
legal term for a non-national.
Language is very influential in how laws manifest themselves in other domains, thus 
how they may generally be understood when they are used within Anglo-Saxon 
‘common law’, Roman law, Code Napoleon and other secular and religious legal 
codes. Beyond the complicated language of Western Europe there are thousands of 
other equally different and occasionally more complicated expressions. Beside those 
are laws, norms, mores, beliefs and practice which make the actual meaning of 
citizenship an extremely diverse possibility.
This is only the lingual 1juggling’ in what is actually culturally and linguistically a 
very small part of the world. The global picture is of a world in which there are over 
600 prevalent languages, but 6,912 (see Gordon, 2005) ‘living’ languages plus 
distinct dialects, across something in the region of 5,000 recognisable ‘ethnic groups’ 
in 194 independent nation states. This warns one of a more complicated task in 
actually reaching definitions. The many cultural, belief led and politically varied 
forms of citizenship and membership become overwhelming when the entire socio-
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linguistic issue is taken into account and, of course, the role of historical development 
wherever either convergence or divergence has occurred.
Children’s participation and citizenship
A further issue to examine in this chapter is ‘participation’ although Chapter Nine 
will more explicitly visit the topic. Participation has become virtually a ‘cottage 
industry’ of the children’s rights world since the adoption of the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) in 1989. The state of participation at 
present is that there is neither constructive debate nor discourse. From the beginning 
of enthusiasm for children’s participation it has been taken into vague forms of 
‘ownership’. This includes numerous authors who make assumptions based on their 
interpretation of the participatory articles of the CRC to state rather than prove that 
children are citizens. Much of this has used the medium of Article 12 to the exclusion 
of other articles as described by van Beers, Invemizzi and Milne (2007: vii-ix) in 
their introduction to a reader on children’s participation.
Whilst Article 12 is unique to the CRC, Articles 13 to 16 are also ‘participatory’ but 
have been taken almost unchanged from Articles 18, 19, 21, 22 and 23 of the 1966 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. They thus fall in line with the 
base principle of ‘the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human 
family’. There has been an additional elusiveness of real explanation by use of the 
word ‘participation’ out of context instead of describing it as participation in civil 
society. It is frequently contextualised. Thus, by way of example, one finds that in the 
United Kingdom it is possible to find publications that refer to the participation of 
looked after children (see Chapter Eight) within the welfare and social work domains 
but largely divorced from the rest of society. It is this segmentation of participation 
that removes rather than incorporates children into full citizenship that undermines its 
potential for resolution of the question this research addresses.
Child participation tends, in fact, to be a distraction and to move the issue away from 
citizenship. It appears to work counter to early liberal-democratic theory such as John 
Stuart Mill’s (1869) forceful advocacy for the extension of political franchise to 
women. This was part of his belief in representative democracy whereby all people 
(the electorate: men and women) chose their (educated) representation and included
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direct action and participation as necessity demanded. The contemporary pro-child 
participation view tends to suggest separatism. Accordingly, children generally make 
decisions addressing the issues of children and are allowed to have a degree of 
opinion but no real political influence. There is certainly no real decision making 
capability in the world generally where adults are best placed to decide for them. In 
other words, children are allowed only partial citizenship through a veneer of playing 
a role in their part of civil society. In fact, as evidenced by children’s role in the 
Palestinian intifada, protests and strikes in apartheid period South Africa and anti-war 
protests from the 1960s onward, the response by people in places of authority and 
power is largely negative and occasionally harshly punitive (see Coles, 1986b). Thus, 
and as Chapter Nine will examine more extensively, it is intellectually influential at 
best but pragmatically of little value to the matter of children’s citizenship.
Citizenship remains the bedrock of contemporary legal and social status whereby its 
natural foundation is the principle that citizens enjoy equal rights. However, under 
certain circumstances consideration of individuals’ interests or actions are used to 
justify differential treatment by the state. That may include not considering the 
possibility that children might have the capability to fulfil the duties and 
responsibilities of citizenship. This will be considered later in this work where 
exceptions as well as rules will, of necessity, be examined.
Children’s citizenship and political power
A question also arises how persuasive the argument for children’s citizenship might 
be in complex and internally diverse societies? This question is dominated by a 
tension that is difficult to resolve without popular support of the populace in general 
and evidence that corroborates the argument for inclusion. Whilst the USA played a 
central role in the drafting of the CRC, at the end of the second decade of it being in 
force they have still not ratified it. In the USA there are said to be moral, legal and 
religious reasons for not ratifying. Whereas the Constitution and Bill of Rights should 
produce a policy of open-mindedness and respect for all ‘citizens’, fundamentalists 
have turned to Christianity to emphasise the moral duties of the family. Those are 
raised to a level beyond the opportunity to protect personal rights that are ensured 
constitutionally. At the same time, the US Constitution never specifically mentions 
children as bearers of the rights it protects. Thus whilst the majority of the population
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may not be concerned either way, the outspoken fundamentalist Christian lobby has 
used moral and quasi-religious reasoning to support a legal argument against 
ratification. Rather than going into more detail here, this issue will be examined again 
in Chapter Ten.
What we know about the pluralist nature of contemporary societies leads us to draw 
attention to the importance of general legal and political principles that include 
democracy, human rights and the rule of law. However, those are often in the most 
cursory fashion rather than unequivocally presenting the entire picture. Even the most 
advanced liberal democracy has a tendency to do this rather than look at traditional 
symbols of citizenship and nationality that every nation state sustains in its common 
history and culture.
The power of government to call a ‘state of emergency’ during which many ‘rights’ 
and democratic institutions may be suspended without recourse to obtaining a 
mandate to do so from an electorate through the ballot box bears witness to this 
Achilles’ heel. The Egyptian people have lived under an Emergency Law (Law No. 
162 of 1958) since 1967 except for an 18 month break that began in 1980. The state 
of emergency was invoked during the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. It was reintroduced 
following President Anwar Sadat’s assassination in 1981. Since then it has been 
continuously renewed every three years. Under it police powers are extended, 
constitutional rights suspended and censorship was legalised. It very consequently 
restricts any non-governmental political activity so that street demonstrations, non­
approved political organisations, and unregistered financial donations are officially 
prohibited. Several thousand people have been detained under the law and estimates 
of political prisoners (administrative detainees) run high. The briefest examination of 
either Amnesty International or Human Rights Watch’s Egypt reports would show a 
rather grim reality. Power is apparently organised under a multi-party, semi- 
presidential system in which executive power is supposedly divided between 
President and Prime Minister. In practice power rests almost solely in the hands of a 
President who was until recently usually voted in by single candidate elections.
In 2001 the ‘Concluding observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child: 
noted that:
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14. The Committee emphasizes the important role civil society plays as a 
partner in implementing the provisions of the Convention, including with 
respect to civil rights and freedoms. The Committee recommends that the 
State party consider a systematic approach to involving civil society, 
especially children’s associations and advocacy groups, throughout all 
stages of the implementation of the Convention, including policy-making.
In this regard, the Committee recommends that the State party ensure that 
legislation regulating NGOs conforms to international standards on 
freedom of association, as a step in facilitating and strengthening their 
participation. The Committee recommends that greater efforts be made to 
involve relevant State actors, such as local government officials and the 
police, in the dialogue with civil society and encourages the State party to 
support initiatives aimed at strengthening the role of civil society.
Egypt is an example of the extreme use of state power in a country that is seen as an 
important ally by liberal democracies involved in political mediations they hope will 
bring the long term crisis in the Middle East to an end. Normally, countries 
negotiating for peace with Egypt at the heart of their mission should be diplomatically 
protesting for improved conditions in that country. This ‘balancing act’ is political 
expediency that creates a permanent state of conflict between states who tolerate 
Egypt uncritically and the human rights lobby. The Committee comments reflect this 
tension. To recommend “strengthening the role of civil society” addresses both the 
increased inclusion of children but simultaneously acknowledges the fact that within 
an undemocratic system there are other underlying problems.
With such questions we are confronted with resolving where children stand in the 
complicated issue of citizens’ political agency. Without resolution we would be 
simply adding the dimension of children to parts of the world that have only 
relatively recently included women in their political and social environments. That 
change was most certainly central to debates between liberals and republicans for 
several decades and probably political ‘dust’ has still not settled in those places. 
Inclusion of young people assumes an understanding of democracy in terms of civil 
self-government along civic republican lines or through the capacity to implement 
control over government in a liberal society. However, it is not easy to determine how 
and through which means citizens of varying competence and maturity exercise 
meaningful political agency in complex societies that are themselves at different 
stages of social and political development.
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One of the most forceful arguments for the continued political exclusion of women 
was always their incapacity to direct their own lives. Whilst the Pitcairn Islands 
granted suffrage in 1838, one of the last countries to grant women equal voting rights 
was Liechtenstein in 1984. The Swiss Federation for Women’s Suffrage had to 
campaign from 1909 to 1971 before women were allowed to vote in national 
elections and it was still not until a 1990 decision by the Federal Supreme Court of 
Switzerland that women in the Appenzell Innerrhoden Canton were allowed to vote 
in local elections. A few countries such as Oman and Saudi Arabia are still in the 
process of introducing franchise and there are countries where economic rights 
allowing only property owners to have voting rights still work against the majority of 
women. Economic rights are often biased against women whereby wage differences, 
even in countries with equal pay regulations, are very common.
Overall, despite almost two centuries of gradual change it is a very incomplete 
change. At present we have the phenomenon of the CRC almost mirroring the view 
that women required the guidance and protection of men that was prevalent for 
centuries (e.g.: paragraph nine of the Preamble, Article 3 -  ‘best interests’ and Article 
5 -  ‘evolving capacities’ [see Appendix I]). Thus part of the evidence for citizenship 
that is required is a convincing argument for children’s competence as social actors in 
a number of domains including the economy, politics and social environment.
The initial question this chapter raised was what a specific definition of citizenship 
might be for the purpose of this research. Citizenship is different things and at a vast 
range of stages of development from one nation to another. The ideal one for this 
research would be to assume that it is essentially egalitarian and to search for 
arguments from history to the present to substantiate the case for inclusion. On the 
other hand, to do so would be to place emphasis, as is already often the case, on 
western liberal democracies where the predominant political culture is far more likely 
to view the notion positively. Thus, the option remaining is to apply an adaptable, 
wide ranging definition. The proposition this research raises can then be incorporated 
and conclusions can be reached that are not only identifiable with a single political 
culture or nation state.
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Chapter Four: The emergence of childhood - from the ancient world 
until the dawn of the Enlightenment
The objective of this work and Chapters Three and Four more specifically, is not to 
painstakingly re-examine the history of childhood. That is already a relatively 
thoroughly thought through aspect of social history. Whilst most of the easily 
accessible literature looks at Western European children since at least the late 
medieval period and Britain is exceptionally well covered, interest in other parts of 
the world is gradually falling into place. Archaeologists have fairly recently begun to 
contribute complementary data that increase our knowledge of how children lived in 
the past (for instance, see Sofaer Derevenski, 2000). Their work is extremely 
interesting and beginning to broaden our knowledge of children’s everyday lives. 
Despite that, as with history from most sources, we learn very little about children’s 
position in civil society.
There are notable exceptions like boy pharaohs, girl queens, child priests and other 
high ranking children whose remains and occasionally stories of their lives are 
discovered. They are, however, almost always exceptions to the rule and contribute 
little at best to a social history of childhood. Likewise, comparably recent 
developments in both biological and social anthropology have increased interest in 
children in all branches of the discipline. They now examine childhood from the 
prehistoric to contemporary world. History itself is often highly dependent on other 
disciplines. It is frequently interwoven with the descriptions of children or family life 
that were described by philosophers, theologians and poets. Whether these are 
selective or distorted by idealised descriptions is not as important as the fact that they 
are written and may be the only data available. Thus Socrates8, Plato, Confucius, 
Cicero, later on Thomas Aquinas, St Anselm and more recently John Locke, Jean- 
Jacques Rousseau are among the many proxies for exact historical sources.
This brief examination of history has thus been divided into two chapters. This 
chapter looks at the ancient world until the 16th century then Chapter Four continues 
on to the present day. The former, rather more than the latter, attempts to present a 
world overview. There are good reasons for this. Many of the perceptions of 
childhood we find today owe origins to older traditions that have only partially 
changed more recently. Thus it may be said that in a large part of the world the
47
influences of Ibrahimic religions have been carried over into the modem world. To 
one degree or another, Christianity has not moved so very far from what Socrates was 
saying of children and in other places Hinduism and Confucianism have retained 
traditions from time well before inclusion would be at all relevant here.
However, it should be noted here that both Africa and the Americas particularly, but 
also other parts of the world receive scant, if any attention, in this history. In fact, 
those are the least influential parts of the world in a bigger picture. Africa, with 
exception of Islamic regions, has almost too many different histories. The great 
empires that include Ethiopia, Ghana, Mali and Munhumutapa (Zimbabwe) all 
comprised of many different people whose social organisation, beliefs and traditions 
were more diverse than would be practicable here. The many smaller nations, indeed 
even the smallest ones we sometimes refer to as ‘tribes’, are far too many to consider.
However, apart from some exceptions, such as what we may know about child 
monarchs, little of substance about childhood is known. Much the same can be said 
for the pre-Columbian Americas and once we begin to have a picture of the great 
civilisations such as Aztec, Inca, May or Toltec again we lack real knowledge about 
children there. Those who survived the conquest of the Americas following 
Colombus’ voyage of 1492 were originally described in what are often extensive 
accounts of ‘savage’ people written by missionaries and pioneer colonists. More 
recently they have been studied by mainly anthropologists and archaeologists who 
also tend not to say very much about children. Thus, seen historically neither Africa 
nor the Americas have a great deal of substance to offer in the context of this work 
although knowledge of older societies is an ongoing process that may well tell us 
more in years to come.
There are notable exceptions. Lee and DeVore’s (1976) work on the IKung San of the 
Kalahari is used in Chapter Seven because an entire section of their book (Part III) 
appears under the heading ‘Childhood’. They were looking at the IKung San as they 
were in the early 1970s, when they remained essentially a nomadic hunter-gatherer 
society as they had been for many centuries. The childhood observed by those 
anthropologists was almost certainly little changed over most, perhaps all, of the 
period covered by this chapter.
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One of the common strands in historical study of western childhood is either notion of 
an ‘emergence’ or a ‘disappearance’. It has been expressed in various ways. 
Cunningham (2006) calls it ‘The Invention o f Childhood1, Pollock (1983) uses 
‘Forgotten Children', Aries (1962) ‘Centuries o f Childhood' , Buckingham (2000) 
‘...Death o f Childhood' Postman (1982) ‘The Disappearance o f Childhood' and 
deMause (1974) ‘The History o f Childhood'. It is the question that arises out of either 
proposition that allows for an assumption that there was and is again a time when 
adulthood and childhood are inseparable that is more interesting. It is that possibility 
and its implications that justify the inclusion of history. It is thus a chronological 
examination of what is known and has been said about childhood rather than a 
reconsideration of historical data. One of the obvious difficulties is to know exactly 
where to begin in a roughly chronologically ordered examination of childhood. The 
ultimate aim of this work is to look at the possibility of children’s full citizenship. 
Thus the question arises as to whether or not this has arisen in one form or another in 
the past. Any line of enquiry that pursues an exact answer to that question also needs 
to take into account different forms of citizenship or the absolute absence of a concept 
of a common membership of a society that can be understood as a form thereof.
The Classical Period
In order to not to move too far away from the intended outcome of this research into 
the realms of another equally intricate intellectual task, a starting point has been 
chosen to the exclusion of whatever is known about the period preceding that time. 
This beginning is sometime after 470 B.C., the birth of Socrates, and as it was 
recalled by Plato in his Crito (Kpucov).
In the Crito there is citation of Socrates explaining the passage of membership into 
citizenship thus: “...having granted the indulgence to any of the Athenians who may 
desire to use it as soon as he has arrived at the years of discretion and become 
acquainted with the business of the state...” (Stanford, 1834:104). In his annotation 
Stanford notes that “At what age children were ... enrolled does not appear; some 
suppose at one, others at three or four years old. ...second enrolment was at eighteen” 
and again at “twenty years old”. The process through which a child became a citizen 
was, in effect, entry in the register (k o i v o v  ypappaxeiov) of the ward {(ppaxpia) in 
which they resided along with an oath by both parents that the child was legitimately
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bom or adopted, thus entitled to enjoy the full privileges of citizenship. The second 
enrolment was for ephebi (etprjpoq) who were the young men, usually 18 to 20 years 
old, undergoing military training. The final enrolment was in a further register 
{Xtj^iapxiKov ypappareiov) that entitled them to full civil rights that included freedom 
from the will of parents or guardians and to inherit from their fathers.
What we also learn from Plato in the Crito is that Socrates expressed a view that the 
state is to us as a parent is to a child. Given that it is always wrong for a child to 
disobey a parent, it is commonsense that it is always wrong to disobey the state. We 
could, of course, raise serious doubts about the legitimacy of an analogy between 
parents and the state. Obedience to our parents is after all only a temporary obligation 
we ultimately grow out of by learning to make decisions for ourselves. His argument 
was that obeying the state is an obligation for an entire lifetime (for instance, see 
Emlyn-Jones, 1999).
Plato, again citing the assumed words of Socrates, wrote about differences in his 
Republic. In the Greece of his time it was assumed that natural differences between 
adult male and female members of the human race results in a significant segregation 
into appropriate social roles. Children, in Plato’s view, should be further segregated 
from adults. His view is that the best interests of the state are served if children are 
brought up and educated by society as a whole rather than by natural parents. He 
proposed a simple scheme for the breeding, development and education of children of 
the guardian class.
Plato believed that the supposed pleasures of family life are among benefits that 
higher classes of society must be willing to relinquish. It is those children who in due 
course become guardians of the state. Their accomplishment at this level of education 
correctly ascertains whether they are qualified to do so and, if so, whether they 
deserve to be a leader or a soldier. Society should accordingly design its educational 
system as a measure by which to discriminate among those future citizens whose 
functions will be at variance and thus educate them appropriately to the capability of 
each. Thus we see that some children are allowed to watch and listen to ‘dangerous’ 
art whilst others are encouraged to directly observe the violence of war. Of course 
this is specific only to a particular class and does not extend to, for example, artisans
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or labourers who are citizens who should be ruled by the higher classes. Again this is 
example of an early example of recognition of children as future citizens rather than 
as being already part of their society.
Apart from Plato we know enough about the status of children to understand that it 
was not entirely dissimilar to what it is in the modem world9. However, Greek 
children tended not to go to school. Many children in ancient Athens, Corinth and 
other cities were, in fact, slaves therefore could not go to school in the first place. 
They would never be citizens anyway. Poor boys, including those who were free, 
could not go to school since their families could not afford to pay teachers. They 
usually needed sons at home to work, especially those of tradesmen who would be 
learning their future skill from fathers. Girls normally stayed at home with mothers 
until they were married. They either worked in the home or, among agriculture 
people, in the fields. Apart from that, there were no public schools.
Parents who had enough money did try to send their sons to school since not learning 
to read and write and having some general education meant there would have been 
little opportunity to participate in politics when they grew up. Boys began school 
when they were about seven and attended until about 13 years old. At school they 
generally learned to read and write and learned large amounts of Homer’s Iliad and 
Odyssey by heart. Therewith they had basic skills for access to the political sphere 
which was always limited to those with literature and cultural skills and more often 
than not to those who were bom privileged to begin with. They furthermore learned 
to play the lyre and pipes and also to sing (see Beaumont, 2006, Golden, 1990, Kamp, 
2001 and Tames, 2002).
The exception to other children in Hellenic antiquity was among the Spartans (see 
Cartledge: 2001 and 2002) whose family was quite different from that of the other 
city-states. The word ‘Spartan’ now describes a life of abstinence and minimalism in 
our terms, which is what Spartan life was essentially about. Their notions of family, 
childhood and citizenship were very different from modem, western understanding of 
these terms. Men and women did not live together although they married, but met 
occasionally for procreation. A wedding comprised of a ritualised physical fight 
which resulted in the man tossing the woman over his shoulder and taking her away.
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By the end of the 4th century BC there were more men than women in Sparta so that 
there was often more than one father of children or several men might even share a 
wife. Connubial love was discouraged and progeny were bom children ‘of the state’ 
rather than of parents, raised to be soldiers or wives of soldiers, staunch supporters of 
the state and expected to be strong and self-disciplined. A mother’s ‘softening’ 
influence was in fact deemed harmful to a boy’s education.
When a baby was bom, soldiers examined it assiduously to determine its strength. 
The child was bathed in wine instead of water to see how it reacted. If it was frail it 
was left on a hillside (to die) or taken away to become a slave {helot10). When a boy 
reached his seventh birthday he was enrolled in the agoge (military training) under 
the authority of the paidonomos {naiSovdpoq), or ‘boy-herder’, a magistrate who 
supervised education. Nurses who did not indulge them took immediate charge of 
them. Boys were housed in a dormitory and began the first of the three stages of the 
agoge: paides (ages 7-17), paidiskoi (18-19) and hebontes (20-29). The boys lived in 
agelai, (‘herds’) under an older boy leader and were expected to give their loyalty to 
the communal mess hall rather than families. Boys were given one piece of clothing 
per year and made beds of reeds from the Eurotas River. They suffered austere 
physical discipline and denial to make them robust. They marched unshod, going 
without food for lengthy spells. They were intentionally underfed to master skills 
essential for foraging or stealing food. However, they were severely punished if 
caught. They developed their acumen as fighters, bearing pain and in survival skills. 
Older boys beat younger boys to toughen them up. Abstinence, frugality, the soldier’s 
code, and loyalty to the city-state were their raison d'etre. They were taught stories of 
courage and resilience.
At around age 12 boys entered into an institutionalised sexual relationship with a 
young adult male Spartan. It was a form of pederasty, whereby older soldiers would 
engage promising youths in long-lasting relationships with ostensibly educational 
objectives. Boys were expected to ask for these relationships which were seen as a 
means of passing on knowledge and upholding loyalty in war. At paidiskoi, around 
age 18 students became reserve members of the army. Promising students were taken 
to the Crypteia, a kind of festival to test skills by declaring war on helots, 
encouraging them to slay any who were out at night and steal their food. At the stage
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of hebontes they became full part of the syssitia and Spartan army after passing a 
rigorous test to graduate as full citizens. Only soldiers were received into the 
‘aristocratic’ citizenry. If they failed tests they could not become citizens, but 
perioeci11 which in contemporary terms was a kind of middle class. Thus to some 
extent class was based on merit rather than birth. When they passed, young men 
continued to live in barracks, train as soldiers and compete for a place among the 
Spartan hippeis, the royal guard of honour, and also required to marry to produce new 
young Spartans. The state gave them a piece of land which was cultivated by helots to 
provide income for their support so that they could remain full-time soldiers for 
another 10 years.
Girls were also removed from home at age seven and sent to school where they 
learned dance, wrestling, gymnastics and underwent other physical training together 
with other subjects such as reading, writing and war education. Spartans believed that 
robust mothers produced strong children, thus young women competed in athletic 
events and probably partook nude as men did. Qualities such as grace and culture 
were frowned upon in favour of physical disposition and moral integrity. They wore 
the old-fashioned peplos {neirXoq) that was open at the side, leading to teasing by 
other Greeks who nicknamed them phainomerides, (paivoptjpiSeq) or ‘thigh 
showers’. During religious ceremonies, holidays and physical exercise girls and 
women were naked. When they passed citizenship tests at age 18-20 and when they 
were emotionally mature and closer to the age of future husbands they were expected 
to marry. In preparation for her wedding a woman’s hair was cut short and she was 
dressed in male clothing. Afterwards the husband returned to his all-male barracks.
Thus childhood was seen as a preparation for particular roles in Spartan society. 
Those who were rejected perished or were enslaved early in life. Those who failed 
tests never achieved full citizenship and only those who fulfilled all criteria for full 
membership enjoyed all privileges. Childhood was preparation for adulthood which 
was more or less synonymous with citizenship. Thus childhood was ‘potential 
citizenship’ but not ‘citizen-becomings’ because achieving full recognition was not 
ensured. However those who became helots almost certainly became like other slaves 
who had no exact status in this regard. Perioeci were probably far more comparable
53
with a modem European ‘blue collar class’, although those who had failed tests were 
probably a very different kind of adult to those bom perioeci.
From these early descriptions of the transition from childhood to adulthood in the 
Hellenic world of around 400 BC we learn two important things. Firstly, when 
children are referred to it most frequently means male children rather than both sexes. 
Secondly, what Plato tells us about is a transition that gives only partial citizenship at 
the first stage which is a notion that will be revisited at a later stage when looking at 
Locke, later Durkheim and more recently Qvortrup. In further examination of 
antiquity there are various conditions that we can roughly compare with class 
structures in the modem world and the privileges enjoyed by a minority in upper 
echelons until the 19th and early 20th century.
Asian philosophies and beliefs
An emergent culture almost contemporary with the philosophy of Socrates and Plato 
is Confucianism (Oldstone-Moore: 316-332, 362-371 and 406-15). Its founder K’ung 
Fu Tzu (Latinised as Confucius) lived from 551 until 479 BC. He was a social 
philosopher in China whose teachings have profoundly influenced East Asia for at 
least the last 24 centuries, albeit it is sometimes held that the relationship between 
Confucianism and Confucius is for the largest part tenuous.
One of the central themes of Confucianism is that of relationships and various duties 
arising from different statuses held by individuals in relation to others. Those 
individuals are held to concurrently have different degrees of relationship with 
different people. Notably, they are junior in relation to parents and elders and senior 
in relation to their own children, younger siblings and all other people of lesser age. It 
is considered that juniors owe strong duties of veneration and duties to elders. They, 
in turn, have duties of benevolence and responsibility toward juniors. In one form or 
another, contemporary versions of this belief permeate many aspects of East and 
Southeast Asian culture to the present day.
There are extensive filial obligations on the part of children toward parents and elders 
and profound sense of responsibility of parents toward their children. Filiality (xiao or
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hsiao; # )  is considered among the greatest of virtues and must be shown towards
both the living and dead. Filial itself means ‘of a child12’ and represents the respect
and obedience that a child should show to parents and especially his or her father.
This relationship was described as a sequence of five principal relationships (Wulun
if ra ) . Those are between ruler and subject, father and son, husband and wife, elder
and younger brother and finally between friends. Particular duties were prescribed
between participants in each of these relationships. Those duties also applied to the
dead since the living are considered children (sons) of their ancestors. Stafford (1995)
describes two different paths to adulthood in Confucian society. By the first, children
are ‘persons’ from the moment of conception and growing is a natural process that
needs to be protected as they grow and mature. The second sees them as formless and
without competence and as growing persons who must learn the Confucian ideal of
filial piety and deference to arrive at full adulthood. Stafford explains thus:
There is not so much a problem with Chinese children becoming 
something, as with them remaining something. The underlying 
assumption is that children are, were, and will forever be persons... The 
emphasis is (...) not on making them social, but instead on protecting a 
natural process and on emphasising certain forms of identification. ...this 
exists alongside another more “Confucian” view (...) in which children 
are in the process of becoming persons (Stafford, 1995:18)
In the fullness of time, filiality was incorporated into the Chinese legal system. A 
criminal was traditionally punished more severely when somebody had committed a 
crime against a parent. In general, fathers have always exercised great power over 
children. The same tends to be found in other age biased relationships where elders 
are involved. Thus, we again see that in the most populous areas of Asia children 
have not occupied a position in which a notion of the child citizen finds substance. In 
fact, as we also see in the Occident, they are ‘human becomings’. Indeed, a great deal 
of what has survived for well over 20 centuries tells us what a society which now 
appears to be increasingly assimilating life in the western world was like historically 
(See also: Ivanhoe, 2000 and Yao, 2000).
Siddhartha Gautama (circa 556/563-476/483 BC) who we know as Buddha 
(Gautama Buddha), founder of the Buddhist philosophy (See Eckel, 2000: 110-29) 
was a contemporary of Confucius who died in 478. Buddhism and Confucianism 
often coexist and have shaped life in much of East and Southeast Asia. Buddhism
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itself does not itself precisely describe an ethos of intergenerational relations but 
initially introduced practices from the older Hindu ideology. Siddhartha was himself 
bom into that religion and incorporated numerous other tribal practices into his 
doctrine. Thus we find beliefs about family values that may sometimes appear to 
contradict each other elsewhere but correspond or occasionally overlap throughout 
the Buddhist, Confucian and Hindu world.
However one of the most pervasive values in all three philosophies is that the main 
purpose of marriage is to make and raise children. They are not only important in 
their own right but ensure extension of family lineage and are there to perform last 
rites for parents. In general, Hinduism places emphasis on children being loved and 
never neglected. Indeed, the first part of the ancient Bhagavad Gita touches on moral 
and social problems caused by unwanted children (see Cobum, 1984, or Comille, 
2006). Hindu texts expressed disapproval of contraception, proposing that children be 
wanted rather than sex being primarily for pleasure. Children, therefore, have always 
been most certainly very much included in the sense that for a parent duty is to their 
child to provide a home, warmth, food, clothes and education. In return, a child is 
duty bound to show gratitude to parents, work hard to make the best of his education 
and respect the people who provide for him or her.
Despite a great concern for the well-being and benevolent rearing of children there is
little to suggest that in the past, or indeed in the development of these philosophies up
to the present day, that children have ever enjoyed any manner of position that may
be understood as making them in any way comparable with or equal to adults.
Needless to say, where caste systems such as Hindu varnas with further
classifications such as jati have ever shaped social status or are still present, it is not
remarkable that the adult-child distinction is less obvious given that a child of a
specific caste status may be of higher social rank than an adult of a another caste.
Furthermore, Hinduism is complex and really refers to people of particular caste,
community, region and language rather than a single religion or ideology. Narayanan
(2005: II)  says that:
In Indian law, the term ‘Hindu’ may even include those who belong to 
traditions usually thought of as theologically distinct from Hinduism. It is 
generally applied to anyone who lives in India and accepts the Hindu
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tradition -  which is not defined -  in any of its forms or developments.
This therefore embraces Buddhists, Jains, and Sikhs.
Thus, when looking at India rather than Hinduism itself a combination of caste, 
community (ethnic group) and region together with particular Hindu practices 
provide example without the complexity of attempting to portray a single typology. 
Fuller (1976) and Agarwal (1994) describe the Nayars of Kerala, a Hindu upper caste 
who were traditionally prominent in medicine, education, law, politics and 
government service. Prior to British occupation of Kerala in 1792 the region 
contained small, feudal kingdoms. Each had royal and noble lineages, a militia and 
most land administrators were exclusively drawn from the Nayars and related castes. 
At the beginning of the British occupation their armies were disbanded. Partly as a 
result of that, their tradition of plural marital unions gradually died out by the end of 
the 19th century. Laws passed in the 1930s imposed monogamy on them and 
permitted division of what had traditionally been matrilineal estates among male and 
female members. Thereby children were also given full rights of maintenance and 
inheritance from the father.
Thus the very different practices that had described an entirely different form of 
social organisation changed. It was one in which we would identify a very different 
kind of ‘citizenship’ that was determined by and included brothers and sisters, the 
latter’s children, and their daughters’ children and lineage. The oldest man was 
always legal head of the group. By the middle of the 20th century it was increasingly 
common, especially among urban families, for nuclear families to form separate 
residential and economic units away from matrilineal joint-families. Furthermore, 
Fuller {Ibid.) draws particular attention to other issues such as the impact of the 
changing modem market economy, disappearance of traditional military training and 
assimilation of new values through the late and post-colonial system of education. A 
new consciousness was engendered by lower castes with their demand for equality 
and equal constitutional rights. Thus, Nayars began to adapt to the modem world.
To all intents and purposes they often appear part of contemporary, rather westernised 
life. However, beneath the veneer of modem ways many of the old practices and 
rituals define who they are. Children are less ‘free’ than we understand in western 
terms, thus usually experience lives that are ranked by traditional structures, governed
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by practice and are substantively unlike occidental standards that describe how and 
when full membership of society, citizenship, precisely begins. India, even today, 
with numerous differences of origin, caste, religion and understanding of their own 
democracy essentially bridges time between European antiquity and contemporary 
western civil society.
Whilst eastern philosophies and their cultural imprint have continued to shape the 
historical development of the family, the importance of the philosophy of western 
antiquity began to decline in influence. They were eventually to be a significant 
influence on each of the main Ibrahimic theologies as they increased in importance. 
Whereas western philosophies tell us about the emergent socio-political world that 
continued to exist in one form or another throughout the Roman Republic and later 
Empire, their historians, social commentators and philosophers were little concerned 
with children or any other aspect of family and social life. Strabo (circa 63 or 64 BC 
to 24 AD), for instance, looked at people and social organisation in much of the world 
known to the Roman Empire to the degree that his description of the Indian caste 
system is reasonably recognisable today.
The Romans
What we do know about Roman childhood13 is that it was more or less as connected 
with status and class as it was in Greece. When a child was bom he or she was laid at 
the father’s feet. If the newborn child was raised in his arms it was acknowledged as 
his and given access to all rights and privileges of membership in that family. Birth 
registration was a requirement from sometime during the reign of Marcus Aurelius 
(121 to 180; emperor from 161 to death) onward. The father was required to register 
his child’s name and date of birth within 30 days. However, a boy was not enrolled as 
a full citizen until he put on a man’s toga. When a boy came of age varied, depending 
to some extent to physical and intellectual development but otherwise on his father’s 
decision. That also appears to have depended on the period in which a boy lived. By 
and large, a man’s toga was donned between the fourteenth and seventeenth years 
whereby a higher age was customary in earlier times. In the classical period the boy’s 
age was by and large about 16 years.
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Girls, on the other hand, were as their mothers, women who were a class apart whose 
status in Roman society altered over time. Roman women were not allowed to vote or 
enter civil and public office since they were, theoretically, subject to the almost total 
power of their paterfamilias. In many respects they were little more than slaves 
although the interrelationship of social ‘classes’ would, in fact, add another 
dimension of this notion.
Social and moral education and training was largely carried out by parents. The 
emphasis was on moral rather than intellectual development. The most essential 
qualities for a child to acquire were reverence for gods, respect for the law, absolute 
and instant deference to authority, honesty and personal independence. Education 
(school) was left to parents’ discretion and lasted until about age seven. Boys and 
girls were taught to speak Latin correctly and do elementary reading, writing and 
arithmetic. The 12 tablets of law were learned by rote.
In the early period of the Empire, education was left to both parents but gradually 
became more a duty of mothers and sometimes specially hired slaves. Additional 
education was limited to wealthier families who could afford a tutor and keep the 
child from working. Whenever possible, a boy would go to a regular teacher but a girl 
became her mother’s companion. Formal education was nearly always discontinued 
because girls married early and needed to learn about home management. Girls 
learned to sew, spin and weave from mothers. Boys were trained by fathers. If a 
father was a farmer, a son would learn to plough, plant and harvest. When fathers 
were of high status their sons stood beside them in the atrium when visitors were 
received. That facilitated them acquiring first-hand knowledge of political affairs that 
would enable them to be full citizens. Fathers also trained sons in use of weapons, 
military exercises, riding, swimming, wrestling and a form of boxing for manhood 
and time they would probably spend doing military service.
Full citizenship was effectively dependent on one hand on age and gender and on the 
other on status such as social class and whether or not an individual was free in the 
first place. However, in the later days of the Roman Empire Christianity began to 
shape the organisation of the family that would eventually become the modem model 
for a large part of the world. It had developed for the most part from the family
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structure of the ancient Hebrews that was patriarchal and monogamous. The type of 
family that emerged from Greco-Roman culture was also patriarchal and governed by 
strict religious principles. As Greek and later Roman civilisations declined so did 
their highly ordered family life but what remained was the importance of the union of 
man and woman and their children as the ‘nucleus’ of the social unit. Christianity 
made marriage and procreation central concerns in religious teaching. Children 
became the issue of the sin that made them. Other influences and several centuries 
during which we know little about childhood came at the end of the Western Roman 
Empire in 476. The Byzantine Empire retained Roman legal and cultural traditions in 
a markedly Christian form for about a further 1000 years until giving way to the 
Ottoman Empire in 1453 when Constantinople fell. Therewith over 2000 years of 
continual ‘Roman’ history14 came to an end.
The purely religious nature of family relations that was once Roman, but later became 
the Roman Catholic Church’s dogma, more or less persisted until the Reformation. 
Given the continued patriarchal structure of the family, despite lack of precise 
knowledge about children’s lives there are few reasons for assuming they assumed 
any form of status that one could describe as adult-like.
The Early Middle Ages
With the end of the Western Roman Empire, the influence of the ancient order in 
Europe declined. The period known as the European Early Middle Ages, from about 
476 to roughly 1000, is one of the periods we know least about. All of the Eurasian 
landmass saw change through migration, invasion and historically speaking rapid 
transition that had a profound effect on social structures. A corresponding period, 
known as the Migration Period (also called ‘barbarian invasions’ or 
‘Volkerwanderungen’)15, largely occurred within a period from about 300 to 700 
during the transition from Late Antiquity to the Early Middle Ages. During the latter 
years of Roman occupation much of Western Europe had been Christianised. This 
was maintained by Germanic Visigoths who conquered much of Spain, France, 
southern Germany, the Alpine region and Italy.
Eurasian Huns who occupied large parts of the eastern Empire displaced Christianity 
and the established social order of centuries of Roman occupation. From about 360
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onward ‘pagan’ Germanic people began to invade and settle in parts of Roman 
Britain. After the Roman Emperor Honorius withdrew the last legions from Britain in 
410, ‘Anglo-Saxons’ progressively consolidated their foothold in the British Isles. 
During 8th to 10th centuries, although not customarily counted as part of the Migration 
Period and despite being within the Early Middle Ages, new waves of migration of 
the Magyars, later Turkic peoples and then the Viking expansion from Scandinavia 
threatened the newly established order of the Frankish Empire in Central Europe.
In East and Southeast Asia a great deal of movement and change similarly affected 
social environments. The Khmer Empire was consolidated in 802 (Dagens, 1995 and 
2003). There the next 600 years were to see the wide variety of belief systems and 
tribal practices brought closer together to form a relatively cohesive regional culture 
lasting until colonialism began in the 19th century. At first the empire’s official 
religions included Hinduism and Mahayana Buddhism until Theravada Buddhism 
became more significant after introduction from Sri Lanka in the 13th century. 
Confucian influence was also very strong since large parts of the region south of the 
modem Chinese border were under Khmer control until well into the 10th century.
In China16 the Tang Dynasty (618 to 907) gave way to the Five Dynasties and Ten 
Kingdoms until the Song Dynasty (960 to 1297) reunited much of what is modem 
China. Song Neo-Confucian philosophers found particular integrity in the 
imagination of ancient classical texts and wrote commentaries on them. The most 
influential was Zhu-Xi (1130-1200) whose blend of Confucian thought with 
Buddhist, Taoist and other ideas became official imperial ideology from the late Song 
period until the end of the 19th century (Berthrong, 1998:109ff). His philosophy 
evolved into an uncompromising official doctrine placing emphasis on the one-sided 
obligations of acquiescence of each subject to the ruler. Under that nomenclature 
child to father, wife to husband and younger brother to elder brother were all subject 
to the same principles. This inhibited societal development in pre-modem China that 
affected the position of children through to the present day. Neo-Confucian doctrines 
also came to play a dominant role in intellectual life in Japan, Korea and Viet Nam 
with strands of influence throughout Southeast Asia into parts of modem Indonesia 
and Malaysia.
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During the 7th century the Prophet Muhammad founded Islam (see Graham, 2006 and 
Nasr, 2003). Sharia law (‘well trodden path’) determined by traditional Islamic 
scholarship and using the Qur’an as the principal source of jurisprudence 
reinterpreted older Jewish and Christian principles and established an Islamic family 
life in which children are categorically subject to adult, particularly paternal, 
authority. In fact there are very few significant sources shedding light on how and 
what medieval Muslims thought about children and families. What little is available 
tends to offer insights into physical needs of children, actions for fulfilment of those 
requirements and advice for parents grieving the loss of children. However legal 
treatises on marriage offer a few details obliquely related to childhood. The most 
useful ones integrate Qur’anic pronouncements and the word of the Prophet on 
marriage, women, children and family life. There is no apparent paradigm of the child 
and childhood in the classical period of medieval Islam. Indeed, if anything Islam 
appears to have generally been more concerned with adults and where children are 
mentioned tends to see them as beneficiaries of the actions of parents.
The Middle Ages
During the lengthy period described thus far, relatively little is known about 
childhood generally, most certainly less about the status of children. In Western 
Europe, England particularly, a little information survives to tell us about adult 
attitudes toward children during the Anglo-Saxon period from about 500 to 1066. 
Some archaeological work found burials where children had grave goods like adults. 
Knowledge about adult attitudes develops when we examine the 12th century which 
was an age of law-making by both the Roman Church and lay society. Law making 
included specific arrangements for children who could not be expected to bear the 
same responsibilities and penalties as adults. Medieval law-makers usually demarked 
the transition from childhood to adulthood at puberty. Through baptism a child was 
received into the Church and freed from the burden of original sin. Infancy lasted up 
to the age of seven years, pueritia or childhood traditionally until age 12 years for 
girls and 14 years for boys.
The Church usually led the way in deciding the distinction between childhood and 
adulthood based on notions inherited from Greek and Roman authorities on the stages 
of life. It regarded pre-pubertal children too immature to commit sin or comprehend
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adult concepts. Accordingly they were not allowed to marry, exempted from 
confession to priests and excluded from partaking in the sacrament of the Eucharist. 
Secular justice developed a similar concept of age of legal accountability beginning 
about puberty, although there are accounts of children receiving adult punishments 
(see Crawford, 1999)17. There is generally little that leads to believe that children 
really may have been considered ‘little adults’ as some historians maintain (e.g.: 
Aries, 1962 and deMause, 1974). Childhood was not thought as imperative as we 
now consider it in formation of personality and character. Nevertheless, there was 
scope for consideration on how it was best to bring up a child.
One account gives a sketchy insight into an example of how children were seen. It 
tells how St Anselm, Archbishop of Canterbury from 1093 to 1109 (Southern, 1972), 
came to be considered a ‘pioneer’ of child protection. The story tells how an abbot 
told Anselm about difficulties he was having raising boys entrusted to his care. The 
abbot was authoritarian and beat boys for every transgression. Anselm could not 
restrain his distaste for their treatment and chastised the abbot for unjust and violent 
treatment of the boys, saying that kindness and reason would always prevail. 
Anselm’s views were commonly quoted into the late Middle Ages. The resultant 
debate ‘spare the rod and spoil the child’ persisted until the late 20th century and 
subsequently prohibition of corporal punishment in schools in an ever increasing 
number of countries. That tells us very little about childhood itself beyond the 
treatment of boys. It at least contributes to putting paid to the idea that in the Middle 
Ages and much of the time thereafter children were essentially ‘little adults’. They 
were very clearly not and childhood was undoubtedly identifiable as being 
unambiguously a set of stages in the life cycle.
When we come to conduct books about two centuries later, the contradictory nature of 
the ‘little adult’ stance becomes clearer. Whilst children were expected to behave like 
adults, probably contributed a great deal to the economic survival of most households 
and had particular responsibilities, a conclusion we may extrapolate from an example 
like Anselm is that children were then as now being ‘brought up’. There was clearly a 
notion of transitions from infancy to adulthood that may be obscured behind the 
reality of contributing to domestic tasks, possibly other non-domestic work and the 
measure of responsibility they bore that probably demanded more ‘adult-like’
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behaviour in many situations. These perceptions are also very culturally conditioned 
and where a thesis such as Aries tends to be right is within a narrow European context 
among those whose lives were observed and recorded who tended to have belonged 
to an equally narrow social stratum of their society. Exactly as in the contemporary 
world, childhood would always be different from one place to another and in accord 
with conditions at particular points in time.
The Mongol Empire
Across Asia and parts of Europe the Mongol Empire (1206-1405)18 extended 
influence from Western China and Japan to the eastern edges of Hungary, Poland and 
Lithuania, across the north of Russia and Siberia and down well into the Levantine, 
Persia, India and Southeast Asia. The Mongol Nation began as a group of disparate 
tribes in what we now call Mongolia. The man who united them was bom with the 
name Temtijin (circa 1167 -  1221) in the Borjigin clan. At around age nine his tribal 
leader father, Yesugai Bat’atur was poisoned, after which his household was driven 
away by his clan who thought he was too young to rule. He became leader of his 
family under his mother’s guidance. At one stage in his childhood he was carried off 
by a rival clan but escaped after a few months. At age 16 he married and began his 
career as a leader.
Whilst Temiijin was still 16 the Merkid tribe attacked his family and carried off his 
wife. With his small force of five men he could not retaliate, so turned to one of his 
father’s old allies, Toghrul Khan of the Kereyid tribe. He, in turn, enlisted Jamugha 
and his men. Together they defeated the Merkids so that Temiijin recovered his wife. 
It was over 20 years later aged over 40 that he brought the clans together to form the 
Mongol nation. By then he had been given the title Genghis Khan. Whilst he had 
been a young leader, most of his famed leadership accumulated in adulthood. There is 
little to suggest that among the Mongols or in their areas of influence children 
enjoyed any great privilege. However the influence of the Mongol Empire was that 
three great religions, Buddhism, Christianity and Islam, were permanently to be the 
most influential across the entire landmass. With them their moral influence was 
formative in how societies were structured (Marshall, 1993).
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Urban awareness
Italy was very influential in the development and change in Europe (see Duggan, 
1994:31-59). After the fall of the Roman Empire there was concerted urban 
awareness in northern Italy that had declined in importance in other parts of Europe. 
Some Italian cities and institutions were survivors of earlier Etruscan and Roman 
towns which had existed within the Roman Empire and the republican institutions of 
Rome had also survived. There were still some feudal lords with well-ordered labour 
forces and vast territories. By the 11th century a number of cities such as Florence, 
Genoa, Milan and Venice had become large trading conurbations which had been 
able to win independence from monarchies. Italy between the 12th and 13th centuries 
had been very different from feudal European countries to the north of the Alps. It 
was essentially a peninsula, geographically divided into many small regions by 
mountain ranges that made inter-city communication difficult and a patchwork of 
cultural and political territories rather than a unified state.
The city states that survived longest were in the least accessible and best defended 
regions, such as Florence and Venice. Since attacks over the Alps were complicated, 
Teutonic invaders found it difficult to apply sustained control over Italian vassal 
states so that they were largely free of Germanic political incursions. Thus strong 
monarchies did not emerged as easily as they did in the rest of Europe. The 
independent city state emerged instead. While Roman, urban and republican feelings 
endured there were numerous movements and changes taking place. Italy had initially 
felt the changes in Europe from the 11th to 13th centuries. The influences borne on 
Italy were rise in population which doubled during the period and emergence of vast 
cities (Florence, Milan and Venice each had over 100,000 inhabitants and others such 
as Bologna, Genoa and Verona exceeded 50,000) by the High Middle Ages.
There was considerable rural to urban migration making Italy the most urbanised 
place in the world when the urban population arrived at around 20%. There was also 
an agrarian revolution and rapid development of commerce. It has been estimated that 
per capita income in northern Italy nearly tripled from the 11th to 15th century. It was 
a very mobile, demographically expanding society that was invigorated by rapidly 
growing trade throughout the Renaissance. By the 13th century, northern and central 
Italy had become the most literate society in the world. At least one third of men and
65
a smaller but nonetheless significant number of women were able to read in 
vernacular languages.
During the 11th century in northern Italy the city state or commune had emerged as a 
new political and social structure. The civic culture that arose in those cities was 
extraordinary. In other places such as Britain and Flanders where communes had 
arisen they usually were merged into powerful monarchies as they emerged. Almost 
exceptionally they survived in northern and central Italy to become independent and 
powerful city states. Their breakaway from feudal lords had occurred in the late 12th 
and early 13th centuries during the Investiture Controversy between the Pope and 
Emperor. Milan led the Lombard cities against the Holy Roman Emperors to gain 
independence. Meanwhile Genoa and Venice were able to establish powerful naval 
empires on the Mediterranean. By the end of the 12th century a new and distinctive 
society had emerged that was rich, mobile and expanding. It had a mixed aristocracy 
that was interested in urban institutions and republican government. However many 
city-states had within them a violent society that was based on family, association and 
affiliations that destabilised cohesion. By 1300 most of these republics had become 
principalities dominated by a Lord {Signore). The exceptions included Florence, 
Lucca and Venice that remained republics despite an increasingly monarchic Europe.
The Children’s Crusades
At about the same time as waves of Mongol hordes were sweeping through Asia, the 
fifth to ninth, and final, ‘Crusades’ were fighting against Islamic rule of the ‘Holy 
Land’. The Crusades were, in fact, a series of military campaigns of a religious 
character waged by Christians from 1095-1291 (Riley-Smith, 2001: 66 and usually 
sanctioned by the Pope in the name of Christendom. The objective was to ‘liberate’ 
Jerusalem and the sacred ‘Holy Land’ and bring them back under Christian influence. 
They were originally called for19 in response to a plea from the Eastern Orthodox 
Byzantine Empire to help quell expansion of the Islamic Seljuq dynasty into 
Anatolia20. In the 13th century there were several crusades, two of them in 1212 were 
said to be ‘children’s crusades’.
Children’s Crusades were not exactly military campaigns but something more of the 
nature of popular uprisings that began in France and Germany. The probable intent
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was to march to the Holy Land in order to peacefully convert Moslems to 
Christianity. There appear to have been two movements of (young) people in France 
and Germany. Similarities between the two led to later chroniclers and consequently 
historians merging them into a single account. The first appears to have been led by 
Nicholas, a German shepherd from near Cologne, who led a group across the Alps 
into Italy during spring 1212 (Raedts, 1977: 279-323). About 7000 young crusaders 
reached Genoa in late August. Unfortunately their plans fell apart when the waters of 
the Mediterranean failed to part as they expected and the crusade disbanded. Some 
went home, others possibly to Rome and some allegedly travelled down the Rhone to 
Marseilles. It is said that some were sold into slavery. Only a few returned home and 
none ever reached the Holy Land.
During the same spring the story has it that in the middle of a field near Cloyes in 
France, a boy of 12 years called Stephen was tending sheep (see Runciman, 1951: 
139-144). A stranger who he recognised was Jesus, approached and spoke to Stephen. 
Jesus explained that the (adult) crusades had failed because the hearts of the soldiers 
were impure. He told Stephen to lead a new crusade of the most pure of believers - 
children. Stephen was promised that his crusade would succeed because the waters of 
the Mediterranean would part so they could cross directly to the Holy Land. Stephen 
went to Saint-Denis where he began to tell his story to anyone who would listen. The 
story had a profound effect. Crowds gathered, listened and allegedly had no problem 
believing that past crusades were tainted by impure hearts. They found the 
proposition that children might succeed where bad adults had failed reasonable.
By June 1212 30,000 children had gathered in Vendome located on a Roman road 
leading to the port of Marseilles. The large number of children appears to have 
marched to and fro in France until disease, exhaustion and disillusion depleted them 
to about 700. Two merchants ‘rescued’ the crusade and provided seven ships. During 
the voyage a storm wrecked two ships and all children including Stephen were lost. 
The remaining children were taken to Alexandria and sold into slavery. It was 
approximately 30 years before news of the children reached France, by which time it 
was far too late for them.
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By some accounts it was said that as many as 50,000 children set out in the combined 
French and German crusades, of those only around 10,000 were ever accounted for 
again. Nicholas was hung (Runciman, 1951: 142). Of course, we know little about the 
children. One possibility is that they were not children at all. In the early 13lh century 
bands of wandering poor appeared throughout Europe (see Zacour, 2005: 332-41 and 
Raedts, 1977). They were peasants displaced by economic change which compelled 
many poor people in France and Germany to sell their land. They were often referred 
to as pueri (Latin for ‘boys’) in a disdainful fashion by chroniclers which may have 
lent much of the substance to many of the stories. It would appear that bands of 
itinerant poor may have merged into a religious protest movement, thus transforming 
their enforced march into a ‘religious journey’. If the pueri marched behind the Cross 
and associated themselves to Christ’s journey in the Bible then it would have been 
very easy to call them ‘Crusaders’ in line with popular imagination of that time. In 
reality there is little consistency in any account of the Children’s Crusades and less to 
suggest they were children if any part of either account is at all true.
Medieval children
Some of the most valuable explanations of how children and youth lived in Western 
Europe appear in conduct books mainly written between 1300 and 1500. They tell us 
that two dominant behaviours of children are either ‘behaving’ or ‘misbehaving’. 
The books give an overview of how children and young people were perceived in 
various social and domestic situations since the literature describes the propagation of 
representative perceptions of the ‘ideal’ child. In early 14th century literature 
particularly, emphasis was on courteous behaviour and conduct of children as they 
carried out specific tasks. Those included serving in privileged households, how they 
used public spaces such as the street and how they interacted socially. That literature 
develops the notion of ideal behaviour of children characterised by the figure of male 
child servants who lived and worked within elite households. They generally 
expressed concern with behaviour through repetition of rules on manners, public 
conduct and how to follow a consistent set of procedures. Those would combine to 
exemplify the model ‘courteous’ child. A very good example is How the Goode Man 
Taght Hys Sone (Salisbury, 2002) that illustrates particularly well that sons were 
subject to the will and wishes of fathers rather than being, by any means, little adults. 
Another example is Symon’s Lesson o f Wisdom fo r all Manner o f Children (Opie and
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Opie, 1973:9) from circa 1500 that very precisely described how children were 
expected to conduct themselves and, above all, “worship they father and thy mother”.
St Anselm, Thomas Aquinas (1225- 1274) as well as other theologians and Christian 
philosophers gave rise to implications that filter right on through into the work of Kant 
and later Hegel. Is this a clear historical point for the end of the notion of ‘little adults’ 
and separable childhood and adulthood? Probably not since the readership of those 
books was limited to the essentially small number of people who were literate and had 
access to books in the first place.
There were boy bishops and Festivals of Misrule throughout the occidental Christian 
world. The custom of electing a boy bishop on the feast of St Nicholas dates (see for 
instance ecclesiastic website sources such as The Catholic Encyclopedia) from very 
early times and was in vogue in most Catholic countries, although chiefly in England. 
It prevailed in all larger monastic and scholastic establishments as well as many 
country parishes with the full consent of civil and ecclesiastical authorities. A boy 
bishop was selected from a monastery school, cathedral choir or pupils of a grammar 
school. He was elected on St Nicholas’s Day, 6 December, dressed in clerical 
vestments, followed in procession round the parish by his companions in priest’s 
robes to bless the people. He then occupied the church to officiate at all ceremonies 
and offices until Holy Innocents Day on 28 December.
In Scotland the Abbot of Unreason and in France the Prince des Sots was an officer 
appointed during Advent to preside over the Feast of Fools or Festival of Misrule. 
The Lord of Misrule was a boy appointed to be in charge of Christmas revelry, 
including drunkenness and wild parties as in the pagan Saturnalia. In England the 
custom was abolished by Henry VIII in 1512, restored by Queen Mary and again 
abolished by Elizabeth I. In practice it lingered on longer. Across mainland Europe it 
was suppressed by the Council of Basle in 1431 but revived in some places from time 
to time until as late as the 18th century. It was essentially no more than a symbolic 
office preceding Holy Innocents Day that conferred no real power on any boy.
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The Black Death
However, other forces contributed to change. A ruinous bubonic plague pandemic 
began in south-western Asia and spread to Europe where it appeared in Sicily in 
1347. It became known as the Black Death. Each successive wave of the plague 
killed between a quarter and two-thirds of Europe’s population21 and, including the 
Middle East, India and China is said to have killed at least 75 million people. The 
Black Death is thought to have reappeared in Europe roughly every generation with 
varying intensity and numbers of fatalities until disappearing from Europe during the 
18th century. The Black Death had a drastic effect on Europe’s population, 
irrevocably changing Europe’s social structure.
The plague brought radical reorganisation of the economy in its wake and in due 
course changes in the organisation of European society. In emergent urban centres the 
disasters of the 14th and early 15th century and consequential labour force shortages 
caused rapid drive for economic diversification and scientific innovation.
Subsequent to the Black Death the loss of life, famine and desertion of entire 
communities and previously productive agricultural land contributed to an 
intensification of capital accumulation in urban areas. This stimulated trade, industry 
and rapidly increasing urban populations in fields as diverse as banking, textiles and 
weapons. The Hundred Years’ War brought about a boom in production of 
armaments which also brought about growth in the making of iron and steel and thus 
the materials required for their manufacture. As recovery and success advanced the
th  00population grew back to its former levels by the early 16 century . A combination 
of a more than ample labour supply and improving productivity were a ‘mixed 
blessing’ for many sections of European society. Regardless of tradition some 
landlords began to remove peasants from ‘common’ and unenclosed land.
The emergence of mercantile capitalism and the Reformation
During the 14th and 15th centuries the most powerful Italian city states (Duggan, 1994: 
60ff), Florence, Milan and Venice, had been able to conquer other weaker city states 
thus creating regional states. In 1454 the Peace of Lodi had ended the struggle for 
hegemony in Italy and brought about a balance of power that was to largely persist 
until the unification of Italy in the 19th century. By the beginning of the 16th century
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and the period pertinent to this chapter only Venice was still able to fully preserve her 
independence and compete with the European monarchies of France and Spain or the 
Ottoman Empire. Nonetheless, the experiences of the Italian republics and the 
mercantile capitalism that had arisen and thrived within them were to be of great 
influence on economic development.
As trade became more successful landowners progressively moved away from the 
feudal economy. Wool production greatly expanded in England, France, Germany 
and the Netherlands and new textile industries began to expand. With the new 
‘mercantile capitalism’, the ‘humanism’ of the Renaissance enjoyed unprecedented 
academic interest. With it came disquiet about the lack of academic freedom. Intense 
theoretical debates came about in the universities that seriously questioned the nature 
of the church, the authority of the Pope and Vatican Councils and also of monarchies.
The Catholic Church faced a crisis in theology that commenced with William of 
Ockham (circa 1288-1348) in England during the 14th century that was taking place 
alongside communal discontent. Again in England, John Wycliffe (1320-1384) made 
an English translation of the Bible and spoke out against the authority of the Pope and 
monasticism. A little later, In Bohemia, Jan Hus (1369-1415) a follower of Wycliffe’s 
teachings challenged the authority of the papacy for which he was excommunicated 
in 1411, then tried and burned at the stake in 1415.
With the gradual collapse of philosophical fundamentals of scholasticism, 
nominalism replaced it with a doctrine that regarded abstract concepts or universals to 
have no independent existence other than as ‘names’. They threatened the existence 
of the established church whose legitimacy was based on its institution and clergy 
being the only mediator between man and God. A new argument emerged that 
preferred the notion that no religious doctrine can be proven by philosophical 
arguments. It thus made inroads into the previously unchallenged alliance between 
reason and faith expressed by Thomas Aquinas that had taken firm root in the 
medieval period. The Reformation was the outcome.
Martin Luther (1483-1546) finally inspired the Reformation and his theological work 
gave life to several major traditions that have collectively come to be known as
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Protestantism. With those changes the Peasant’s War (1524-25) began as a response 
to his teachings. Peasants’ revolts had occurred periodically since the 14th century. 
However some peasants erroneously believed that Luther’s attack on the established 
church would also lead to the downfall of the social hierarchy on the basis of his 
condemnation of the close relations between secular princes and those who were 
called princes of the church. Small revolts in Swabia, Franconia, and Thuringia in 
1524 gained support among peasants and nobles disaffected with their power and 
influence, often influenced by debts owed to both groups of princes.
The New World
At the same time the world was both changing and opening up very quickly. In Spain 
the Islamic Moorish conquest and occupation that began in 711-18 came to an end 
with the union of Castile and Aragon in 1479. The ensuing conquest of Granada in 
1492 and Navarre in 1512 brought most of Spain together as a single country. Spain 
and their neighbour Portugal also began extensive exploration of the globe.
In 1453 the Ottoman Empire under Mehmed II conquered Constantinople which 
became Istanbul, the capital of the entire empire. It was at its height of power during 
the 16th and 17th centuries, particularly during the rule of Suleyman I (the 
Magnificent) from 1520-66. The Empire covered three continents, dominated much 
of south-eastern Europe, the Middle East and North Africa. It extended from the 
Strait of Gibraltar (and in 1553 the Atlantic coast of North Africa beyond Gibraltar) 
in the west to the Caspian Sea and Persian Gulf in the east. It northern limits were the 
edge of Austria and Slovakia and the hinterland in the region of Ukraine to Sudan and 
Yemen at its southern limits. The Ottomans inherited aspects of both Roman and 
Islamic traditions with a ‘unification of cultures’ that to this day directly influences 
large parts of the ‘Mediterranean world’.
At its eastern edge was the Islamic Mughal Empire, which at its greatest territorial 
extent ruled most of the Indian subcontinent, known then as Hindustan, and parts of 
what are now Afghanistan and Pakistan. It was established in 1526 by the Timurid 
prince Babur, a descendant of Genghis Khan, expanded and consolidated until about 
1707 when it was at its zenith. It was a dominion of Islamic rule over Hindu and
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Buddhist subjects that shaped much of the region and incorporated values from each 
to form many of the social structures and values that persist to the present day.
Throughout the 15th century Portuguese explorers had already sailed the coast of 
Africa and set up trading posts as they searched for a route to India in order to bring 
back spices which were in high demand throughout Europe. During 1498 Vasco da 
Gama finally round the Cape of Good Hope, reached India and thus brought 
economic prosperity to Portugal. In 1500 Pedro Alvares Cabral landed in Brazil and 
claimed it for Portugal. Ten years on Afonso de Albuquerque occupied Goa in India, 
Ormuz in the Persian Strait and Malacca in what is now Malaysia. Consequently the 
Portuguese empire held dominion over commerce in the Indian Ocean and South 
Atlantic. Don Cristobal Colon (Christopher Columbus) set out on voyages across the 
Atlantic in order to find the Indies from the opposite direction and began a 
determined European venture to explore and colonise the Americas. Although history 
places great emphasis on his first voyage of 1492, he did not in fact reach the 
mainland until his third voyage of 1498. At more or less the same time Ferdinand 
Magellan, a Portuguese explorer in the service of Spain, led the first successful 
attempt to circumnavigate the world. Thus, not only the social environment but also 
the space in which changes would occur began to become greater.
The changing world of children
The impact on children was little visited by contemporaries and generally largely 
unknown. What is certain is that very few of them made noticeable impact as 
Protestantism took hold and more devout groups such as those known as ‘Calvinists’ 
flourished. Children became more subject to adult authority than previously since it 
was the duty of adults, out of whose sin children were bom, to teach them 
righteousness and piety. In the Protestant world, Marianism was mainly discarded 
with its veneration and admiration of Mary as the spiritually immaculate and eternally 
giving mother of the Christ child and the baby Jesus who was the embodiment of 
godliness and purity. Thus one a cornerstone of belief that had once guided the view 
of what and how children should be became unfashionable.
On the other hand, conduct books and changing values of ‘behaviour’ and 
‘misbehaviour’ indicate a shift in perceptions of childhood in late medieval Europe as
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the Reformation began. Compared to the idealised behaviour of the type the conduct 
books prescribed, late 15th century literature shows growing concern with identifying 
misbehaviour as an indicator of the child’s moral nature and character. That was 
combined with a diminution of the importance of superficial ‘courteous’ behaviour in 
children’s overall actions.
Throughout much of the world little is known about children, although we can often 
see that many traditions have continued for almost as long as the entirety of history 
covered in both periods. With exploration, conquest and eventual Christian 
missionary activity vast parts of the ‘New World’ were drawn under the influence of 
a Western notion of childhood and, thus, what a child should be and how they 
conduct themselves as children. This, in turn, has also had varying amounts of 
influence on parts of the world that were not themselves under the power of European 
colonial powers. There are no precise universal standards to describe citizenship 
which makes this manner of search for what may at the very least provide a clue to a 
shared understanding of children as citizens. However there are also no apparent local 
standards other than those measured against occidental principles.
The transition from 15th into 16th centuries marks the end of the ancient to pre-modem 
period in which about 2000 years of childhood has been considered. There have been 
a very few children who have found a place in history about whom we have a 
consistent and comprehensive knowledge. There are many more who are of uncertain 
provenance (e.g.: the rise of Genghis Khan as a ‘young’ leader or the Children’s 
Crusades). There is little to suggest that in whatever form citizenship can be 
extrapolated out of the societies considered in this ‘thumbnail’ history that it was ever 
inclusive of children. Where there is divergence from modern-day standards is in that 
the transition from childhood to adulthood was often earlier. Thus, age 14 years 
would perhaps not refer to a child but a young adult which may colour contemporary 
versions of those we remember for their youth. Nevertheless, when we look at the 
ancient European world particularly, childhood in Greek and Roman civilisations 
does not look so much different to the modem world when we look at when (and 
occasionally how) the transition from youth to full adulthood actually occurred.
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Chapter Five: The emergence of childhood -  from the Enlightenment 
to modern world of childhood
There was a changing perception of children during the 16th and 17th centuries in 
Europe. During the 16th century the Protestant Reformation supplanted the Catholic 
Church and its rituals with a sterner form of faith that emphasised the sinfulness of 
children. Therewith children and parents no longer had the reassurance of 
understanding that baptism would spare children the torment of Hell if they died in 
infancy. Devout parents were urged to bring children to acknowledge their sins and 
the need for salvation by clerics. They were bom out of sin into sin and needed to be 
taught the ways of righteousness. The increasing availability of the printed word made 
catechisms the preferred method of bringing children to the knowledge of God. Adults 
posed questions and children learned appropriate responses by rote. Parents could 
never start this too early with a catechism even for children “that are not past the 
breast yet” and behaviour books of around 400 pages for five year olds.
Some parents consequently lived in a situation of angst unequalled until the present. 
That was without considering the situation of children themselves (for instance, see 
deMause, 1974: 51 and Aries, 1962; 379)). Parents’ unease about bringing up children 
was greater than in the past and undoubtedly began to mark out different ages at 
which childhood ended and conflicts this could cause. Many poor children would then 
have been earning a living full time at six or seven years of age although ‘better o ff 
boys might still be in full-time education at age 14. The period saw the expansion of 
boys’ education and an astonishing volte-face in attitudes to girls’ education that 
defied the established (Roman Catholic) Christian doctrine.
Economic expansion
There was a great deal of change in Europe which in economic history is known as 
the Commercial Revolution. It was a period of European rapid economic expansion, 
colonialism and mercantilism that lasted from approximately 1520 until 1650. This 
change was partially influenced by the commercial success of the Italian city states 
but also by a policy of expansion through acquisition of new territories that earlier 
voyages of discovery had opened. The voyages of discovery of the late 15th into 16th 
centuries allowed some European nations to begin to accumulate vast networks of 
international trade. In turn that generated a great deal of wealth that went into
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circulation throughout Europe. Initially the rapidly growing global economy was 
based on silver which allowed the purchase of goods (for instance: silk, spices and 
other goods from the Far East) that Europeans wanted. However, they possessed 
nothing of comparable valuable for which to exchange it until vast amounts of silver 
coinage and bullion were found for payment. This drove exploration of newly 
discovered territories in which silver and gold could be found. An important outcome 
of Europe’s commercial revolution was accrual of the basis of the wealth that led to 
the Industrial Revolution.
The large amount of money caused widespread inflation, widening the already wide 
gap between rich and poor. Inflation was worsened by a growing population but 
stagnant production, low wages and a rapidly rising cost of living. This, when 
combined with overpopulation, affected agriculture profoundly. The landholding 
aristocracy also suffered under inflation because they were dependent on fixed rents 
paid by peasant tenants who were fast becoming poorer and unable to pay. Botched 
attempts were made by the aristocracy to offset diminishing income by setting up 
short term leases of land in order to allow periodic reassessment of rent. The manorial 
system dwindled and aristocratic landowners were forced to sell pieces of land in 
order to maintain their standard of living. This attracted a new rich bourgeois who 
wished to buy land to improve their social status.
Common land was gradually being enclosed by landed bourgeois who increased the 
efficiency of stock breeding. Enclosure made food production more efficient and less 
labour intensive, thus forcing the surplus population who could no longer find 
employment in agriculture into cottage industries such as weaving. In the longer term, 
this pushed them into growing towns and cities and newly developing factories. 
Initially, wool from growing numbers of well husbanded sheep fed quickly expanding 
textile production. That eventually became one of the most important components of 
the impending Industrial Revolution.
The European economic centre relocated from the Islamic eastern Mediterranean to 
Western Europe (Portugal, Spain, France, the Netherlands and England). Following 
circumnavigation of the Cape of Good Hope, the new eastern trade ended the 
monopoly of the Ottoman Turks and their competitors the Italian city states. Portugal
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came to control trade between east and west and later the (then) Dutch city of 
Antwerp which had one of the first currency exchanges in Europe.
One of the outcomes of this rapid expansion was the growth of something that was to 
shape parts of the modem world. That was the transatlantic slave trade. The traffic of 
slaves from Africa to the Americas originated around 1500 during the early modem 
period of European exploration of West Africa and setting up colonies in the 
Caribbean, South and North America. It is estimated that 11 to 12 million men, 
women and children were transported in ships across the Atlantic to various ports in 
the New World. Most went to South America and the Caribbean between 1500 and 
1850. In the Americas, slavery played an important role in economic development, 
with slaves planting and harvesting cash crops and working on construction of 
buildings and roads as well as performing domestic duties.
As the early exploration of the New World moved forward the conquest of native 
people and often their enslavement followed. In the Spanish Americas the native 
population dropped when diseases they had never previously suffered arrived and 
rapidly depleted them. That is when the importation of African slaves began. The 
liberalisation of trade from a large merchant base may have allowed parts of Europe 
to produce and utilise emerging scientific and technological developments more 
effectively than countries with robust monarchies and aristocracies who were still 
essentially feudal. For children also, the changes in distribution of people around the 
world, the conversion of many of them to Christianity and introduction to European 
economic, social and political structures as well as social and economic changes in 
the Western world were bringing changes. Those were to give the world the 
beginnings of what universal notions of childhood are considered to be today.
A period of unrest
People were beginning to show disquiet with their situation in Europe. In the spring 
of 1517 the Bundshuh movement arose and rebelled on account of a harsh period of 
by the aristocracy. Castles were ruined, aristocrats slain and expanses of the 
countryside devastated throughout three months of uprisings. The Emperor 
Maximilian stayed his hand throughout the episode and appeared favourable to the 
cause of the peasants as long as they only punished the most avaricious aristocrats.
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Thereafter as peasant ‘armies’ disbanded and the remainder degenerated into 
marauding bands he sent a few hundred knights to end the disorder. Little compassion 
was shown to fugitives and brutal executions followed. Additionally, heavy 
reparation was demanded from the entire peasantry in the form of a perpetual tax. The 
conflict was mostly in southern, western and central areas of what is now Germany 
and parts of modem Switzerland and Austria. At its height in the spring and summer 
of 1525 it involved about 300,000 peasant rebels. Contemporary estimates put 
fatalities at 100,000. The revolt in the Krain (Slovenia) lasted longest and was 
suppressed with most bloodshed. Those in Styria and Karinthia (Austria) came to an 
end sooner with far less disastrous results for people who had been involved.
The bad feeling was to continue in Europe. During 1524 and 1525 the Peasants’ War 
began. It was Europe’s most massive and widespread popular uprising before the 
1789 French Revolution. The strife consisted of a series of economic as well as 
religious revolts by peasants, townsfolk and the aristocracy without common 
objectives. It was not only in Germany or elsewhere in Central Europe that discontent 
was perceptible among peasant populations at the beginning of the 16th century. In 
England expropriation of land to make room for sheep farms gave occasion for 
periodical local disturbances that culminated in 1549 in Wymondham in England 
where Robert Kett led a rebellion.
The period of economic hardship and recovery
At that time much of Europe was facing severe economic hardship. In England, in the 
region of 80% of income was used to purchase food. Wages were lower than before 
and falling. In 1559 they were 60% less than in 1509. There were consecutive harvest 
failures following heavy rains in 1556 and 1557 and an outbreak of ‘sweating 
sickness’ during 1551 and 1552. Epidemics in 1556 and 1558 reduced the population 
by 200,000 (6%), with the death rate at twice its normal level (see Livi-Bacci, 2000). 
It has been argued by historians (for instance Rosenwein, 2001) that the long period 
of population expansion during the Middle Ages was brought to an end by either a 
Malthusian ‘positive check23’ at the end of the 13th century or by the ‘exogenous’ 
intercession of the Black Death in 1347-50. However, population expansion is part of 
a continuum that lasted up to the end of the 19th century during which there were 
obstacles, some of them direct consequences of development. When labour was
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depleted after an epidemic, famine or war starvation, malnutrition and lower birth 
rates, there was often a relatively immediate outcome. However, as the situation 
improved, standards of living and wages rose. Labour shortages demanded increased 
use of all available people including children. In rural economies all labour inputs 
were required to maintain economies. Much has been made of the situation of 
working children in the early part of the Industrial Revolution. Large scale industrial 
manufacturing and mining appeared only in the late 18th century and children began 
to be removed from workplaces by the mid-19th century. In fact, children in Western 
Europe were only engaged in heavy industrial labour for around a century, which is 
only a small part of the period this research looks at. Here we find what such authors 
as Aries may have misread as periods when it was difficult to distinguish between 
adults and children.
During the 15th century, European recovery became general with rapid population 
growth and relative prosperity. Urbanisation increased exponentially and 
mercantilism replaced what had previously been a more sedentary rural economy. 
Religious war, plague and economic upheaval changed much of that. The Italian city 
states never recovered and the ascendancy passed to Northern Europe particularly the 
Hanseatic cities of the North Sea. Growth was steady until 1700 when improving 
technology, expanding sea routes and growing cities began to change rural agrarian 
production systems toward capitalism and imperialism. The Netherlands, Great 
Britain and France became powerful and increasingly ambitious about acquisition of 
new colonies. Between 1750 and 1845 there was extensive population growth, with 
about half of the world population in Europe (250 millions). Spain at first and then 
Portugal began to decline in influence beginning with liberation wars throughout 
Latin America in the 19th century.
New philosophies that include children
In the middle of the 17th Hobbes, the philosopher and political theorist turned his 
attention to the evils of ‘the state of nature’ in his argument for absolute rule in his 
best known work Leviathan. The problems of social organisation included some 
consideration of the ‘ownership’ of the child. His work, including his consideration of 
children, exerted a continuing influence on later thinkers (see also Chapter Six).
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Children finally became the focus of new thought as the 17th century ended and the 
18th century began. The impact of two great philosophers, John Locke and Jean- 
Jacques Rousseau, on children and their vastly differing views of childhood began to 
change perceptions of whom and what children were. In 1693 John Locke published 
Some Thoughts Concerning Education which was for many years probably the most 
influential British book on childhood. Its origins hardly suggested this.
Locke had been tutor to a number of aristocratic children and on the basis of this 
experience wrote some letters to a relative on child rearing. These circulated and 
eventually Locke was persuaded to publish them. Locke, unlike the Puritans of the 
16th and 17th centuries, was not apparently concerned with children’s salvation. His 
concern was with suggesting ways of inculcating good habits into children that would 
last for life. The way to do this was neither through corporal punishment nor through 
frightening them, but taking reason as the means: “the Principle of all Vertue and 
Excellency lies in a power of denying ourselves the satisfaction of our own Desires, 
where Reason does not authorize them” (§ 38.). The first thing infants should learn, 
according to Locke, is that they should not have something simply because they like it 
but because it is deemed good for them. He also thought that learning should be fun 
and children and they “...must be tenderly us’d24...” (Locke, 1971:19). He also 
appreciated that each child should have his (or her?) own “natural genius and 
constitution” (Locke, 1971:27).
John Locke’s book was comparable with the work of Benjamin Spock in the 20th 
century in that he comforted parents and described a clear schema. In that he claimed 
that “nine parts of ten” (Locke, 1971:4) of how a child develops into the adult, for 
“Good or Evil, useful or not” {Ibid.), will be the result of education and upbringing. 
This was the age of the development of a gentler and more affectionate type of family 
life. The life of the child in the bosom of the ‘protective’ family was established.
For something in the region of half a century Locke’s book held a place of enormous 
influence throughout Europe and North America as well as in Britain. It was 
eventually challenged by Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s Emile (1762). Rousseau believed 
that the problem with Locke rested in his fixation on the adult to be rather than on the 
child. He was conceivably the first intellectual to be at least convincingly ‘child- 
centred’. He wrote that we should not reason with children but let them learn from
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things, ideally from nature rather than teachers. Rousseau therewith laid a foundation 
for the Romantic poets in the late 18th and early 19th centuries and for a number of 
philosophical and moral stances on children during the 20th century. It was only a 
single small step from arguing that a child should learn from nature to postulating that 
a child might gain access to the natural world in a manner that was normally 
inaccessible for unhappy adults.
New economic thought
Economic analysis of the period generally disregarded children however Adam Smith 
(1723-90) noticed the conditions of some in his native Scotland. He was one of the 
major figures in the intellectual movement known as the Scottish Enlightenment and 
for his treatise: An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes o f the Wealth o f Nations 
(1776, here ‘The Wealth o f Nations', 1973) It was one of the earliest attempts to 
methodically study the historical development of industry and commerce in Europe 
and attempt a sustained attack on the doctrine of mercantilism. His work was a 
foundation of the modem academic discipline of free market economics. It offered 
one of the best-known components of the intellectual raison d'etre for capitalism, 
free trade and libertarianism. His treatise was so successful that it led to the refutation 
of earlier economic schools. Much of his work reflected his knowledge of the 
Scottish economy and it is here he noticed the situation of children: “poverty (...) is 
unfavourable to the rearing of children” (Smith, 1973:182).
He was critical of working conditions of the common people that did not allow them 
a state in which children would grow to maturity. In what is essentially an argument 
for better pay and a larger labour force that child survival would bring, he says that: 
“(The) liberal reward of labour (...) enabling them to provide better for their children, 
and consequently to bring up a greater number...” {Ibid.). Later economists such as 
Mai thus refined his theory into what is now known as classical economics.
Thomas Malthus (1766-1834) was an avid disciple of Jean-Jacques Rousseau and 
David Hume, both of whom he knew. In his Essay on Population (1798) he 
hypothesised that unchecked population growth always exceeds the growth of the 
means of subsistence. Actual, or ‘checked’, population growth is kept in line with 
food supply growth by ‘positive and preventive checks’ both of which are
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exemplified by ‘misery and vice’. His hypothesis inferred that actual population 
always has a tendency to exceed food supply. Thus any attempt to improve the 
condition of lower classes by increasing incomes or improving agricultural 
productivity would be futile. The additional means of subsistence would be entirely 
absorbed by the boost in population it caused. He saw three elements at the root of 
this situation: the overproduction of children, incapability of resources to remain 
abreast of the rising human population and recklessness of the lower classes. He 
suggested the family size of the lower class ought to be regulated so that they did not 
produce more children than they could support.
That, of course, does not conform to Smith’s proposition and certainly countervails 
Rousseau’s ideas. In contradiction to his views it may be argued that a high rate of 
population that is rapidly increasing meant a high rate of innovation. The extreme 
exception in his time was Ireland. It had the fastest growth in Europe in 18th century 
following the introduction and widespread cultivation of the potato. In the 19th 
century that was to see its greatest ever population crisis during the Great Famine. 
Starvation, disease and mass emigration saw the population of Ireland reduced by 20 
to 25% between 1845 and 1852. About a million people died, many of them children, 
and a million more emigrated to England, Scotland, Australia, Canada, and the USA.
One of the harshest critics of Malthusian principles was Robert Owen (1771-1858) 
who believed in far more positive ways that people were the product of their 
environment. That nurtured his support for education and labour reform making him a 
pioneer in the promotion of investment in human capital. A general malaise and trade 
stagnation as a consequence of the end of the Napoleonic Wars was gripping the 
United Kingdom. Thus he considered the special causes connected with the wars that 
led to the execrable situation. He noticed that the permanent cause of distress could 
be found in the contest between human labour and machinery with an effective 
remedy in the united action of men and subordination of machinery.
He advocated social inclusion and early intervention at the beginning of the 19th 
century when he stated that the community he created would accommodate more than 
just the children of New Lanark. Anyone in nearby Lanark or thereabouts who could 
not afford to educate their children would be able to send them to his school where:
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They would receive the same care and attention as those who belong to 
the establishment. Nor will there be any distinction made between the 
children of those parents who are deemed the worst, and of those who 
may be esteemed the best members of society: indeed I would prefer to 
receive the offspring of the worst, if they shall be sent at an early age; 
because they really require more of our care and pity and by well-training 
these, society will be more essentially benefited than if the like attention 
were paid to those whose parents are educating them in comparatively 
good habits. (Address to the Inhabitants of New Lanark, 1 January 1816)
This was part of his proposition on the remedy of poverty. Communities of about
1200 persons would need to be settled on parcels of land from 1000 to 1500 acres.
Everybody lived in a large building in the form of a square that had a communal
kitchen and dining rooms. Families would live in private apartments and have care of
the children until the age of three. Thereafter they should be brought up by the
community, although parents could see them at mealtimes and on other occasions.
The notion was that the communities could be established by individuals, parishes,
counties or state. Supervision would be by suitably qualified persons. Work and its
rewards would be a common good. Education and inclusion were the keys to the
success of this plan:
It is therefore, the interest of all, that every one, from birth, should be well 
educated, physically and mentally, that society may be improved in its 
character, - that everyone should be beneficially employed, physically and 
mentally, that the greatest amount of wealth may be created, and 
knowledge attained, - that everyone should be placed in the midst of those 
external circumstances that will produce the greatest number of 
pleasurable sensations, through the longest life, that man may be made 
truly intelligent, moral and happy, and be thus prepared to enter upon the 
coming Millennium.
(A Development of the Principles & Plans on which to establish self- 
supporting Home Colonies, 1841)
What he was describing was what should be referred to as an intentional community. 
It is a planned residential community planned and operated so that it has a higher 
degree of collaboration amongst members than other communities. They usually 
share responsibilities and resources. Members typically hold common social, political 
or religious beliefs and are often considered part of alternative society.
Those communities include co-housing communities and cooperatives, communes, 
eco-villages, residential land trusts, retreats, kibbutzim and ashrams. Members are 
selected by a community’s active membership and whilst many attempt to live in a
83
‘different’ and ‘improved’ circumstance to the rest of society they do not tend to 
claim to be ‘Utopias’. Children are often treated very much as in Owen’s vision, 
indeed are often far more autonomous and allowed to share decision-making. 
However there is often a great deal of emphasis on a childhood unspoiled by adult 
influences (for instance see McLaughlin, and Davidson, 1990: 187-216). Owen’s 
ideas were to be of great influence on Karl Marx. Apart from a few idealised and 
usually short lived communal experiments from that time to the present, those 
egalitarian and inclusive ideas have never really come to fruition.
Children in literature
With the end of the 18th and beginning of 19th centuries the impact of British poets on 
childhood through works such as those of William Blake and William Wordsworth 
further ‘softened’ hearts and minds toward children. When we examine the transition 
into the Victorian age, we find a period in which some children were allowed to live 
out the dream of a romantic childhood. On the other hand, the conditions of life in a 
rapidly industrialising and urbanising Europe gave an appearance that many were 
‘children without childhood’. Those children were predestined to long hours of work 
and their lives were far from the nature that the Romantics so highly valued.
Critical authors such as Mayhew, Dickens, Kingsley, Twain, Anderson and numerous 
others used fiction and/or journalism as a means of exposing the situation of children. 
Briefly mentioned in the Introduction is a related trend whereby Dominique Julia 
(2004:85) identifies three illustrative representations of childhood that emerged 
toward the end of the 18th century and was to endure well on into the 20th century.
In literature and current affairs three romantic figures of childhood were drawn into 
popular imagination. The first was the abandoned child who is reared by animals (i.e.: 
Victor25, Mowgli or Tarzan). Victor’s discovery fortuitously came toward the end of 
the Enlightenment when many intellectuals were debating what exactly distinguished 
man from animal. A prevalent enquiry of the time was about the human ability to 
learn language. It was hoped that by studying Victor they might discover the answer. 
Mowgli26 and Tarzan27 are examples of the same genre who also possess 
extraordinary powers and skills much like those in the third group.
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The second group was child prodigies. Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart (1756-91) is 
perhaps the most well known example in general. The German mathematician Carl 
Friedrich Gauss (1777-1855), Irish mathematician and physicist, William Rowan 
Hamilton (1805 -1865) and English composer, organist and artist William Crotch 
(1775- 1847) are probably his equal in their respective areas and creativity. In the 
oriental world child priests and deities such as Tibetan lamas and living gods have 
been attributed similar prodigious spiritual qualities. Siddhartha Gautama (the 
Buddha) is said to have had the enlightenment that led to his later life as a youth and 
in Hinduism more than a few gods such as Rama appear to have become divine whilst 
they were still very young.
The third was child heroes who were mainly fictional figures, including such 
characters as Petit Gavroche28, Jack Dawkins29or Huckleberry Finn30 who often 
possessed extraordinary skills and occasionally almost superhuman powers. They do 
things that adults would not normally do or dare that are both considered childish 
because of the risks but heroic and mature because of their courage and fortitude. 
Surprisingly, there are few accounts of real ‘child heroism’ in the 17th to 20th 
centuries. It appears that with exceptions of examples like Hugo’s fictional Petit 
Gavroche, children usually take the role of victim and frequently the nameless victim.
Despite the number of wars and the role of the hero as a model for society, it would 
seem that heroism was a matter for adults and reserved almost exclusively for men. 
Jack Cornwell, although 16 years old when he died (Unknown author, 1918), 
volunteered to serve in the Royal Navy and became Boy Seaman First Class after 
basic training. He received further training as a Sight Setter or Gun Layer. After the 
Battle of Jutland in which his ship, the Chester, was engaged and seriously damaged, 
Cornwell was found to be sole survivor at his gun. There were shards of steel in his 
chest, but he was still looking through his gun sights and waiting for further orders. 
He died three days later in Grimsby General Hospital. Later that year his mother 
received his posthumous Victoria Cross. His example is quite unique and has also 
something of the boy hero that has been used to describe a particular British type of 
courage and devotion to duty. It has, however, little apparent appeal outside of the 
sphere of British influence.
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Crossovers like Mowgli or Tarzan bridge the gap between the ‘wild’ children and 
‘heroes’ and have some of the promise of the prodigies. Various forms of this vision 
of childhood persisted well into the 20th century when film stars such as Jackie 
Coogan, Shirley Temple, Judy Garland and Mickey Rooney often seemed to bring 
many of those characteristics together through both their acting skills and the 
characters they portrayed. This is part of the history of childhood that has implanted a 
notion of a ‘golden child’ that supports an earlier view of the indistinguishable nature 
of children and adults espoused by those who believe in a ‘golden age’.
At the other end of the spectrum were children whose lives were less exciting and 
certainly neither privileged nor exceptional. Literature also contributes here. Henry 
Mayhew31 described many urban children’s miserable lives as a critical journalist and 
Dickens contributed very revealing caricatures of lives and attitudes in several of his 
books32. In the harsh industrial world in particular, Victorian reformers such as Lord 
Ashley, Mary Carpenter or Dr Bamardo in the UK set themselves the undertaking of 
rebuilding childhood for those who were effectively missing out on it.
In the USA ‘child savers’ were more concerned with delinquency but also contributed 
to changes in attitudes and practice toward young people (Platt, 1977). It was felt that 
children should be protected from the adult world of work and responsibility. They 
should become and thus remain dependent on adults with their time apportioned 
between home and school.
The ideal was that they should be happy, which was something that has since been 
particularly associated with childhood. Childhood was idealised as a kind of garden 
that was protected by walls and hedges and where nature throve flawlessly. In reality 
few parents attained or even wished for this kind of childhood for their children. The 
better off put their children into the care of governesses and later sent them to 
boarding schools. For the majority of working classes poverty meant that a child had 
to contribute to the family economy as soon as possible, which the law allowed.
Although there was a removal of children from the labour force from about the 1850s 
onward, compulsory and universal education from the 1870s onwards generally had 
to be imposed by force of law (for example, see Davin, 1996). The economic value of
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children was changing from one of the child as a contributor, to one of the ‘property’ 
of the parents and, to a point, the state who invested in the child as a future asset 
(Zelizer, 1985).
Education
Education was another key element in the changing status of children. It is not an 
exclusively European notion, but in its present form largely owes much to western 
formats. When the Church of Scotland was established in 1560, a year later it 
followed up by setting out to provide schools in every parish controlled by the local 
kirk session. Education was to be provided free for the poor and it has hoped that 
pressure by the church would assure that all children took part. In 1633 the Scottish 
Parliament introduced a local tax to fund it. Schooling was not free for everybody, 
however the tax kept fees low and the church and charities financed poor students.
This was substantially successful, although late in the 18th century some parishes had 
grown so much that there was a growing role for ‘adventure schools’ that were 
funded through fees and religious charities. In 1872 education for all children aged 
five to 13 was made compulsory through ‘public schools’ (in Scotland that meant for 
the general public) run by local school boards. Leaving age was raised to 14 years in 
1883 and a Leaving Certificate Examination introduced in 1888 to set a national 
standard for secondary education. General school fees were brought to an end in 1890 
(see Smout, 1972, and Devine, 2006: 389-412).
In 1833 the United Kingdom government budgeted for the construction of schools for 
poor children which was when the state became involved with education in England 
and Wales unlike Scotland that began in 1561. The Elementary Education Act 1880 
made education compulsory from age five to 10 years. The Elementary Education 
(School Attendance) Act 1893 raised leaving age to 11 and a little later to 13. The 
Elementary Education (Blind and Deaf Children) Act the same year gave compulsory 
education to blind and deaf children with provision for special schools (Green, 1990).
During the 18th century Prussia was probably the first country in the world to 
introduce free and universally compulsory primary education. Historically, 
Lutheranism had a strong influence on German culture including education and
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Luther himself had advocated compulsory schooling. It consisted of eight years of 
primary schooling (Volksschule). It provided the skills needed in the early 
industrialised world through reading, writing, and arithmetic but also a strict 
education in ethics, duty, discipline, and obedience. At that stage the general 
population had almost no access to secondary education. In 1810, after the 
Napoleonic Wars, the Prussians introduced state certification of teachers which 
considerably raised standards. The leaving examination (Abitur) was introduced in 
1788, compulsory in all Prussian secondary schools in 1812 and extended to all of 
Germany in 1871. With unification in 1871 the school system was centralised. More 
secondary schools were opened and the state assumed the sole right to set standards 
and supervise recently established schools. At the beginning of the 20th century, four 
types of schools were given equal rank and privilege, thus ending what had 
previously been a class based system. Even then, the different types did not mean that 
they were of equal prestige. The divisions were retained in order to allow a small 
corridor of difference in which the distinction between those educated to be the ruling 
elite varied, down to those destined to be the rump of all echelons of the national 
labour force.
With the enthronement of the Meiji in 1868, the new leadership of Japan set out on 
rapid course of modernisation. It included establishment of a public education system 
designed to enable Japan to catch up with the rapidly industrialising West and 
develop a modem nation. The influence of education in England, Germany and the 
USA and initially the ‘liberal’ education of the latter shaped what was to become a 
conservative but dynamic system by the end of the 19th century.
Italy had a state-wide school system from 1859 when the Legge Casati (Casati Act) 
authorised educational responsibility for the imminent Italian state (unification was 
completed in 1861). The Legge Casati made primary education compulsory with the 
prime intent of reducing illiteracy. Control of primary education was devolved to 
single towns and cities, secondary education to Regioni (counties) and the 
universities to the State. Part of the task was to standardise Italian identity through 
education using a common language which had hitherto consisted of dialects and 
distinct languages. It was also very progressive and whilst very slow in achieving
education for all Italian children, it was equally delivered to boys and girls and 
attempted to offer schooling to others previously excluded.
In 1898 Maria Montessori gave a lecture at an Educational Congress in Turin on the 
topic of education and training of the disabled. The serving Minister of Education 
was at the lecture and was so impressed by her compelling arguments that the same 
year he appointed her director of the Scuola Ortofrenica. It was an institution 
dedicated to the care and education of the mentally backward. She accepted the post 
so that she could put her theories to proof. Her first outstanding success was that 
several of her eight year old pupils applied to take the state examinations in reading 
and writing.
The ‘defective’ children not only passed but did so with marks above average. After 
her success with these children she was invited to start a school for children in a poor 
housing project in Rome in 1907. She called it the Casa dei Bambini (Children’s 
House). The Casa dei Bambini was essentially a child care centre in an apartment 
building where she focused on teaching her pupils ways of developing their own 
skills at their own pace. It was a principle she called ‘spontaneous self-development’ 
(see Montessori, 1964). The success of the Casa dei Bambini prompted the opening 
of many others and worldwide interest in her methods of education and philosophy of 
the meaning of childhood. She was very well informed about educational 
developments and the ideological propositions behind many other nations’ views of 
children and uniquely for her time saw children as bearers of rights.
The century of the child
This was followed by the 20th century that was loudly proclaimed at its outset to be 
‘the century of the child’ (see Aries, 1962). What this meant, was acknowledgment of 
the future of any nation being dependent on the wellbeing and preparation of its 
children. There were numerous positive facets to this new creed of ‘welfarism’. The 
so-called child sciences that included paediatrics and parts of psychology and 
psychiatry came to be publicly acknowledged and formally established practical and 
theoretical disciplines. Child health received serious attention. So did education. 
There were some ambitious campaigns to relieve children from poverty with 
measurable success in the Family Allowances Act of 1946 in the UK. Elsewhere
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children began to receive equally successful attention as the principles of welfarism 
disseminated universally (Shinwell, 1963:167). One of the initial responses was the 
reaction to the suffering of children during and in the wake of the First World War 
and a growth in charitable work with children (See also Chapter Seven on Englantyne 
Jebb and Save the Children).
Early in the 20th century, science was held forth that the key to the future could be 
seen through such examples as the work of child psychologist Cyril Burt. In the 
1920s he claimed that: “superintending the growth of human beings is as scientific a 
business as cultivating plants or training a race horse” (See Chapter Seven). It was a 
notion that bore the hallmark of Freud’s acceptance of the tabula rasa idea. Many 
parents then seemed badly prepared for the task. Burt, at roughly the same time, 
notably ascertained that girls were equal to boys in general intelligence which was a 
change from beliefs prevalent since the Edwardian era.
Thus, throughout the 1920s and 1930s behaviourism dominated child rearing with the 
stress on producing obedient children. A backlash against behaviourism during the 
1940s that has lasted to the present probably did little to alleviate the fear of 
consequences of ‘maternal deprivation’ and relieve the trepidation of parents (See 
The Curtis Report, 1946). However, rising standards of living mid-century permitted 
parents to commence investment of hopes and resources in children on a previously 
unprecedented scale. A question arises about this period’s influence on where 
children stand today. For instance, does it contribute to an assumed understanding of 
‘the evolving capacities o f the child’ expressed in Article 5 of the CRC or in a 
broader view of what children can and cannot do?
The relationship between authoritarian parents and children changed so that from the 
1960s onwards children began to acquire new rights in relation to the state and 
families. What had happened was that childhood itself appears to have in numerous 
ways become longer and somehow ‘safer’ and children attained better status within 
both family and society generally. However, in its distinctness childhood has become 
so very different from adulthood. The notion of the child as a citizen with rights, 
responsibilities and any form of contribution comparable with those of adults was 
clearly an aspiration rather than a possibility. The early part of that period saw some
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efforts toward changing the status quo. The ‘children’s liberation’ movement was 
overtly occupied with establishing equal status between adults and children. What 
was at first covert, became increasingly evident very quickly, which was that it was 
occasionally very manipulative. Advocacy of sexual liberation, for example, of 
children sometimes blurred into attempts to justify paedophilia. That probably had far 
more to do with the power relationship between knowing and occasionally 
‘predatory’ adults and learning and ‘vulnerable’ children in many cases.
Child protection
The backlash against the negative aspects of children’s liberation and also the growth 
of greater attention to abuse and neglect phenomena that owed much to Henry 
Kempe’s work began to more sharply define the need for protection. In 1958 Kempe 
and his colleagues Elizabeth Boardman and Betty Elmer created the Child Protection 
Team at the Colorado General Hospital in Denver. In 1961 Kempe, Brandt Steele and 
other colleagues made their first presentation entitled The Battered Child Syndrome, 
(see Kempe and Heifer, 1974, and Kempe, Silverman, Steele, Droegemuller and 
Silver, 1962) in Chicago at a meeting of the American Academy of Pediatrics. It was 
also a very open acknowledgement of the universal nature of the phenomenon, 
something borne out by the extent of membership and regional sub-grouping of the 
International Society fo r  Prevention o f Child Abuse and Neglect (ISPCAN) in 1977. 
However, despite the widespread concern with the topic, the ‘discovery’ of child 
abuse has had some negative consequences for children.
The true nature and extent of the ‘new’ discovery during the 1960s and 70s is 
exemplified by the English experience. In 1884 the Reverend Benjamin Waugh had 
founded the National Society for the Prevention o f Cruelty to Children (NSPCC) in 
England. George Staite had begun this work in Liverpool in 1883, which in turn had 
been inspired when Thomas Agnew had visited the New York Society for the 
Prevention o f Cruelty to Children in 1881 (see also Chapter Seven). Harry Ferguson 
(1993) completed his doctoral thesis, Protecting children in time: a historical 
sociological study o f the abused child and child protection in Cleveland from 1880 to 
the ‘Cleveland Affair’ o f 1987, that charted over a century of usually unpublicised 
data about children held by the NSPCC. 1993 was also the year that the murder of
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three year old James Bulger by two 10 year old boys on 12 February had attracted 
world media to focus on the UK.
In fact, these English examples can very easily be matched by contemporary cases of 
violence against children, the ‘home alone’ phenomenon, working children, child 
soldiers, trafficking, international adoption and other events that have had the effect 
of reinforcement of child protection legislation internationally. In 1982 Neil Postman 
described a gloomy picture in which he noted the disappearance of games, food and 
clothes that were specifically for children. His vision of childhood was one in which 
children should be deferential to adults and committed to preparing themselves for 
adulthood rather than being a time in which relative free will and happiness are 
paramount. He saw this phenomenon as an aspect of an age of consumerism in which 
children are targeted as economic actors rather than having the kind of ‘traditional’, 
unbridled childhood that is embedded in folk memory.
This is very much part of the state of childhood we have at present and where the 
dividing line between how far they appear to need protection and how far they can 
actively play a role in civil society with all or most rights, duties and privileges of full 
citizenship is reliant on the success of children’s rights.
Children and human rights
Throughout the 20th century the development of human rights has been rapid, the 
1924 Declaration o f the Rights o f the Child was to be reworked several times. It 
eventually inspired the 1979 International Year of the Child and subsequent 10 year 
long drafting process that produced the CRC in 1989. That, in turn, has come to be 
the most universally adopted United Nations convention ever.
In theory, if not yet in practice, it should be a counterbalance to redirect some power 
back toward children. Thus, whilst much of the CRC is concerned with protection and 
provision, the inclusion of a judicious but comprehensive set of participation rights 
notionally redresses the tension between parental anxiety and the route toward 
increased inclusion in civil society.
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There is tension between the perceived need for greater protection, a nostalgic 
perception of an unbridled but safe childhood in the past. There is also an ideal of 
increased shared responsibility and decision making for our world and mounting fear 
of the apparent lack of restraint of children and youth that marks the present state of 
play in the history of children’s role in society. That does not generally describe a 
move toward inclusive citizenship as either the restoration of an earlier state of being 
or as a seriously considered proposition for the future supported by adults in general.
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Chapter Six: Intellectual Discourse, Beliefs, Moral and Ideological 
Positions on Children from Antiquity until the Present - Children 
from Antiquity to the High Middle Ages
Chapters Five and Six go beyond notions explored in the preceding chapters drawn 
from history. Some require further development and others supplementation through 
examination of philosophies, theologies and beliefs that affect the position from 
antiquity through to modernity. Thus, to follow the time line set in the examination of 
children in history, this begins with Hellenic philosophers such as Aristotle (i.e.: 
Politics and On Youth and Old Age) and Plato and their approximate contemporaries.
Both philosophers named already were included in Chapter Three. They are 
chroniclers of events as well as thoughts during their time and in the immediate 
earlier period and are therefore themselves contributors to history. However in this 
chapter their work will be developed further to take in the intellectual contribution 
rather than the record of events as substance for this work. Other cultural areas will 
also be examined, including the great Eastern religions and ideologies that differently 
describe adults and children and the relationship between generations, as too other 
aspects of the three main Ibrahimic religions.
This and the following chapter follow a passage through time to the Middle Ages, on 
to Hobbes, Enlightenment philosophers, Rousseau, Smith, Kant, Hegel and Marx. 
They pass on into theoretical sociology as a precursor to modem sociology in Chapter 
Seven through the influence of authors such as Tonnies, Durkheim, Simmel and 
Weber, then on toward mid and late 20th century thought. It includes moral and 
ideological positions of the period of history that shaped their work where that has 
any connection (however tenuous) with childhood. Likewise, it includes where they 
describe notions such as citizenship and human rights that were bom in philosophy 
mainly and theology to some extent if they relate in any sense to children and 
childhood. Thus, the following chapters give much of the basis of that which follows.
European antiquity
Whilst history tells us about the position of children in different places and at 
particular points in time recorded in sufficient detail for us to recreate a picture, it 
does little to tell where they belonged. Much of the content of what made history has
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often been best recorded by those who have observed it or shaped it intellectually. 
Thus, this work turns to thought, particularly as it is expressed by philosophy, 
theology and other intellectual expressions of who and what a human being is and 
where parts of humanity belong in the social order the authors of those views saw 
about them. At first impression, children are not always immediately evident and 
seldom acquire the importance male adults hold, indeed much early philosophy often 
leans toward older people since they have accumulated wisdom over a whole lifetime.
Socrates was certainly of a mind that adults above the age of 30 would be best 
situated to begin to learn dialectic and to begin to learn philosophy one should be 50 
years old. Having thus learned it by old age the person, by virtue of knowing 
philosophy, became interesting. However, Matthews (Turner and Matthews, 1998: 
12) tells us that Plato found it “entirely appropriate for Socrates to engage older 
children and young people in philosophical discussion”. It is, of course, difficult to 
extrapolate from this which ages he meant but it does at least show that for him there 
was a lifelong learning course in which preparation for 30 and 50 were permissible. 
However it does separate adulthood and childhood very clearly.
Only a few of the several stages of childhood are interesting for most ancient
philosophers. The birth of the new child is both enigmatic and apparent, depending on
whether one believed the continuum began with conception and birth or as a
transition from a ‘spiritual’ existence to an essence or soul that entered the person at
birth. For those whose focus on childhood includes a belief that life begins at birth
there is a ‘clean slate’ view. The tabula rasa concept is an early appearance in
philosophy. Aristotle certainly gets very close to identifying it in De Anima {On the
soul or Tlepi 'Fv/tis)-
What the mind thinks must be in it in the same sense as letters are on a 
tablet (grammateion) which bears no actual writing (grammenon); this is 
just what happens in the case of the mind. (Aristotle, 1987:3.4.430al).
He wrote of the mind as the unwritten tablet in De Anima, which one might possibly 
consider the first text that could be described as psychology by modem western 
standards. He also did so more explicitly in History o f Animals (Balme, 1991: 
587a228-b9) in which he observed children neither laugh nor cry for 40 days, usually 
do not laugh when tickled and have no attachment to their parents. In Nicomachean
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Ethics (Aristotle, 1999a: [VIII. 12] 141) he wrote: “parents love their children as soon 
as these are bom, but children love their parents only after time has elapsed and they 
have acquired understanding or the power of discrimination by the senses.” For him 
they begin life without knowing anything of the world around them. They are 
incomplete beings, a principle that was at odds with the earlier held Platonic notion of 
the human mind as an entity that already existed somewhere in the heavens before its 
consignment to corporeal existence. Despite bearing the knowledge of existence 
before corporeal life the young human being still needed to be educated in the skills 
of citizenship:
Plato: what we have in mind is education from childhood in virtue, a 
training which produces a keen desire to become a perfect citizen, who 
knows how to rule and be ruled as justice demands. I suppose we should 
mark off this training from others and reserve the title ‘education’ for it 
alone. (Plato, 1970: 73)
In the Aristotelian process of ‘becoming’, paternalism is necessary for the
progression from powerlessness, immaturity and lack of knowledge in childhood.
Thus it can be seen in terms of ownership since the child, having no faculties for
independent life, requires the unconditional control of the father until he (more so
than ‘she’) learns to make own choices and be responsible for his own actions.
Aristotle describes paternal exercise of constraint over a child thus:
The justice of a master and that of a father are not the same as the justice of 
citizens, though they are like it; for there can be no injustice in the 
unqualified sense towards things that are one’s own, but a man’s chattel, 
and his child until it reaches a certain age and sets up for itself, are as it 
were part of himself...
.. .justice can more truly be manifested towards a wife and chattels, for the 
former is household justice... {Ibid.: [V.6.] 82)
He also saw achieving membership of the polis as part of a process of learning
citizenship whereby:
...children must be trained by education with an eye to the constitution, if 
the virtues of (...) them are supposed to make any difference in the virtues 
of the state. And they must make a difference: for the children grow up to be 
citizens... (Aristotle, 1999b:22)
Aristotle (384-322 BC) has in fact some points in common with what Socrates’ 
contemporary K ’ung Fu Tzu (Confucius, 551 to 479 BC) saw as the primary 
relationship within the state. That was ‘filial piety’ (.xiao) (Coogan, 2005: 324) of
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children toward parents. It had probably been what had been expected for many 
generations. However, Confucius was the first philosopher we know to write down 
the expectation that a person ‘became’ through the study and practice of appropriate 
behaviour, thus takes their place within a well-defined hierarchy in which one would 
be treated with humanity {Ibid.:363-65). Fatherhood was the highest value of Chinese 
society, each person a subject of the father whereby the emperor was the father of all 
subjects. It was said that a child was ‘cut, carved, filed and polished’, which one 
might take as a somewhat more poetic manner of describing the Aristotelian 
‘becoming’ process. The notion of citizenship was very much different to the 
understanding we have in the present world. Similarly, children were not bom with 
any equivalent to our understanding of citizenship but, as Confucius described, grew 
into it. His work has remained the cultural foundation of much of East and Southeast 
Asia including where Buddhism, Tao, Shinto or, to a lesser degree, Hinduism and 
Islam are the dominant beliefs.
Asian philosophy
During the 6th century BC in China Laozi (sometimes written Laotse) was author of a 
classic Chinese book called the Tao Te Ching (iStfJM). Tao (or Dao ( il) )  is a 
Chinese character that also means ‘path’ or ‘way’. Although already an existing 
philosophy (see Oldstone-Moore in Coogan, 2005:221-24) Laozi is considered the 
founder of Taoist philosophy as we now understand it. A common thesis running 
throughout the Tao Te Ching is that a head of state should not meddle with society. 
The people should be left to their own devices. When, for example, referring to 
government in Chapter 58 of the Tao Te Ching he wrote: “That which is meddling, 
touching everything, will work but ill, and disappointment bring”. Laozi viewed the 
happiness of the individual as the primary goal of society.
The Taoist concept of wu wei ( ‘non-action’) is expanded on in Laozi’s text to express 
wei wu wei ( ‘action without action’ or to ‘do without doing’) and is held to be an 
equivalent of the modem Western concept of laissez-faire. That is ‘let do’ literally, 
but has come to be largely based on the notion that all individuals have equality of 
and in rights in liberal political theory.
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Laozi’s position is quite unique among East Asian thought since it does separate the 
individual from the collective and also puts the interests of private people (citizens in 
our terms) before those of his or her ruler and also appears to do so without direct 
reference to age and gender in a classless framework.
Buddhism is more or less as far removed from Confucianism and Taoism as Aristotle 
was from Plato. Siddhartha Gautama taught a doctrine of samsara (wandering) that 
describes a process of ‘rebirth’ whereby a person is bom, ages, dies and is reborn to 
begin the same process in another body as animal, deity, spirit or human being. Those 
who have been corrupt or evil in the last life may alternatively be reborn in Hell. 
Whatever form is taken, after death the cycle continues. The assumption is also that 
in human form the experience of the former life is carried over until the karma is 
exhausted and nirvana is achieved. One might extrapolate from that succession that 
since life is a continuum that a child is bom in full wisdom of previous lives, thus 
whatever form citizenship took comes with life.
In reality the teachings of the Buddha are only based his understanding of older 
Hindu beliefs, of which there are many forms with vastly different social and 
hierarchal practices. It is also highly influenced by other older beliefs, tribal and 
social organisation of different groups who became Buddhists.
There are likewise numerous differences between the main forms of Buddhism: 
Mahayana practised in China, Tibet, Viet Nam and parts of Japan, Theravada in Sri 
Lanka and South East Asia, Vajrayana which is a Tibeto-Mongolian form. Each is 
also divided, some are heavily influenced by Han Chinese culture, particularly in 
China and Viet Nam, and also very Confucian in character. There is also Chan ( # )  
Buddhism (commonly known by the Japanese name Zen) which developed as an 
amalgam of Mahayana Buddhism and Taoism (Tao (Hi). That has ancient origins 
and whilst the first scripts are believed to be those of Laozi from the fourth or fifth 
centuries BC, there are both older and more recent influences although its basic 
principle is of wu wei ($£Jb) or ‘non action’ (meaning ‘harmonisation’ rather than 
‘passivity’). The passage of Buddhism into China was, in fact, by way of a 
‘discourse’ with later Taoism that transformed both. Over several centuries of
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interface, Buddhism progressively found itself transformed from a philosophical rival 
of Taoism to a fellow denizen of the Chinese cultural ecosystem along with 
Confucianism, other lesser beliefs including Judaism and localised social 
organisation. Across the Sea of Japan, Mahayana Buddhism, eventually challenged 
the indigenous religion Shinto, eventually also bearing elements of Confucianism and 
Tao with it. As elsewhere and common to other cultures and beliefs, the outcome has 
been co-existential philosophies with no single or simple position on children.
Buddhism, despite Siddhartha Gautama developing on older Hindu beliefs that 
shaped their cultural and social environment, has no precise philosophical statement 
about children anywhere. The adoption of the Hindu belief in karma that has an 
underlying theory of spiritual immortality gave it the notion of rebirth. For Hindus it 
meant spending periods of undefined time in Heaven or Hell before reincarnation. 
Life is thus a cycle in a longer existence and, if only notionally, the previous 
existence is carried over into the new, thus age is a corporeal concept. Childhood is 
only a stage.
However, Hinduism is a collective name for many beliefs that are at the outer 
extremes quite dissimilar. As elsewhere in South, East and Southeast Asia, local 
practice is very diverse. Thus in Hinduism children may be bom as reincarnations of 
gods, saints or other holy people and be venerated from infancy on, thus enjoying far 
more privileges of his or her society than most other people of all ages. Buddhism has 
taken on some of that in the rebirth of living buddhas and priests (such as lamas), 
however it also tends to ‘educate’ young reincarnations into their roles by early 
adulthood. It is where the filial piety of Confucianism has entered or influenced 
Buddhist practice that children have a role that is well defined but always subordinate 
to that of adults.
Thus, when we look at the early period of the growth of these world religions and 
some of the key aspects of their philosophies that are more or less contemporaneous 
with ancient Greek philosophers, very few clues to a notion of an ancient 
egalitarianism across ages are apparent. Indeed, children are often only apparent in 
exceptional circumstances as child monarchs, reincarnations or their like and in no 
way portray anything typical of childhood.
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From Antiquity to early Christianity
Returning to European antiquity, the Stoics advocated the brotherhood of humanity 
and the natural equality of all human beings and became the most influential school 
of the Greco-Roman world. They embraced a view of the individual as a citizen of 
the world that reflected what Socrates is held to have said (attributed to Plutarch) that 
“I am not an Athenian or a Greek, but a citizen of the world.” Lawrence Becker 
(Turner and Matthews, 1998: 45-61) says that the Stoics were “ ...theoretically 
committed to rejecting any form of sexism, racism, slavery, or elitism that imposed 
developmental defeaters” {Ibid.:52). However, practice seems to have been a more 
pragmatic approach to the moral development of children that depended on the 
quality of care given by adults. The Stoics were also quite opposed to Plato’s view 
that life was a continued existence of an entity that took human form at birth, thus 
saw the beginning of development at the point of birth. Therefore, clearly where a 
theoretical space for a notion of lifelong citizenship may otherwise have been offered, 
in fact the Stoics are far closer to the position of modem child development than to 
other thinkers of their time.
Stoicism was highly influential in the Roman world which, in turn, grew as the 
Empire eventually occupied large parts of the Mediterranean and Western Europe but 
as a philosophy did not always disseminate beyond Romans themselves. One of the 
cultures taken into the Empire but that retained its older traditions was Judaism. 
Whilst the exact origins of many Jewish beliefs and teaching are difficult to precisely 
place, what is certain is that the inherent nature of being a Jew has changed very little 
from the earliest time to the present.
Early Jewish philosophy and theology are overshadowed by Old Testament and 
Torah biblical teachings. However, during the medieval period when philosophers 
had direct access to Arabic philosophical and scientific writings and referred closely 
to the Greek works of Plato, Aristotle and the Stoics, their philosophical repertoire 
developed and opened up. Jewish responses to Greek ethics may be seen in major 
rabbinic work such as the teaching of Maimonides (see Fox, 1990) who propounded a 
Jewish interpretation of Aristotle through Islamic writings. In turn, his work was to 
influence Thomas Aquinas who was to be one of the leading figures in Catholic 
ethics and the natural law tradition of moral theology in the medieval world.
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Children already had a very firmly fixed place in Jewish society. The Torah requires 
children to honour their parents and to care for them in old age. Childhood is also 
relatively short but well defined and ends with the b ’nai mitzvah. Jewish Law says 
that every Jewish girl becomes a bat mitzvah (mxa ra, ‘daughter of the 
commandments’) which happens automatically reaching age 12 years. No ceremony 
is required, although the Reconstructionist Movement introduced the idea of 
celebrating bat mitzvah in 1922 thus ending the carried over ancient practice. A 
Jewish boy becomes a bar mitzvah (mxa *n, ‘son of the commandments’) at age 13 
years because boys mature later than girls. Bar mitzvah is celebrated by a ceremony 
in both synagogue and as a secular event. As a bat mitzvah or bar mitzvah the child 
becomes duty-bound by God’s commandments as specified in the Torah and 
interpreted by Moses, the Prophets, the Sages and the Rabbis. Before reaching that 
transition parents take all responsibility for their children following Jewish law and 
traditions. Thereafter they are allowed to participate in all areas of Jewish community 
life and bear their own responsibility for Jewish law, tradition and ethics as adults.
Judaism and the Roman Empire were eventually to have a major influence on western 
beliefs and where children belonged in Christian society. In fact, between the early 
Stoics and lifetime of Jesus Christ children appear to have attracted little intellectual 
attention. In Rome during the first eight days of a baby’s life there were different 
religious ceremonies (see Dixon, 2001 and Rawson, 2005). A child was named on a 
day of purification {dies lustricus) but was not enrolled as a citizen until a boy put on 
a man’s toga at a coming of age ceremony according to the birthday that came nearest 
to the Liberalia (the festival of Liber) on 17 March. No special ceremony marked a 
girl’s transition into womanhood. When a boy attained majority, he discarded the 
childhood red edged toga {toga praetexta) and put on the pure white toga of a man 
{toga virilis) at some time between the fourteenth and seventeenth years. The boy’s 
name was added to the list of citizens and official congratulations were offered.
As Christianity developed, Jewish and Roman purification rituals merged into 
baptism, at first a total immersion (of adults) in a mikveh (a pool where water has 
gathered) but later a place in a synagogue or temple. Immersion was not intended for 
physical cleansing since that would have been done beforehand but for spiritual 
cleaning in a purification ritual. Jesus Christ was immersed in the River Jordan by
John the Baptist (Matthew, 3:13-15 in Unknown, 1971:3) and Romans practised 
purification and naming in early infancy. In the early Christian churches immersion 
was still practiced and later Roman Catholicism translated the mikveh into the 
sprinkling or smearing of water from a font onto the head of the child as an initiation 
into the Christian family during early infancy. However, whether Christian, Jewish or 
Roman ritual none of them makes a child a full member of his or her society. There 
was still a period of transition between initial membership, naming, purification until 
full membership donning the toga virilis, b ’nai mitzvah or confirmation and first 
communion that symbolically if not legally represented admission into adulthood.
Christianity has a particularly important role in the development of the predominant 
modem view of children. The origins of seeing the child as weak and need of 
protection are to some extent based on the premise that they are bom out of original 
sin. Pelagius (circa 354-420) (see Rees, 1988) taught that original sin did not 
denigrate human nature because that was a divine quality given by God.
In his view Adam’s sin set a bad example to his offspring and descendants 
(everybody) but had none of the other consequences attributed to the Original Sin. He 
taught that mortal will is able to choose between good and evil with divine 
intervention. Thus Jesus Christ set a good example that nullified Adam’s bad. 
Thereby humanity has full control over its actions and bears responsibility all sins and 
thus is also responsible for its own salvation. Pelagius taught that since human beings 
were responsible for those things they did not need God’s grace, thus Christ’s self- 
sacrifice was free of the quality of deliverance from sinful transgression.
His follower Caelestius, a monastic lawyer, is said to have ascertained that even if 
Adam had not sinned he would have died and that his sin harmed him only but not the 
entire human race. He believed that the image of God is present in each newborn 
child and that sex is a facet of our essential creation given by God. Consequently, 
children are bom in the same state as Adam before his fall.
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Augustine
Pelagius and Caelestius’ teachings were opposed by Saint Augustine (354-430) (see
Saint Augustine, 1998:26ff.) who taught that salvation ultimately comes through the
grace of God and that individuals must also perform freely chosen benevolent works.
He also believed in a form of limited predestination that did not impinge on
mankind’s free will. However nobody could earn salvation through these good works
since that was an endowment of God’s grace. Augustine saw humanity as essentially
evil and corrupted by the sexual activity that brings about conception. He was
shocked that Pelagius and his followers were not denounced as heretics thus
summoned the Council of Carthage in 418 and at which he declared nine beliefs of
the church in opposition to the principles of Pelagianism:
Death came out of sin but was not of humanity’s physical nature.
Infants must be baptised in order to be cleansed of original sin.
Extenuating prayer covered past and helps prevent future sins.
The blessing of Christ gives strength and will to carry out God’s commandments.
No benevolent works are possible without God’s blessing.
All of us must confess that we are sinners because we believe it is true not do it as an 
expression of humility.
Saints must also ask for forgiveness for their own sins.
Saints must also confess being sinners since that is what they are.
Children who die without having been baptised cannot enter the kingdom of heaven 
or enjoy eternal life.
Each of Augustine’s principles was accepted as a universal belief of the church 
henceforth and all Pelagians declared heretics. It was to influence the position of 
children in western society as the church’s dogma until the 12th century which was in 
part to persist until at least the views of Hobbes and Locke began to redefine their 
place in society. To one degree or another they have a resonance today that is still 
retained in secular legal views of children across all beliefs and political systems.
The rise of Islam
Two centuries after the zenith of the moral influence of Augustine a new religious 
force changed the position of children in what had at first been largely a Jewish and 
Christian world. It eventually spread to other parts of the world where it displaced 
Buddhism, Hinduism, Zoroastrianism and many older, minor religions. Islam is 
usually dated from 622 (Kramers, et al, 1954) when Mohammed and his followers 
arrived in Medina.
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In pre-Islamic Arabia children were considered the property of fathers. Infanticide 
was practiced as a form of postnatal birth control, often in situations of familial 
destitution (boys and girls), as sacrificial offering to gods or in the advent of being 
disappointed or stigmatised by having a daughter. As Islam displaced other religions 
infanticide became a serious sin. Arabs also had a custom of using a form of 
adoption whereby a child was assimilated into a family legally as though through a 
property transfer. Under Islam the notion of children as property was discarded and 
the custom of adoption ended. However, Islam continued to consent to child slavery 
under certain circumstances (Levy, 1969:79ff) such as when the children of married 
slaves were bom enslaved they became the property of the woman’s owner. Even if a 
free man married a female slave he did not own their children. They would be the 
property of the woman’s owner. The same went for a child bom of a slave parent 
from an ‘irregular union’. If a child is bom of an owner and slave that child is 
automatically free although his or her inheritance is reduced by an amount 
representative of the (re)sale value of his or her parent.
The Qur’an uses a variety of terms for children (Arabic words and expressions that 
include: dhurriyya, ghulam, mawlud, sabi, saghir, and walTd) although the context 
usually does not make clear whether it is specifically referring to the maturity or age 
of children. Quranic assertions are more commonly connected with adoption, breast­
feeding, infanticide and orphans and have traditionally been of a normative moral 
significance for Islamic jurisprudence that laid down the foundations of Islamic law.
However, in Quranic law children have a set of well defined rights that also describe 
their status in society. They have the right to be fed, clothed and protection until 
adulthood and to have the benefit of love and affection from their parents. They also 
have the right to be treated equally with siblings whenever receiving financial and 
material gifts and parents are expected to provide adequate inheritance for their 
children. Children likewise have the right to education. In return parents have very 
clear rights, of which the first and foremost is to be obeyed and respected by their 
children. A mother has particular privilege in receiving the best treatment accorded to 
any person and the right of custody of a child under normal circumstances.
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Historically, parents had the right to physically punish children over 10 years old who 
neglected prayers and also had the right to admonish their children as well as protect 
them from physical or moral harm. They have always had the right to be looked after 
by their children and be given material, financial or personal physical support as 
required. That is most especially so during old age, although ‘offspring’ will probably 
no longer be strictly speaking definable as ‘children’ by age by that stage in life.
Children, it would appear, were always and are in fact still well defined by their roles 
and maturity and, if anything, may historically have remained children by status far 
longer than today. With such a fluent definition and the legal roles of children being 
clearly described, there is no clear reason why it may be assumed that an Islamic 
child could be seen as a citizen in any comparable sense to adults and, in many parts 
of the Islamic world, male adults especially.
One of the greater problems that always accompanied Islam has been the difficulty of 
differentiation between Quranic law and older, persistent cultural practices such as 
tribal traditions that have even persisted for the 1400+ years in Arabia (see Kramers, 
et al, 1954). As increasing numbers of people with different customs and traditions 
came under Islamic rule it came directly into contact with the theological systems of 
Judaism, Christianity and Zoroastrianism. It also took in the ancient philosophies of 
India and Greece. Islamic theologians increasingly began to use philosophical ideas 
and principles to interpret Quranic doctrines. Thus, in the early medieval period, 
Islam itself went through an intellectually rich period in which the Greek and Roman 
philosophers, Jewish and early Christian theologians such as Augustine and the 
influences of each of the other great religions it came into contact with influenced its 
development. Indeed, the exchanges between the three main Ibrahimic religions were 
extremely fluent although very much more concerned with examination of God and 
belief. Relatively little energy was dedicated toward the laity.
The influence of Ibrahimic philosophy and theology
Medieval thought was less philosophical than generally theological. The Ibrahimic 
religions were seeking divine truth through logic, dialectic and analysis to discover 
the truth. Underlying that was the principle of reasoned argument that was highly 
respectful of the positions of ancient philosophers, particularly to Aristotle, with high
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esteem for their intellect. The common commitment was to bring together the 
standpoints of philosophy with theological teaching and revelation. The latter was 
important above all else. Probably no other single issue concerned medieval thinkers 
more than the relation of faith to reason. This pursued the manner of classical 
Platonic ideal principles and scholasticism, particularly in Christianity, thrived 
throughout the medieval era. Islamic theology or Kalam was the rational reflection on 
Allah and his holy word, the Qur’an, really began at the end of the seventh century, or 
first century in the Islamic calendar, with debates about divine and human freedom. 
One school of thought was the Qdariyyah who defended a comparatively strong view 
of human freedom, although later medieval thought began to become far more rigid 
and seek many of the divine solutions the other faiths sought.
It was a contradictory world where compassion for the worldly was almost absent 
from Christianity despite it being one of the main messages of Christ to humanity. 
Typical of the period was that in 1095 Pope Urban II had priests’ wives sold into 
slavery and their children were simply abandoned. Indeed, Christ’s view of children 
as innocents deserving of compassion was relegated to little more than words in the 
Bible: “Suffer the little children to come unto me, and forbid them not; for of such is 
the kingdom of God” (Mark 10:14, Unknown, 1971:101). Priests were increasingly 
being pressed toward devotion to piety rather than worldliness. Nonetheless, it would 
still not be until during the early Reformation before the Roman church eventually 
stopped most priests33 marrying and having families.
Rhazes, also known as Al-Razi, (862-circa 925) defended the views of Plato against 
Aristotle, considering the latter a falsifier of philosophy. Aristotelianism was 
maintained by Al-Farabi (870-930) and Abu ‘AIT al-Husayn ibn ‘Abd Allah ibn Slna, 
also known as Ibn Sina (often known by the Latin name Avicenna), (980-1037). The 
Ash’arite theologian Al-Ghazali (1058-1111) denounced Aristotle, Socrates and other 
Greek thinkers as non-believers and characterised whoever made use of their methods 
and ideas to be corrupters of Islam. Islamic Aristotelian thought reached its height 
with Ibn Rushd (known as Averroes) (1126-1198) with his commentaries on Aristotle 
of which Hebrew translations had a lasting impact on Jewish philosophy and 
theology. Medieval Jewish philosophers and theologians at that time were divided 
into three categories. There were those primarily concerned with commentary on the
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Talmud, those whose main interests were more in the area of philosophical theology 
and others who were part of a movement that rejected the Talmud.
Thus medieval philosophy is typically viewed as theological due to the seriously 
debated topic of that age which was faith versus reason. Ibn Sina and Ibn Rushd were 
both inclined more towards the side of reason. However, Augustine and Anselm both 
supported a view on the ascendancy of faith. The Augustinian solution to the faith 
against reason problem was to believe and then search for understanding. Thus there 
is an abundance of philosophy in the works of medieval thinkers who used the ideas 
and logical techniques of ancient philosophers to tackle challenging theological 
questions and clarify points of doctrine.
The Graeco-Roman Hipprocratic tradition divided childhood into three stages 
(Heywood, 2006:14). Infantia was birth to seven years. Girls were pueritia from 
seven to 12 and boys seven to 14. Adolescentia lasted for both until 21 years. Ibn 
Sina’s Canon was highly influential in the Christian west, to the point that his Latin 
name Avicenna was preferred. He described life in stages, the first being birth to age 
30 {Ibid.) divided into five stages that described details such as the ability to use legs 
through to full physical growth. Doctrinally these arguments established the unready 
state of the infant to be participant in the spiritual setting, which in the medieval 
world was considered more or less equally important across the Ibrahimic religions.
The intellectual influence of the Arabic world was especially important since it 
included works by classical authors that had been preserved by Islamic scholars and 
penetrated the Christian West through Islamic Iberia and influenced theologians like 
Gerbert d’Aurillac (circa 950-1003) who was later to become Pope Sylvester II (999- 
1003). Outstanding theological activity was happening in some European cathedral 
schools giving birth to universities such as Bologna and Oxford. The intellectual 
examination of faith prefigured the upsurge of theological argument that began to 
take place throughout the 12th century and take philosophic enquiry even further away 
from worldly issues.
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Aquinas
At its zenith in the 13th century, Thomas Aquinas {circa 1225-1274) sought after 
concord between faith and reason. Although normally regarded to be a theologian 
some of his work is distinctly philosophical by nature. His name for philosophy was 
ancilla theologiae (theology’s handmaiden). However, he also said that theology is 
the guidepost of philosophy. He wrote that philosophy and theology are in harmony 
because both were created by God and that if philosophy conflicts with theology that 
would be erroneous, so that such a philosopher must revisit his or her work and look 
for the error within. As a consequence he was confirming a common rapport between 
philosophy and theology. He also brought the Aristotelian concept (see Summa 
Theologica, Volume I, Treatise on Man, ‘Of the Intellectual Powers’) back to the 
vanguard of ‘modem’ thought.
For Aquinas the human mind was the lowest in the order of forms of intelligence and 
furthest removed from the perfection of the Divine intellect. It is, he cites Aristotle 
having said, at first “like a clean tablet on which nothing is written” (Aquinas, 
1981:396). It contrasted with the Platonic notion, supported by his contemporary St 
Bonaventure, that since the person existed as an entity before human birth, that the 
intellect naturally came with the ‘spirit’ and was, thus, innate. However, it was the 
Aquinas view that was to become received wisdom. Henceforth it was held that the 
normal way of looking at personal development was that the full store of knowledge 
is built up gradually from experiences and sensory perceptions of the world into 
which each individual is bom. With that he brought back an examination of the 
worldly that included what was considered the conventional way of looking at 
infancy and early childhood for several centuries.
By and large supporters of the tabula rasa thesis championed what we now consider 
the ‘nurture’ quality of the nature versus nurture debate whenever it comes to 
explanation of the development of the characteristic of an individual’s personality, 
their emotional and social behaviour and intellect. Aquinas’s views on the tabula rasa 
theory stood untried and without development until at least the time of Rousseau in 
the 18th century. However, he had an impact on political theory that Heater (1990: 22) 
describes as ‘revolutionary’. Certainly the renaissance of Aristotelian political theory, 
to which he contributed, accelerated the return of the concept of citizenship into the
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political world in the 13th and 14th centuries. These, in turn, would see the ages of 
liberal civic consciousness and secularism emerging during which the child would in 
time achieve ‘personhood’ and the possibility of considering citizenship would begin 
to be a reality.
DeMause (1974: 1-74), Lyman (DeMause, 1974: 75-100) and McLaughlin (1974:
101-182) portray the Middle Ages in which childhood was by modem standards a
nightmarish period of life. Religious belief dictated that children were bom innocent
but weak and had to be trained and corrected in order to enter the social order of
adulthood. However it is also the period when some points of view have been
expressed that probably follow the Platonic rather than dominant Aristotelian thesis.
Although generally discredited on account of a very narrow view of life in the Middle
Ages, Aries (1962: 15-32) analysis of the period was that once a child was weaned,
he or she was regarded as a small adult whose life was little differentiated from the
adults around him or herself. In his conclusion to the first part of Centuries o f
Childhood {Ibid. : 128) he says that:
In medieval society the idea of childhood did not exist: this is not to 
suggest that children were neglected, forsaken or despised. The idea of 
childhood is not to be confused with affection for children: it corresponds 
to an awareness of the particular nature of childhood, that particular nature 
which distinguishes the child from the adult, even the young adult. In 
medieval society this awareness was lacking.
Of course, one must draw attention to the fact that he was looking at children above 
age six years and that infancy is little more than a passing note throughout his work. 
The main focus of his work is also France. However it has been a highly influential 
thesis since it appeared in 1960. It was almost certainly the first ever social history of 
childhood, thus still holds sway for many other authors today.
The more important point is that as with history, even the authority of the spiritual 
leaders who shaped moral life has not been interpretable either way. Thus, even if the 
Aries thesis was proven in everyday life, it was religions that shaped much of life and 
had immense power in ‘political life’. They determined the exclusion of children 
from anything resembling modem citizenship. It was largely on the basis of doctrinal 
views of childhood and the role of children that with relatively few exceptions 
nothing substantial changed from the time of Augustine {circa 430).
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The doctrine of original sin emerged out of the Pelagian heresy, despite not being 
entirely unsympathetic to children (Lyman in deMause, 1974:88). That view persisted 
until the 12th century when the notion of child innocence became a more acceptable 
view (Heywood, 2006: 33) although Augustinian fervour resurfaced in the 
Reformation (Ibid). Martin Luther preached a position that original sin was as deeply 
implanted in children as in adults.
To all intents and purposes, the Augustinian view was orthodoxy for over 1200 years 
until Thomas Hobbes (circa 1650) began a process of intellectual examination that 
moved children out of the position of total subjugation. It might also be argued that 
Ibn Sina and Thomas Aquinas placed markers on the route to change that began to 
really accelerate with John Locke in 1693.
If Aries draws attention to any particular point, it must include the fact that in 
medieval feudal34 Europe very few individuals were truly free. Education was the 
privilege of the small elite. Economic activity was the duty of the masses, including 
children from the age at which any particular child could be made to contribute 
within the family. It was an age when vassalage, bondage, slavery, serfdom and 
thraldom were the norm, where fealty to an entire secular hierarchy from local ‘lords’ 
to monarchy made the majority of people more property than free citizens. Moreover 
they were heavily taxed by secular lords and usually through tithes, alms and other 
forms of church taxes by their priests. It was also the spiritual duty of all believers of 
a religion to build, maintain, feed and support the places of worship, spiritual retreat 
(i.e. monasteries) as well as pay priests in their communities.
Whereas Aries draws us toward a limited view of the world, in fact history holds that 
there was a great deal of change worldwide. Single but lengthy events such as the 
Mongol invasions of the 13th and 14th centuries or relatively rapid spread of Islam 
from Arabia to much of the known world from the 7th century on changed entire 
cultures, transferred parts of cultures elsewhere and integrated cultural practice into 
the larger event. Within such upheavals the real social and economic conditions and 
values of people changed.
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By the time of the Mongol invasion of Europe feudalism was beginning to come to an 
end with material and monetary values gaining ascendancy and capitalism emerging 
in its earliest mercantile forms. The upshot of the Black Death in the 14th century was 
radical reorganisation of the economy leading to widespread change in European 
society. In the flourishing cities labour deficits brought about the momentum for 
economic diversification and technological innovation. The initial loss of life due to 
famine in the wake of the plague pandemic contributed to intensification of capital 
accumulation in cities, thus stimulating trade initially, then the rapid increase of other 
sectors as diverse as banking, textile and clothing manufacture and trade, iron mining 
for the flourishing armaments industry. The accumulation of surplus and 
overproduction increase competition to take full advantage of economic advantage 
bringing about civil war, peasant uprisings and uncompromising militarism. This was 
to lead to moves toward centralisation from the 13th century to its successful 
conclusion in England, France and Spain by the end of the 15th century. All 
constitutional restrictions on the exercise of the authority of kings and other rulers 
were removed although the power of the church remained by and large steadfast.
However, Europe recovered from the worst of the Black Death and prosperity 
advanced thus allowing the population to regain former levels by the late 15th and into 
the 16th centuries. The combination of both a plentiful labour supply and rapidly 
improving productivity promoted the move away from manorial rural economies 
towards industrialisation in growing urban centres.
Humanism during the Renaissance led to new theoretical discourses on the nature of 
the church, the authority of the papacy and royalty and most especially in universities 
that were seeking academic freedom. One of the innovations that advanced the 
intellectual cause was the growth of biblical literacy that came with the invention of 
movable type (circa 1439) and translation of the Bible in the wake of the first printed 
version (circa 1450) by Gutenberg. In parts of Europe there was dissent in the 
established church. In England the Lollards led protests against the authority of the 
church under the leadership of John Wycliffe during the 1350s as too the Hussites in 
Bohemia and Moravia, founded by Wycliffe’s follower Jan Hus, from 1420-34. A 
century later, in 1517, Martin Luther began the protest against doctrine and authority 
in the church that began the Protestant Reformation.
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Although Luther in point of fact revived Augustinian values, which effectively 
diminished and worsened the situation of children for the immediate future, it was to 
lead to reconsideration of their position during the Age of Reason and later to the 
Enlightenment. Theology that had held the dominant intellectual position among the 
Ibrahimic religions from at least the early medieval period was in sharp decline and to 
be once again superseded by philosophy. The work of such men as Descartes, Hobbes 
and Locke, later Hume, Rousseau and Kant would lead to a discourse that would have 
an enormous impact on the increasingly material and secular world. Much of the rest 
of the world remained broadly speaking culturally unchanged and socially and 
economically conservative from the medieval period until the 16th century. However, 
it was the beginning of the colonial and early capitalist period where European 
influence began to dominate the world and would soon begin to reshape the entire 
political and economic landscape.
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Chapter Seven: Intellectual Discourse, Beliefs, Moral and Ideological 
Positions on Children from Antiquity until the Present - Early 
Modern to the Present
When the medieval world became the early modem, new concepts of ‘humanity’ 
began to manifest themselves in the work of European intellectuals. The influence of 
the Renaissance, Reformation and relatively recent historical experiences such as the 
peasant uprisings and Italian city states had contributed to new ways of thinking in 
Europe. The world was opening up as exploration, conquest and colonisation of vast 
areas of the world that had largely been socially and economically isolated from 
Europe had western values imposed on them.
Machiavelli and Erasmus
Machiavelli’s best known work The Prince, which was written in 1513 but appeared
posthumously in 1532 (Machiavelli, 2005), brought about a debate that has continued
to the present day. He documented the generally violent means by which political
power was gained, retained and lost with detail of the public works and private
morality of people involved. An explanatory footnote by the editor (Ibid.: 103) to his
inclusion of ‘citizens and subjects’(/&/<i.:37) describes them thus:
citizens and subjects: Machiavelli generally distinguishes between the 
members of a city-state who have rights and privileges and participate in 
the municipal government, on the one hand, and those people who live in 
the surrounding dominio (territory or dominion), and who have fewer, if 
any, rights of the citizen.
Throughout the entire chapter (IX Of the civil principality) (lbid.:3A-31) he goes to 
length to describe who may be a citizen which includes, under two different 
circumstances, the ‘common people’. Whilst not explicitly describing who he means 
by age and gender, it is probably safe to assume that men are meant from the overall 
language of his work. It was at the very least a move away from the narrower view 
Plato had expounded. That was broadly speaking all what those who were aware of 
such ideas knew about civic republics and citizenship. Moreover, it begins to address 
the issues that eventually contribute to liberal definitions of citizenship that included 
the rights and privileges of citizens and subjects.
In the Netherlands, Machiavelli’s contemporary, Desiderius Erasmus van Rijn (1466- 
1536) was an advocate of the emergent doctrine we now know as humanism. It was a
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critique of ingrained and unshakeable interests and the preponderance of irrationality 
and superstition. In response to Erasmus’s critique, Erasmusian societies formed 
across Europe. That was to some extent a response to the insecurity caused by the 
Reformation. Erasmus considered freedom of will to be a crucial point in forming a 
view of humanity. His discourse De libero arbitrio diatribe sive collatio (1524) 
analyses the Lutheran overstatement of obvious limitations on human freedom with 
enormous intelligence and good humour. Thus we see notions of citizenship and 
individuality emerging from what had hitherto been suppressed by religious 
intolerance of secularity, personal uniqueness and ability of individuals to hold their 
own beliefs, have free will and contribute to change of the established social order.
Hobbes
Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) was an early political theorist occupied with the
problems of government. He held that social institutions, of which he viewed
government as one, were the outcome of measured agreement between free
individuals. His great work Leviathan appeared in 1651 at the end of the three phases
of war between Parliamentarians and Royalists from 1642 until 1651 commonly
referred to as the English Civil War. The political status quo was rapidly changing
and where monarchy had ruled more or less absolutely until 1642, by the end of the
Civil war and following the deposal and execution of Charles I, governance and the
role of common people was very much changed. Hobbes’ argument was that in the
absence of a social or political organisation it would be rational individuals of
relatively equal status who would enter into an agreement on setting up a
government. They would hold the monopoly of use of force. This innovative view
heralded the beginning of modem political philosophy and the liberal state:
A Common-wealth by Acquisition, is that, where the Soveraign Power is 
acquired by Force; And it is acquired by force, when men singly, or many 
together by plurality of voyces, for fear of death, or bonds, do authorise 
all the actions of that Man, or Assembly, that hath their lives and liberty in 
his Power. (Hobbes, 1651 (1976): 196)
That power acquired by force is called ‘dominion’ ( . . .’this kind of Dominion, or 
Soveraignty, differeth from Soveraignty by Institution’... (Ibid.)). Hobbes says it 
comes in two forms which are master over servant and parent over child. The rights 
of sovereignty occurring out of institution and acquisition are the same (Ibid.:\91) 
and also dominion:
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...is acquired two wayes; By Generation, and by Conquest. The right of 
Dominion by Generation, is that, which the Parent hath over his Children; 
and is called PATERNALL. And is not so derived from the Generation, 
as if therefore the Parent had Dominion over his Child because he begat 
him; but from the Childs Consent, either expresse, or by other sufficient 
arguments declared. For as to the Generation, God hath ordained to man a 
helper; and there be alwayes two that are equally Parents: the Dominion 
therefore over the Child, should belong equally to both;... {Ibid.)
In other words, the child is as absolute a subject of the parents as a servant is to the
master. Hobbes viewed childhood as a period of servitude we would consider slavery
in the modem world. Throughout Leviathan (1651) he expressed his views of
children as follows:
There be beasts, that at a year old observe more, and pursue that which is 
for their good, more prudently, than a child can do at ten. (71)
Children therefore are not endued with Reason at all, till they have attained 
the use of Speech: but are called Reasonable Creatures, for the possibility 
apparent of having the use of Reason in time to come. (86)
...Children, Fooles, and Mad-men that have no use of Reason, may be 
Personated by Guardians, or Curators... (170)
The Master of the Servant, is Master also of all he hath; and may exact the 
use thereof; that is to say, of his goods, of his labour, of his servants, and of 
his children, as often as he shall think fit. (199-200)
It is an expression of the incapacity of children to raise themselves above the level of 
animals (‘beasts’ or ‘creatures’), be more reasonable than the psychologically 
deficient (‘fooles’ or ‘mad-men’) or those lacking reason to be their own person 
(‘servants’). The final citation also expresses very well the fact that they were, in fact, 
essentially property until age and maturity delivered the privileges and freedom of 
adult citizenship. Hobbes was thus more than clearly stating a view that children, like 
slaves, were owned by their parents.
Hobbes did not believe that this authority over children simply emanated from
generation but came:
...from the Childs Consent, either expressed, or by other sufficient 
arguments declared. (197)
It is a view with its foundations in a belief that authority functions only with the 
consent of the subject. However, given the preceding examples of views describing
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children as lacking rationale it is very hard to understand how that consent in fact
operates. Hobbes argued {Ibid.: 199) that force is congruent with consent in that
agreements made under threat or in fear are morally binding especially in the state of
nature. For him political theory itself begins in this state of nature. There is no actual
need for an obligation to consent or the social contract but he assumes that people are
equal in the state of nature, therefore the need for consent is foregone:
Nature hath made men so equall, in the faculties of body, and mind; as 
that though there bee found one man sometimes manifestly stronger in 
body, or of quicker mind then another; yet when all is reckoned together, 
the difference between man, and man, is not so considerable, as that one 
man can thereupon claim to himselfe any benefit, to which another may 
not pretend, as well as he. For as to the strength of body, the weakest has 
strength enough to kill the strongest, either by secret machination, or by 
confederacy with others, that are in the same danger with himselfe.
And as to the faculties of the mind, .. .1 find yet a greater equality amongst 
men, than that of strength. For Prudence, is but Experience; which equall 
time, equally bestowes on all men, in those things they equally apply 
themselves unto. That which may perhaps make such equality incredible, 
is but a vain conceipt of ones owne wisdome, which almost all men think 
they have in a greater degree, than the Vulgar; that is, than all men but 
themselves, and a few others, whom by Fame, or for concurring with 
themselves, they approve. For such is the nature of men, that howsoever 
they may acknowledge many others to be more witty, or more eloquent, 
or more learned; ... But this proveth rather that men are in that point 
equall, than unequall. For there is not ordinarily a greater signe of the 
equall distribution of any thing, than that every man is contented with his 
share.
From this equality of ability, ariseth equality of hope in the attaining of 
our Ends. {Ibid.: 141)
In The Elements o f Law (1650 (1994):85-86) Hobbes described:
...already subdued... or gotten into his power any other, that (...) by 
infancy, or weakness, is unable to resist him, by right of nature may take 
the best caution, that such infant, or such feeble and subdued person can 
give him, or being ruled and governed by him for the time to come...
...Out of which may also be collected, that irresistible might, in the state 
of nature, is right...
Thus ‘might’ is ‘right’ is justified without need for any form of agreement. For the
child there is filial obligation as he describes it in De cive (1642 (1983): 167):
...whoever is freed from subjection, whether he be (...) a son (...) 
promises at least all the external signs by which superiors are honoured by 
their inferiors -  from which it follows that the precept about honouring
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parents belongs to the natural law not only under the heading of gratitude 
but also of contract...
His proposition is that filial obligation itself derives the obvious inequality of power 
between adults and children within a state in which ‘citizen’ obligations reflect the 
consent of individuals to be governed. The obligation itself exists in the best interests 
of the individual. Thus we find what is essentially a political enquiry addressing the 
question about the moral obligations of the state towards its citizen members and who 
decides what best interests are emerging. This is an ongoing theme that will be 
addressed in other parts of this work and most especially when children’s rights are 
examined. Of course, whilst Hobbes used the status of children as a means of 
expressing a particular relationship between generations there is no specific interest 
in changing their status in his work.
Changing philosophy
At this early point in liberal theory it essentially attempted to see people as citizens of 
a state rather than as subjects of a monarch whose rule over them was generally 
accepted as a divine right conferred on the ruler by God. As the notion of absolute 
and divine rule over subjects declined and intellectual moves toward the individual 
citizen who consented (or dissented) to political authority advanced, another strand of 
thought questioned the dominance of patriarchal authority. Those such as slaves, 
servants and wives had been thereto considered to have lacked reason to be citizens 
but children had the potential of becoming. The child was seen to be capable of 
developing rational capacities that would ultimately lead to a point at which he could 
become a citizen.
In England the Civil War had brought about new perceptions of how social 
stratification was received. The Levellers and True-Levellers (better known as the 
Diggers) movements whilst relatively short lived saw a new philosophy sometimes 
referred to as Christian Communism. Gerrard Winstanley (1609-76) was one of the 
leaders of a group of True-Levellers who began a short lived commune at St 
George’s Hill near Weybridge in 1649 and a shorter lived commune at Little Heath in 
Cobham in 1650 after eviction from the first settlement.
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Winstanley was very acutely aware that the Civil War would secure a bigger share of
power among the merchant class and landowners, thus, quite rightly, foresaw the
deprivation and corruption that would follow. He was an archetypal radical who was
able to identify the obsession of those with access to capital with ownership and
private property as the major root of social discontent. He was determined to put an
absolute end to this form of materialism in favour of common ownership and justified
this in God’s word through Solomon that mankind: “ ... may enjoy the free use of the
earth, with the fruits thereof.” (Winstanley, 1652; see ‘Chapter 1’). As in two of his
earlier pamphlets (1649a and b), his phrasing tends to imply gender equality and
whilst not inclusive of children most certainly advocates the preparation of children
and youth for citizenship in which very modem notions of participation and
internationalism are evident:
Mankind may be considered in a fourfold degree, his childhood, youth, 
manhood and old age. His childhood and his youth may be considered 
from his birth till forty years of age; and within this compass of time, after 
he is weaned from his mother, who shall be the nurse herself if there be no 
defect in nature, his parents shall teach him a civil and humble behaviour 
toward all men. Then send him to school, to learn to read the laws of the 
commonwealth, to ripen his wits from his childhood, and so to proceed in 
his learning till he be acquainted with all arts and languages. And the 
reason is threefold:
First, by being acquainted with the knowledge of the affairs of the world, 
by this traditional knowledge they may be the better able to govern 
themselves like rational men;
Secondly, they may become thereby good commonwealth's men, in 
supporting the government thereof, by being acquainted with the nature of 
government;
Thirdly, if England have occasion to send ambassadors to any other land, 
we may have such as are acquainted with their language; or if any 
ambassador come from other lands, we may have such as can understand 
their speech.
...children may not quarrel like beasts, but live in peace like rational men, 
experienced in yielding obedience to the laws and officers of the 
commonwealth, everyone doing to another as he would have another do to 
him. (Winstanley, 1652; see ‘Chapter 5’)
Essentially the same kind of idea had been expressed a few pages earlier when he had
explained how young people should be prepared for responsible adulthood:
A father is to cherish his children till they grow wise and strong, and then 
as a master he is to instruct them in reading, in learning languages, arts 
and sciences, or to bring them up to labour, or employ them in some trade 
or other, or cause them to be instructed therein, according as is shewed 
hereafter in the education of mankind.
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A father is to have a care that as all his children do assist to plant the 
earth, or by other trades provide necessaries, so he shall see that everyone 
have a comfortable livelihood, not respecting one before another.
(Ibid.: see ‘Chapter 4’)
He was also warned against creating a ruling elite who would rise in status above
those of lesser ability and access to power:
But one sort of children shall not be trained up only to book learning and 
no other employment, called scholars, as they are in the government of 
monarchy; for then through idleness and exercised wit therein they spend 
their time to find out policies to advance themselves to be lords and 
masters above their labouring brethren, (...) which occasions all the 
trouble in the world.
Therefore, to prevent the dangerous events of idleness in scholars, it is 
reason, and safe for common peace, that after children have been brought 
up at schools to ripen their wits, they shall then be set to such trades, arts 
and sciences as their bodies and wits are capable of; and therein continue 
till they come to forty years of age.
For all the work of the earth, or in trades, is to be managed by youth, and 
by such as have lost their freedoms. (Ibid.)
However, the underlying message was adherence to Christian biblical teaching and 
very much a reflection of the message of the prophets of the Old Testament. They 
would thus, had Winstanley’s arguments ever become the accepted form of 
governance, been very closely aligned to the authority and overview of the church. It 
was also, and as history has tested, tried and proven, at odds with and less influential 
than Hobbes’ views.
Critics of religious intolerance at about this time were, however, increasingly 
encouraging the separation of religion and secularity. In the Netherlands, Baruch 
Spinoza (1632-1677) wrote the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus and Tractatus 
Politicus as proto-liberal defences of the notion of the separation of church and state 
as well as describing types of democracy. In the former he expressed an early critique 
of religious intolerance and defence of secular governance. He was a meticulous 
determinist who held a view that absolutely everything occurs out of necessity. He 
held that even human behaviour is fully determined with freedom being our capacity 
to know that we are preordained to do and understand how and why we act as we do. 
Thus Spinoza said that freedom is not just the option of saying ‘no’ to what happens 
to us but must also entail the possibility of saying ‘yes’ with full comprehension of 
why things inevitably happen that way. The growing influence of theological
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positions such as John Calvin’s view that all people are entirely at the mercy of God 
were the core of great intellectual authority and were to have a major role in the 
confessional and ecclesiastical debates throughout the 17th century. Even so the 
influence of developing liberal perspectives was nonetheless bringing enormous 
change as well.
The Enlightenment
John Locke (1632-1704) posited a theory of mind that is often cited as the origin of 
modem concepts of identity and ‘self which came to feature significantly in the later 
works of other philosophers such as Hume, Kant and Rousseau. He was the first 
philosopher to define ‘self through a continuity of ‘consciousness’. He expressed the 
view that the mind was a ‘blank slate’ or tabula rasa without inborn ideas. That was 
contrary to the Cartesian philosophy, which initially arrived at a single principle: 
thought exists. This was a position that thought cannot be separated from the self 
therefore one exists.
Descartes is famously quoted as saying “cogito ergo sum” (“I think, therefore I am”) 
although it is more precisely “Dubito, ergo cogito, ergo sum” (“I doubt, therefore I 
think, therefore I am). Thus, drawing on Descartes’ conclusion that if he doubted 
something or someone must be doubting, therewith the fact that he doubted proved 
his existence. The Cartesian philosophical position implies, since it is not explicitly 
expressed, that thought (and also doubt) are innate and thus the human mind has the 
foundation upon which it builds rather than beginning from nothing. Everything we 
experience becomes in a sense part of us, becomes an intimate component of our 
mental and physical being.
The contemporary appeal of Enlightenment theory is often credited to Locke’s 
demonstration of the ‘becoming’ idea. In his philosophy the epistemological notion 
was that of the tabula rasa expressing the view that the human mind is a ‘clean slate’ 
at birth without rules for processing data, which are gradually added and the specific 
rules for progressing formed exclusively through corporeal experience. This thesis is 
central to Lockean empiricism. For Locke tabula rasa meant not only that the mind 
of an individual was bom ‘blank’ but he also placed a great deal of emphasis on the 
individual’s freedom to cultivate his or her own soul. Each individual is thus free to
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define the substance of his or her own character although his or her elemental identity 
as a member of the human race can never be changed. It is from this presumption of a 
free, ‘self-authored’ mind that is combined with an unchangeable human nature that 
the Lockean principle of ‘natural’ rights is drawn. It is, in fact, only a small step to 
move on from the tabula rasa notion that draws the ‘becoming’ thesis into the 
contemporary argument that contends that free will and choice is bom into the 
individual although capacities and experience do indeed evolve with age. It exists in 
children’s rights as part of Article 5 CRC that uses ‘evolving capacities’ as an 
expression for justification of adult authority over and responsibility for children.
In his Second Treatise o f Government Locke also challenged the authority of
patriarchy (1965:126-37) in which he saw the child as ‘becoming’ but still subject to
parental authority:
Children (...) are not bom in this full state of equality, though they are 
bom to it. Their parents have a sort of rule and jurisdiction over them 
when they come into the world, and for some time after, but it is but a 
temporary one. (127)
and:
...the power that parents have over their children arises from their duty 
to take care of their offspring during the imperfect state of childhood.
What the children need, and what the parents are obliged to provide, is 
the forming of their minds and the governing of their actions; that is 
while the children are still young and ignorant; when reason comes into 
play the parents are released from that trouble. (129) 
also that:
...we are bom free as we are bom rational; not that we have actually the 
exercise of either: age that brings one, brings with it the other too. And 
thus we see how natural freedom and subjection to parents may consist 
together, and are both founded on the same principle. A child is free by 
his father’s title, by his father’s understanding, which is to govern him 
till he hath it of his own. (130)
Unlike Hobbes, Locke believed that human nature is typified by reason and tolerance,
although like Hobbes he believed that it allowed men to be selfish. The latter explains
why he was not an advocate of bringing children up to be only reasonable and
tolerant, thus generating ‘ideal’ citizens. Archard (Turner and Matthews, 1998:91-92)
describes Locke’s important contribution to political theory thus:
.. .his insistence that legitimate authority is founded upon the freely given 
consent of those individuals over whom the authority is exercised. Human 
beings, in a state of nature, enjoy a freedom subject to the laws of nature 
and are, “as Creatures of the same species and rank,” entitled to equality
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of recognition. It is only by means of consent, their contracted agreement, 
that they quit this state for “the bonds of Civil Society.” The rights -  to 
life, liberty and estate -  enjoyed in the state of nature are not given up 
with the creation of the State; it is only the power to enforce and protect 
these rights which is transferred from individuals to government. Civil 
government retains its legitimacy only in so far as continues to secure and 
protect these rights.
For Locke it is adult human beings who make the contract, and 
consequently enjoy the protection of their rights under civil government. 
Children are neither parties to the contract nor right-holding citizens of the 
government thereby agreed to.
However (Ibid.: 92):
For Locke, children are not bom in the full state of equality enjoyed by 
their parents, but they are bom to it.
( . . . )
The condition of children (...) justifies parents in acting on behalf of their 
children, but it also constitutes (...) tutelage as a duty.
Furthermore ((Ibid.:93) he:
...specifically rejects the view that natural parents enjoy rights over their 
children because the own them.
( . . . )
...he denies that parents own their offspring in virtue of having produced 
them.
To use ‘selfish’ in a very literal sense, in Locke’s view although children lack the 
capacity to decide for themselves they are individuals with the potential that is to be 
developed. Thus by placing them in the setting of work that examines the origins and 
development of civil government and the foundations of knowledge itself he opened 
the door to the possibility of an inclusive stance on children in civil society. Of 
course, since Locke did not generally (the exception being Some Thoughts 
Concerning Education in 1693) write about children specifically it is difficult to use 
his work to evidence a substantial step forward in the direction of a changing position 
of children either intellectually or in early modem civil society.
Rousseau
Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778) was to change the established perception of 
childhood with Emile, or On Education (Emile, ou Veducation) (1762) (here: 
Rousseau, 1979). It was a work that drew on his own early experience of 
employment as a tutor and musician long before taking up his literary career in his
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forties. It is a semi-fictitious work describing the growth of Emile who is a young 
boy being brought up under Rousseau’s tutelage. In this fictional setting he is 
bringing him up in the country where he believes people are better suited than being 
in a city. That is where we learn both physical and intellectual bad habits. The 
purpose of education is, in his view, to learn how to live which is achieved by 
following a custodian or guardian who can direct one on the way to good living. The 
growth of a child is divided into three parts with the first from birth to the age of 
about 12. At that stage calculating and complex thought is not possible so that 
children, he deeply believed, live more like animals. The second stage is from 12 to 
about 16 years when reason begins to develop. The third and final part of childhood 
is from age 16 onwards at which stage the child develops into an adult. Emile then 
finds a young woman who complements him, Sophie.
By and large the book is based on Rousseau’s ideals of a healthy life. The growing 
Emile has to work out how to follow his own social instincts and protect himself 
from the vices of urban individualism and self-consciousness. Emile is not an account 
of education of a gender-neutral ‘child’ since the education he suggests for Sophie, 
who Emile is destined to marry, is significantly different to that of Emile. Mary 
Wollstonecraft responded to Rousseau’s assertion about men and women: “In what 
they have in common, they are equal. Where they differ, they are not comparable” 
(Rousseau, 1979:358). She devoted a considerable portion of one chapter, 
‘Animadversions on Some of the Writers who have Rendered Women Objects of 
Pity, Bordering on Contempt’ (Wollstonecraft, 2004:99-143), to attack his arguments 
in A Vindication o f the Rights o f Women (1792).
The authorities made a great deal of effort to suppress Rousseau’s works and the 
ideas they expressed, along with those of Locke, although they were to be of great 
influence during the French Revolution. Thus it was many years before his proposed 
changed educational vision would become more widely known and his 
‘revolutionary’ ideas to be associated with the ‘emergence’ of children.
Some of the key elements that we can still see in his work include a view of children 
being very different to adults since they are innocent, vulnerable, mature slowly and 
are entitled to freedom and happiness. In his terms, children are naturally good. Then
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there is the notion that people develop through the stages above and that different 
forms of education may be apposite to each. There is also the guiding principle that 
what will be learned should be determined by understanding of an individual’s nature 
at each stage of development. Thereto there should be appreciation of the fact that 
individuals vary within those stages and that education must consequently be 
individualised as he says ‘Every mind has its own form’. All children have a 
fundamental impulse to partake of activity. Restlessness is eventually replaced by 
curiosity with mental activity being a direct development of their physical activities. 
Because of his views on a healthy life, the power of the environment determined the 
success of educational experience. It was crucial, which John Dewey would later 
recognise, that educators pay attention to the environment. The more they were able 
to control and use it, the more effective education would be. Rousseau also argued 
that children should be kept in complete ignorance of ideas beyond their grasp. This 
is the controlling function of the educator which he saw as a fundamental principle. 
There was also the importance of developing ideas for oneself in order to make sense 
of the world in one’s own way.
In short, Rousseau is seen as a turning point at which children find a more 
pronounced place in civil society, characterised by ‘primitivism’ and ‘irrationalism’. 
It was a view that gained little credence until the 20th century and certainly adds little 
to an argument for children’s citizenship as part of a revolutionary process such as 
the French Revolution to which Rousseau contributed. In fact, two of his seminal 
works, Discourse on the Origin o f Inequality (1754; here 2004) and The Social 
Contract (1762; here 1998), do little to pursue the case for a changing status of 
children in France or elsewhere (e.g. Russia and Cuba) where his work was to 
contribute to revolution.
Indeed Rousseau’s influence is highly evident in one of the great works in the 
process of achieving a universal notion of human rights, Thomas Paine’s Rights o f 
Man (1791 and 1792; here 1999) which is a call for democracy and egalitarianism. 
However, as most documents of its time, it is a call for social reforms that included 
reform of wage policy, public provision for those in need of work and social security 
for men. In essence it excludes women, children and slaves who are still seen as 
generally under the ‘dominion’ of men.
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Kant
Around 120 years after Hobbes, Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) developed parts of his 
argument further. Kant’s view was that a child is not property of parents. Instead he 
believed that having brought a child into the world they “...incur an obligation to 
make the child content with his condition so far as they can...” (Kant, 1996:64) and 
that from “...this duty there must necessarily arise the right of parents to manage and 
develop the child” {Ibid.:65). It is an expression of the duty of care that broadly 
speaking persists to the present day but that this obligation derives not out of the 
child’s consent but depends on his or her satisfaction (‘content’).
Kant was also very clearly considering the child’s best interests. This in part derives 
from his theory that there is a single moral obligation. He called it the ‘Categorical 
Imperative’ and described its derivation from the concept of duty. He thus defines the 
exigencies of the moral law as ‘categorical imperatives’. They are principles that are 
inherently valid and are good in and of themselves, must be obeyed under all 
circumstances and situations so that our demeanour is to comply with the moral law. 
All other moral obligations emanate from the Categorical Imperative, as too the 
means by which all moral obligations can be examined. Kant furthermore stated that 
moral means and ends may be applied to the categorical imperative, thus rational 
beings may pursue certain ‘ends’ by application of the appropriate ‘means’. Those 
ends are based on physical needs or wants that will always apply for purely 
hypothetical imperatives. The categorical imperative, however, may be based only on 
something that is an ‘end in itself’. That is, an end that is a means only to itself but 
not to another need, desire or objective.
Kant’s view was that moral law is a principle of reason in itself and is not based on 
conditional details such as what might make us happy. Hence, for example, a human 
being acts on the moral law which has no further motive than the ‘worthiness’ of 
being happy: “ ...all happiness awaits us, except in so far as we have diminished our 
share in it through our unworthiness of being happy, is a practically necessary idea of 
reason” (Kant, 1996:428). Accordingly, he believed that moral obligation applies to 
all and only to rational agents. However, since Kant believed children were not bom 
with reason but had to be tutored toward being rational agents by parents, we have
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again a thesis that tends toward the ‘human becomings’ but that is cognisant of the 
essentially inborn liberty of each individual.
There we have what appear to be intellectual steps toward the nature of recognition of 
the child as an individual and bearer of rights and also the development of the 
concept of citizenship that may well have given children extensive rights (and duties) 
in civil society. Perhaps it came as a development of an event such as the French 
Revolution or American War of Independence, another force most certainly 
contributed to delaying that possibility. This was the emerging idea of ‘nationhood’. 
Rousseau and Kant were both to contribute intellectually to this notion through their 
common goal of resolving the issue of bringing an end to the affliction of war on the 
world, in their case Europe.
Rousseau’s notion of citizenship was almost Aristotelian (see Heater, 1990: 54) but 
with an inclination toward the development of a sense of national cohesion rather 
than global citizenship. Kant, on the other hand, advocated a cosmopolitan 
citizenship that transcended national and international laws. It thus looked toward a 
future with something approaching world government. However, the concept of 
nationhood assumed a fundamental political significance that came with the rise of 
political ideology and the doctrine of nationalism.
Those who came to be regarded nationalists saw a ‘nation’ not merely in terms of a 
descriptive term for a group of people with a ‘common’ identity, but as an entity 
endowed with the right of sovereignty. If necessary, this could be achieved by the 
conquest or absorption of non-national territories. There is no consensus among the 
theorists of nationalism on whether nations were a significant political factor before 
the 18th century. Some of them see the nation state as a 19th century phenomenon that 
came about as the result of the political campaigns by nationalists or as a top-down 
construction of pre-existing states.
The doctrine of nationhood was that all human beings are divided into groups called 
nations which gives rise to the ethical doctrine of nationhood and is the foundation of 
nationalist ideology. The members of a ‘nation’ are distinguished by some kind of 
common identity and almost always by a common origin which is frequently
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expressed in terms of a sense of shared ancestry. National identity refers to the 
distinctive features of the group and to an individual’s sense of belonging to the 
nation. People may be separated by differences in personality, belief systems, 
geography, temporality or language yet they may regard themselves, and also be seen 
by others, as members of one nation. Members of that nation are deemed to share 
certain characteristics, values and behaviour and feel a sense of duty toward other 
members and take a degree of responsibility for the actions of other and all members 
of the same nation. The nation state, however, whilst possessing many of those 
characteristics tends to exist in a state of political cohesion that binds people to a 
single ‘national’ identity within geographically defined boundaries which may divide 
literal nations.
Spence
With the emergence of the modem nation state the status of the ‘citizen’ and 
‘national’ (member of a nation) began to appear. As a political status it also brought 
with it a new emphasis on the roles of citizens and their duties and responsibilities 
within their nations. In his pamphlet The Real Rights o f Man (1793), later republished 
under the title The Nationalization o f the Land (1882), Thomas Spence (1750-1814) 
advocated the kind of absolute change in social organisation that would have brought 
about an almost universal citizenship. He was a Radical democrat and advocate of the 
common ownership of land who strongly believed the role of the state was to provide 
for its members was through taxes.
His proposal was not that land be nationalised but that self-contained parochial 
communities be established and in which rent paid to that parish, which had absolute 
ownership of the land, should be the only form of taxation in that state. Profits from 
rents would to be used to support local government, public libraries and schools in 
that area. Each parish would choose a representative for the country’s national 
assembly and every adult male would be a member of the militia. His The Rights o f 
Infants (1796) is an early English language declaration of the natural rights of 
children. In fact, it broadly speaking addresses the question through the ‘voice’ of a 
woman in the form of a dialogue between the aristocracy and a ‘mother of children’. 
In his own appendix to The Rights o f Infants: ‘A Contrast between Paine’s Agrarian 
Justice, and Spence’s End of Oppression’, he argues that:
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...both young and old share equally alike of the parish revenues, children 
and aged relations living in a family will, especially in rich parishes, 
where the dividends are large, through high rents or the production of 
mines etc., be accounted as blessings.
It is an early appeal for equality of all across boundaries of age and gender. It is a 
sign of the gradual move toward a new attitude on the road to the disestablishment of 
usually economically distinguishable (i.e. property owning) men as the only people 
with access to citizen’s rights and duties. Spence’s idea was that all people retain 
control and oversight of governance very locally. Whilst nationhood was one pillar of 
a unified society, the interdependence of members of communities with devolved 
control over essential resources gave both equity and stability to the other pillar of 
that society.
Hegel
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770 -  1831) believed that individuals can only
lead a proper moral life through absolute obedience to the laws of the state. Within
that state there are two subordinate levels of social activity to which people had to
commit themselves: those are the family and economic contribution to civil society.
Hegel went to some lengths to distinguish between the role of individuals as
‘economic man’ (the bourgeois) and ‘political man’ (the citizen) (for instance, see
Hegel, 2001:76-83). He also gave great credence to the notion of nationalism as an
attribute of membership of the state that thus gave identity and meaning to the citizen
of that state. Within that state the family was the basis of the ‘unity’ which cemented
overall membership and wherein children are of great importance:
The unity of marriage which, as substantive, exists only as an inner 
harmony and sentiment, but, so far as it exists actually, is separated in the 
two married persons, becomes in the children a unity, which has actual 
independent existence, and is an independent object. This new object the 
parents love as an embodiment of their love. — The presupposition of the 
direct presence of the two people as parents becomes, when taken on its 
merely natural side, a result. This process expands into an infinite series 
of generations, which beget and are presupposed. (147)
Within the family, children were naturally subject to the authority and decision
making processes of their parents, thus:
Children have the right to be supported and educated out of the common 
family means. The right of parents to the service of their children, as 
service, is limited to and based upon family cares. The right of parents
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over the free choice of their children is just as clearly limited to correction 
and education. The purpose of chastisement is not mere justice; it has a 
subjective moral side, its object being to restrain a freedom, which is still 
bound to nature, and to instil the universal into the child’s consciousness 
and will.
Addition.—Man does not possess by instinct what he is to be, but must 
first of all acquire it. Upon this is based the child’s right to be educated.
As it is with children, so is it with nations under paternal government; the 
people are supplied with food out of storehouses, and are not looked upon 
as self-dependent or of age. The services required of children must bear 
upon their education and promote their good. To ignore this good would 
destroy the ethical element of the relation, and make the child a slave. A 
prominent feature in the education of children is correction, intended to 
break their self-will, and eradicate what is merely sensual and natural.
One must not expect to succeed here simply with goodness, because the 
direct volition of children is moved by immediate suggestions and likings, 
not by reasons and ideas. If we give children reasons, we leave it open to 
them whether to act upon them or not. In this way everything depends 
upon their pleasure. In the fact that parents constitute the universal and 
essential is included the necessity of obedience on the part of children. 
When no care is taken to cherish in children the feeling of subordination, a 
feeling begotten in them by the longing to be big, they become forward 
and impertinent. {Ibid.: 147-48)
Therefore children are also seen as comparable to membership of the state itself (“As
it is with children, so is it with nations...”), wherein they are also bearers of rights:
Children are potentially free, and life is the direct embodiment of this 
potential freedom. Hence they are not things, and cannot be said to belong 
to any one, their parents or others. But their freedom is as yet only 
potential. The education of children has with regard to family life a two­
fold object. Its positive aim is to exalt the ethical nature of the child into a 
direct perception free from all opposition, and thus secure that state of 
mind, which forms the basis of ethical life. The child thus passes his 
earlier years in love, trust, and obedience. Its negative aim is to lift the 
child out of the natural simplicity, in which it at first is, into 
selfdependence and free personality, and thus make it able to leave the 
natural unity of the family.
Note.—That the children of Roman parents were slaves is one of the facts 
which most tarnishes the Roman law. This wounding of the ethical life in 
its most intimate quarter is an important element in forming an estimate of 
the world-historical character of the Romans, as well as of their tendency 
towards formal right.
The necessity for the education of children is found in their inherent 
dissatisfaction with what they are, in their impulse to belong to the world 
of adults, whom they reverence as higher beings, and in the wish to 
become big. The sportive method of teaching gives to children what is 
childish under the idea that it is in itself valuable. It makes not only itself 
ridiculous, but also all that is serious. It is scorned by children themselves.
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Since it strives to represent children as complete in their very 
incompleteness, of which they themselves are already sensible. Hoping to 
make them satisfied with their imperfect condition, it disturbs and taints 
their own truer and higher aspiration. The result is indifference to and 
want of interest in the substantive relations of the spiritual world, 
contempt of men, since they have posed before children in a childish and 
contemptible way, and vain conceit devoted to the contemplation of its 
own excellence. {Ibid.)
Whilst he was not advocating intergenerational equality, he expressed a mild critique 
of the irrationality of some of the notions normally considered as defining what is 
suitable for children and their capacity to express opinions. It is a step forward in the 
longstanding notion of the child as being in a state of becoming that is far from 
offering a full role in civil society. It certainly offers a chink of light through a 
previously closed door of opportunity that had moved relatively little from Hobbes, 
despite some interpretations of what Locke and Rousseau said as great steps. It is 
most certainly measurably less Aristotelian than Rousseau’s positions. However, 
Hegel’s position on the subservient role of the citizen within a very strong state 
denies the degree of individuality that is attached to contemporary concepts of 
citizenship in which children would be able to make choices independent of the will 
and supervision of adult caretakers.
Mill, Marx and Engels
Then there is John Stuart Mill’s (1859) argument for a broader ‘weak’ autonomy. He 
postulated a view that people (adults) do not necessarily make wise and right 
decisions but that the highest value is liberty. People possess the right to choose for 
themselves. Mill (1806 -  1873) included women but not children because he assumed 
that they are too immature to be liable for the risk of making personal decisions. For 
him, the ‘age of consent’ divided adulthood from childhood. Along the lines of a 
view held by Jeremy Bentham, Mill relocated morality away from duty toward utility 
and cost effectiveness.
He considered that in democracies the highest value is the right of choice and to vote 
when the freedom to choose matters more than whatever value or an alternative is 
chosen. People generate their personal destiny that is based on their own risk-benefit 
reckoning. In Mill’s world, contracts replace trust and thus reduce risk. However, it
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should be borne in mind that civil rights were only really extended to working men in
the 19th century and to women and other ‘minority’ adult groups in the 20th century as
the outcome of often embittered campaigns. Thus the history of the ‘liberation’ of
women plays an important role in concluding the argument for the extension of
citizenship to children although the inclusion of children was unacceptable for
theoretical and practical reasons. Citing Mills’ Principles o f Political Economy
(Turner and Matthews, 1998:139):
...classing together, for this and other purposes, of women and children 
appears to me both indefensible in principle and mischievous in practice. 
Children, below a certain age cannot judge or act for themselves; up to a 
considerably greater age they are inevitably more or less disqualified for 
doing so...
Given the influence of Mill’s work, it is most likely that it has had at least some 
lasting influence on the modem view of childhood which separates children as 
immature and vulnerable. In Mill’s view they are subject to the care and protection of 
adults who also bear responsibility for their moral and social preparation for adult 
life. That view holds sway to the present day. If viewed through a contemporary 
equivalence of his position on women’s right to equality then it may be possible to 
extrapolate a view that children deserve moral and political equality with adults.
In examination of the intellectual progress of children from antiquity to the present 
day, it would be almost natural to assume that Mill’s contemporaries Marx and 
Engels would contribute. Indeed, the latter in his most famous work The Condition o f 
the Working Class in England in 1844 Friedrich Engels shows a great deal of concern 
with English children. However that is more or less confined to critical appraisal of 
their working conditions, broadly speaking that they worked at all, and somewhat 
less to their broader role in civil society. He does, however, say that schools had the 
role of teaching “ ... educational skills, (...) not only occupational skills, but also the 
nature of (...) domestic and social relations, (...) position in society, and the moral 
and religious duties appropriate to it” (1999:157).
Karl Marx likewise shows some degree of concern for the economic exploitation and 
poverty of children in parts of his large body of work. On the other hand he does not 
look at them as important social actors so that in his examination of civil and human 
rights where political and social emancipation is separable from an essentially
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economic thesis there is relatively little. Indeed, the only really substantive work is 
On the Jewish Question (1844) which was a critique of the situation of civil and 
human rights at the time he was writing. It is mainly a critical view of Judaism and 
Christianity seen from his position on social emancipation. In his Foundations o f the 
Critique o f Political Economy (1857), sometimes known as Grundrisse (Grundrisse 
der Kritik der politischen Okonomie) (1993), he said that: “Die Gesellschaft besteht 
nicht aus Individuen, sondem driickt die Summe der Beziehungen, Verhaltnisse aus, 
worin diese Individuen zueinander stehn.” (Society does not consist of individuals 
but articulates the sum total of relationships [and] conditions that describe the 
relationship of individuals to each other). English translation loses a great deal of the 
nuance of the word Gesellschaft which has greater depth in its original form as used 
in Ferdinand Tonnies’ 1887 work Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft (Tonnies, 2005) 
that has become part of the vocabulary of modem sociology.
Whilst Tonnies was of the view that distinction between social groupings is based on 
an assumption that there are only two basic forms of an actor’s will to express 
approval of other actors, that approval is by no means self-evident (see Tonnies later 
in this chapter). It is rather more an idea in line with what Hobbes is saying than 
Marx, thus there is a very little room for a view that Marx’s Gesellschaft is an 
inclusive version in which children might have a distinct role. Indeed, Marx, whilst 
giving little consideration to children is often cited as having written that “Children 
should educate their parents” in an article for the New York Daily Tribune in 1857. 
In their joint works such as The Communist Manifesto (1872) there is a great deal of 
reference to gender disparity and only fleeting attention paid to age and then usually 
with reference to labour exploitation by bourgeois entrepreneurs. Thus, despite a 
tendency to look toward Marxism for suggest ion of highly influential social changes 
there is very little of any notable value for this work.
The philosophy of education and welfare as social control
In fact education and welfarism, and more explicitly emergent ‘philosophies’ of each, 
were to have a far greater role in influencing how children were seen. In England and 
Wales the 1870 Elementary Education Act introduced compulsory universal 
education for children aged between five and 13 years. The 1880 Education Act 
better regulated school attendance laws. There is some debate whether or not this was
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for the best interest of children depending on whom one reads. Some authors such as 
Corrigan (1979), Goodman (1971) and Illich (1973) occasionally use the example of 
19th and early 20th century political argument for the introduction of compulsory 
education as a means of removing idle, unemployed youths from streets and public 
places. It is highly possible that what appears a propitious move toward the 
protection of children and bringing about an improvement of their living standards 
was almost always inclusive of the element of increased control over them thus more 
ideological than altruistic.
What is apparent from political history is the real fear of potential disruption by 
young people. That was to lead to every consideration of one of the more important 
products of education which was turning out people who would be part of a 
disciplined, punctual labour force, as Corrigan (1979:33) says:
In looking at the inspectors’ reports over thirty years we can see that there
were a number of strands in (...) ‘education’ and that these were very
directly linked to fears of insurrection.
1. The provision of bourgeois facts and theories to counter both 
‘revolutionary’ facts and those facts that were derived from the 
material conditions of working-class existence at the time.
2. The provision of a bourgeois moral and religious code, which once it 
had been taught to the working class, would shape their behaviour.
3. The creation of a disciplined, punctual labour force.
4. The creation of a hierarchy of civilisation based on education and 
refinement which the working class would respect and of which they 
would find themselves at the very bottom
It is a view that reflects Engels’ simpler analysis of the reason for compulsory 
education. It was designed to provide a bourgeois moral and religious code for the 
working class within basic education for their children that would offset the potential 
for revolutionary activity that was an embryonic force under the material conditions 
of the working class way of life at that time. Therewith the position of children when 
they grew up and took their place in the social hierarchy would be an outcome of the 
subtlety of educated-ness that schooling with its routines and disciplines inculcated 
(see Corrigan, 1979:29-43). This was the educational ideology that was disseminated 
through the entire British Empire as public education began to be widespread.
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Social reform
Education was part of the wider provision of welfare that was developing quickly in 
industrialising Europe. The welfare state is a ‘double-edged’ provision that requires 
something back from the people it looks after. It is the outcome of a long process of 
social reform that not only bestowed greater freedom and privileges on people but 
also demanded more of them.
From the late 18th and throughout the 19th centuries social reform was a fast moving 
component of the changes of the status and situation of children especially. Two 
particular forces majeur that contributed to change that led to the creation of the 
welfare state have had long term effects that resonate to the present day: philanthropy 
and literature. In 1807 when the abolition of the slave trade was being debated in 
Parliament, a campaign that had lasted two decades ended and saw the age of 
philanthropy come into its own. The House of Commons voted by 283 to 16 to 
abolish the slave trade. Acquisition, transport and the sale of enslaved Africans 
became illegal although slavery remained legal in Britain’s colonies.
When the driving force of the Abolitionist movement, William Wilberforce retired 
from Parliament in 1825, younger MPs like Thomas Fowell Buxton took over the 
Parliamentary campaign. In July 1833 the bill abolishing slavery was finally passed. 
The Buxtons were to continue to campaign for what we would call ‘human rights’ 
today. The end of slavery is probably the single most distinct marker on the way to a 
rights based social state in which most people are entitled to the benefit of welfare 
provisions. The extension of rights was also a political expediency that reflected a 
genuine fear of the possibility of the masses rising up in revolution.
Philanthropy
People like the Buxtons were part of a new group of educated, well-heeled people 
who became known as philanthropists. Philanthropy describes endowment of money, 
goods, services, time or effort in support of something socially beneficial. It has a 
defined objective but offers no financial or material reward for the donor. It usually 
includes any unselfish activity aimed the improvement of the improvement of the 
quality of life of humans or animals. It is essentially a liberal, intellectual pursuit that 
must always be converted into practical and material outcomes. Children were early
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teneficiaries. Mistakes were also made, as examples of the expatriation of children to 
the colonies that follow illustrate.
Toward the end of 19th century greater attention was paid to the specific needs of 
children. Mary Carpenter (1807-77) opened a small school for girls with her mother 
in Bristol. It has been said that her interest in the problems and experiences of 
children living in poverty began when she was out with a philanthropist, Dr Joseph 
Tuckerman, in 1833 and saw a small ragged boy in the street. He said that “...the boy 
should be followed to his home and seen after...” (Young and Ashton, 1956:166).
In 1846 Mary Carpenter opened a ‘ragged school’ in a poor neighbourhood of Bristol 
where: “ ...she was faced with the riotous behaviour of untamed and poverty-stricken 
children, yet she succeeded in holding their interest by her ability and enthusiasm” 
{op. cit.). She thus began to focus on the needs of the ‘difficult’ children who were 
often also offenders because she was shocked by the way they learned criminal 
behaviour at such an early age. She began to study the situation in other countries.
In 1851 she published an essay on reform schools Reformatory Schools for the 
Children o f the Perishing and Dangerous Classes and for Juvenile Offenders and 
organised a conference in Birmingham on the institutional care of young offenders. 
There was a great deal of interest in her ideas and in 1852 she opened a reformatory 
for boys and girls. Her work was influential, influencing the writing of the Youthful 
Offenders Act 1854 that acknowledged the role of the reformatory schools.
Her lobbying contributed to the passing of the Industrial Schools Acts 1857, 1861, 
and 1866. Young and Ashton (1956:169-172) described six of her methods and 
principles:
1. Treatment should be based on the love of the child. Thereby the trust, affection and 
sense of security ‘normal’ child expected within the family can be stimulated. After 
visiting the Rauhe Haus in Hamburg she believed that a reformatory should be as 
close in size to a family as possible so that individual needs could be dealt with and 
an appropriate environment created.
2. Change necessitated the cooperation of a child. She believed it difficult to do any 
consequential work unless children were ready and willing to change and believed
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that progress was possible. Without their active participation she believed that change 
would not be forthcoming.
3. Work was only a means to an end instead of an end in itself and never forced work 
since she believed it had no instructive quality. She felt: “It would be better for a 
child to be idle, even refused access to work, so that when he was tired of his idleness 
work could be made available as a favour.”
4. Recreation was as important as work and children needed sport which was 
stridently opposed to the dominant thought of her day. She thought that teachers in 
schools had better opportunity to determine “the true nature of the boy in his periods 
of recreation than at any other time.”
5. Corporal punishment was reduced to a minimum because she felt that relentless 
harshness and intemperance were counterproductive. When children earned money 
for work and had own possessions they would be more prone to respect the property 
of others.
6. The approach should be educational whereby Christian and moral teaching had to 
be parallel to learning a trade.
In contrast to other practitioners she also had no fixed idea of how long a reform 
process might take believing that: “Each case should be dealt with on its merits, 
release dependent on the progress made, and decided by the school managers under a 
government inspection” (Ibid/A ll). Whilst the emphasis was for work with children 
who broke laws, the undercurrent was always the social environment in which they 
lived and seeking a better quality of life for children generally (see Manton, 1976).
A ‘child-saving movement’ emerged in the USA during the 19th century (see Platt, 
1969) that was very similar to the work of Carpenter and was to be very influential in 
the development of the juvenile justice system. The ‘child-savers’ emphasised the 
value of redemption and prevention through the early identification of deviance with 
intervention in the form of education and training. They were reformers who 
developed programmes for disturbed and troubled youth rather than for all children. 
Contemporary critics say that they were far more interested in control of the poor 
rather than their welfare. However, the development of juvenile justice has 
contributed to giving children a well defined place in society that whilst separating 
them from adults also introduced a notion of proportionality and practice that can be
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compared with the ‘evolving capacities’ principle at the core of present day 
children’s rights (Article 5, CRC).
Poverty was nonetheless an issue that drew attention to children. Thomas Bamardo 
(1845-1905) noticed the plight of homeless and destitute children in 1866 whilst 
working in the East End of London during a cholera epidemic. He opened his first 
home in the East End in 1870. His homes were started to search for and to receive 
waifs and strays who were then fed, clothed and educated and wherever possible 
given industrial training. The principle was of free and immediate admission with no 
restrictions on age, sex, religion or nationality.
Children were accepted irrespective of whether they were physically healthy or 
incurably ill with one necessary qualification of destitution. Infants and younger girls 
and boys were usually ‘boarded out’ in rural districts. Girls over 14 years of age were 
sent to industrial training schools to be taught useful domestic occupations and boys 
over 17 years of age tested in ‘labour homes’, then placed in employment at home, 
sent to sea or emigrated. Boys between 13 and 17 years of age were trained for 
various trades for which they were assessed to be mentally or physically suited. There 
were also other institutions including a rescue home for girls in serious danger, a 
seaside convalescent home and a hospital for the chronically ill. At the time it was 
generally felt that the most useful of all work introduced by Bamardo was the 
emigration system. Thereby thousands of boys and girls were sent to British colonies, 
mainly Canada.
Other organisations began to send British boys and girls overseas. One, the 
Fairbridge Society, was established specifically to relocate young children to 
populate the Empire with ‘Good White British stock’. Other British national charities 
such as the Church of England, the Methodist Church (through the National 
Children’s Homes), the Salvation Army and the Catholic Church played major roles 
in forced migration. In New Zealand children were frequently placed with foster 
parents whilst in Canada children were placed with farmers, often without sufficient 
preparation and supervision. Some farmers were later charged with manslaughter due 
to the extent of their cruelty.
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Only few children were ever legally adopted overseas with the majority spending 
entire childhoods in large, impersonal institutions or farm schools that accommodated 
over 300 children. These migrations were motivated by a diversity of objectives 
although none of them gave priority to the needs of children. Accordingly, child 
migrants were later seen as a propitious source of cheap labour for Canada’s farms, 
as a measure to boost Australia’s post-war population and means of safeguarding a 
white, professional elite in former Rhodesia. Considering it had begun as a 
philanthropic principle, the sad truth for many child migrants was appalling standards 
of care that fell well below accepted standards found within British institutions. 
Nonetheless, it was to persist until the 1960s.
In 1881 the Reverend George Staite wrote to the Liverpool Mercury: “ ...whilst we 
have a Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, can we not do something to 
prevent cruelty to children?” (NSPCC, 2005:4). Social attitudes made very clear 
distinctions between the public and private lives of Victorians so that the famous 
reformer Lord Shaftesbury said to Staite: “The evils you state are enormous and 
indisputable, but they are of so private, internal and domestic a nature as to be 
beyond the reach of legislation” (Ibid.) A Liverpool banker, Thomas Agnew, visited 
the New York Society for the Prevention o f Cruelty to Children whilst on a trip to 
New York in 1881. On his return he set up a similar project in Liverpool in 1883, the 
Liverpool Society fo r  the Prevention o f Cruelty to Children that was eventually 
followed by the London Society for the Prevention o f Cruelty to Children in 1884 
under the his guidance (Ibid.'.l). In 1889 the London Society had 32 branches that 
were known as aid committees throughout England, Wales and Scotland. Each 
branch raised funds from donations, subscriptions and legacies that supported an 
inspector whose task was to investigate reports of child abuse and neglect. At the 
1889 Annual General Meeting the Society changed its name to the National Society 
fo r the Prevention o f Cruelty to Children (Ibid.).
Josephine Butler was a Victorian ‘feminist’ whose work was especially concerned 
with the welfare of prostitutes. As an outcome of her efforts, international 
organisations including the International Abolitionist Federation began a campaign 
against state regulation of prostitution and the traffic in women and children between 
1869 and 1886.
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Throughout Europe and North America other philanthropic works were to be 
influenced by the reforms in Britain. However it was the other major force for change 
that was to be more universally influential. That was literature. It would be more 
likely that a separate thesis examine the role of literature in order to do its diversity 
and importance justice. This brief visit attempts only to give only a small sample.
Literature and children
In the early 19th century Romantic poets and novelists ‘discovered’ children. William 
Wordsworth’s Ode: Intimations o f Immortality from Recollections o f Early 
Childhood (1807) epitomises the direction of this development. It is a deeply 
philosophical work thematically ranging from the Platonic belief in pre-existence to 
the poet’s own belief that children have an instinctive wisdom that adults lack. His 
interpretation of Plato’s pre-existence was that the soul existed in an ‘ideal’ other 
state prior to corporeal existence and that it will return to the ideal other state after 
death. The immortality the title refers to is that of the soul which he believed is felt or 
alluded to during infancy; thus his famous opening line to the Ode: “The Child is the 
Father of the Man.”.
Samuel Taylor Coleridge, John Keats, Walter Scott, James Hogg and Lord Tennyson 
all wrote about children, whereas others including the Lambs, Edward Lear, Heinrich 
Hoffmann and Lewis Carroll (Charles Lutwidge Dodgson) wrote for them. Much of 
the work of Romantic poets was largely sentimental and more trivialising than 
contributing to any significant steps forward in civil society. On the other hand, the 
authors writing for  children had made a large step forward to recognition of children 
as an audience capable of enjoying their work.
Charles Dickens tends to be the first author who strikes a critical chord generally. His 
Bleak House appeared in 1853 is one of the sharpest parodies of social injustice of its 
time. One of the main characters is Jo the crossing sweeper, a rootless child who has 
nobody and nothing. He is a forlorn, hopeless character who lives in a decaying part 
of London known as Tom-all-Alone’s. Jo’s character and history are only briefly 
outlined by Dickens.
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He presents Jo thus:
Here he is, very muddy, very hoarse, very ragged (Dickens, 1853:108).
...Jo the outlaw with the broom... {Ibid,.: 160).
When he appears in court as a witness for his one and only friend he cannot 
comprehend the coroner’s quite ordinary questions about his identity, so that Dickens 
tells us:
Name, Jo. Nothing else that he knows on. Don’t know that everybody has 
two names. Never heerd of sich a think. Don’t know that Jo is short for a 
longer name. Thinks it long enough for him. He don’t find no fault with 
it. Spell it? No he can’t spell it. No father, no mother, no friends. Never 
been to school. What’s home? Know’s a broom’s a broom, and it’s 
wicked to tell a lie. Don’t recollect who told him about the broom, or 
about the lie, but knows both (Ibid.: 10).
Dickens very graphically portrays children of his time in a number of books. In 
Oliver Twist or the Parish Boy's Progress (1838), The Personal History o f David 
Copperfield (1850) and Great Expectations (1861) there are children who could have 
as easily be rewritten versions of observations from journalist Henry Mayhew’s four 
volume London Labour and London Poor (1851) or London Characters (1874) who 
visited the poorest parts of the city. However it was not only England where we find 
rootless, dispossessed children. In the USA Mark Twain (Samuel Langhome 
Clemens) wrote two books with boys as main characters: The Adventures o f Tom 
Sawyer (1876) and The Adventures o f Huckleberry Finn (1884). Huck Finn was a 
development on Tom Sawyer and demonstrated a more serious quality than its 
antecedent. The main assertion behind Huckleberry Finn is the young boy’s (Huck) 
confidence in ‘the right thing to do’ although the majority of people believe that what 
he did was wrong. It is a very moral story that examines the situation of children in 
the society Twain lived in and recorded as a journalist.
Hans Christian Andersen’s short ‘fairy tale’ The Little Match Girl (1846) used a short 
story to describe the hopeless plight of an impoverished child who would die rather 
than fail to sell her matches in the freezing streets of a Danish city on Christmas Eve. 
She dies unseen and uncared for by celebrating people around her.
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Charles Kingsley wrote The Water Babies (1863) categorically as a ‘fairy tale’. It 
naturally has the moral, even though Kingsley was explicit rather than tacit as is the 
norm in more traditional tales. The morphology of the story owes a great deal to 
contemporary writers and is to a degree a social comment on injustice against 
children in his time although traditional elements are present. His inspiration was 
Charles Darwin’s The Origin o f Species and is a modified version of the theory of 
evolution for children. It shows that survival of a species is determined not only by 
the condition of the physical being but also the condition of the soul. It was a critique 
of the materialism of the Victorian age as a vehicle for adaptation of Darwin’s theory. 
In fact, he was heavy influenced by reporters of his age like Mayhew and thus 
reflects portrayal of the real world in which he lived.
Although the story is set earlier, Petit Gavroche is one of Victor Hugo’s main
characters in Les Miserables (1862) The street boy is a powerful image who Hugo
dedicates six subchapters to. He took almost eight pages (Hugo, 1994:396-402) to
introduce the notion of the Parisian ‘gamin’ before turning to Petit Gavroche himself.
In a footnote he tells us:
This word ‘gamin’ was printed for the first time, and passed from the 
popular language into that of literature, in 1834. It was in a little work 
entitled Claude Gueux35 that the word first appeared. It created a great 
uproar. The word was adopted. (Hugo, 1994:396).
It is, in fact, a social comment on the lives of children of his own time including 
children he would have seen around him in France and later in exile in other places 
including Jersey.
The preoccupation of Victorian authors was with poverty and injustice, however their 
portrayal of young characters is usually independent, competent, moral and reasoned 
(Jo is generally all of those things despite his general ignorance of the world about 
him). Thus literature was not uncommonly used in campaigns for anti-cruelty laws 
and the raising of the age of sexual consent and marriage were amongst many laws 
that came either side of the change of century in Europe, parts of the USA and South 
America, as also in large parts of the European colonial world.
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The emergence of child sciences
The early 20th century was, though, to be undoubtedly the beginning of real change 
for children. Child ‘sciences’ including developmental psychology, paediatrics and 
child psychiatry were to become formally accepted disciplines. It was an era during 
which, as Zelizer (1994) describes in the USA but applied almost comparably 
throughout the Western world, efforts to capitalise and in some ways assign a 
financial value to children and increasingly sentimentalise them to the degree of 
making them almost ‘sanctified’. It is this period when the child ceases to simply be a 
chattel of parents, especially the father, toward becoming an individual bearer of 
rights. The knowledge of the importance of the life stage ‘childhood’ also began to 
develop. Undoubtedly some of the greatest steps toward what we recognise as 
modem child protection and welfare occurred at that time.
Thus, one might say that, childhood had finally emerged as a distinctly identifiable 
life stage in a way that absolutely separated them from adults. Even then in many 
respects it was a position that had travelled only a very short step forward from the 
view held by Hobbes in 1651. Zelizer’s title Pricing the Priceless Child: the 
changing social value o f children encapsulates all of the components of childhood 
that was on the threshold of becoming what it is at present. That includes the nature 
of the contradiction between (over-) protection and the potential for participation in 
society as full citizens. This theme will be developed on in the next chapter.
Sociology
Toward the end of the 19th and early in the 20th century sociology emerged as a 
discipline in its own right. Its roots were deeply embedded in moral philosophy 
although its proponents and those beginning to advance the discipline were looking at 
how society was organised, from whence it came and where it might be going. Pre­
eminent among sociologists at the time were Ferdinand Tonnies, Emile Durkheim, 
Georg Simmel and Max Weber.
Ferdinand Tonnies (1855-1936) was a Hobbesian sociologist best known for his 
contribution to sociology that made the distinction between two types of social 
grouping: Gemeinschaft - often translated as community - is a form of social 
integration based on personal relations, thus more a community than association as in
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Gesellschaft, and conceivably historically epitomised by a family or neighbourhood 
in pre-modem (rural) society. Gemeinschaft is characteristic of small scale, localised 
societies and is in contrast to Gesellschaft which refers to complex, impersonal 
societies. Gesellschaft - often translated as society - is a form of social integration 
based on impersonal ties thus attributed to large scale, complex societies, with strict 
division between private and public spheres of life and contrasting to community- 
oriented life. Gesellschaft relationships arose in urban and capitalist settings 
embodied by individualism and impersonal pecuniary connections between people.
The distinction between social groupings is based on an assumption that there are 
only two basic forms of a social actor’s will. His Wesenwille (essential will) 
describes an actor seeing himself as a means of serving the goals of social grouping, 
which he considered to be an underlying subconscious force. Group around 
Wesenwille are called a Gemeinschaft. The other is Kiirwille (arbitrary will) whereby 
the social actor sees a social group as a means of advancing individual goals thus 
decisive and future-oriented. The groups are called Gesellschaft. Whereas 
membership in Gemeinschaft is self-fulfilling, Gesellschaft is instrumental for its 
members. In theoretical sociology the two types of will are strictly separated, whereas 
in applied sociology (thus empirically) they are mixed.
Emile Durkheim (1858-1917) was primarily concerned with how societies could 
maintain integrity and coherence in the modem era. He believed that things such as 
common religious and ethnic background should no longer be assumed. So as to 
study social life in modem societies, he set out to establish one of the first scientific 
approaches to social phenomena. Under the influence of Herbert Spencer, he was one 
of the first people to describe the existence and quality of different parts of a society 
by reference to what function they served in maintaining the commonplace or every 
day, and sometimes seen as a forerunner of functionalism. He insisted that society 
was more than the sum of its parts. Unlike his contemporaries Tonnies and Weber, he 
focused not on what motivates actions of individuals but instead the study of social 
facts which describe phenomena with existence in and of themselves not bound to 
actions of individuals.
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Durkheim argued that social facts had independent existence, better and more 
objective than actions of the individuals who composed society. They were only 
explained by other social facts instead of, for instance, society’s adjustment to a 
specific climate or ecological location. In his view, the phenomenon of society is not 
itself dependent on the personal nature of individuals (Durkheim, 1963:36) and also 
that “ ...individual natures are (...) indeterminate material that the social factor 
moulds and transforms” (Durkheim, 1966:24). This view is developed a little further 
in the following chapter.
Georg Simmel (1858 -1918) referred to “all the forms of association by which a mere 
sum of separate individuals are made into a ‘society’” (Simmel, 1949:157) that he 
describes as a “higher unity” {Ibid.) composed of individuals. He was particularly 
excited about the “impulse to sociability in man” {Ibid.) which he described as 
“associations... (through which) ...the solitariness of the individuals is resolved into 
togetherness, a union with others” {Ibid.): 158). It is a process he described by which 
“the impulse to sociability distils, as it were, out of the realities of social life the pure 
essence of association” {Ibid.) and “through which a unity is made” {Ibid.) and is 
“free-playing, interacting interdependence of individuals” {Ibid.). He defines 
sociability as the “play-form of association” {Ibid.) motivated by “amicability, 
breeding, cordiality and attractiveness of all kinds” {Ibid.). So that free association 
can occur “the personalities must not emphasize themselves too individually... with 
too much abandon and aggressiveness” {Ibid.).
Simmel also elucidated a “...world of sociability... democracy of equals... without 
friction” provided that people interact in a spirit of fun and affection that would 
“bring about among themselves a pure interaction free of any disturbing material 
accent” {Ibid.: 159). Since numerous social interactions are not exclusively of this 
agreeable disposition, one must conclude that he described a rather idealised vision of 
the best types of human interaction which are absolutely not the most representative 
or common type.
Max Weber (1864-1920) considered ultimate values and their consequent political 
values to be subjectively determined. He believed that particular communities are 
able to provide conditions for not only bourgeois values such as citizenship and true
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democracy but “ ...also much more intimate and yet eternal values, including artistic 
ones” (Lassman and Speirs, 1994:76). Language used to characterise the two types of 
values led to the interpretation that he understood them to be a subjective matter. As 
regards the first set of values, labelling them bourgeois revealed their conditional 
nature in which they are the product of a class. The second set of labels intimate and 
eternal explicitly set them apart from any objective basis. An intimate value is by 
definition personal such as an opinion. Furthermore, it carries the implication of 
emotion and eternal likewise. In his Economy and Society (Weber, 1992), he looked 
at society in terms of ‘Status Groups and Classes’ (Ibid.:302-309) and ‘Household, 
Neighbourhood and Kin Group’ (Ibid.:356-369). He thus moved on from Durkheim’s 
concern with how societies maintain their integrity and coherence to how society is 
structured in capitalist society and also developing on the Gemeinschaft and 
Gesellschaft ideas expounded by Tonnies.
He was also very interested in religion. His Religion o f China: Confucianism and 
Taoism (1951) was his second major work on the sociology of religion. He focused 
on aspects of Chinese society different from those of Western Europe that 
particularly contrasted with Puritanism. He also asked why capitalism did not 
develop in China. He viewed extended kinship groups in China that were based on 
the religious importance of family ties and ancestry as the means of protection of 
members against economic hazards. They thus approved or disapproved 
accumulation and payment of debts, work discipline and rationalisation of work 
processes. They also opposed development of an urban status class, slowed down 
development of legal institutions, the codification of laws and the emergence of a 
lawyer class.
He believed that Confucianism and Puritanism represent two comprehensive but 
mutually exclusive types of rationalisation in which both endeavour to organise 
human life according to specific definitive religious beliefs. They both encouraged 
moderation and self-control and were well-suited to accumulation of wealth. 
Confucianism strove to attain and preserve a cultured status position and used 
education, self-perfection, courtesy and familial piety as means of tuning into the 
world. Puritanism used those means to create a tool of God thus generates individuals 
who would serve God and thus succeed in the world.
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Whilst none of these, or indeed, other early sociologists contributed directly to the 
substance of this work in respect of children, they were to be highly influential 
through the social sciences and, in due course, to what became most recently known 
as the new sociology o f childhood. On the other hand, none of them is to be excluded 
in any examination of citizenship.
Children’s rights pioneers
Philanthropy, education and even literature were also to contribute to changes that 
came with the 20th century. One of the vanguards was Janusz Korczak (1878-1942). 
Korczak was the pseudonym of Henryk Goldszmit who was a Polish-Jewish 
paediatrician, educationist and children’s writer. It is uncertain when he seriously 
began to give children’s rights any form of consideration but what is known is that in 
1911-12 he was director of a Jewish orphanage, Dom Sierot, in Warsaw. Until 
serving as a military doctor in 1914 he created a simple children’s republic with its 
own parliament, court and newspaper in the orphanage. After 1918 he returned to the 
orphanage and helped found a second (Catholic) one. In 1926 he helped children start 
their own newspaper that was eventually published as a supplement to a national 
Jewish newspaper. His work ended in August 1942 when he was taken to Treblinka 
with the children and presumably gassed on arrival. However, in the fullness of time 
his work would become a driving force for children’s rights.
At the end of World War I Dorothy Buxton started a group that began to campaign 
for European children whose misfortune was to have been on the losing side. She was 
married to Charles Roden Buxton, great grandson of Thomas Fowell Buxton the anti­
slavery campaigner. She was also related to William Godwin the anarchist 
philosopher and atheist dissenter against religious tyranny and his daughter Mary 
Shelley, wife of the poet anarchist Percy Bysshe Shelley. It was a family with a good 
‘pedigree’ in campaigning for social change.
Eglantyne Jebb, Buxton’s sister, was a member of the group. Buxton launched the 
Save the Children Fund in 1919 to raise money for children affected by war 
throughout Europe. Jebb was a sickly but mentally energetic woman who went to live 
in Geneva where she began the Save the Children International Union. Jebb was
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eventually the figurehead of the group founding a second Save the Children charity in 
Sweden. Her best known contribution to children was in 1921 when she wrote a 
‘Children’s Charter’ that the International Union would adopt in 1923. In 1924 it was 
adopted almost to the letter by the League of Nations as the Declaration o f the Rights 
o f the Child, often called the Declaration o f Geneva. It was the starting point for what 
has since become the CRC.
Modern philosophy
John Dewey (1859-1952) probably made the most considerable contribution to the 
development of educational philosophy in the 20th century. His pragmatism, interest 
in interaction, reflection and experience and furthermore his fascination with 
community and democracy came together as an evocative educative form. He is often 
misrepresented and erroneously linked to child-centred education. In fact his work is 
not simply inserted into curricular traditions that have dominated North America and 
UK over the last century. His importance for informal educators arose out of his 
belief that education should engage with and increase experience, which has become 
a significant element in informal education. In addition, exploration of thought and 
reflection (and the associated role of educators) has continued to be an inspiration. He 
also had great enthusiasm for democracy and education for all that provides a raison 
d'etre for practice in the settings in which informal educators work. In his 
Democracy and Education (1966) he attempted to combine, criticise and expand on 
the democratic or proto-democratic educational philosophies of Plato and Rousseau.
He saw the former as overemphatic of the society and the latter overemphasising the 
individual. He viewed the mind and its formation as a communal process in which 
the individual is only a significant concept when viewed as an inextricable part of his 
or her society which has no meaning apart from its realisation in the lives of 
individual members. It was crucial that education should not be the instruction of 
facts and that the abilities and knowledge students learned be fully integrated into 
their lives as persons, citizens and human beings. The key concept of his view of 
education was greater emphasis placed on the enlargement of intellect and 
development of problem solving and critical thinking skills instead of simply 
memorising lessons. He believed a school was much like a repair part or accessory to
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the ‘organism’ of society. Education thus opened a door to a society in which 
children already belonged but in which they grew into their proper place.
Throughout the 20th century to the present few other philosophers have seriously 
contributed directly to significant change in the position of children toward their 
inclusion as full citizens. Some authors (e.g.: Philip Shields: Turner and Matthews, 
1998:161-88) have attributed more than is possibly due to Ludwig Wittgenstein. In 
fact his contribution is limited to his experience of the Austrian Reform School 
Movement. It is thus a worthy but essentially small contribution to the kind of area 
where Alexander Neill’s work at Summerhill offers something of greater 
significance. Similarly there is an almost inexplicable enthusiasm for John Rawls 
(e.g.: Freeman, 1983; Archard 1993, 2003 and 2002 [with Macleod]; O’Neill, 1994; 
Brennan and Noggle, 1998 [Turner and Matthews, 1998:203-32]) that in reality is 
limited to examinations of rationality through the medium of autonomy and self- 
determination and a theory of justice (Rawls, 1971). Both are valuable assets in an 
argument for social justice for children. That, in chain, has a key role in delivery of 
well reasoned argument for children’s citizenship, although Rawls never 
categorically touched on that subject.
Piaget, Kohlberg and Vygotsky, whose work will be examined in Chapter Seven, are 
not uncommonly placed under the rubric of intellectual input, however whilst they 
have all contributed to a view of a culture of childhood they would all be misplaced 
here. Their part in this work is of a more practical nature and their real contribution 
better measured in terms of their input into theoretical areas (e.g. the sociology of 
childhood and ‘childhood studies’) and practical domains (psychology particularly 
but also education and child care).
Some important guidance can be extrapolated from the work of Paulo Freire (1921- 
1997) who contributed a philosophy of education with roots in classical approaches 
derived from Plato and also modem Marxist and anti-imperialist thought. In some 
respects his Pedagogy o f the Oppressed (1972) is a development on a theme 
embarked on in Frantz Fanon’s Les Damnes de la Terre (1961) [The Wretched o f this 
Earth (2001)] emphasising the need to provide indigenous populations with 
education that was both new and modem (instead of traditional) and anti-colonial.
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This is one of the few approaches not expressly western and inward looking. Freire is 
renowned for his fervent critique of what he called a ‘banking’ concept of education.
This is where the student was seen as an empty account that was to be filled by 
teachers. The key critique was not new since it developed on Rousseau’s concept of a 
child as an active learner. That was a considerable step away from Locke’s tabula 
rasa that is essentially the same as a ‘banking’ concept and closer to such thinkers as 
Dewey who were ardently critical of the transference of ‘facts’ as the goal of 
education. However he brought the concept up to date and placed it in line with 
contemporary theories and educational thereby laying a foundation for what came to 
be ‘critical pedagogy’. It most certainly incorporates a notion of inclusion that 
presents a strong argument for children’s citizenship.
Elise Boulding is a Quaker peace campaigner whose view of the world imagines a
‘global civic culture’ that is not simply composed of nation states but is a global
community of human beings. She believes that a civic world order could become a
reality despite acknowledging the discord that exists. To create peace she believes
that we must all be teachers and develop new learning communities in which
everyone, old and young, will teach. Generations will teach each other from the
perspective of their respective generations. Her belief is that we understand events
unique to our own generation which shapes how we each perceive later events. In
order to achieve this we must think ‘outside of the box’. She believes that for most of
us education is stymied by the maxim ‘stick to facts, no need for imaginative
thinking’. To the contrary she believes we need to harness both intuition and
imagination to solve world crises. Whilst writing Children’s Rights and the Wheel o f
Life in 1979 she noted that:
As I studied the UN Declaration of Human Rights and the Declaration of 
the Rights of the Child, I became more and more aware of ageism as a 
phenomenon that excluded both the young and old from participation in 
society according to their abilities, and established them instead as a vast 
protectorate inside the social order (xiii-xiv)
In her book she looked at chronological age and maturity, children and youth as 
shapers of the future world and extension of human rights to people under 21 (still 
the age of majority in many nations at that time) with a great deal of focus on civil
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participation of all in which children were the equals of older generations. It is a text 
that has brought a certain amount of credence to an ideology of children’s 
participation. It is also one of few texts that essentially theoretically describe what 
citizenship might be for children. It is perhaps a ‘naive’ view that has far greater faith 
in the ability of humanity to form inclusive community than take account of the 
tendency of individuals to defend personal territory and spheres of influence.
Other authors have contributed other arguments. Although better known for her
works on Kant and Rawls, Onora O’Neill has made brief visitation to the issue of
childhood and especially given good account of the then impending change that
would come with the CRC in 1989:
If we care about children’s lives, we will have a number of good reasons 
not to base our arguments on appeals to children’s fundamental rights.
Some of these reasons are the theoretical difficulties of theories of 
fundamental rights. To look at rights is to look at what is ethically 
required indirectly by looking at what should be received. Constructivist 
accounts of what should be received are radically indeterminate, hence 
blurred. All rights-based approaches are incomplete in that they tell us 
nothing about what should be done when nobody has a right to its being 
done: they are silent about imperfect obligations. The view we get from 
the perspective of rights is not merely indirect, but blurred and 
incomplete. (O’Neill, 1988:463)
Since rights has to be the foundation on which a concept of citizenship must be 
constructed, O’Neill’s counsel in the closing words is the caveat that reminds that 
whilst Hobbes is a watershed in change of the status of and thought about children, in 
reality little intellectual progress has been made. It is difficult to view more than a 
small amount as sector and overall in this context it is mostly a newly emergent and 
unfinished concept that is still often more elusive than conclusive.
The entirety of this chapter is ‘Western’ with little exception, reflecting a global view 
of citizenship that is broadly speaking a neo-liberal notion with occasionally some 
strands of influence from the civic republican tradition. Most modem nation states 
have secular constitutions and basic laws that consolidate the concept of nationality 
and the nature of belonging within a political state. Within those states the family is 
still viewed as the benchmark of basic structure within community that has remained 
hierarchically conservative. It thus understands children as typically deferential to 
adult (primarily parental) authority and protection. Most intellectual clues that may
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be drawn from about 2500 years of thought tend to offer only limited indication of 
how to move the notion of children’s citizenship even the first few steps forward.
Philosophy has offered the greater argument for advance whereas theology that began 
by cementing societal cohesion within its doctrines appears to have offered little 
guidance. Indeed the position on children has little changed across beliefs since 
Augustine’s time. Despite the tendency of child researchers to emphasise the 
importance of Locke and Rousseau, their role is probably better appreciated as 
‘liberal’ educational theorists rather than as pioneer thinkers for the rights of children. 
Perhaps Kant’s belief in the inborn liberty of each individual and Hegel’s position 
that children are potentially free and that life is the direct embodiment of this 
potential freedom are far more significant. This is a question raised by Renaut (2002: 
229-313) in his chapter ‘Avec ou contre Rousseau’ as he moves toward examination 
of children’s rights in the contemporary world and includes a brief examination of the 
question ‘L ’enfant citoyen?’ {Ibid.:341-46). His view tends toward the Kantian 
inborn liberty in which the ethics of the position of children is for him of greater but 
never entirely resolved import rather than the contestable issue of their rights.
One should also not overlook less universally regarded figures like Winstanley, 
Spence and their ilk in the formation of ideas that have given life to a tradition in 
which the likes of Montessori, Neill, Korczak and Freire could give us the foundation 
for a vision of children’s inclusion in the modem world. Literature has often drawn 
attention to the unequal situation of children and has a probable future role. Those 
whose work was both moral and practical at least gave a raison d ’etre to the 
‘voluntary sector’ in which advocacy and action for change in children’s lives takes 
root. None have insignificant roles but have as yet to play a momentous part in an 
unforeseeable future.
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Chapter Eight: The ‘child sciences, social sciences and childhood 
studies
The late 19th and early 20th centuries saw ‘child sciences’ such as paediatrics, child 
psychiatry and developmental psychology emerge and come into their own as 
disciplines with academic and practical elements. In fact, the provenance of ‘child 
science is older as this chapter shows by very early on by giving mention to 
Hippocrates (circa 460 - 370 BC) in passing when introducing medicine’s interest in 
children as a starting point. Paediatrics appeared in written form in the 10th century. 
Child care, which has become virtually a ‘science’ only recently is historically richly 
described if one includes the story of Moses’ discovery by the Pharaoh’s daughter 
(Boswell, 1988:145-46) in a reed basket or Romulus and Remus cared for by a wolf 
until a shepherd found them (Ibid.:16). Mary Carpenter, Dr Bamardo, Charles 
Dickens (e.g.: Jo the crossing sweeper) or Victor Hugo (e.g.: Petit Gavroche), as 
described in the previous chapter, briefly examine similarly ‘dispossessed’ or
l / r
‘abandoned’ children .
Although it is a theme that has not been and will not be developed in this work, it 
deserves a mention here in the context of what has become (residential) social work. 
It has a close relationship with child psychiatry and developmental psychology and 
more recent developments in child sciences.
The sociology of childhood is a relatively recent event. We see some of its theoretical 
roots in Aristotle’s notion of the tabula rasa. That was also used by Ibn Sina in the 
11th century, Aquinas in the 13 th century, Locke in the 17th century and Freud in the 
19th century before its emergence as a notion of ‘human-becomings’ at the end of the 
20th century. The sociology of childhood focuses particularly on the ways societies 
conceptualise and organise childhood. The two central themes are the child as a 
social actor and generational order with socialisation in practice and through 
institutions central themes in research. They are being examined in an innovative, 
more sociological way than before that analyse socialisation processes by 
reconstructing historically and culturally shifting concepts and processes. Other 
concepts such as the strategies of the formation of habitus and the practice of status 
production and reproduction are being taken into account. In this chapter the
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‘genesis’ of this branch of sociology, its influence on the social sciences and the
' i n
closely related area of childhood studies are examined up to the most recent point in 
time where a significant contribution to this work arises.
This is followed by Chapter Nine in which one of the key areas, children’s rights, 
emerges. This is treated as part of the broader human rights field. Human rights itself 
has roots in much of the substance of Chapters Three to Six. There is very clear 
correlation between the latter and this chapter that can be very plainly seen in the 
‘humanism’ of modernity and the path pursued by philosophers such as Kant, Locke, 
Rousseau and then through the influence of some of the major contributions by 
social scientists from the 19th through 20th centuries.
What is often called the ‘rights revolution’ has become a focal point of modem 
political consciousness and has brought within a proliferation of theories about the 
real status of children’s rights. Mainstream thought of the kind examined in the last 
chapter and liberal theories particularly in which children’s rights have been theorised 
have seldom taken children’s rights as citizens seriously. The standard position in 
liberal theories is that children are ‘not-yet-citizens’ or ‘citizens-becoming’. The 
analysis has tended to be located within anti-racist, feminist, gay, lesbian and trans­
gendered theories of citizenship that are mainly concerned with difference (See 
Moosa-Mitha, 2005:369-88). The emergent analyses generally look for an alternative, 
difference-focussed expression of children’s citizenship rights through an analysis of 
their rights to liberty and equality.
With the ‘rights revolution’ there has been an expansion of liberal, normative 
concepts of liberty that have been defined around the exercise of individualised, 
autonomous decision-making and participation in civil society. There is also a notion 
of ‘equality-as-same’ that allows for treating children as ‘differently equal’ members 
of society in which they are full participants but more similar to others who are 
‘different’. There are some people who argue that children’s rights will sufficiently 
transform societies at the point in time when the notion of ‘human rights’ is 
reconstructed in the light of childhood rather than of difference. Should that ever 
occur, human rights would thus be understood as grounded but not in modernist 
perceptions of autonomy, liberty, privilege or agency, but within a post-modern flow
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of responsibility to each other. This interpretation of rights is constructed through 
inspection of diverse forms of child-centred ethical theory in Western history. That 
theory has had impact on the major human rights theories since the Enlightenment 
and persists until the present.
Alternative visions implicit in 20th century international children’s rights treaties have 
allowed new theoretical bases to arise out of post-modern ethics which, in turn, allow 
the possibility of human rights genuinely including all humanity (for instance see 
Wall, 2008:523-543). The sociology of social inequality is an important area of study 
for sociologists of childhood and also central to the development of the recently 
emerged ‘children’s-rights-as-human rights’ argument.
In the areas this chapter examines it is difficult to locate any exact point in time when 
children became a separable topic or any particular branch of scholasticism entirely 
concerned with them became a formal part of a distinct discipline. It is somewhat 
easier to turn to child protection, age of consent, political franchise, education, 
employment and other social and civil reforms for points of entry (for instance see 
Milne, 2008:44-45) however scientific study generally came many years after those 
provisions were in place. Whilst there is by no means an extensive source of literature 
that sheds light on a solution to the children’s citizenship question, it is 
simultaneously extraordinarily difficult to choose what to use.
By and large the early 20th century was the point in time when serious interest turned 
to the methodical and academic as a possibility. In Viviana Zelizer’s seminal work, 
Pricing the Priceless Child: The Changing Social Value o f Children (1994), she 
draws attention to the fact that so-called child sciences such as paediatrics, child 
psychiatry and developmental psychology became formally accepted disciplines with 
academic and practical components within the areas each belongs to. However, each 
also has older provenance that gives a degree of insight into attitudes about children. 
It is, thus, why this chapter begins by examining them.
154
Paediatrics
Paediatrics has a particularly long history. Most of the short history here is 
synthesised from Still’s (1931) A History o f Paediatrics: The progress o f the study o f 
diseases o f children up to the end o f the XVIIIth century. He used a predominantly 
biographical method in which he traced the growth of medical interest in children 
chronologically from Hippocrates to Jenner during a period of about 2200 years up to 
about 1800. Here it is used to trace much of the later period where that sheds any light 
on the status of children. The period after 1800 draws on Roy Porter’s The Greatest 
Benefit to Mankind: A Medical History o f Humanity from Antiquity to the Present 
(1997:397 -524) whereby the latter part begins to contextualise psychiatry (493-524) 
as an emergent science. This has been supplemented by a chapter by J.A. Walker- 
Smith in Irvine Loudon’s (1997) Western Medicine: An Illustrated History. Beyond 
these sources, website searches tend to repeat only what is found in the foregoing 
texts and add little further detail. One problem that arises here is that medical history 
appears to be more concerned with biographies. Furthermore, the gradual increase of 
scientific knowledge and understanding with particular conditions and diseases is 
given greater prominence than detail about the patients. However, despite this, these 
histories do help to map the ‘emergence’ of children as a defined social group and 
gives some expression of their status.
During the 10th century Rhazes (Muhammad ibn Zakarlya Razi also known as Rhazi 
or Al-Razi: 862-925) wrote The Diseases o f Children, the first book that deals with 
paediatrics as an independent field of medicine. Medical historians occasionally refer 
to Rhazes as the ‘father of paediatrics.’ His teacher Ali ibn Sahl Rabban al-Tabari 
was a pioneer in the field of child development which he earlier discussed in his 
Firdous al-Hikmah (.Paradise o f Wisdom) that is still referred to as the first 
encyclopaedia of medicine. The first work on paediatric medicine in Europe appeared 
nearly six centuries later; the Boke o f Chyldren by Thomas Phaire (1510-60) was 
published in 1545 (here the 1955 facsimile edition) and was itself inspired by the 
works of Rhazes and Abu ‘All al-Husayn ibn ‘Abd Allah ibn Slna (Ibn Sina or 
Avicenna).
Paediatrics as a separate area of practice in the Western world principally began in the 
19th century. The Hospital for Sick Children in Great Ormond Street, London, was
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established in 1852 adjacent to Coram’s Fields which is the site of the earlier 
Foundling Hospital established in Lamb’s Conduit Fields from 1742-45 by Thomas 
Coram. He was shocked by the presence of many abandoned, homeless children 
living in the streets of London. In 1739 he obtained a Royal Charter to establish a 
‘hospital for the maintenance and education of exposed and deserted young children’ 
which is said to be the world’s first incorporated charity. Great Ormond Street 
Hospital, as it is now more commonly known, has continued a close relationship with 
the Thomas Coram Foundation. Its work continues today and goes beyond medical 
and social issues into academic areas examining adoption, parenting and research into 
many more aspects of childhood as a social phenomenon.
During the middle 19th century demographic research in England revealed that 15 out 
of every 100 babies bom died during the first year of life. The main causal factors 
were malnutrition, bad hygiene and lack of knowledge about how infants should be 
looked after. In 1880 the first organised infant welfare work began in Paris with the 
work of Dr Baudin. Important evidence emerged that was to have a major influence 
on the health of young children. He established that infant mortality was highest in 
industrial towns. Working mothers were unable to breast feed infants at industrial 
workplaces. He found that the only recently available glass bottles and rubber teats 
should be adequately sterilised for safe use. He furthermore found that poor hygiene 
and changes in the seasons contributed to diseases like summer diarrhoea.
The outcome of his work combined with increasing awareness of preventable child 
health problems and thus the first international Child Health Conference was held in 
Paris in 1905. Progress in practice and research accelerated rapidly thereafter and a 
marked downturn in the numbers of childhood deaths can be measured from about 
that point in time onward.
Child psychiatry
A significant precursor to child psychiatry emerging as a discipline was the social 
recognition of childhood as a specific stage of life (for instance, see Zelizer, 1994, 
Timimi, 2002 and Porter, 199738) with its own developmental stages that began at 
neonatal and lasted through adolescence. In 1899 the term ‘child psychiatry’ appeared 
in Dr Manheimer’s monograph Les Troubles Mentaux de UEnfance, Precis de
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Psychiatrie Infantile. In 1933 Moritz Tramer (1882-1963) in Switzerland was in all 
probability the first person to define the parameters of child psychiatry so that there 
could be formal diagnosis, treatment and prognosis within the medical discipline. In 
1934 he founded Zeitschrift fur Kinderpsychiatrie which later became Acta 
Paedopsychiatria. The first use of the term ‘child psychiatry’in English was when 
Leo Kanner published Child Psychiatry in 1935 focussing on psychiatric problems of 
children. The discipline probably had its zenith in its earliest days but during recent 
times has received a great deal of critique (see Timimi, 2002 and 2006). Psychiatry 
also appears to work against the nature of inclusion that full citizenship implies.
By its nature the discipline is concerned with deviation from the norm that has 
behavioural or (mental) health reasons for diagnosis of a number of conditions. 
Whoever displays symptoms of these conditions to a degree that requires psychiatric 
intervention is a then subject of diagnostic evaluation of the nature of the condition. 
This may result in responsibility for their life and decision making being taken away 
from the individual. He or she is almost certain to be confined in an institution, with 
many of the rights, duties and other qualities of citizenship withdrawn. This may be 
temporarily or permanently enforced according to the degree to which an individual 
is diagnosed as being psychiatrically ill.
One of the critiques of both medical areas, paediatrics and child psychiatry, has been 
‘medicalisation’ (see Timimi, 2002) of childhood whereby young patients become 
very much passive recipients of diagnosis and treatment in which they have little or 
no say. In the case of psychiatry in particular, children diagnosed as ‘abnormal’ early 
in life have often been taken out society and placed in institutions. Occasionally this 
has been for much of and all of life. The British royal family has given good example 
of the extremity of this approach. Under the Mental Deficiency Act of 1913 two of 
the late Queen Mother’s cousins were incarcerated as too was the so-called ‘lost 
prince’ who was in fact Queen Elizabeth II’s uncle John.
In 2002 a BBC television film, The Lost Prince, written and directed by Steven 
Poliakoff, told the boy’s story. During boyhood he was diagnosed epileptic and 
suffered from autism-like learning difficulties. He was unable to participate in public 
life and became increasingly isolated from his family and the world at large. John was
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easily lost in history because he died when he was only 13 years old and also because 
it happened in 1919. From 1916 until his death he lived in isolation at Wood Farm at 
Wolferton near Sandringham in Norfolk. He was cared for by a nurse Mrs. ‘Lalla’ 
Bill and a male orderly well out of the public eye.
The Queen Mother’s cousins (see Summerskill, 2000) were Nerissa Bowes-Lyon 
(1919-1986) and Katherine Bowes-Lyon (1926-1986). Both of them were diagnosed 
developmentally disabled and consequently institutionalised for most of their lives. 
They had simply been listed as deceased in various publications thus causing 
something of a scandal when discovered living and fairly neglected in the Royal 
Earlswood Hospital during the 1980s. Burkes Peerage incorrectly reported Nerissa as 
having died in 1940 and Katherine in 1961. Both were recorded as ‘mentally 
impaired’ from birth. Both were confined to the hospital in 1941 aged 22 and 15 
respectively where they both remained until their almost anonymous deaths in 1986.
In the USA President John F. Kennedy’s sister, Rose Marie (1918-2005) commonly 
known as Rosemary (see Gibson and Schwarz, 1995) was kept in an institution and 
eventually had a frontal lobotomy. Although she had been good-natured and 
easygoing as a child and teenager, Rosemary developed an increasingly aggressive 
personality. She was reported to have become subject to violent mood swings which 
some observers attributed to difficulties in keeping up with her active siblings. She 
was diagnosed as having the hormonal surges during puberty. Moreover the Kennedy 
family found it increasingly difficult coping with the tempestuous behaviour and her 
stealing away from the convent where she was being educated and taken care of in 
the night. At age 22 the lobotomy was performed in order to contain her embarrassing 
behaviour. Once in office John Kennedy brought about reform to allow people with 
learning difficulties to live in their communities.
In the UK the Mental Deficiency Act (1913) was rather typical of its time as interest 
in mental health became increasingly methodical and scientific. Whilst still crude 
compared with psychiatry today, it began to identify mental illnesses and also to 
categorise people in particular groups; accordingly those classified ‘disabled’ people 
were described as follows:
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o Idiots were people with a mental defect of such a degree that they were 
considered unable to guard themselves against everyday hazards, 
o Imbeciles were those in whose case there was a mental defect which did not 
equate with idiocy but was so apparent that they were thought incapable of managing 
themselves and their normal affairs or, in the case of children, being taught them, 
o Feeble minded described persons in whose case there were mental defects which 
did not amount to imbecility but was nonetheless so pronounced that they required 
care, supervision and control for their own protection and that of others. In the case of 
children it was judged that they appeared to be permanently incapable by reason of 
those defects of benefiting from instruction in a normal school, 
o Moral defective was used for individuals in whose case there were mental defects 
together with pronounced vicious or criminal propensities who required care, 
supervision and control for the protection of others.
Under the Mental Deficiency Act at least 50,000 children with communication and 
physical impairments were confined in institutions in the first half of the 20th century. 
Many of them were only released as adults (some quite elderly) in the 1980s. 
Children with significant learning difficulties were deemed unfit to be educated 
whereby those with less significant learning difficulties went to educationally sub­
normal schools until 1973 when the law changed39.
In point of fact, in the UK, throughout the British Empire and similarly elsewhere40 
many such people remained in the hands of psychiatrists for many years into 
adulthood. For some, most or even all of life they were deprived of many of the civil, 
social and political rights we normally associate with enjoyment of full citizenship41. 
The discipline has become less radical in its application of labelling and inflexible 
diagnosis since the 1980s and gradually many more countries are ceasing to 
stigmatise sufferers of mental health problems for life. Nonetheless, there is still a 
degree to which ignominy remains part of the problem that makes a normal transition 
from childhood to adult, thus full citizenship, problematic. However, patients of 
closed psychiatric institutions with the most serious and especially unpredictable 
conditions in many countries remain isolated from their communities and are often 
still detained under legal orders that also remove normal civil rights from them42.
159
Developmental psychology
Developmental psychology has had a far more positive history and constructive 
contribution toward a contemporary view of childhood. It is a scientific study of the 
progressive psychological changes that take place in individuals as they age. Its 
modem form has roots far back in history taking in influences from a wide range of 
sources that include Aristotle, Tabari, Rhazes and William Shakespeare. From the 
latter, the melancholic Jacques in As You Like It describes the ‘seven ages of man’ of 
which three stages are childhood and four adulthood. Jean Jacque Rousseau (1979) 
described three stages of childhood as infans (infancy), puer (childhood) and 
adolescence in Emile or On Education. His ideas were strongly supported by 
educators at that time. Toward the end of the 19th century, psychologists conversant in 
Darwin’s evolutionary theory began to look for an evolutionary description of 
psychological developments. Prominent among them was Granville Stanley Hall (see 
Partridge, 1912, chapter one) who attempted to correlate ages of childhood with 
previous ages of mankind.
A more scientific approach was initiated by James Mark Baldwin (see Gregory, 1998: 
721) who wrote essays on topics that included a step by step theory of cognitive 
development. It was to become highly influential in the more widely-known 
developmental theory of Piaget. In 1905 Sigmund Freud (1996) described five 
psychosexual stages of development and later Rudolf Steiner (2006) expounded 
stages of psychological development throughout human life. The first three stages 
correspond closely with Piaget’s stages of childhood that were described some years 
later. By the early to mid 20th century the work of Vygotsky and Piaget came to 
dominate the discipline.
Cognitive development is primarily concerned with the ways in which infants and 
children acquire and develop internal mental capabilities such as problem solving, 
memory, and language. Major topics in cognitive development are the study of 
language acquisition and the development of perceptual and motor skills. Piaget was 
one of the first influential psychologists to study the development of cognitive 
abilities. His theory suggests that development proceeds through a set of stages from 
infancy to adulthood and that there is an end point or goal. Other accounts, such as 
that of Lev Vygotsky, have suggested that development does not progress through
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stages, preferring the argument that the development process that begins at birth and 
continues until death is too complex for such structure and finality. Rather, from this 
viewpoint, developmental processes proceed more continuously, thus it should be 
analysed, instead of a product to be obtained. Furthermore, modem cognitive 
development has chiefly moved away from Piagetian stage theories. It is influenced 
by descriptions of domain specificity that argue that development is guided by innate 
evolutionarily specified and content-specific information processing mechanisms.
Vygotsky
Lev Semyenovich Vygotsky (JleB CeMeHOBHH BuroTCKHH) (1896-1934)43 worked 
comprehensively on ideas about cognitive development particularly in regard to the 
relationship between language and thought. His written work emphasises the roles of 
historical, cultural and social factors in cognition using the central argument that 
language is the most important symbolic tool afforded us by society. He was a 
prolific author with his major works extending over six volumes that were written 
over about 10 years beginning with Psychology o f Art (1925) to Thought and 
Language (1934). His interest in the fields of developmental psychology, child 
development and education cover a wide diversity of issues. His ground-breaking 
work in psychology included several key concepts including psychological tools, 
mediation, internalisation and the ‘zone of proximal development’. He explored child 
development and how this was directed by the role of culture and interpersonal 
communication. He studied how higher mental functions developed historically 
within specific cultural groups as well as individually through social interactions with 
significant people in a child’s life, especially parents but also other adults. These 
interactions aided a child to learn the habits of mind in her or his culture which 
included speech patterns, written language and other symbolic knowledge through 
which a child derives meaning and thus shapes a child’s construction of her or his 
knowledge. This is the key premise of Vygotskian psychology that is commonly 
referred to as cultural mediation. The specific knowledge acquired by children 
through these interactions also represents the shared knowledge of a culture. This is 
the process known as internalisation.
This can be understood in one sense as ‘knowing how’. A typical example would be 
riding a bicycle which is a ‘tool’ of the society that is initially outside of and beyond
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the child. The mastery of such a skill is acquired through the activity of the child 
within society. A further aspect is appropriation in which a child takes a tool and 
makes it their own even in a way limited to her or himself. Internalising the use of 
paints allows a child to use them for their own ends rather than paint what others in 
society have painted beforehand.
His less well known research is on play as a psychological phenomenon and its role 
in the child’s development. It describes how through play a child develops abstract 
meanings separated from the objects in the world which are critical features in the 
development of higher mental functions. Play is a transitional stage which as children 
get older diminishes. A further aspect of play Vygotsky referred to was the 
development of social rules that develop when children play particular games such as 
house whereby they adopt the roles of family members. The rules of behaviour 
children acquire that go unseen in daily life are consciously acquired through play. 
Beside that social rules they acquire are what we now refer to a self-regulation.
However his most important contribution probably concerns the interrelationship of 
language development and thought. That concept, explored in Thought and 
Language, (sometimes under title: Thinking and Speaking) established an explicit and 
profound connection between speech (both inner [unspoken] speech and oral 
[spoken] language), and the development of mental concepts and cognitive 
awareness. Vygotsky described inner speech as being qualitatively different from 
normal (external) speech. Although he believed inner speech developed from external 
speech via a gradual process of internalisation, whereby young children could only 
really ‘think out loud’, he maintained that in its mature form it would be unintelligible 
to all but the thinker and does not resemble spoken language as we understand it 
because it is compressed. Therefore, it follows that thought itself develops socially. 
An infant learns the meaning of signs through interaction with carers so that pointing, 
cries and babble can express what is meant. How verbal sounds (words) are used to 
carry out social interaction is learned thus and children learn to develop this ability by 
using names for objects, etc.
Thus language begins by being a tool external to a child used for social interaction. 
He or she guides personal behaviour by using this tool for a kind of self-talk or
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‘thinking aloud’. Initially, self-talk is a tool of social interaction although used at low 
levels when a child is alone or perhaps with deaf children. Progressively self-talk is 
used increasingly as a tool for self-directed and regulated behaviour. By the time a 
child starts school speech has been learned and internalised so that self-talk is seldom 
present. Inner speech then develops through its differentiation from social speech.
Speech thus develops along two routes, social communication and inner speech, by 
which the child mediates and regulates an activity through thoughts which are 
mediated by the semiotics or meaningful signs of inner speech. This is not to say that 
thought cannot take place without language but rather more is mediated by it and thus 
develops a higher level of sophistication. The form of inner speech is not comparable 
with external speech which is the process of turning thought into words. Inner speech 
is the opposite being conversion of speech into inward thought. Inner speech appears 
to consist of predicates and subjects are redundant. A word in inner speech may be so 
full of sense for an individual that it takes many more words to express external 
speech, thus words are used economically. If we take Vygotsky’s ideas as a measure 
of how children develop articulate language and thought then some of the debates on 
articles 12, 13 and 14 CRC having application for young children’s participation in 
civil society tend to be less persuasive.
Piaget
Jean Piaget (1896-1980)44 began work as a malacologist45 and later became professor 
of psychology at the University of Geneva between 1929 and 1975. He became best 
known for reorganising cognitive development theory into a series of stages. It 
expanded on earlier work with four levels of development corresponding 
approximately with infancy, pre-school, childhood and adolescence. Each stage is 
characterised by general cognitive structures that affect children’s thought (which is a 
structuralist view predisposed to Kantian philosophy). The stages represent children’s 
comprehension of reality during that period. Development from one stage to the next 
is produced by the accumulation of errors in the child’s understanding of the 
environment whereby the accumulation ultimately causes disequilibrium to such a 
degree of cognitive that thought structures require reorganisation. He described the 
four development stages as:
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o Sensorimotor stage: birth to age two years when they experience the world 
through movement and senses and learn object permanence; 
o Preoperational stage: from ages two to seven years when motor skills are 
acquired;
o Concrete operational stage: from seven to 11 years when children begin to think 
logically about concrete events; and 
o Formal operational stage: after age 11 years and the development of abstract 
reasoning.
He gave no exact description of the development process as a whole. It consists of a 
cycle which begins when a child performs an action that has an effect on or organises 
objects and the child is aware of the characteristics and consequences of the action. 
Through repeated actions with variation, different contexts or different kinds of 
objects, a child becomes able to differentiate and integrate its elements and effects. 
This is the process of reflecting abstraction (described in detail in Piaget, 2001). At 
the same time a child is able to identify properties of objects through how different 
kinds of action affect them. This is what he described as the process of empirical 
abstraction. Repeating the process across a range of objects and actions enables a 
child to establish a new level of knowledge and insight. This leads to formation of a 
new cognitive stage.
Once a child constructs new kinds of knowledge, he or she begins to use them to 
create still more complex objects and carry out more intricate actions. Accordingly, a 
child begins to recognise more complicated patterns and construct even more 
complex objects. Then a new stage begins which is concluded when a child’s activity 
and experience have been entirely re-organised on this higher level.
The process is not entirely gradual since once a new level of organisation, knowledge 
and insight proves to be valuable it will promptly be disseminated to other areas. 
Thus transitions between stages tend to be quick and radical with most of the time 
spent in a new stage used to refine the new cognitive level. Once knowledge that has 
been acquired at one stage and experience leads swiftly and radically to a higher stage 
of insight, a ‘gestalt’ (more comprehensively explained in Piaget, 1936) is considered 
to have occurred.
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Since the process takes this dialectical form, whereby each new stage is created 
through the further differentiation, integration, and synthesis of new structures out of 
old, the sequence of cognitive stages is logically necessary rather than merely 
empirically correct. Each new stage emerges once a child can take achievements of 
precursors for granted and there are other sophisticated forms of knowledge and 
action still to be developed.
Piaget’s model of development explained some features of human knowledge never 
previously researched. For instance, showing how children progressively augment 
understanding as a result of which by acting and reflecting on the outcome of their 
previous knowledge, they are able to organise knowledge about increasingly 
complicated structures. Simultaneously, by reflecting on their actions children 
develop ever more sophisticated understanding of ‘rules’. He explained their 
increasing awareness of notions such as ‘right’, ‘wrong’, ‘necessary’, ‘appropriate’ 
and so on. In other words, through objectification, contemplation and abstraction 
children construct principles through which actions are not only successful or correct 
but are also acceptable.
Originally Piaget did not study younger children, since if at four years old a child 
could not cope with quantity how could a child who is younger? Thus he examined 
the question and one of his best known studies (recounted in Mehler and Bever, 
1967:141-2) looked at the discriminative abilities of children between the ages of two 
and a half and four and a half years old. Piaget took children of different ages and 
laid out two lines of M&M sweets. One was with the sweets in a line spread further 
apart and the other had the same number of sweets laid out closer together. He found 
that, “Children between 2 years, 6 months old and 3 years, 2 months old correctly 
discriminate the relative number of objects in two rows; between 3 years, 2 months 
and 4 years, 6 months they indicate a longer row with fewer objects to have ‘more’; 
after 4 years, 6 months they again discriminate correctly” (Ibid.). It proved that 
children of less than three years and two months have quantity conservation but as 
they get older lose the quality which is recovered at about four and a half years old. 
The skill may be lost due to temporary inability to solve it caused by overdependence 
on perceptual strategies that correlate more sweets with a longer line of sweets or else 
the inability of a four year old to reverse situations.
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By the end of the experiment several results were established. Firstly, younger 
children have a discriminative ability which demonstrates a logical aptitude for 
cognitive operations that exists earlier than previously received. It also revealed that 
young children may be capable of possessing particular qualities for cognitive 
operation that depend on how logical the construction of the task is. It also showed 
that children develop explicit understanding at age five and consequently will count 
M&Ms to decide which line contains more. Lastly, the study found that generally 
quantity conservation is not a basic characteristic of humanity’s native inheritance.
Using Piaget’s research one might surmise that the evolving capacity passim in the 
CRC (Articles 5, 12, etc.) may be prejudicial on the basis of subjective rather than 
objective assessment of a child’s abilities. However, there is a problem in that 
Piaget’s samples were very small and localised and may be substantively disproved, 
for instance by using large, cross-cultural samples.
Kohlberg
Other developmental psychologists have had a great deal of influence on how we 
view children as individuals. Lawrence Kohlberg’s (1927-87) work on the stages of 
moral development (see Kohlberg, 1981, opening chapters) offers an interesting 
contribution to the question of reasoning that plays an important part in describing 
what makes citizens. His stages of moral development are planes of moral adequacy 
that explain the development of moral reasoning. The theory was inspired by Piaget’s 
work and his interest in children’s reaction to moral dilemmas.
The theory regards moral reasoning as the basis of ethical behaviour which has six 
identifiable developmental constructive stages. It goes through the stages sequentially 
without omissions. Movement through these stages is not natural, which is to say that 
people do not automatically move from one stage to the next as they mature. 
Movement is caused when cognitive dissonance occurs, which is when a person 
notices inadequacies in his or her present way of dealing with a particular moral 
dilemma. According to this theory, individuals cannot understand moral reasoning 
more than one stage ahead of where they are. Thus, someone in Stage 1 may 
understand Stage 2, but not beyond that. Kohlberg’s proposition is that we should 
present moral arguments one stage ahead of a person’s present level to stimulate
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movement to higher stages (see Colby and Kohlberg, 1987 and Walker, 1989). The 
six stages are set out in three levels thus:
Level One
Pre-conventional Morality Stage 1: Punishment-Obedience Orientation
Stage 2: Instrumental Relativist Orientation
Level Two
Conventional Morality Stage 3: Good Boy-Nice Girl Orientation
Stage 4: Law and Order Orientation
Level Three
Post-Conventional Morality Stage 5: Social Contract Orientation
Stage 6: Universal Ethical Principle Orientation
At Stage 1 the individual might ask: How can I avoid punishment? In Stage 2 it 
becomes: What’s in it for me? Stages 3 and 4 are when social norms such as the good 
boy/ girl attitude, followed by a law and order morality lead on to Stages 5 and 6. 
That is when a social contract orientation and universal ethical principles complete 
the moral development of the individual.
Kohlberg followed the development of moral judgment beyond the lower ages 
originally studied by Piaget who also maintained that logic and morality develop 
through constructive stages. Kohlberg believed that that the process of moral 
development was principally concerned with justice and that development continues 
for life. The philosophical implications of that research go well beyond Piaget’s 
simpler predisposition for Kantian ideas. Kohlberg’s theory is not value neutral but is 
initiated with a stake in particular perceptions in the area of meta-ethics that include a 
view of human nature and some comprehension of the form and content of moral 
reasoning. It contains notions of the right to and scope of moral reasoning across 
different societies. Moreover it includes the correlation between morality and the 
world and also between morality and logical expression and furthermore the role of 
reason in morality. It then examines a view of social and mental processes involved in 
moral reasoning.
Kohlberg’s basic premise is that humans are inherently communicative and capable 
of reason in addition to possessing a desire to understand others and the world around
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them. His stages refer to qualitative moral reasoning which people espouse and do not 
translate directly into praise or blame regarding the actions or character of 
individuals. So that he could argue that his theory measures moral reasoning but not 
particular moral conclusions, he contended that the form and structure of moral 
arguments is independent of the content of arguments, a position he described as 
‘formalist’ drawing on Kant.
His theory enfolds the notion that justice is the essential attribute of moral reasoning. 
Likewise, justice relies strongly on the notion of meticulous reasoning on principles. 
Thus despite being a justice centred theory of morality, Kohlberg considered it to be 
congruent with credible formulations of deontology46and eudaimonia41. His theory 
therefore understands values as a key component of the right or just. Whatever the 
right is it must be universally valid across different societies (be morally universal) 
and there can be no relativism. Furthermore, morals are not natural features of the 
world but are prescriptive and moral judgments can be evaluated in logical terms of 
truth and untruth.
His work most certainly correlates well with Thomas Marshall’s notion of duties and 
responsibilities. Given that he looked at moral development at a lower age than 
Piaget, it could support an argument for early access to full citizenship although 
falling short of a notion of lifetime (from birth) citizenship. Kohlberg lowered the 
threshold at which the evolving capacities argument is an absolute value and in his 
arguments on moral reasoning the question of the ‘best interests’ principle (Article 3 
CRC) in the same context is open to further scrutiny48. Deontological theory 
emphasises duty as the basis of moral value in which there is a principle of the right 
over good. In the case of a moral judgement in respect of an issue affecting a child or 
children in their best interest, no decision should be reached without full inclusion of 
children to absolutely establish their capacity as morally reasoning individuals. This 
is entirely compatible with a justice centred theory of morality (See Article 3, CRC49 
which places the ‘best interests’ of the child in everybody’s hands except those of the 
children themselves).
Likewise, Kohlberg’s formalist approach using Kantian philosophy (see Chapter 
Seven) is most certainly more engaging for advocates of full citizenship for children
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who normally have only pro-children’s rights structuralists to support their view. This 
is particularly the case for those who place greater emphasis on participation than on 
a broader application of social justice through a range of civil and human rights. 
There are countervailing forces in vexing questions about the rights of children. This 
is especially so with regard to the precarious territory in which those rights conflict 
with traditionally accepted rights of parents to raise their children as they choose 
without intervention by outside authority or influence.
Pro-children’s rights structuralists attach a very precise meaning to children’s 
participation that is produced and reproduced within a children’s rights culture 
through various activities which serve as systems of association within which there is 
only a partial participation in civil society. Those are largely based on children’s 
activities mainly disassociated from equivalent adult activities. Thus meaning is 
produced and reproduced within a separatist (different) culture that assesses only 
children’s participation without balancing adult and children’s comparable pursuits 
(including adult choice to bring children up in a particular way).
Kohlberg offers Kant’s theory that there is a single moral obligation which is derived 
from the concept of duty. Kant defined the exigencies of moral law as ‘categorical 
imperatives’ which are principles that are inherently valid. The moral subject needs to 
be able to transcend his particular preferences, thus must act according to the moral 
law as a law given by the subject itself but which is also universally applicable. Those 
principles are good in and of themselves, so must be obeyed under all circumstances 
if we are to observe moral law. Since Kohlberg believed children acquire and possess 
moral reasoning at a relatively low age (see Kohlberg, 1983:101-189), the logic must 
follow that they belong within the same social order as all other moral beings, thus 
enjoy citizenship in which duty derives from the ability to reason and understand and 
contribute to what is just.
Among the many other psychologists who have looked at children’s moral 
development, Robert Coles (1986a and b; 1997) has gone a step forward with his The 
Political Life o f Children (1986b). That book looks at children struggling with their 
own political concepts among influences as diverse as nationalism, religion, ideology, 
language, culture, class and political morality. His fieldwork took in accounts
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including those of children in then apartheid South Africa and violent Northern 
Ireland. In those places children had grown up within conflict and were still only 10 
years old expressed mature views, albeit laden with prejudices but also well reasoned 
and full of hope for change. Developmental psychology has undoubtedly a significant 
role to play in designing and justifying change for children.
Sociological research
Other disciplines have drawn heavily on theories in developmental psychology 
particularly sociology and social anthropology. However those disciplines have only 
very recently begun to look at children inclusively and seriously. There are still 
doubts about the viability of anthropology to achieve that end without far greater 
development of the work that (for instance) Vygotsky, Piaget, Kohlberg and others 
have done to set the agenda that has been questioned by Hardman (2001; originally 
published in 1973), Buehler-Niederberger (1998) and Milne (1997b) although in 
recent years children are beginning to attract greater attention. Until the recent focus 
on the topic both anthropological and sociological field studies tended to overlook 
children without even actually appearing to realise that that was the case.
It was felt that children were part of communities, therefore they were ultimately 
included. There were studies in which children were included that became seminal 
works for future research. The study of ‘Middletown’ in the USA has come to be 
considered an exemplary example of this kind of work. In 1924 Robert and Helen 
Lynd went to Muncie, Indiana (Middletown’s real name) to research American 
institutions and values. The results of their work are the classic studies Middletown 
(1929), a case study of a typical American town of the 1920s, and Middletown in 
Transition (1937), which is an analysis of social and economic trends in that 
community during the Depression.
In the late 1970s a team of social scientists, Theodore Caplow, Howard M. Bahr, 
Bruce A. Chadwick and a number of research assistants, revisited Middletown to test 
changes that had taken place over the 50 years since the Lynds’ first visit. The 
Middletown III Project replicated the earlier work, in some instances using the same 
questions and gives an extraordinary portrait of a small American town as it adapts to 
changing times. The first report, Middletown Families, was published in 1982.
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The main findings of Middletown III were numerous. The class system the Lynds had 
observed in 1924 had not entirely disappeared but its importance was considerably 
reduced. This was partly because most industry upon which the class system was 
based had gone elsewhere, closed or gone entirely out of business. The new 
employers in Middletown were service industries so that the resulting pattern of class 
relationships was less clear. Unlike other commentators then, Caplow, Bahr and 
Chadwick discovered that the ‘Middletown family’ was not disappearing and religion 
remained vitally important to the majority of the townspeople. However, some 
substance of both institutions had changed. Families were more often fractured by 
divorce and religion had lost its essentially dogmatic character and become an 
optional part of people’s lives. The study has continued on to become Middletown IV 
and so it was seen that by 1999 only half of Middletown’s high school students lived 
with both birth parents although those living with their children spent more time with 
them than previously. Whereas in 1924 parents wanted children to be respectable 
churchgoers and be deferential, in 1999 parents wanted children to be broad-minded 
and independent.
Whilst it is a remarkable longitudinal study of a ‘typical’ community the family is 
never really examined from any other perspective than that of adults. Caplow, et aVs 
(1982) first book includes a chapter under the heading ‘Parents and children’ (136- 
58) in which children are only accounted for in terms of the relationships and roles of 
their parents and there is only brief mention of how some children independently earn 
pocket money. The closing chapter, ‘The myth of the declining family’ (322-43) also 
focuses on adults with little attention paid to children. Recent findings on the 
Middletown website (see http://www.bsu.edu/middletown/historv/) give little more 
emphasis on children themselves and continue to almost marginalise them despite the 
greater concern with what will come of them in a changing world.
In tthe UK Michael Young and Peter Willmott’s (1957) Family and Kinship in East 
London has similarly been used as a seminal work50. They were surprised that the 
extended family was alive and well and also that neighbourhoods were microcosms 
of the world at large. Three generations lived close to each other and knew 
‘everybody’ in Bethnall Green. It was a safe place to live because family and friends 
ensured that. If one was to examine the index (Milne, 1998:70) there is little reference
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to children and none of the entire content at all describes any aspect of childhood
whatsoever. Their follow up study focused on Woodford (Willmott and Young,
1967), a suburb with a higher middle class population, and compared the nature of
family and communal life with Bethnal Green as it had been. They found that kinship
ties were much looser in Woodford, for instance:
When a couple marry they set up a genuinely independent household; 
relatives’ homes are more often connected by occasional missions, not by 
the continuous back and forth which make two homes into one in Bethnal 
Green. Kinship matters less, friendship more. (Ibid. AOS)
Whereas in the first book they had concluded that ‘the mother-daughter tie’ was a 
widespread and probably universal phenomenon in urban areas of industrialised 
countries among manual workers, the Woodford study revealed that it was also a 
significant feature of middle class family life (op. dr.:111). However, it told nothing 
about daughters as children.
Michael Young revisited Bethnal Green with two other researchers (Dench, Gavron 
and Young, 2006) about 50 years after the area had gone into vast decline and was 
comprehensively redeveloped. Half a century had seen the traditional families mostly 
leave and replaced by a massive influx of Bangladeshi families. Many of them are 
now into the second or third generation. This study looks at how the community is 
coping with radical change. It especially examines relations between the old white 
and new Asian populations and how government policy affects racism. It is a 
comprehensive examination of life in a fascinating part of London. Like the 1957 
study, children are notable for their absence. The index (Ibid.:266-14) give no direct 
reference to children or youth, in fact only two brief entries on pages 12 and 118 on 
child rearing appear to cover this aspect of the study.
Peter Willmott’s Adolescent Boys o f East London (1969, originally published in 1966 
by the Institute of Community Studies) was one of a small number of sociological 
examinations of youth in the mid 1960s. The post second world war sociological 
literature focussing on experience of young people was limited to two main 
contributors, Pearl Jephcott (1942, 1948, 1954 and 1967) and John Barron Mays 
(1954, 1962 and 1965). In the early to mid-1960s a number of authors including the 
Eppels (1966), Downes (1966), Jackson and Marsden (1962 and 1966) Carter (1966)
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and Musgrove studied youth. Much of this work appeared to have been influenced by
William Whyte’s (1943) Street Comer Society. Willmott was unique amongst them
in that able to communicate something of the essence of their experience and lives.
He studied 200 or so youths and classified three wide-ranging typologies:
First the ‘working class’ boy who went to a secondary modem or 
comprehensive school and left school at 15 to go into a semi-skilled or 
skilled job -  comparable with Whyte’s ‘comer boys’. Then there was the 
‘middle class’ boy whereby in Bethnal Green where the majority were 
working class this described those who went to grammar or 
comprehensive school and left school at 16 or over then entered white 
collar employment - Whyte’s ‘college boys’. Finally, the ‘rebel’ described 
boys who went to secondary modem school but left at 15 and went into 
unskilled or semi-skilled manual work, probably going through several 
jobs. (Willmott,1969:171-6).
He noted that: “ ...during adolescence most boys withdraw from the mixed-age 
society of childhood into a one-age society of their fellows, and that as they mature 
and particularly as they move toward courtship and marriage, they rejoin the mixed- 
age society as adults” {op. eft.: 177). He saw that the peer group was of obvious 
significance as too the local community. It was still “ ...importantto the great 
majority of boys and becomes even more so as they move into adulthood” {op. cit.: 
182). Whilst his subjects were youths, little suggests that they were at all capable of 
assuming full ‘adult’ or citizens’ duties and responsibilities. Perhaps, in terms of how 
we saw children then and now, our perception then of youth of around age 15 was 
that they were on the threshold of adulthood. That has changed somewhat.
Social and cultural anthropology
Anthropology has no greater success being inclusive of children. Christopher Fuller 
(1976) in his study (see also Mencher, 1965:163-191) of the Nayars in Kerala, India 
was particularly concerned with the disintegration of the matrilineal joint-family 
system (123-50) noting that at the time of his study the nuclear family had emerged as 
the dominant type of household and economic unit.
Children were seen in terms of maternal and paternal authority, marriage ages and the 
value of virginity before marriage. Economic change was driving change in which the 
economic importance of children was becoming defined by education and the future 
value in the labour force. The Nayar had three principal marriage and rite de passage
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ceremonies. First was the thaali tying rite that happened before puberty. During the 
ceremony a girl was married to a man who was ideally a Namboothiri Brahman. The 
ritual husband had no additional duties to the girl after completion of the ritual 
although she was required to observe a period of death impurity when the ritual 
husband died. The Thirandukalyanam ceremony was the puberty ceremony during 
which femininity was celebrated and when women were allowed to occupy parts of 
households usually occupied by men. The Sambandham ritual was less auspicious 
than the thaali and puberty rites, literally meaning ‘relationship’. It was the traditional 
institution that described casual marriage alliances within what is called 
marumakkathayam, which is a matrilineal system of inheritance.
The ritual was held on the union of bride and groom but was not necessarily a 
permanent arrangement. Sambandham denoted hypergamy between Nayar women 
and Namboothiri men as well as reciprocal marriage among Nayars. However, the 
bond was not recognised as constituting marriage by Namboothiri Brahmins or 
colonial courts but seen as immoral, allied with polyandry, comparable to 
concubinage or even prostitution. It was nothing like that for Nayar girls since 
sambandham essentially gave the liberty to initiate, consent to or terminate a sexual 
relationship with any man and thereby formed one of the foundations of 
matrilineality. Despite that virginity was considered a very high value and also the 
legitimacy of children paramount. The degree of competence in making moral 
decisions and keeping what were essentially very rigid rules was entrusted to females 
particularly, however in our terms these would have been children.
Formal marriage more or less marked the passage into adulthood and a more stable 
and in some ways less regulated relationship. Unfortunately, beyond this complicated 
betrothal and marriage system there is little else said that gives a measure of the rest 
of the girls’ roles in society and even less about boys. Thus, whilst in moral terms 
very big decisions were made as a matter of course, there is little more information 
about the broader societal role of these young people.
In examination of the transition from childhood to adulthood such authors as Arnold 
van Gennep (1960) and Victor Turner (1969) tell us much about initiation {rites de 
passage) and liminality but as in other areas we learn little about children themselves.
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Van Gennep’s seminal work (1960) on initiation had two chapters, IV. Pregnancy and 
Childbirth {Ibid.:A\-A9) and V. Birth and Childhood {Ibid.:50-64), that looked at early 
years. For him childhood ended slowly as individuals go through rites of passage that 
are transitions when individuals move from one social status to another in a three- 
phased scheme of separation, segregation and incorporation.
It appears that society guides individuals from one status to another as though going 
from one room to another, whereby they always pass over thresholds. The spatial 
constituent is important since changed status often implies changing place. The 
‘magico-religious aspect of crossing frontiers’ {Ibid.:\5) absorbed van Gennep for 
whom religion signified abstract ideas or dogma and magic meant ritual action. 
‘Magico-religious’ was his idiosyncratic explanation for practical religious acts 
unlike Durkheim’s distinction between religion as collective activity and magic as 
privately selfish activity.
According to van Gennep, the dynamic transitions depend on ‘the pivoting of 
sacredness’ {Ibid.: 12) during the middle liminal phase which underlines why door 
and threshold (Latin: limen) were important for him in both literal and metaphorical 
senses. The fear inherent in changing status and responsibility was dealt with ritually 
even if not concurrent with adolescent biological changes. The rites designate the 
journey through life indicating physical change and altering responsibility.
Victor Turner explored a threefold structure of rites of passage (1969:94-130) and 
broadened theories about the liminal phase. Van Gennep’s structure consisted of the 
pre-liminal phase (separation), a liminal (transition) and a post-liminal phase 
(reincorporation). Turner observed that in liminality, the transitional state between 
phases, individuals were ‘betwixt and between’ thus did not belong to the society 
they were previously part of and were still not reincorporated into society. Liminality 
is like limbo which is an ambiguous stage characterised by humility, isolation, trials, 
sexual indistinctness and communitas {Ibid.: 131-65) which he defined as an 
unstructured community in which members are all equal.
Van Gennep and Turner were highly dependent on the language of psychology and 
psychoanalysis, although neither used either discipline as a research tool. However,
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we have the possibility of comparing Jean Piaget and Margaret Mead as psychologist 
and anthropologist who used both psychology and psychoanalytical method as tools 
to reach their respective conclusions. Piaget’s research (1929) in developmental 
psychology and genetic epistemology set out to discover how knowledge grows. His 
answer was that it comes about through progressive construction of logically 
embedded structures that replace each another through a process of the inclusion of 
lower, less powerful logical means that become higher and more powerful as the 
individual grows to adulthood. He concluded that children’s logic and modes of 
thought are wholly different from those of adults at the outset. During the first half of 
the twentieth century, he claimed {Ibid.) that his subjects, all Swiss children, were 
animistic51 in their thinking.
In contrast, Mead combined psychological sciences with anthropological fieldwork 
for the first time. She believed that study of children was vital to developing an 
understanding of ourselves and improving our futures. She was one of the first 
anthropologists to study child rearing practice and its effects on various societies. Her 
theory of imprinting was a method through which she believed children learn. She 
presented evidence (1967) demonstrating that Pacific island children were not 
animistic although her title describes them as ‘primitive children’.
Mead and Martha Wolfenstein (1955) tried to put childhood into a broader social 
context. Wolfenstein’s chapter in their collection, ‘French parents take their children 
to the park’ (99-117), recounts how in Paris she observed the behaviour of parents 
and children in parks. She noted that French children quickly learned that any display 
of physical aggression was not permissible and also that verbal clashes are substituted 
by other means of expression.
Her conclusion was that French childhood and adulthood are very distinct so that the 
correlation between childhood and adulthood were almost completely opposed in the 
USA and France. In the former, childhood is viewed as an almost ideal time with 
adults nostalgic about their own childhood. Adulthood is an interminable life of work 
in which immediate gratification is virtually absent. For the French, the opposite is 
true since adulthood is when one can live for the moment and that passions become 
ends in themselves; and preoccupation with such pleasures and resourcefulness in
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achieving them is an ongoing issue as an adult. French children have to learn to be 
adults by diligent attention to the world around them, unlike the American children 
who grow out of blissful times into the austerity of adulthood.
Whilst the topic seems grave, Wolfenstein had written Children’s humor: A
c*y
psychological analysis (1954) only one year earlier and did see a profounder 
competence in children. Analysis of their use and creation of humour focussed 
especially on the child’s view of the ludicrous. She drew data on what children 
regarded funny from interviews with children between ages four and 12 years who 
were asked to tell funny stories, jokes they already knew, recall funny things in class 
and other things that made them laugh. She noted that, banal and unfunny as adults 
might find children’s humour, ultimately the same rules defining and constructing 
what was funny applied to both adults and children.
Richard Lee and Irven DeVore’s 1976 work on the !Kung San of the Kalahari 
includes an entire section of the book (Part III) under the heading ‘Childhood’. It is a 
relaxed childhood that consists of seasonal comings and goings in which there are 
child marriages (Draper, 1976:199-271). The menses and attendant rituals are of great 
symbolic importance as too is childbirth (See also: Konner, 2005:19-64). That is 
usually in the bush and unattended for women who by western values would be 
considered young girls. The transitions are shorter but very clearly marked and 
celebrated. This is more clearly shown in Hewlett and Lamb’s (2005) work on hunter 
gatherer childhoods in which they look at what they regard as ‘evolutionary’ 
developments and a range of cultural perspectives in which we find childhood very 
clearly defined and recognised.
Enid Schildkrout’s work with the Hausa in Nigeria (Rogers and Standing, 1981:90-5 
and 103-06) looked closely at the socio-economic role of children. It is a study of 
work that challenges many previous assumptions. It particularly shows how women’s 
economic responsibilities in Islamic society are dependent on the work of children 
who have greater freedom of movement. She looked at their daily activities, including 
play and self-care, as well as their work. They are ranked by age and gender without 
their role in Hausa society really ever described. There is no real reference to their 
decision-making capabilities or, indeed, to particular skills.
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Neither Fuller nor Schildkrout say much about the conditions in which childhood 
occurs or how children are valued. Likewise, they tell us little about children and 
their capabilities and importance to their society as the capital for the preservation of 
traditions in the former and part of the economic capital of family and community in 
the other. Lee and DeVore are a little more concerned with aspects of childhood that 
indicate the need for extensive use of individual decision making and competence.
Whilst these works give a wider perspective on the content of childhood one of the 
key themes that is repeated is the economic value of children. They very much 
support the view expressed by Zelizer (1994:56-112) in her two chapters on the 
labour value of children. Economic approaches to the value of children have largely 
been neglected by social scientists, although economist Joseph Spengler (1966) saw 
them in terms of a controlled, desired birth rate as a response to industrialisation 
where economic and social changes influence income generation.
Each family, he believed, consciously or unconsciously weighed up the value and 
cost of each additional child against resources available to invest in that child. Thus 
family size shifts as income increases and the value of a child includes their labour 
contribution to the family economy. However, when a country industrialises, child 
labour laws, compulsory education and other factors such as social security provision 
reduce potential monetary value. The real costs of a child are outlays for their needs 
and the cost of parenting time against paid labour. Thus the cost of a child in a 
traditional society is low since he or she demands few resources against those of a 
rich, industrialised country where family size is a direct function of income.
The new sociology of childhood
Over the last two or three decades the sociology of childhood has gained increasing 
attention and generated numerous empirical studies as well as rigorous theoretical 
disputes within Scandinavia and English speaking countries particularly (for instance, 
see Alanen, 1988; James and Prout, 1990; James, Jenks and Prout, 1998; Corsaro, 
2005; Mayall, 2000; Qvortrup, 1993 and 1994). This sociology of children and 
childhood is essentially a study of social inequality, about children’s ‘nature’, needs, 
interests, values, morals and capabilities. It is actually interdisciplinary rather than a 
single discipline, bringing together sociology, history, ethno-methodology and
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ethnography, cultural studies, pedagogy and law. It is an examination of the changing 
social circumstances of contemporary children’s lives, social class differences in their 
life experiences, traditional and emerging perspectives on socialisation, gender and 
race, and methodological issues concerning children and children’s peer cultures. It 
puts all aspects of children’s lives at the centre of research.
Rather than assuming that children are passive participants in interactions involving 
adults, the assumption is that children are active participants who do not simply 
respond to the demands, instructions or explanation by adults. Children also make 
independent contributions to social life affecting adults. Until the late 1980s, 
sociologists tended to include children in the kind of sociological studies previously 
described in which they are passive objects in an adult led process of socialisation or 
are causes or victims of social problems. Now sociology approaches children and 
childhood from a mainly socialisation perspective in which the emergence of the new 
sociological paradigm was analogous to the feminist critique of sociological 
traditions. Childhood sociologists attacked ‘adulto-centric’ approaches and the 
‘separatist view’ of sociology towards children.
The new sociology of childhood is organised around two central discourses. The first 
is the child as a social actor in which the approach draws from youth sociology and 
ethnography. It focuses on everyday life and ways in which children take their place 
in society as too the social worlds they construct and take part in. Theory and 
research approach children as active participants and members of society right from 
the onset. Thus they are neither analysed as outsiders of society nor as merely 
‘emergent’ members of society. The social actor has ‘agency’. When agency is 
considered in the philosophical sense, it is the capacity of an agent to act in the world. 
The capacity to act does not at first imply a specific moral dimension to the ability to 
make the choice to act. Moral agency addresses this type of issue. Human agency 
describes the capacity of human beings to make choices and to impress those choices 
on the world. They are normally contrasted with natural forces which involve only 
impulsive deterministic processes.
It is therefore subtly distinct from a concept of free will, because it takes in the 
uncontroversial, weaker assertion that humans come to make decisions and whether
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that is by free choice or other processes is another issue. The capacity of a human to 
act as an agent is specific to that person, although considerations of outcomes flowing 
from particular acts of human agency for us and others may be considered to invest a 
moral element of a given situation wherein an agent has acted and thus involves 
moral agency. If a situation is the consequence of human decision making actors may 
be responsible for applying value judgements to the consequences of their decisions, 
thus held responsible for decisions. Human agency entitles the observer to ask 
whether it should have occurred. In some philosophical traditions, human agency is a 
shared, historical force instead of a function arising out of individual behaviour. In 
social psychology the term agency refers to the self-efficacy of a person and ability to 
act on his or her own behalf.
Philosophers suggest that only rational beings, thus people who are capable of 
reasoning and forming selfish (egotistic or self-interested) judgments, can be moral 
agents. It has been suggested that individuals with limited rationality (for example, 
the mentally disabled) also have basic moral capabilities. Kant argued that whether or 
not our real self can choose, we are without choice other than believing that we 
choose unreservedly when we choose. We can also compare the notion of moral 
agency with the legal principle of mens rea, or guilty mind, which states that 
somebody is legally responsible for what he or she does on condition that they know 
what they are doing and the choices are deliberate. In terms of how this might be 
viewed using children’s rights principles, the notion of ‘evolving capabilities’ is a 
possible argument for supporting an argument that children do not inherently posses 
all qualities to make fully reasoned decisions.
The second approach, the generational order, focuses on socio-structural and socio- 
theoretical questions concerning social equality and social order in a society. That 
society categorises members by age and segregates them in some respects (rights, 
deeds, economical participation, ascribed needs, etc.). These issues can be 
summarised under the overall concept of the generational order. Consequently the 
categorisation of members of society by age is far from being a naive representation 
of natural distinctions but is rather more a social construction of a ‘natural truth’. It is, 
accordingly, a germane constituent of social order and profoundly connected with
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other dimensions of social inequality. Social and economic changes and socio­
political intervention have thus become central topics in the sociology of childhood.
The analysis of these issues has increased awareness of the generational inequality of 
societies. For instance, analysis of the socialisation processes means reconstruction of 
historically and culturally varied concepts, processes and institutions of disciplining 
and civilising children. Additionally, the approach to formation of habitus and the 
practices of status reproduction need to be taken into account. Children’s actions, 
their resistance, cooperation, and collective action among peers must then be taken 
into account.
Likewise, common anthropological assumptions concerning a universal human nature
based on a view of individual and society as opposed to each other should be
excluded from the conceptual inventory of sociological childhood research. Those
remain as a vestige of the socialisation approach that justified some forms of
childhood and education practices as essential and even a natural condition of society
whilst others are unvalued. Western middle class childhood appears to be the model
of the ‘norm’ thus concealing social inequality and the interests of social order. This
was what Aries and Benedict appear to have accepted. Aries (1962) believed that
scholarisation (i.e.: pp308-9) was a major conduit for producing childhood
historically, as compulsory and universal schools became the norm. It is a long
process of segregation, which isolated and delivered children to reason that has
continued up to the present. Ruth Benedict said that:
From a comparative point of view our culture goes to the extremes in 
emphasizing contrasts between the child and the adult. The child is 
sexless, the adult estimates his virility by his sexual activities; the child 
must be protected from the ugly facts of life, the adult must meet them 
without psychic catastrophe; the child must obey, the adult must 
command this obedience: These are all dogmas of our culture, dogmas 
which, in spite of the facts of nature, other cultures commonly do not 
share. In spite of the physiological contrasts between child and adult, 
these are cultural accretions. (Benedict, 1955:21-22, originally published 
in 1938).
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Bourdieu
Sociology has been taken to that point where beyond agency the question has turned 
to children’s possession of capital. Authors who have gone down this route rely 
heavily on Pierre Bourdieu. Chapter Nine goes into this topic in greater detail 
specifically in an examination of the use of the notion of cultural and social capital 
where it is used in the examination of and attempts to define children’s participation 
in civil society. Bourdieu’s work on capital identified and distinguished between four 
forms of capital which are referred to as economic, cultural, social and symbolic 
capital. Social and cultural capital are seen as the most valuable in terms of viewing 
children in the contemporary ‘pro-child’ sociological context.
Bourdieu defined social capital as: “the aggregate of the actual or potential resources 
which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalised 
relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition” (1983:249). His treatment of 
the concept is generally instrumental and focuses on the advantages of those who 
possess social capital and the “deliberate construction of sociability for the purpose of 
creating this resource” {Ibid.). The renaissance of interest in social capital as an 
antidote to contemporary social problems draws on an assumption that problems rest 
in the decline of the importance of civil society. Inclusion of all social actors, thus 
children, is seen as a way of drawing society back together. A profusion of social 
capital is viewed as a necessary condition for modem liberal democracy in which 
egalitarianism needs to expand to sustain it. Low levels of social capital lead to an 
excessively inflexible and uncaring political system and high levels of corruption 
within the political system and oppression of individual freedoms.
Cultural capital is strongly linked to one’s habitus, which is a person’s character and 
way of thinking (Bourdieu, 1986:247). Bourdieu adopted the concept of habitus from 
Marcel Mauss and enlarged the range of the term to include an individual’s beliefs 
and character. It was used relatively systematically in an attempt to resolve the debate 
between objectivism and subjectivism in the human sciences. Bourdieu defined 
habitus as a system of robust and compatible ‘dispositions’ (durable schemes of 
action, perception and thought).
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An individual agent develops dispositions in response to determining structures such 
as family, class and education and external conditions they encounter. They are, 
therefore, neither entirely voluntary nor involuntary. Thus the habitus offers the 
practical skills and nature necessary to plot a course within different fields such as 
sport, profession, art and so on and directs the individual’s choices without ever being 
exactly reduced to set, formal rules. Simultaneously, it is constantly remodelled by 
those choices including success or failure of previous action. Since it describes 
neither absolute determination by social factors nor individual autonomy it mediates 
between objective structures of social relations and the individual subjective 
behaviour of actors. Cultural capital consists of three subtypes which he described as 
embodied, objectified and institutionalised (Bourdieu, 1986:47).
The embodied state is where it is personified in the individual. It is thus both the 
inherited and acquired properties that make the individual’s self. It is not inherited in 
a genetic sense but time, cultural and tradition bestow elements of the embodied state 
on the individual, most usually within the family through socialisation, and is thus 
linked to the habitus. The objectified state is that in which objects are owned, such as 
scientific implements or works of art. Those ‘cultural’ goods can be traded as an 
application of economic capital and also symbolically by using them as cultural 
capital. In the case of children this is least likely to apply since their legal status 
seldom gives them either the status of full owner or broker for such transactions. The 
institutionalised state is formal recognition of cultural capital held by an individual 
that is most often recognised as academic credentials or qualifications. This mainly 
occurs in relation to the labour market from which children are generally excluded.
Economic capital is less significant here since children do not usually own capital or 
means of production. However, if one looks at child workers, especially those who 
are (street) vendors who must buy stock in order to resell it, it is not irrelevant. In 
economic terms, capital, goods or real capital refer to readymade durable goods 
available for use as an aspect of production. Those capital goods may be acquired 
with money or other capital. It is a question that arises in examination of child street 
vendors in informal economies, but has tended to be more closely associated with 
street trading as a deviant rather than respectable occupation. Finally there is 
linguistic capital which Bourdieu defined as the mastery of and relationship with
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language (Bourdieu and Passeron, 1990:114) in the sense that it signifies manners of 
speaking and may also be understood as a form of embodied cultural capital. This is 
like the previous type of capital, perhaps least applied since language acquisition and 
sophistication are almost always associated with maturation of the individual. It is 
most frequently assumed that fully nuanced language is exclusive to adults only.
Children’s agency
Using children’s agency and their possession of capital is the route by which they are 
neither analysed as outsiders to society nor as merely ‘emergent’ members of society. 
As far back as Aristotle’s (1987) De Anima ,the notion of the ‘tabula rasa’ was used 
by Ibn Sina in the 11th century, St Thomas Aquinas, (Summa Theologica: 1.79.2; see 
Pojman, 1985) in the 13th century, John Locke in the 17th century and Sigmund Freud 
in the 19th century. Jean Jacques Rousseau, despite his theory of the ‘natural man’, 
believed that children ‘became’ adults. In his view the development of a child was 
divided into three stages. The first was from birth to the age of about 12 years when 
calculation and complex thought is not possible and children, he believed, live like 
animals. The second stage from 12 to about 16 years is when reason begins to 
develop. Finally from the age of 16 years onwards is when children develop to 
become adults.
These types of theory have persisted until very recently. David Oldman (1991: 25) 
used a ‘tongue in cheek’ chronological table of typical ‘privileges’ accruing from 
adolescence to early adulthood including such examples as when a young person can 
apply for a provisional driving licence or legally consume alcohol in his ‘Childhood 
as a Social Phenomenon’ report on Scotland to exemplify accumulation of agency 
and capital. Some stages appear ludicrously arbitrary or even contradictory in terms 
of what the Scots ‘child’ can do, but not the English or Welsh although both are 
within a single United Kingdom. A critic of this kind of ‘evolution’ from childhood to 
adulthood is Danish sociologist Jens Qvortup who said that:
Children are reduced to human becomings, they are a ‘project’ to be
moulded, whilst shielded from the public issues and major social events...
(1991:7)
Furthermore he saw this as part of a problem in which neither their agency nor the 
possibility of their having capital was acknowledged:
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The anticipatory point of view reiterates a common sense view of children, 
as socially and economically, relatively unimportant when compared with 
adulthood... A corollary of this appears to be that children are not credited 
with human agency... (Ibid/J-S)
...children belong to society -  not in the trivial sense of simply being there, 
nor as a reduced form of raw material to be moulded, nor as the possession 
of the society or the state. Childhood is part of society in the sense that 
children do participate in organised activities, and it constitutes a part of the 
social structure interacting in many ways with other parts. (Ibid.: 10)
New arguments
The sociological development has attracted new support from other quarters. The first
has been a feminist critique of the status of children. Ruth Lister arguing for
children’s equality says:
To treat others with respect is seen by the general public as a key 
responsibility of citizenship and it is a responsibility that children are 
capable of exercising. However, many would argue that children and young 
people (and the responsibilities they exercise) do not receive either 
recognition or respect. In other words, they do not enjoy equality of status.
This is the other side of the current Respect Agenda: asking people 
(including children and young people) to behave with ‘respect’ should be 
met with a renewed respect for the positive contribution many young people 
make to society and the responsibilities that they take on. This is 
particularly true of children who are brought up in poverty and may have 
multiple responsibilities and pressures in the domestic sphere.
The international children’s movement, like social movements before it, 
such as the feminist, civil rights and disability movements can be 
understood as a struggle for recognition of and respect for children’s equal 
status as citizens. (Lister, 2006:24)
The second is in the anthropological and social research fields of childhood and
medicine. US anthropologist Myra Bluebond-Langner (1980) worked with children
aged 18 months to 14 years, with main informants of between three and nine years
old, who were dying from cancer. She describes their capacity to deal with their
illness and likely death thus:
...When first diagnosed, they were concerned about the seriousness of the 
illness, about the fact they were sicker than they had ever been. When they 
began to achieve the first remission, they wanted to know about the drugs 
used in the treatment and their side effects. They were heartened by the fact 
that although they had been ill, they were now recovering. However, during 
the first relapse, old doubts returned. They wondered if they would always 
be sick. They tried to learn everything they could about procedures and
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treatments they had to endure. After further relapses, they asked about the 
chronic nature of the illness. They wanted to know if and when the suffering 
would end. At such a time, the death of a fried provided the needed 
information. They knew that, like their friends, they too would die.
Often children will decide to conceal their knowledge of the prognosis from 
adults. (1980:233-4)
In another study in 1989 she examines the place of illness and death in the lives of 
healthy children and ill siblings at the end stages of the latter’s lives. The behaviour 
displayed by children provided remarkable insights into children’s views of their 
lives as well as of death. Likewise, in her 1996 work children from as young as two 
years old described living in the shadow of illness as siblings of chronically ill 
children. British sociologist Priscilla Alderson has looked at medical consent and 
information for children since the early 1990s (Alderson, 1993, 1994; Alderson and 
Montgomery, 1996). She has moved toward a position of defence of children’s right 
to integrity, informed consent before surgery and helping share decisions with them, 
reaching conclusions about the ability of children to comprehend and decide much 
like Bluebond-Langner.
More recently, she worked with a group of researchers (Alderson, Hawthorne and 
Killen, 2005a and b) whose work was with premature babies. They are the same 
gestational age as foetuses, absolutely without rights. Their ethnographic neonatal 
study illustrated how most of the CRC applies to premature babies. Parents of 
neonates and staff presented socially and culturally constructed versions of childhood 
relating to versions of citizenship, duties, responsibilities and rights that, far from 
denying or trivialising rights, diverted attention to premature babies’ rights. They 
describe how recognition of neonates’ citizenship can explain how human rights are 
embodied, aesthetic, interactive, emotional, political, economic and socially 
contextualised. The premature babies’ “...resistances also demonstrated the relevance 
of rights to them as sentient, sapient, active meaning makers, within the private 
family and the public neonatal units” (Alderson, et al, 2005:97) the research took 
place in. Research findings assess advantages and disadvantages of conceptualising 
premature babies’ needs as rights and acknowledging their status as citizens.
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New social theory and the resurgence of older ideas
Thus, recent developments in the social sciences have links back to the far distant 
past of philosophical views of child development, through to contemporary 
arguments for treating children in the same ways as adults in the paediatric, 
psychological and other ‘medicalised’ environments. This is furthermore 
acknowledgement of what Zelizer (1994:22-55) describes as the ‘sacralisation’ of 
children’s lives and presents a sound argument for a cross-disciplinary review of how 
children’s agency particularly is important.
Taking Qvortrup’s critique of the ‘human becomings’ approach that has dominated 
hitherto, an argument is perhaps that the collective view of children as lesser than 
adults has to be abandoned in favour of assessment of the capability of the individual. 
Adults may also be judged in terms similar to the ‘evolving capabilities’ method. 
Turning to an older sociology rather than more recent work on children, Durkheim 
tells us that:
If we can say that in a given sense collective representations exist outside 
of individual consciences, it is because they originate not from individuals 
taken separately but from their interaction, which is very different. No 
doubt each one brings its own share in the development of the common 
result; but private sentiments become social only in combining under the 
pressure of sui generis forces that this association develops. Following 
combinations and the mutual alterations resulting from them they become 
something else. A chemical synthesis occurs to concentrate and unite 
synthesised elements and, by through this process, transforms them. Since 
this synthesis is the work of the whole, that phase will also be the whole.
The resulting outcome thus extends beyond each individual spirit, just as 
the whole extends beyond the partial. ... It is thus that it is outside of 
particular individuals. ... To really understand what it is we have to take 
the sum of its entirety into consideration. It is that which thinks, feels and 
wants although it can only do this through specific principles. That is also 
how we are able to see that the phenomenon of society is not dependent 
on the personal nature of individuals. (Durkheim, 1963: 35-36; my 
translation)
Taking Durkheim further, from his Rules (1966:24-25) we may see a more positive
view of individuals, here children, in these terms:
...individual natures (of the members of society) are merely the 
indeterminate material that the social factor moulds and transforms. Their 
contribution consists exclusively in very general attitudes, in vague and 
consequently plastic predispositions . . .
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There is no age or stage of development implied here. It may, for example, describe 
what might be considered an immediate change of mind by an adult rather than the 
type of developmental stages Vygotsky or Piaget described within childhood. It may 
be assumed that having undergone maturation processes and knowing how to access 
and use information, an adult can change his or her disposition toward something 
spontaneously. His or her capacity has evolved sufficiently for that to be possible.
In fact, Durkheim’s concepts of collective representation and the process of 
universalisation, correspond to Kantian concepts. Durkheim acknowledged the 
relevance of Kantian philosophy to his epistemological and moral considerations. 
Like Kant, the teleological imperative governing human history, was considered by 
Durkheim to be a progressive liberation of human objectivity through progressive 
liberation of human thought. Thus, it follows that social facts are studied objectively 
when they are isolated from their individual manifestations.
If we examine what are highly influential works of the 20th century, noticeably this 
form of objectivity is lacking when, for instance, Aries (1962) and Benedict (1955) 
are making the most of similarities between children and, needless to say, 
overlooking innumerable differences. That does not mean they were unaware of 
differences but had another story to tell which intended to understand the main 
character of changing childhood. Furthermore, it does not mean that they lost 
direction, since both more or less compared childhoods historically or cross-culturally 
without considering the transition of child into adult, but rather more thinking about 
the transformation of childhood as society and oikos (household) changed. It is 
through the formation of roles within the oikos that they pointed to the clear 
distinction between childhood and adulthood. Their comparative universalities were 
different social configurations within respective socio-economic parameters.
Aries generally failed to take into account differences between families and children. 
Benedict was very much more concerned with cultural conditioning than a more 
universal view.
The sociology of childhood in particular is still finding its way and particularly in 
addressing agency, capital and the critique of the ‘human becoming’ notion is
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beginning to offer further clues. If there is anything absolute within examination of 
the child sciences and social sciences as a whole, it is that from Rhazes to the present 
children have been set aside as a distinct category. To some extent that creates a 
strong world tradition that might be used against any argument for a comprehensively 
inclusive full citizenship for children.
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Chapter Nine: Children’s rights and the contemporary interest in 
child participation
This chapters looks at a number of issues beginning with the emergence of the 
concept of human rights and legal provision in constitutions, basic laws, bills of rights 
and other laws for the protection of these rights. It moves on to children’s rights and 
the emphasis on children’s participation that has occupied a large part of the child 
rights environment for almost two decades. Whilst some participation specialists have 
insisted that the solution to the citizenship debate is easily found in this area. Critical 
examination of some of that work looks at the substance of their arguments in 
achieving this end.
Children’s rights are both an opening and obstacle to resolving the question as to 
whether children’s citizenship is a viable proposition. The present, whereby the CRC 
is central, projects into an unforeseeable future rather than drawing on the past for 
evidence of an age in which children shared equal status with adult citizens.
The emergence of human rights
The advent of the CRC, which is part of a wider human rights ‘consciousness’ in the 
modem world. As previous chapters, especially examination of philosophy, have 
shown, it has a far longer ‘provenance’. Whilst it would be possible to start at an 
earlier point in time, the English Bill of Rights is perhaps the earliest example of the 
modem period that is chronologically appropriate.
The English Bill of Rights 1689 {An Act Declaring the Rights and Liberties o f the 
Subject and Settling the Succession o f the Crown) was almost certainly amongst the 
first to begin to take a route toward a notion of ‘human rights’. It is a statement of 
particular positive rights that the people who drew it up considered that citizens of a 
constitutional monarchy should be entitled to. It asserts the Subject’s right to petition 
the Monarch and that Subject’s right to bear arms for defence. It also sets out 
constitutional requirements whereby actions of the Crown require the consent of the 
people it governs who are represented in an elected Parliament. It differs from other 
‘bills of rights’ including the US Bill of Rights although some parts of the first eight 
amendments to the US Constitution reflect it53.
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In France, La Declaration des droits de 1’Homme et du citoyen (The Declaration of 
the Rights of Man and of the Citizen) of 1789 was a principal document of the French 
Revolution. It defined individual and collective rights of all of estates as one. It was 
influenced by a doctrine of ‘natural rights’ in which those rights are universal. They 
are legally binding at all times and in all places and relate to ‘human nature’ itself. 
Although it laid down fundamental rights for all men rather than only for the French, 
it neither made any assertion about the status of women nor did it unequivocally 
address slavery. Nonetheless it can be deemed the precursor to international human 
rights principles. The first article is: ‘Men are bom and remain free and equal in 
rights. Social distinctions can be founded only on the common utility ’.
The US Bill of Rights, 1798, consists of the first 10 amendments to the Constitution. 
The amendments define the powers of federal government to protect the rights of all 
citizens, residents and visitors on United States territory. Among the specific rights 
these amendments guarantee are those that ensure freedom of speech, press and 
religion, allow citizens to keep and bear arms, enjoy free assembly, freedom to 
petition, be free of search and seizure, cruel and unusual punishment and be 
compelled to incriminate oneself. It also restricts congressional power by prohibiting 
the making of any law to establish a (state) religion and by prohibiting the federal 
government from depriving any person of life, liberty or property without ‘due 
process’ of law.
Thomas Paine’s (1999) Rights o f Man has occasionally been cited for its influence on 
the American Bill and French Declaration. Its two parts were published in 1791 and 
1792 respectively as more a response to Edmund Burke’s criticism of the French 
Revolution than in response to either, although he included the latter in the first part. 
Mary Wollstonecraft’s (1992) A Vindication o f the Rights o f Women appeared in 
1792, partly in response to Burke but also following Paine’s precedent. One of her 
causes was the principle that civil and religious liberties were part of one’s birthright 
(Wollstonecraft, 1992:xviii) which departs from the narrower extension of rights (to 
men) espoused in English and American Bills and French Declaration and is probably 
the closest to a child inclusive proposition.
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Other countries pursued a similar route toward extending human rights. India is a 
good example. After independence in 1947 they introduced a Bill of Fundamental 
Rights enshrined in Part III of the Constitution. It guarantees equality before the law, 
freedom of speech, association and peaceful assembly, the right to practice religion 
and the right to constitutional resolutions for protection of civil rights by means of 
such writs as habeas corpus. Violations carry punishments prescribed in the Penal 
Code. Fundamental Rights are defined as basic ‘human freedoms’ through which 
every citizen has the right to enjoy proper and harmonious development of 
personality. They have their origins in many sources including the English Bill of 
Rights, US Bill of Rights and French Declaration of the Rights of Man. They apply to 
all citizens irrespective of race, religion, caste, creed, colour, sex or place of origin. 
Whenever looking at ‘bills of rights’ such principles tend to be similar in all nations.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) is an ‘advisory’ declaration 
adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations in Paris on 10 December 
1948. The 30 articles summarise the position of the General Assembly on the 
minimum standard of human rights that should be guaranteed to all people. The 
International Bill of Human Rights consists of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights with the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and its two Optional 
Protocols. In 1966 the General Assembly adopted both Covenants to complete the 
International Bill of Human Rights. In 1976, after the Covenants had been ratified by 
the required number of nations, it entered into force. The UDHR is one of the guiding 
principles of the CRC as shown in the preamble.
The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child
What makes the CRC very different was the process that ultimately leads to it. 
Eglantyne Jebb’s ‘Children’s Charter’ that the International Union adopted in 1923, 
was adopted more or less verbatim by the League of Nations in 1924 as the five point 
Declaration of the Rights of the Child, often called the Declaration of Geneva. In 
1948 it was used as the basis for a seven point Declaration that was adopted by the 
General Assembly of the then new UN. In 1959 it was further revised as the 
Declaration of the Rights of the Child that is still valid to the present day. Even at that 
time there was some lobbying for a more assertive convention. To celebrate 20 years
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of the Declaration, 1979 was designated International Year of the Child (IYC). At a 
session of the Commission on Human Rights in early 1978 Poland, who had 
supported a convention in 1959, proposed that a binding convention mainly based on 
the 1959 Declaration be drawn up and adopted in 1979. The Polish concern for 
children was very much influenced by the work of Janusz Korczak at the beginning 
of the 20th century.
After consultation with governments and international organisations, it was felt that 
drafting and adoption of a convention could not be achieved in a year. In 1979 during 
the IYC an open-ended working group was set up. Any of the 43 member nations of 
the Commission on Human Rights could join the Working Group and all other UN 
member states were able to send observers. The first draft submitted by the Polish 
delegation consisted of 14 articles that were of a mainly economic, social and cultural 
nature. They omitted a wide range of rights including participation rights and any hint 
that it might be a means of introducing a notion of full citizenship for children. 
During 1979 the aim was to complete drafting within 10 years in order to present and 
adopt the finished convention on the 10th anniversary of the IYC. The core 
participatory articles (12 to 16) first appeared as Article 7 that was adopted by the 
Working Group in 1980. Article 7 expanded to have la  in 1981, further to Ibis in 
1982, li te r  1987 and Iquater in 1988. The five articles were adopted by the Working 
Group in 1989 and passed on into the official text of the Convention for adoption by 
the General Assembly on 20 November 1989.
In the passage of drafting (See Detrick, 1992) every article had been the subject of 
debate and dispute. There were controversies over whether childhood begins at 
conception or birth, freedom of religion and adoption. Given that choice of religion 
and adoption are both not normally possible under Islam, accommodation had to be 
made. There were also strong debates on an age limit for children serving in armed 
forces. It has since been resolved by an optional protocol. Some aspects of civil and 
human rights have entirely been omitted; there are, for instance, neither full economic 
nor political franchise rights. All in all, by 1989 what emerged was nonetheless 
remarkable in its scope and what was to follow. The CRC was opened for signature 
on 26 January 1990. By 2 September and 30 days after deposit of the 20th ratification, 
the CRC entered into force. It was the first UN convention that had ever acquired a
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large number of signatures and ratifications that quickly. At the time of writing this 
all UN member states except Somalia54 and the USA55 have ratified and are in one 
sense or another in the process of incorporating it into national laws.
It is a convention that most certainly continues the tradition that began with the 
‘Declaration des droits de 1*Homme et du citoyen’ and has some of the aspirations of 
the ‘US Bill of Rights’ within the scope of rights it includes. Above all, and as 
acknowledged in the Preamble, the ‘UDHR’ and ‘International Bill of Human Rights’ 
are reflected in its sentiments. However, it is not a ‘perfect’ instrument of law, 
remaining contentious and unpopular in some countries, with both supporters and 
detractors almost universally. Part of that is because of its content.
Toward the conclusion of drafting, Defence for Children International, an NGO 
which was at the hub of the NGO contribution to the process from 1983 onward, was 
asked to ascertain some kind of classification of the first 41 of the 54 articles (see 
van Beers, et al, 2006:12). They determined that protection, provision and 
participation, sometimes known as the 3Ps, were the three immediately identifiable 
groupings and also distinguished each article within its relevant category. This drew 
attention to participatory articles. Since the CRC entered into force participation, 
especially Article 12, the child’s right to an opinion, have become a separable focus 
in the children’s rights ‘world’.
Children’s participation and the CRC
One of the most confusing aspects of the way the CRC has been used by 
‘aficionados’ of child participation has been an almost immovable refusal to think 
beyond Article 12 by many. Their vision has often been constrained by their belief 
that the ‘voice’ of children somehow extends a wide range of new liberties to them. 
Article 13 should complement 12, yet is often almost treated as though it goes a step 
too far. Freedom of expression is a respected liberal ideal, yet is often censured with 
an outlook of mild embarrassment for all ages. Whoever speaks out, indeed including 
many people who make great sense, often shock those who lack the substance to 
articulate thoughts themselves. There would appear to be an undercurrent of distrust 
that deepens when children speak freely.
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As far as many people are concerned young people are, in their minds, not mature 
and, lacking fluency and vocabulary, often express things badly. Instead of accepting 
that Article 14 is where the meaningful content and depth of any view held by many 
children is to be found, the fact that the notion of freedom of religion is found there 
has led to a virtual disregard of its very strong set of social and civil functions. 
Therein, the desire to be impeccably politically correct is apparent whereby nobody 
wishes to upset people of ‘other’ beliefs. Ironically, much of this comes from a 
perceptibly secular sector, often NGOs who would appear to be liberal, secular 
organisations and already have well established policies that describe universal 
notions of tolerance.
As far as children are also concerned, it would appear that there are preconceptions 
about what children should be allowed to talk about. Political activity (and religion) 
naturally figure highly in this domain (For examples of critique see Alderson 2000 
and 2002; Cockbum, 2002; Davis, Farrier and Whiting, 2006; Kirby and Bryson, 
2002; Moss and Petrie 2001; and Smith, 2007).
A further problem undermining the potential of the CRC is the tendency for 
participation to be made the focus of a particularistic view of children’s rights. In 
1992 UNICEF published a 44 page book under the title Children's Participation: 
from tokenism to citizenship by Roger Hart. On page nine there is a ‘ladder of 
participation’ Hart ‘borrowed’ from an essay on adult participation by Sherry 
Amstein in 1969 (Hart, 1992:8-9). It has eight steps that describe ‘levels’ of 
participation in projects. However, Hart says “The Ladder of Participation” is 
designed to serve as a “beginning typology for thinking about children’s participation 
in projects” {Ibid.). The main points to draw attention to here are ‘beginning 
typology’ and ‘thinking about children’s participation’.
Whilst the ladder was never designed as a tool for measurement of participation it has 
become exactly that. In Johnson, Ivan-Smith, Gordon, Pridmore and Scott (1998) 
several contributors either used the ladder itself, something based on it or a variation 
on a similar theme precisely as a measuring tool. Other authors have continued to do 
so until the present. To return to Hart, beyond inclusion of the word ‘citizenship’ in 
his title, there is nothing one could feasibly consider conclusive or indicative of how
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children’s participation could transform itself or be developed into citizenship. It is in 
this vein that a steadily growing number of authors have attempted to either say what 
participation is or measure it without concretely addressing ‘citizenship’.
Harry Shier’s ‘Pathways to Participation’ (Shier, 2001) has been highly influential 
over recent years. It consists of five ‘levels’ of participation beginning with children 
being listened to, then supported in expressing their views, thereafter those views are 
taken into account. Children are then involved in decision making processes and 
finally ‘share power’ and responsibility for decisions. It is highly dependent on how 
workers with children view this process and is also very much linked to Article 12 
CRC, whereby:
1. States Parties shall assure to the child who is capable of forming his or 
her own views the right to express those views freely in all matters 
affecting the child, the views of the child being given due weight in 
accordance with the age and maturity of the child.
The second part of Article 12 and ‘due weight in accordance with the age and 
maturity’ principle is very clearly underscored and overall the intention appears 
especially mindful of the ‘evolving capacities of the child’ principle in Article 5. 
Shier believes that participation, at least the way he understands it, “requires an 
explicit commitment on the part of adults to share their power; that is, to give some of 
it away” (Ibid.:\\5). It is by no stretch of the imagination a tool for examination of 
participation as a gateway to full membership of civil society, especially being so 
dependent on adult consent rather than a genuine outcome of a negotiated process.
Whereas Hart’s (1995) typology sets out eight levels of involvement that children 
may have in decision making (he only defines five as ‘participation’), it has been 
extremely influential on discussions about the nature of children’s participation in 
decision making. Shier (2001) has suggested that Hart’s classification of the activities 
that should not be considered ‘participation’ is at least as useful for classification of 
what is. The ladder can be criticised for implying a hierarchy with a target at the top 
to aim for, whereas in reality different degrees of influence over decision making may 
be apposite in different situations. Shier’s (Ibid.) typology built on Hart’s ladder of 
participation without intending to replace it and whilst it is not designed with
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children’s participation in decision making concerning their care in mind (see looked 
after children later in this chapter) some issues it raises are relevant.
Social capital
Thomas (2007:199-218) attempted to draw together a theory of children’s 
participation that relies heavily on typologies. There is some almost superficial 
examination of ‘social and political’ participation, including a specifically UK 
focussed consideration of the lowering of electoral franchise age56 toward what is 
happening in the UK. This is followed by a very narrow (essentially Anglophone) 
examination of representative and participatory democracy and democratic inclusion 
that avoids the issue of exclusion (see Chapter Three).
Therewith he is drawn down a route out of which extrapolation of a single conclusion 
is almost predestined not to happen. Where he begins to find some ground that 
remains underexploited is where he begins to examine the notion of social capital and 
mentions cultural capital in passing. He draws heavily on Pierre Bourdieu who 
defined social capital as “the amalgamation of actual or potential resources linked to 
possession of a resilient network of more or less institutionalised relationships of 
reciprocal acquaintance and recognition” (Bourdieu, 1983:249 [my translation]). 
Bourdieu’s work on capital identifies and distinguishes between four forms of 
capital: economic, cultural, social and symbolic capital.
Thomas refers only to cultural and social capital, thus missing two entire elements of 
what is a single but subdivided concept. Symbolic capital is undoubtedly too 
important to ever exclude from examination of citizenship. It was an ‘afterthought’ to 
his first three forms (i.e. Bourdieu, 1977) whereby he (1984:238) formulated the 
notion as an expansion of Max Weber’s analysis of status. It normally represents 
resources available to an individual based on honour, status or recognition and acts as 
a credible representation of cultural value. However, symbolic capital cannot be 
converted to any of the other three forms of capital.
On the other hand any of the three can also have symbolic value. Thereby, for 
instance, a child being elected as class representative on a school council may have 
both social and symbolic value. The value of any object or situation is always the sum
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of its symbolic plus one or more of the other forms of capital. It is, therefore, always 
defined by the system within which it is given a value, although different value 
systems often see the significance of the same thing differently. In examination of the 
status of being a citizen, symbolic capital is perhaps an inexcusable omission.
However, beyond Bourdieu and more popular at present, the current notion of social 
capital focuses on an imprecise term with roots in the work of American social 
scientist Robert Putnam (see Putnam, 1993, 2000 and 2002). He made a distinction 
between three kinds of social capital he called bonding, bridging and linking capital 
which have since become omnipresent in examination of contemporary civil society.
Social capital examined in this manner is by no means a single thing of which people 
may measurably have more or less of any of the three forms. To be more precise, it is 
multifaceted. Bonding social capital broadly speaking refers to connections with 
people like oneself such as classmates, friends or neighbours, thus places individuals 
socially. Bridging social capital then refers to links to people who are generally 
unlike oneself, particularly in a demographic sense. They might, for instance, include 
people one includes in their phone and e-mail lists that are not contacted regularly but 
are on the other hand essential in such areas as professional life.
Linking social capital suggests associations with people in positions of power. For 
children that may be a head teacher or other people in influential positions, 
particularly those offering financial advantages. An individual’s standing, capacity to 
get things done and such things as future careers often depend on connections to these 
members of particular influence and interest groups. Essentially, it is the degree to 
which individuals can bring into play different types of bonding, bridging and linking 
social capital that has an effect on such conditions as success, progress or welfare. 
People without bonding, bridging or linking relationships are commonly seen as 
‘outsiders’ who often lack any benefits of strong social capital. Whilst Thomas rightly 
describes (2007:212) Bourdieu as “analytically more robust that Putnam...” the use 
of the latter to complement the former offers a reasonably clear insight into a 
sociological analysis of children as holders and users of each form of capital.
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There are, furthermore, a number of constituent parts of social capital that have been 
described as a ‘social glue’ between people, organisations and their communities that 
make it possible for them to work together in pursuit of common objectives. In theory 
this should be complemented by cultural capital. It is comprised of three taxonomies 
that Bourdieu describes as embodied, objectified and institutionalised (Bourdieu, 
1984:47) (see Chapter Seven for another examination of this concept). Each of those 
contributes to the role of the individual within society and particularly explains the 
significance of the culture goods human beings carry and acquire that give them 
uniqueness within a cohesive social order.
Thus, although social and cultural capitals are indisputable parts of what defines 
membership, Thomas nonetheless omits economic and symbolic capital. Whilst 
children do on the whole lack direct an immediate access to most forms of economic 
capital, in itself an inhibitor to the nature of full membership citizenship. He 
overlooks the fact that children are increasingly important contributors to economies 
as consumers, whether as proxies through adults or through the use of their own 
resources. In fact, what appears to be exclusion is almost a contradiction in terms 
since of all three types, economic capital is that which, if only generated and used by 
adult proxies, in one sense or another comes first. There is an economic cost (thus 
value) from the moment of birth, if not even a short time after conception, might 
define it as being the only genuinely lifelong form of participation.
Thomas concludes with a suggestion that a theory of participation should include the 
following (Thomas, 2007:215):
a) encompass all the sites where children’s participation may or may not 
take place;
b) be located in a broader context of inter-generational relations;
c) understand the distinction between ‘participation’ meaning activity that 
children engage in conjointly with adults, and children and young people’s 
autonomous activity;
d) accommodate the new kinds of participatory practice with children and 
young people that have been developed (particularly in countries of the 
majority world);
e) account for the demands for children and young people to have the 
same political rights as adults.
199
It is a conspicuously prescriptive proposal that uses a rather abstract language in some 
places (i.e. ‘sites where... [it] ...take place’ or ‘new kinds of participatory practice’) 
that imply ‘set pieces’ for children in particular places and conditions. They eliminate 
any real possibility of an inclusive liberal democratic or civic republican notion of 
undifferentiated participation that may exist within or alongside traditional practices. 
Part of the overall problem that Thomas is in turn part of is that many people 
‘designing’ or operating participatory work do so within particular disciplinary or 
professional parameters. This suggests the need for critical appraisal of some of these 
sources since the interrelationship of ‘rights’ and ‘participation’ for children became 
conjoined under the children’s rights heading.
Lansdown (2005:17) argues that participation not only implies the process through 
which children contribute to bringing about change but also it presents them with the 
chance to arrive at a sense of autonomy, independence, enhanced social competence 
and robustness. She looks at this development in terms of Barker’s (1968) six ‘zones 
of penetration’ that are levels of children’s participation in different settings:
As an onlooker with no active role.
As part of an audience with a recognisable place but no power.
As members who have potential rather than immediate power.
As an active functionary with power over part of the setting.
As a joint leader with shared immediate authority over the setting; for example, 
representative of a school council.
As a single leader who has immediate and sole authority.
She goes on to argue that in areas in which children only have the benefit of low 
levels of participation, the prospect of developing competence is reduced. In her view 
using Barker’s schematic approach the most valuable preparation for a sense of 
effectiveness is to achieve a goal for oneself and not just seeing somebody else 
accomplishing it. In closing this issue, she states that the development of competence 
continues for the duration of a lifetime. Much of her work, however, focuses on the 
premise that adults are gatekeepers to participation anyway since children’s capacity 
is continually evolving. Moreover, Barker’s almost disingenuous use of the six zones 
simply describes what adults generally experience, let alone children, giving no real 
guidance to what changes of access to and participation in civil society really means.
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A further example is Clare Feinstein and Claire O’Kane’s (2005) Spider Tool that 
proposes a model that is ‘intended to promote reflection, analysis, sharing, dialogue 
and action planning within organisations’ (Ibid.A). The intent is that participants 
work together to consider the strength of an organisation in relation to a number of 
key considerations that they call ‘Key Quality Elements’. The outcomes of the 
evaluation are transferred to a spider web drawing that exemplifies how participants 
see the organisation they are appraising. The results are intended for use in planning 
or restructuring the organisation’s work. Some participation specialists have 
interpreted this model as a potential tool for evaluation of a wider range of 
participatory activities. However, it is again a model that whilst it encourages 
working together across ages, is both a specialised evaluation tool and is very clearly 
designed for children to use rather than adults. Thus it is potentially unwelcomed by 
the latter, who may be unaware of or suspect the original intent.
On the whole it appears that there is confusion about the difference between a 
typology and a tool. Most of the models appear to be typologies, thus describing 
standardised or exemplary aspects of participation rather than being tools that can be 
used to measure it. Of course, there is always a problem in either, since typologies 
describe norms and there is no provision for how one might account for deviation 
from that standard and thus measure with a tool that which has no standard described 
typologically or otherwise.
The history of child participation and its importance
The history of child participation where it is unambiguously for children rather than
part of a wider active membership of civil society has a common origin with
children’s rights in education. In 1917 Maria Montessori (Montessori, 1964) was
emphatic about the importance of children being free {Ibid.:\96-91) and bearers of
rights (i.e. Ibid. : 12). Freedom is the starting point for her:
.. .honesty ought to make us recognize one day that the fundamental rights 
of man are those of his own “formation”, free from obstacles, free from 
slavery, and free to draw from his environment the means required for his 
development. In short, it is in education that we shall find the fundamental 
solution of the social problems connected with “personality.”
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Deeply instructive is the revelation made to us by the children; that “the 
intelligence” is the key which reveals the secrets of their formation, and is 
the actual means of their internal construction. (Montessori, 1964:197)
If Montessori did not believe in “liberty” as Tom Paine knew it, she did 
believe quite profoundly - for reasons tracing back to St. Francis of Sales 
more than to Rousseau - that the child left to himself must will what is 
good for him. In fact, then, Montessori was prepared to let children make 
the vast majority of decisions for themselves. Though her theory could 
have led her the other way, Montessori in the classroom was forever 
urging her in her teachers to leave the children alone, to tolerate disorder 
and mess and apparently random or even self-punishing behavior, on the 
grounds that the child probably knew what he was about better than the 
teacher could know it. (Holmes in Montessori, 1912: xxix, cited in van 
Beers, Invemizzi and Milne, 2007:78-79)
Perhaps Holmes is right to assume that Montessori did not believe in Paine’s 
understanding of liberty. However, there is far more of Kant’s idea of the innate 
liberty of the individual and almost undoubtedly some shades of Hegel’s view that 
children are potentially free and that the life that follows is the epitome of that 
potential freedom. Thus, in her ‘children’s rooms’ (For example see Montessori, 
1912:44-49 and 62-71) she is not describing a place that is for respite from an adult 
dominated environment but a school in which a child is able to use ‘his liberty’ to 
exploit “the means required for his development”. In fact this is a form of 
‘participation’ that still persists in education.
Her contemporary John Dewey (see Chapter Seven) tried to amalgamate, reappraise
and broaden educational philosophies of Plato and Rousseau. Dewey’s pragmatism,
focus on human relations, contemplation and appreciation combined with
engagement with notions of community and democracy, formed a noteworthy
educational typology. For him intellect and its constitution are part of a collective
process in which individuals are only a key concept when regarded an indispensable
part of his or her society. Schooling has no import other than its fulfilment in the lives
of individual members of that society. In 1907 he wrote:
(From) the standpoint of the child, the great waste in the school comes 
from his inability to utilize the experiences he gets outside the school in 
any complete and free way within the school itself; while, on the other 
hand, he is unable to apply in daily life what he is learning at school. That 
is the isolation of the school - its isolation from life. (Dewey, 1990:75)
202
It was therefore crucial that education should not be the mere instruction of so-called 
facts and that the skills and knowledge students gamer are entirely integrated into 
their lives as individuals, human beings and also citizens. He viewed Plato as having 
placed far too much emphasis on society and Rousseau overstating the importance of 
the individual. Although finding the medium between the two extremes, his 
philosophy lacks the test of practice Montessori’s work allowed her.
In fact there are shades of both in Alexander Neill’s Summerhill School a very few 
years later. Further on in time, Freire brought Dewey’s ideas up to date and 
positioned them alongside his contemporary (1960s) theories and educational 
practice. They created the basis for what was to become ‘critical pedagogy’ which 
undoubtedly embraces a notion of inclusion that most certainly argues strongly for 
children’s inclusion in civil society. It also provides one of the strongest ‘human 
rights’ arguments for children’s citizenship.
Education and children’s participation
Not only are those aspects of participation too little visited by people working with 
children or having an intellectual input into the question, but there is as yet almost no 
critique of these oversights. When looking back over the work some of the pioneers 
in what has since become children’s rights we occasionally find a broader vision. 
Montessori’s philosophy (Holmes, in Montessori, 1965:xxix) was undoubtedly far 
more tolerant and courageous than many of the people who form opinion today.
Korczak most emphatically embraced a vision of an extensive range of possibilities in 
his ideas, Dewey’s educational theories trusted children far more than many 
contemporary child participation devotees and Illich’s critique of education most 
undoubtedly placed far more trust in the hands and minds of all ages -  children 
included. In fact, when critically examining participation, education offers some 
positive views on how children might learn to use democracy.
Perhaps most illustrative of all is the work of A. S. Neill. In his school, Summerhill, 
whilst sometimes seen as an anachronism, intellectual and personal freedoms of the 
kind included in the CRC have been advocated and practised for over 80 years. 
Children give living example that these principles work. In parts of Africa, South
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Asia and Latin America they are activists within children’s movements57. Because 
those movements exist to organise, defend and represent highly disadvantaged 
children who work, live on streets or both, they tend not be received as well as more 
‘respectable’ structures. They are a manifestation of the positive use of the principles 
enshrined in not only the CRC but several of the historically preceding bills of rights 
and declarations. As a guiding principle in the process toward full citizenship children 
need to be allowed the right of freely expressed views. Thus all that is incumbent in a 
principle of free and democratic participation in civil society is also due to them, at 
least as part of the process to give them political inclusion.
One can compare some aspects of the philosophy of Summerhill with a Peruvian 
children’s organisation. MANTHOC (Movimiento de Ninos, Ninas y Adolescentes 
Trabajadores Hijos de Obreros Cristianos) has five philosophical principles:
1. Children and adolescents are not dependent but are autonomous agents. They can 
and should act on their own behalf.
2. They have an active role in society and they, not adults, should defend children’s 
rights.
3. Advocacy is universal: it does not favour MANTHOC members but all children.
4. MANTHOC views itself as a model for other movements.
5. Children are teachers - not just for peers - but for all people.
MANTHOC initiated a successful experiment in the late 1990s when it opened its 
own school in Ciudad de Dios in Lima. The school began as a formal after-school 
programme. Soon children were asking MANTHOC to turn it into a real primary 
school. Now it has its own curriculum, mainly written by the students. It is licensed 
by the Department of Education. Instead of grades, it has ‘circles’. Children go to the 
appropriate circle for their educational level, regardless of age. They move to the next 
circle after achieving certain requirements. This model has turned out to be better for 
older children who never really attended school. Teachers give individual attention 
and base lessons on the child workers’ strengths. For instance, they use the 
mathematical skills of street vendors. Children also participate in school 
administration. They choose the colours and symbols on uniforms and help to 
improve curricula. In contrast to most Peruvian schools, they do not rule with an ‘iron 
fist’ and children generally call their teachers by first names. The results are proven
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through the development of children and their test results (taken and translated from 
IFEJANT’s website: www.ifeiants.org/new/).
Summerhill School was founded in 1921 as an independent boarding school with the 
belief that its education and social activities should be made to fit the child, rather 
than the other way around. It has never had philosophical principles as firmly defined 
as MANTHOC’s. Summerhill has always been run as a democratic community in 
which pupils have always participated in the self-government of the school. School 
meetings are held three times a week at which pupils and staff have an equal share in 
the decision making that affects their day-to-day lives, discussing issues and creating 
or changing school laws. The rules agreed at meetings are wide ranging, including 
agreement on acceptable bed times or allowing nudity at the swimming pool. 
Meetings have also always been used as an opportunity for the community to vote on 
a course of action to deal with unresolved conflicts and agreeing punishments such as 
a fine for theft (see Neill, 1966, for greater detail)
Today we find education in some countries returning back to what Korczak appears 
to have done, also underlies Dewey’s educational philosophy and would probably see 
the approval of Neill or Freire. That is the role of ‘empowering’ children through 
citizenship education. Howe and Covell examine this topic through the medium of 
children’s rights that advance their knowledge of democratic principles and being 
citizens. Their chapter on ‘catching citizenship’ (2007:118-49) looks at what makes a 
‘children’s rights curriculum’ that they feel is necessary to promote and sustain 
democracy by empowering child citizens.
However, when we turn back to the ‘pioneers’ of the early 20th century, Janusz 
Korczak has a highly influential role for a number of reasons. His educational ideas 
were influenced by Pestalozzi. That is a notion that attempts to reconcile the tension 
between the education of the individual (seeking freedom) and citizen (for 
responsibility and function) that was recognised by Rousseau. Thus Korczak looked 
toward establishing a ‘psychological mode of instruction’ that conformed with the 
‘laws of (human) nature’. Thus special emphasis was placed on spontaneity and self- 
motivation that included responsibilities including decision making and expressing 
opinions on matters beyond personal spheres.
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Children should therewith not only be given convenient answers but should arrive at 
them themselves. In order to achieve this, their powers of observation, judgement and 
logic had to be cultivated and self-motivation encouraged. Part of the process was to 
nurture a sense of social justice combined with his, as also with Pestalozzi, 
commitment to work with those who were disadvantaged within society. He shared 
Pestalozzi’s notion of education as a key to the improvement of poor social 
conditions. Thus once he became the director of the Dom Sierot Jewish orphanage in 
Warsaw in 1912, and also the Catholic orphanage later, his priority was to make a 
democratic institution. It had a constitution that gave children key roles in the 
operation of the orphanage (see Korczak, 1992:xiv-xv). The constitution allowed 
them a court, parliament, newsletter and other mechanisms for children to enjoy a 
wide range of self-government and overviews.
Korczak retained the role of ultimate mediator and overseer in view of the children’s 
need for some adult guidance and probably as a link to the outside world. Later on the 
children wrote a newsletter The Little Review that eventually became a weekly 
supplement to the main national Jewish daily newspaper Our Review. It was to last at 
least a dozen years until the German occupation of Poland and had a wide adult 
readership. He was the only adult contributor to the newsletter. Korczak’s work was 
the momentum behind the Polish drive for a children’s rights convention after the 
Second World War that came to fruition after their proposal in 1978. The experience 
of the orphanages also contributed immensely to the process of incorporating 
participatory rights into the CRC. In some ways it is perhaps best viewed as an 
example of child participation in education for citizenship rather than as providing 
children with any more than pseudo-citizenship. Above all else, not only did it not 
integrate children into civil society but was also the creation of an adult and very 
much driven by that same person.
Again contemporary to Korczak and generally held to be far more important, 
Eglantyne Jebb was trained as a teacher and rather than be imbued in any of the 
ideological notions Montessori, Dewey or Korczak drew into their work, she was 
concerned with the condition of children. In what was almost certainly a ‘child 
saving’ undertaking in the aftermath of the First World War, she changed the position 
of children vastly when in 1921 she wrote her ‘Children’s Charter’. When in 1924 it
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was adopted by the League of Nations as the Declaration o f the Rights o f the Child, 
(Declaration o f Geneva) she set a course that would eventually bring the discourse on 
children’s rights to where it is at present. The Declaration o f Geneva is by no means 
either a charter that would of its own volition put children on a passage toward full 
citizenship or was it ever intended to do so.
However what stands out above all among these ‘pioneers’ of both children’s rights 
and participation is their vision that children are human beings with a place in society 
that needs be prepared and protected on the basis of their fundamental right to be part 
of society. Conversely, with the exception of Dewey to some extent, who was the far 
more theoretical of all four, they also saw themselves as initiators or and perhaps the 
overseers of something that was distinctly for and about children. That was rather 
than integrating them into a society without the age discrimination that allowed and 
maintained separation. Thus, as with a great deal of participation in the contemporary 
world it was always a notion that was imposed or inculcated from above and 
consequently ‘top down’. That is as opposed to what would be a genuinely 
democratic process that challenged or dismantled age distinction as a ‘bottom up’ 
route that would achieve full societal membership as citizens for children.
Education has frequently been held to be the principal course to some nature of 
‘liberation through knowledge’ for children. That argument is adequate although 
since education is ultimately adult made and managed it is not reaching that goal. 
Education is usually defined by curricula that are intended to bring about consistency 
of ‘production’ that is measured by those who achieve qualifications. Standards are 
set and examinations leading to qualification are rarely open to discussion with 
children and youth who must sit them to acquire qualification and access to higher 
levels of education. In those areas children’s own inputs into education are marginal 
and rarely reflect children’s rights principles.
Participatory rights suggest an inducement for schools councils although they do not 
usually guarantee members influence on education. Although it reflects on work in 
the UK only, Mayall (2000:257) remarks that:
As regards the education service, where children’s participation rights
are so woefully ignored, there is some pressure to take action, by, for
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instance, a statutory framework for school councils which give students 
a say (...)
Thus we see that although education has a ‘track record’ of at least a full century, in 
reality little has been achieved since Montessori wrote of her children’s houses.
Looked after children
We must also consider what are known in the English language as looked after 
children of whom there are many and are very different depending on where one 
looks worldwide. What is most common is that there is some form of care order 
whereby a local (occasionally national) authority assumes legal responsibility for a 
child. The actual parents58 continue to have parental responsibility. The authority 
taking responsibility decides where a child should live, which is normally away from 
home. The responsible authority will seek a court order if a child is not receiving the 
kind of care it would be reasonable to expect from normal adult caretakers and lack 
of care is causing that child significant harm. Depending on where this happens, a 
court or state agency will decide whether or not a child is suffering harm. The 
responsible authority will usually consult with parents about where a child should 
live but will make the final decision. A child will often be placed with foster carers59 
or in a home. In the western world particularly, but increasingly as modem methods 
of child care become more common around the world, children’s participation in 
making decisions about their placement is being encouraged.
There are two ways in which children participate in these processes. Firstly, there is 
participation in decision making affecting them as individuals. That includes taking 
their views and wishes into account in both ongoing processes and in measures such 
as assessment, care or adoption proceedings, family group consultations, care 
planning and reviews, child protection conferences and complaints. Then there is 
participation in decision making on issues relating to children as a group, and as part 
of development, provision, assessment and evaluation of services and policy. They 
are occasionally involved in parts of consultation exercises, research and as 
respondents, advisers or young researchers in studies. They sometime comprise part 
of a management committee, advisory group or community initiative and sometimes 
have a pro-active role as peer mentors, counsellors or volunteer workers.
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Clearly, adults’ assessment and judgement about the appropriateness of children’s 
participation in any given context is informed by adults’ own assumptions and 
understanding of children’s capacities and best interests. These also influence, and are 
themselves influenced by, assumptions within institutions and structures in which 
decision making happens and the resources allowed for participation. In assessing 
issues influencing children’s opportunities to participate it is necessary to examine 
influential approaches to thinking about children and childhood. It has been implied 
that the CRC reflects a shift from a conceptualisation of children as ‘objects of 
concern’ to a perception of children as human beings with agency and capacity.
A small-scale study by Hoggan (1991) using Adler’s (1985) framework described 
three contrasting approaches to children’s participation adopted by adults as 
‘protectionist’, ‘parentalist’ and ‘liberalist’. That study considered the involvement of 
children aged five to 12 years and concluded that those children frequently 
experienced a ‘parentalist’ stance from professionals. She said that the main factors 
playing a part in this were:
Lack o f resources'. Her argument was that there is need to be honest with children 
about decisions based on available resources rather than on what they feel they might 
need or want.
Unwillingness to take their views into account: Discussion about what would occur 
was often in the form of persuasion of children that they should accept adult 
decisions.
Perceived need to avoid pain on the part o f adults: She suggested that adults involved 
must realise that recovery from traumatic experiences inevitably involves some pain. 
Minimising children's perceived competence: Adults regarded challenging behaviour, 
or what they viewed as developmental delay, in children who have suffered abuse, 
loss and other traumas as a factor for assessing levels of competence.
In many cases despite policy that either requires or recommends child participation 
children are excluded. There are always issues around children’s ability to 
comprehend their situation and give articulate, informed views to those who are 
responsible for their placement. Lack of resources, and probably most frequently 
shortages of human resources in the form of people with ‘hands on’ skill, are often 
close to the reluctance of judges or senior public servants to listen to children. Whilst
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it is a strongly advocated approach that would contribute to children learning to share 
and even take control of responsibility for their lives, countervailing forces appear to 
dilute its potential contribution to imparting the importance of active citizenship to 
these particular types of children.
As the world becomes increasingly infected by fear of bad things that might happen 
to children, the notions of freedom of association or peacefully assembly have been 
very much ‘diluted’ in the face of angst about ‘stranger danger’. Article 14 has 
received only limited attention because in some respects it confronts notions of 
protection. Ironically, when considering the notions of privacy, honour and reputation 
in Article 16, fear of abuse is overshadowed by exactly some of the same facets of 
attitudes that inhibit freedom of association and peacefully assembly. Both now 
require presence and allowance for the possibility of intervention in children’s ‘best 
interests’ in the face of any perceived threat.
More recent inputs into both participation and rights have come from the work of 
development agencies and UN agencies such as the World Bank. Children’s 
participation in development work has usually been set up and measured using rapid 
appraisal methods in particular. More recently, validity of young people’s roles in 
structured activities have been ‘measured’ using one particular ‘model’. That is again 
the ladder scale or variations on the model first used by Hart (1992:9) to serve ‘as a 
beginning typology’. Despite Hart specifying that, few of the ‘experts’ who tend to 
staunchly adhere to Hart or one of the modified versions has contributed to 
development toward any other or more appropriate models. However, it also remains 
to be seen whether participation needs to be measured since in the first place all social 
actors are always participant in their society. In the second, civic society varies so 
much from one place to another that it is probably impossible to set a standard to 
measure against.
Johnson et al (1998) nonetheless do precisely this without consequently developing 
the argument significantly beyond what Hart was saying in 1992. However it is not 
only the use of models and measurement that attracts critical appraisal, but 
participatory approaches themselves.
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Participatory approaches in development -  a critical appraisal
In a direct critique of NGOs particularly, Cleaver (2002) says:
Participation has (...) become an act of faith (...) something we believe in 
and rarely question. This act of faith is based on three main tenets: that 
participation is intrinsically a ‘good thing’ (especially for the participants); 
that a focus on ‘getting the techniques right’ is the principal way of 
ensuring the success of such approaches; and that considerations of power 
and politics on the whole should be avoided as divisive and obstructive. 
(Cooke and Kothari, 2002:36)
Bill Cooke and Uma Kothari include a paper by Harry Taylor (Cooke and Kothari, 
2002:122-138) that challenges the optimistic slant of the ‘rapid appraisal’ school of 
thought’s line on parallels between participatory development and management. His 
critique is that participation is part of an attempt to sway power relations between 
elites and less powerful recipients of programme work.
Rapid appraisal methods seek to gain community perspectives of local needs and to 
translate findings into action. They nearly are nearly all variations of the Rapid Rural 
Appraisal (RRA) approach that owes much of its early development to Farming 
Systems Research and Extension that were promoted by the Consultative Group on 
International Agricultural Research Centres in the early 1980s (for instance, see 
Chambers, 1992, and Simmonds, 1985).
Those methods have been designed to draw inferences, conclusions, hypotheses or 
assessments during a very limited period of time. Data are generally collected through 
interviews with a range of local informants, existing records about the people and 
place, plus observations made in the neighbourhood or in the homes of the 
interviewees. The data collected form an information pyramid that can be assembled 
describing the respondents’ problems and priorities. The pyramidal shape is assumed 
to be a reminder that success depends on building a planning process that rests on a 
strong community information base. The scientific rigour and validity of the approach 
depends more than anything else on triangulation. Data collected from one source are 
validated or rejected by cross-checking with data from at least two other sources or 
methods of collection.
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There are problems. Sometimes it is not even participatory, and is frequently used as 
a fashionable label for standard techniques. A researcher or team, sometimes 
critically referred to as a ‘hit team’, often arrives in a community to ‘do a rapid 
appraisal’. This is an often rushed and exploitative approach that is all too common in 
project-based evaluations where there is a deadline to meet. Local expectations can 
also easily be raised too high. If nothing concrete emerges, local people may come to 
see the process as a fleeting development event. Far too many evaluations claim to be 
empowering and participatory, but the reality is that for often very pragmatic reasons 
they are selective rather than inclusive. Unfortunately, despite initial promises neither 
the respondents nor the wider community are involved in analysis of data. Likewise, 
people are all too frequently uninformed about the conclusions of the appraisal and 
there is no follow up or outcome.
The empowerment proposition of rapid appraisal and the influence of the social 
analysis it generates can create threats to vested interests. Programmes working with 
children in developing countries have been a particular target for participatory rapid 
appraisal. Thus Taylor’s view of these participatory methods as a means of 
influencing power relations between elites and less powerful recipients of programme 
work is an interesting, if also in some people’s view pessimistic, point of view in 
terms of what has happened in the world of children’s participation60.
Work with children that is very easily comparable to what Taylor refers to has 
frequently very deliberately chosen children in ‘need’ such as street and working 
children. Those have sometimes been organised into ‘children’s movements’ that are 
susceptible to criticism and even condemnation for politicisation of child members by 
adult organisers (Invemizzi and Milne, 2002:409-14). This, needless to say, is 
prevalent among participation programmes working in the South and appears seldom, 
if ever, to have been tried in the North. Poor, socially and politically weak people are 
accordingly visited by researchers and sometimes programme planners then later 
project workers. They appear to be offered something by the very presence of people 
from the rich North, at the very least the status of being chosen before people 
elsewhere. In effect they are told what to do, how to do it and results and progress are 
duly measured before the project comes to an end.
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The commissioning ‘client’ is usually motivated by its campaigning process, political 
role or even a threat to its financial sustainability rather than being interested in the 
exact needs and wishes of the people appraised. If they cooperate with the evaluation 
they may receive benefits. If they do not, they will usually receive nothing, perhaps 
face some kind of retribution or punishment
This is a repeated theme Cooke and Kothari’s (2002) collection of essays draws 
attention to and contributes to their choice of Participation: The New Tyranny? as the 
title of their book. That book looks at the topic at community level rather through a 
specific age group, however one may extrapolate from that that what is said their 
applies to all people, thus including children. Cleaver (Cooke and Kothari, 2002:36- 
55) states that: “Participatory approaches can be further criticized for their inadequate 
model of individual action and the links between this and social structure” (Ibid.’A l ). 
Furthermore, that: "... project approaches that focus strongly on institutions as a 
development tool often see people as ‘inputs’, as the ‘human resource’. Social 
difference is recognized through the categorization of people into general 
occupational or social roles: ‘women’, (...) and ‘the poor’” {Ibid.).
The same critique includes children who may well know how to conduct focus groups 
and role plays after inclusion in ‘participatory’ development programmes. They may 
well, for example, have the fact that they should not be working deeply ingrained into 
them as the objective of the programme. This tends to occur, irrespective of whether 
that work operates in line with local custom, economic survival strategy and so on, in 
line with the application of ILO Conventions (138, Minimum Age Convention, 1973 
and 182, Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, 1999) that set out to eliminate 
child labour61.
Despite those limitations, the concentrated power of formalisation of community 
knowledge through participatory techniques sometimes generates an impressive 
amount of information. It happens in a relatively short space of time, leaving time for 
more selective structured formal surveys where and when they are necessary and of 
value. NGOs working with and for children often depend on periodical evaluation of 
programmes for prolonged or new funding using rapid appraisal.
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What critics have picked up on, is that what is most frequently occurring is 
participatory approaches are often defined in terms of the design of the project. That 
will usually be feasible anyway, because after the needs assessment, a recommended 
approach will have been chosen in advance of the rapid appraisal. Consideration of 
the impact of the changing social position and value of individuals tends to be less 
important than the collective action of all participants targeted by the programme. 
Thus, in many evaluations and research, much of what is ‘acted out’ by children in 
(for instance) role plays appears as data on what the needs of the programme 
beneficiaries are converted into positive outcomes.
They also examine what can be done to change conditions or one or more of several 
other possibilities, without thorough examination of negative outcomes. In line with 
views expressed by several contributors to Cooke and Kothari’s book (e.g. Mosse, 
16-35; Cleaver, 36-55; Francis, 72-87; Cooke, 102-21; Kothari, 139-52 and Mohan, 
153-67), what is too often the case, is that after the project goes there is usually no 
real follow-up or support left behind. People change or revert. Change can bring 
negative outcomes that are unpredictable and reversion can similarly be ‘out of the 
frying pan into the fire’. However, the northern elite have done its participatory 
development work by showing the people the options and how to do them. The 
management of the ‘thereafter’ is what nobody in the North sees as a rule.
Despite the notion that development work in ‘poor’ countries conveys democracy, 
rights and other ‘artefacts’ they need before they are emancipated from poverty and 
other ‘negative’ aspects of their lives, little is done that suggests extending citizenship 
to children in even the long term.
However, critique and doubts are beginning to extend to the North. In a recent 
example, Tisdall (2008:419-29) asks whether this inclusion is working with her title 
‘Is the Honeymoon Over? Children and Young People’s Participation in Public 
Decision-Making’. Following the line of her argument, if the enthusiasm for inclusion 
of young people is in decline then this share in decision making, albeit it a minor role, 
reduces the political inputs of children. It is thus also removing some of the 
citizenship-like ‘duties’ and ‘responsibilities’ their efforts afford them.
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Human geography, environmental planning and participation
Human geographers and environmental planners have similarly treated participation 
as an observable situation that serves a particular purpose with specific or intended 
outcomes. The Children's Environments Research Group at the University of 
Colorado has made participation and rights key issues that have been important 
components of publications such as Cities for Children (Bartlett, et al, 1999) and in 
the journal Children, Youth and Environments. British human geographers have made 
an especially important contribution to children’s use of space in which they learn, 
live and play. We find examples in Holloway and Valentine (2000), whereby Tracey 
Skelton’s study of teenage girls in two Rhondda valleys places importance on their 
participation (Ibid.:80-88) and Stuart Aitken {Ibid. A 19-38) looks at parental attitudes 
to gender and the social construction of children with spaces of identity.
The overall outcome has been to make a very rich and detailed contribution to 
children’s participation. However, on the one hand human geographers focus on very 
narrow remits within the wider contexts. Where participation is examined in depth an 
enormous degree of emphasis has been placed on children’s roles in sharing decision 
making with Article 12 CRC as the main identifiable vector of that function. It also 
has the overall effect of segregating children and adult domains. Many publications 
convincingly describe children’s participation rather than an age neutral, thus all age 
inclusive, version and those tend to examine schemes where children are by and large 
the main beneficiaries. They contribute a great deal to an understanding of children in 
social and physical space.
Consequently, despite the importance of the sector, it is most certainly not directly 
contributing to the possibility of children attaining a wider decision sharing role in 
civil society that would be part of citizenship on a par with adults.
Indeed, this latter point addresses similar weaknesses that come to the same end in 
education and development. Arguably, we need to consider the ‘evolving capacity’ 
principle and exclude children until the point in time at which they have reached 
maturity and articulacy that would make the responsibility of sharing possible. On the 
one hand this opposes a notion of full citizenship for life. It is also fraught with 
dilemmas such as deciding a particular age at which this is possible despite the reality
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of individuals all developing differently and reaching the ‘standard’ at a range of ages 
that are occasionally very low or high. It hence provides a tenuous but nonetheless 
real argument for not having set ages.
Participation studies have all been highly influential in the formation of policy among 
not only such UN agencies as UNICEF and UNESCO and NGOs working with 
children specifically, but also organisations working with the family, health, 
development, environment and education. Thus, when using a resource like 
UNICEF’s Child and Youth Participation Resource Guide (Upadhyay, 2006) many of 
the several hundred entries tend to come from domains like those examined above. 
They seldom take a more political and social route to provide resources and sources 
from which a ‘children’s rights route’ toward an age neutral direction may be 
extrapolated. Among all disciplines, education started to influence these ideas a full 
century ago (for instance Montessori, 1965 first published in English in 1912 after 
some years of practice and an earlier Italian version of that work) but has never 
bridged the age divide.
If Montessori, Korczak and other ‘visionaries” ideas had ever been universally 
accepted, they should have provided intellectual counsel against the tendency to carry 
over shadows of a tabula rasa notion. That is the view that children begin most (if 
not all) undertakings without prior knowledge or experience of what they are 
learning. It generally supports the inequity between generations, in which it is 
frequently assumed adults can do ‘most’ things. In reality, that often proves not to be 
the case since adults often need to train in new skills until very advanced ages.
Edwards (1996:47-48) gives five reasons why there are problems with children’s 
participation where it is found within projects and programmes and the development 
of communities and societies generally are touched:
1. Planners use a standard model of childhood which has its roots in 19th 
century Western thinking. This model treats all children as immature 
and irrational. People are qualified to participate in decisions only 
when adulthood has been reached, at a predefined age (usually 16 for 
some things and 18 or even 21 for others). By definition, children’s 
views are considered “childish” and their opinions are not sought.
2. Children are seen as inherently non-productive. Despite the reality that 
they participate all the time in economic development, family life and
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culture (especially in non-Westem societies), they are routinely 
excluded from official definitions and measurements of work.
3. Children are treated as by-products of other units of study such as the 
household, family or parent. The need to collect information which is 
specific to children’s lives is not perceived.
4. Adults may feel that, as they have once been children, they understand 
the needs of children without having to ask them; children’s own 
views are seen as unnecessary.
5. By treating children as passive and dependent, adults reinforce their 
monopoly of power in the world over and above that required to 
nurture children towards adulthood. This is a particularly sensitive 
area, and one in which adults who are also parents may feel 
particularly threatened.
Participation as a contributor to the citizenship-like status of children
In point of fact, the Edwards line of reasoning extends to more or less all domains and 
should be seen as a universal analysis of the situation of children within society. The 
exceptions might be when examining working children’s movements in the southern 
hemisphere. To some degree and that often depends on how one appreciates and 
appraises their activities, they ‘challenge’ points except perhaps 4 in his thesis. The 
examples given in a single collection (Hungerland, et al, 2007) by Pedraza-Gomez 
(23-30), Bourdillon (55-66), Invemizzi (135-44), Coly and Terenzio (179-86) and 
Reddy (187-96) combined with Liebel (2000), Cussianovich (1997) and Glauser 
(1990) show the diversity of situations in which children who work and are 
occasionally living on streets display qualities that might be compared with the duties 
and responsibilities of citizenship.
Despite that they tend to be marginalised by the ‘mainstream’ of society because of 
the ‘deviant’ nature of their initiatives. Organised children’s movements tend to be 
adult initiated and rely heavily on adult management. However, child members 
usually share much of the decision making and political action that give them some of 
the qualities of their adult trade union equivalents. Regardless of that, trade unions 
who may not see eye to eye with governments tend to side with those regimes in their 
opposition to the activities of child workers. In itself that is extraordinary since 
children throughout Saharan West Africa (see Coly and Terenzio, 2007), in India 
(Reddy, 2007) and South and Central America (Liebel, 2000 and Cussianovich, 1997) 
rarely directly agitate politically but are more commonly engaged in negotiating fair
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pay, reasonable hours, equitable working conditions and sometimes even attempting
to define what ‘exploitation’ is themselves. For instance, as Coly and Terenzio say:
In September 2003 ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African 
States), ... organised the ‘peer review’ on child policy. MAEJT and other 
children participated in the meeting together with ministers and public. It 
was decided that in each country (...) periodic reviews would bring 
together government and public organisations including child-led ones.
The children’s statement together with the minister’s declaration was 
adopted (...) by the heads of state. The implementation of the ‘peer 
review’ is now a decisive matter for the MAEJT, African Global 
Movement for Children and the African NGO (...) Coalition for children.
In some countries like Guinea Conakry or Senegal the government is even 
demanding ‘more participation’ from AMWCY-MAEJT to increase its 
contribution to the policy, and thus enhance national policies and their 
definition and implementation. (2007:182)
It is a very active political role that extends citizenship-like qualities, duties and 
responsibilities to working children in member countries. Whilst they do not have 
electoral franchise, they enjoy constant dialogue with governments. The children also 
tend to remain within their families and make a significant contribution to their 
families’ economic survival whilst either continuing to attend school or campaign for 
provision of schools, teachers, etc. Some of them are significant contributors to 
familial and community decision making. Yet they are seldom valued for their 
positive contribution and more for the negative qualities that make ‘bad’ citizens 
among adults (see Milne 2005b). They thus belong among those who can be excluded 
from full membership (see Chapter Three).
Participation of children’s activities in these movements tends not to be measured in 
terms comparable with ‘ladder’ models or adult focussed schemes like those proposed 
by Barker or Shier or more sophisticated models such as Feinstein and O’Kane’s 
‘spider’. They are also generally marginal to the children’s rights arena since child 
labour is considered to be both illegal and counterproductive to the aims and 
intentions of the CRC. The ILO IPEC programme has frequently attempted to end 
this ‘illegal’ work by children. However by taking a positive and responsible political 
course, governments have listened and cooperate with the children rather than simply 
banning their work.
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Thus it becomes apparent that there is no ‘even playing’ field in either child 
participation or rights, or indeed where the two conjoin. Despite the inclusion of the 
word ‘citizenship’ (e.g.: Hart, 1992) in titles the tendency is to not actually touch on 
the topic. This runs counter the objective of defining citizenship and perhaps more 
particularly in contemporary views of a ‘global citizenship’ in which human rights 
are integral. The use of separable adult and child versions of measurements of 
delivery of and participation in membership of all nature of situations from projects 
through to civil society and understanding of a separation of human rights (for adults) 
and children’s rights has made these entirely separate domains to the citizenship topic 
this research examines.
There are an almost excessive number of models. Each of them suits a specific 
discipline or practice area and normally addresses a narrow remit, for identifying 
participation particularly. That has obscured the possibility of identifying a generic 
participation that is or could become synonymous with citizenship.
Child participation and children’s rights was never one and the same thing when they 
emerged in the early 20th century, although since the 1989 adoption of the CRC they 
have been closely associated with each other. In the early stages, participation was 
clearly definable as an educative process in which children were being prepared for 
citizenship and their active role in civil society more generally. Children’s rights were 
conceived out of a wish to improve child protection. Neither is an entirely natural part 
of the other and similarly neither was ever intended as a ‘portal’ into children’s full 
citizenship. This is to the point that the association of the two and the limitations they 
singularly and jointly place on the topic tend toward creation of an obstacle to the 
resolution of the question this research poses.
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Chapter Ten: Issues concerning the legal status, welfare, policy 
making and inclusion of children in governance and full citizenship
In Chapters Ten and Eleven questions regarding the legal status, welfare, policy 
making and inclusion of children in governance and full citizenship take the lead 
from the two preceding chapters toward the eventual conclusions.
Children are an important stakeholder group; according to recent UN statistics they 
constitute roughly 34% of the world’s population and their actions play an important 
role in the future. The CRC created a notion that children’s views must be taken 
seriously, albeit that with caveats, in Article 12. Despite the energy and enthusiasm of 
children’s participation champions, including those examined in both Chapters Eight 
and Nine, their views have failed to inform the provision of resources for the 
improvement of their lives. Despite significant insights on the operation of public 
institutions children’s views have seldom contributed to scrutiny of governance. This 
chapter goes beyond children’s participation and the fact that there is little dialogue 
across the statutory and complementary areas where law and policy are formed.
The history of children’s participation in the South has recently begun to inform a 
new wave of consideration of children in the North as active citizens. Essentially this 
is an additional question about why the theoretical framework for analysis of the 
children’s rights generation is still failing children and does not belong in this work. It 
might be that the ‘citizenship question’ contributes to this analysis. Nonetheless, 
whilst questions regarding why the number of street children appears to be growing, 
displacement, refugeeism and trafficking are increasing (see United Nations General 
Assembly, 2002) and other rights are important, the contribution of an examination of 
these specific issues here would be a distraction.
In the preceding chapter, it was shown that the impact of the process of inclusion or 
‘participation’ still passes by children who lack networks and social capital in both 
North and South despite governments’ commitment through ratification of the CRC. 
One of the objectives of this and the following chapter is to examine why this is the 
case. Thus, this chapter sets out to look briefly at the topic areas, legal status, welfare, 
policy making and inclusion of children in governance around the world. Chapter
220
Eleven then takes outstanding ‘loose ends’ to briefly include them before drawing 
toward analysis and conclusions.
The brief examination focuses on parts of each area that are as proximate as possible 
to the question of citizenship and also, to some extent at least, draw on the notion of 
‘human becoming’ that was addressed in previous chapters. The ‘human becoming’ 
notion is given more substance when separation by classifiable age groups that is not 
entirely a reflection of capabilities, maturity or any other aspect of an individual’s 
nature is taken into account. It is also a very brief examination of a very extensive set 
of fields that take in only very few aspects of many varied legal systems, forms of 
government, policy and law making for very obvious practical reasons.
Children as legal persons
One of the main issues for examination is the status of children as legal persons. 
Although there are caveats (see Chapter Two) achieving the age of majority is the 
normal threshold for adulthood62 as it is described by national and some international 
laws. In this chapter there are ages or timelines that one might call ‘litmus tests’ or 
‘signposts’ where the time in an individual’s life is achieved when it may be 
considered that actions they take show a development of their assumed capabilities or 
mark a stage en route to full competence. This includes even incidences when the 
latter does not allow them all privileges an adult will normally enjoy although it may 
entail the same degree of responsibility as those of majority age. Reaching the age at 
which majority begins is the chronological juncture at which children legally assume 
at least the greater part of majority control over their persons, actions and decisions. 
The legal control and responsibilities of parents or other caretakers over and for them 
terminate at that moment. However, this does not mean ‘full control’ over one’s life.
There is, on the other hand, a drawback in looking at the law as it is presented in 
secular codified forms since it is complemented by or even contradicted by cultural 
and religious practices that assume the role of laws within groups who practice them. 
There is no single standard against which the precise end of childhood is definable. 
Thus, using the typical civil legal age 18 years (see also the definition of childhood in 
Chapter One) it is very unlikely that legislation alone can be used to resolve what this 
research has set out to examine. The starting point here is secular civil legislation.
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In simple terms there are certain things which a person who attains the age of 
majority is permitted to do which they could not do before. The slow accrual of 
‘privileges’ Oldman (1991: 25) described in Scotland lists examples such as when a 
young person can apply for a provisional driving licence or legally consume alcohol. 
These do not exactly mark the transition from childhood as an event but as a process. 
In Scotland, for instance, one can marry at age 16 years but electoral franchise and 
age at which an individual can own his or her own house is 18 years. Elsewhere in the 
world there are differences in legal timelines at which an individual may enter into a 
binding contract, vote, buy or consume alcohol or tobacco, have a driving licence or 
marry without obtaining consent of legally responsible adults. The ages at which such 
rights or powers may be exercised vary between different national jurisdictions. 
Those ages may also vary considerably between and within jurisdictions including by 
gender (or sexuality) as in the example of ages of sexual consent.
The basic principle begins with the notion that there are some things in life (illness, 
death, etc) over which nobody has lawful control. Thus individuals assume majority 
control over their life at a particular age instead of ‘full* control which is oxymoronic 
by its nature. Thus, of interest for this work it is the period prior to the age of 
majority, or minority, during which the child has minority control over his or her 
person and actions. Then adult caretakers have majority control and power to overrule 
most of a child’s decisions and desires and occasionally reverse actions. Age of 
majority is frequently confused with the similar concept, the age of license, which 
also relates to the onset of adulthood in a much broader and abstract manner. The 
criterion is that one neither needs nor can one obtain legal permission to grow up 
because that happens naturally.
Thus in the USA the legal notion of ‘licence’, meaning ‘permission’, can allude to a 
legally enforceable right or privilege to do something such as leaving school without 
parental permission. The age of majority is legal recognition that one has grown into 
an adult and that therewith (generally) no permission is required. Many ages of 
licence are correlated to the age of majority, but they are nonetheless legally distinct 
concepts. One need not have attained the age of majority to have permission to 
exercise certain rights and responsibilities. In fact, some ages of licence are higher 
than the age of majority such as the age of licence to purchase alcohol is 21 in all
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states in the USA although most states’ age of majority is 18 (except: Nebraska and 
Alabama, 19; Mississippi, 21; and American Samoa and Puerto Rico where it is 14). 
Other variants include examples like the age of majority in the Republic of Ireland at 
18 although one must be over 21 years of age to stand for election. Almost all nations 
automatically bestow the status of majority on minors who are married and a few do 
so for minors in their armed forces.
Decision making
When somebody is still a legal minor, decision making for oneself would usually be 
measured in terms of the pros and cons of different choices. Some choices are 
profoundly influenced by attitudes, values and beliefs. Similarly, they may be 
influenced by an individual’s emotional state or the position of other people who are 
important in one’s lives. Thus, some decisions will be or appear to be unwise or 
unusual and individuals may or may not acknowledge that they have made mistakes. 
Likewise, people are reluctant to give up autonomy and the right to make their own 
decisions. The law in many countries states that it is acknowledged that some people 
are not able to make decisions themselves.
Decision making for them has traditionally included parens patriae, whereby a state 
has the authority to act on behalf of children or incompetent adults (for instance see 
Mnookin, 1975:226-293). In most legal systems this appears in the principle that 
makes the protection of the best interests of a child the first and single most important 
concern of courts. For instance, in proceedings affecting the validity of a marriage, 
children will not usually be parties in their own right, nor will they be parties to any 
agreement spouses may make.
In such proceedings courts are often asked to accept and implement any agreement 
between the couple regarding responsibility for their children. Jon Elster (1989) sees 
this as a ‘randomised’ process in which there are probably three ‘solomonic 
judgments’. In a custody case, leaving aside cases in which one parent is 
demonstrably unfit and assuming that a drawn-out dispute is against the immediate 
interests of the child, a court will, firstly, presume strongly in favour of the mother or, 
secondly, presume in favour of the primary carer, who is highly likely to be the 
mother or, thirdly, toss a coin (see Elster, 1989:123-74). He considers these decisions
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paradigmatically indeterminate since, whilst the first two options may be preferable 
in the short to medium term, he argues that there is a case for randomisation in the 
longer term.
When there are random decisions usually it is done when the agreement is seen to be 
in the best interests and welfare of a child. However it would appear that many 
jurisdictions do not define exactly how or why such decisions should be made. What 
is lacking is a clear and agreed framework for making decisions on their behalf 
following an appropriate assessment of individual capacity to make precise decisions.
The assumption is that they are not competent to make it for themselves, despite a 
trend toward ‘inclusive’ laws, so there is often a legal argument based on a ‘best 
interests’ principle. This principle is a primary consideration in the CRC (Article 3, 1) 
that is supported by the evolving capacities principle (Article 5). Although Article 12 
essentially advocates inclusion, particularly Part 2 in such cases, the assumption is 
often that the age and maturity of the child is not yet well enough developed to 
include him or her. It thus appears that use of the parens patriae principle is 
unhelpful in searching for the answer in law. When seen in terms of the CRC, or 
within a human rights framework, the state itself has not taken steps to either make or 
enforce laws which align with the participatory principles, let alone move toward a 
more responsible role with some of the qualities of self-determination of citizenship.
Majority
There are several other ages one could turn to examine when majority might be 
considered to have begun . Marriage is the first example chosen as a possible litmus 
test for full citizenship rights since marriageable age usually allows consenting 
partners entering that relationship to assume a life like any other family. The ‘normal’ 
age range for marriage without parental consent is between 18 and 21 years, although 
a few countries allow it as young as 16 although China is 22 for males (and 20 for 
females). However in Ethiopia the legal age is 18 years for both males and females. 
In Mali, Mozambique and Niger over 50% of girls are married prior to reaching 18, in 
Yemen around 64% of girls are married before 18 or in Bangladesh 81% of girls 
marry before 18. In practice though, children in rural areas are married young and it is 
not uncommon to see girls as young as six years of age being married and it is still
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unusual for a girl to be 16 and unmarried. In Brunei no minimum marriage age has 
been as yet specified.
Numerous countries allow marriage at age 16 with consent and a few allow girls 
particularly to be married as young as 12 or 13 years. Of course, a conceptual 
problem arises here since the age of sexual consent does not always correspond with 
marriage ages. Thus in Ethiopia it is 15 years for both sexes and in Brunei age 14 for 
males and age 16 for females, in Mali and Yemen both must be married before sex 
occurs. Marriage age in Yemen is nine years, whereby in 1999 the minimum marriage 
age of 15 for girls, although rarely enforced, was abolished. The onset of puberty, 
which was interpreted to be age nine, was set as the requirement for the 
consummation of a marriage. In some countries the age of consent is higher for those, 
particularly girls, engaged in commercial sex. In some countries the age of consent is 
higher when one partner is in a position of trust with regard to the other, usually the 
male partner, or when one partner takes advantage of the other’s immaturity. In some 
cases girls marry just after menarche and others prior to puberty. A married person is 
then, for most intents and purposes, considered an adult.
Age of consent laws tend not to not apply when the partners are married, thus young 
traditional marriages occasionally appear to defy the legal standards. Some countries 
cover this by having regional laws that may overrule the national law. Likewise, in 
some cases the age of consent is lower when partners are of a similar age, although no 
matter how young.
Markers for the beginning of adulthood
The age at which a person becomes an adult thus varies significantly in different 
countries in the world. It often depends upon what constitutes being an adult. Most 
countries look at that in terms of an age at which children can legally work as well as 
marry, vote, buy alcohol, be conscripted or be charged with a crime. Child labour is 
an interesting measure. Great variations exist as to the age when one may work in 
different countries. Wherever this is a factor for considering who is an adult, the age 
can range from no laws at all in countries like Papua New Guinea, Yemen and 
Liberia through to countries that set minimum age requirements for child labour. The 
lowest set ages are in countries like Bangladesh, Paraguay or Syria where the
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minimum age is 12 years. However, many children working in developing countries 
begin work before reaching the minimum legal age. Most countries set minimum ages 
at 15 to 16 years old and in a few cases the minimum age may be 14.
In many countries legal voting ages at 18 define who is an adult. A few countries are 
promoting earlier and some even lowering voting ages. Austria and Germany, for 
instance, now allow 16 year olds to vote in municipal elections. In Italy, however, 
one cannot vote for a senator until age 25. In Liechtenstein voters must still wait until 
they are 30 to vote at all. Electoral franchise is a much favoured argument for 
lowering the age at which full citizenship begins amongst children’s rights activists. 
However, it assumes that a universal and accessible electoral system is available to all 
and tends to overlook the variations in who actually has franchise; for instance 
women, people in prisons or mental hospitals, or persons subject to Berufsverbot.
Another common litmus test for determining when one is an adult is the age at which 
one can purchase alcohol. The USA generally has 21 years, which is actually quite 
high, however in some countries alcohol can be purchased by either anyone or 
nobody of any age. In the former it is not generally treated with the same rite de 
passage veneration as in many countries with a minimum drinking age. In the 
majority of northern nations the consumption age is 18 although a few countries, 
including Spain, France, Austria, and Germany, have set drinking age at 16 years and 
some countries allow children under the drinking age to consume alcohol but not buy 
it themselves.
Responsibility before the law
Legislation stipulates when children are considered criminally responsible or an adult
in the eyes of criminal law. Countries with low marriage, drinking or child labour
ages tend to also assess criminal responsibility earlier. For instance, the USA
considers seven year olds criminally responsible and under some very exceptional
circumstances eligible to be charged as an adult.
In the US, the age of criminal responsibility is established by state law.
Only 13 states have set minimum ages, which range from 6 to 12 years 
old. Most states rely on common law, which holds that from age 7 to age 
14, children cannot be presumed to bear responsibility but can be held 
responsible (UNICEF, 1997).
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The defence of childhood is a form of legal argument that excludes defendants falling 
within that definition from criminal liability for their deeds if, at that time, they had 
not reached age of criminal responsibility. After reaching a particular age there may 
be levels of responsibility determined by age and nature of offence allegedly 
committed. Behaviour of an antisocial nature may well be reproved in a more positive 
way that discourages society’s use of the word criminal. Thus one finds the age of 
criminal responsibility treated in two different ways. The first is as a definition of the 
process for dealing with young offenders whereby a range of ages beginning with a 
minimum specifies exclusion of juveniles from the adult system of trial and penalty. 
The majority of countries have separate juvenile justice systems independent of adult 
criminal justice:
In Japan, offenders below age 20 are tried in a family court, rather than in 
the criminal court system. In all Scandinavian countries, the age of 
criminal responsibility is 15, and adolescents under 18 are subject to a 
system of justice that is geared mostly towards social services, with 
incarceration as the last resort (UNICEF, 1997).
Hearings are basically welfare based and usually deal with children as ‘clients’ in 
need of obligatory measures of management, treatment or care. The second considers 
the physical capability of a child to commit a crime. Thus children are considered 
normally incapable of committing some acts such as sexual crimes or other offences 
that require abilities of a more mature nature.
Some countries link childhood with diminished responsibility on the ground of what 
is normally considered mental illness. Differences between children below criminal 
responsibility who are prosecuted and young offenders are classified according to 
assessed levels of capability. The children’s rights lobby does not consider this 
constructive since it implies that children are somehow defective rather than simply 
lacking the acumen that comes with age and experience. This is an aspect of the 
parens patriae principle, whereby each nation will consider the nature of its own 
society and substantiation of the age at which antisocial behaviour begins to manifest 
itself. Some societies are indulgent toward the young and inexperienced and prefer 
not to expose them to the criminal justice process, instead pursuing other means of 
dealing with them. Thus there is a policy of doli incapax (incapable of wrong) that 
rules out liability for all acts that would otherwise have been criminal up to a
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particular age. Thereby no matter what a young person has done there cannot be 
criminal prosecution.
In 1998 the principle of doli incapax that presumed that children aged under 14 were 
incapable of telling right from wrong that had been enshrined in English common law 
since the 17th century was abolished (Wills, 2007). In Nordic countries an offence 
committed by somebody less than age 15 years is usually considered an outcome of 
phenomena in the child’s development. The authorities will usually take 
administrative processes to assure the normal development of that child through 
methods ranging from therapy to placement in a special unit. Since they are not 
administered by the criminal justice system they are not dependent on the gravity of 
the offence but based on the normal circumstances of the child. However, this kind of 
policy of treating minors as incapable of committing crimes does not necessarily 
reflect public opinion. If the underlying principle of the rationale is that children 
below a certain age lack the capacity to form the mens rea of an offence it is 
questionable as to whether or not this is a sustainable argument. The counter 
argument is that given different speeds at which individuals develop both physically 
and intellectually an age limit may be arbitrary and irrational. Nonetheless the 
perception that children should not be exposed to criminal justice the same as adults 
endures. They have neither had experience of life nor do many people consider that 
they have the same mental and intellectual capacities as adults, thus it may be 
considered disproportionate to treat young children in the same way as adults.
In 1993, two year old James Bulger was shopping with his mother in Liverpool. He 
wandered off, was found and led away by two 10-year-old boys, Jon Venables and 
Robert Thompson. They later assaulted and killed him and left his body on a railway 
line. The case shocked people in Britain for a number of reasons. The age of the 
killers and the fact that they were caught on closed-circuit television so that images of 
them making off with James were broadcast on national television caused widespread 
disbelief. Moreover, the indifference of passers-by who saw James being led away by 
his killers in obvious distress did little to help. The two boys were tried in an adult 
court with virtually full media coverage. Their identities were not protected. In the 
public domain they were treated as though they were adults.
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The Bulger case opened up public debate about the nature of children and childhood. 
It brought with it contrasting representations of children, whereby James and similar 
children represented pure innocence and the killers represented pure evil. However, I 
would argue that this was initially a particularly British phenomenon. About one year 
after the Bulger case, the small Norwegian city Trondheim was affected by an 
analogous tragedy. Five year old Silje Marie Raedergard was playing with two six 
year old boys. The game turned violent; they stripped her, beat her unconscious and 
then ran away. She froze to death in the snow.
Similarities with the Bulger case were remarkable. What was surprising were the 
differences in the perception of children and how the Norwegian authorities and 
Silje’s mother reacted. Trondheim is a close, cohesive community. Many people in 
the city knew who the killers were, yet their names were never published. They were 
protected from media exposure. The boys lived in the same neighbourhood as Silje 
and her family. Immediately news of her death was made public. The police and the 
local schoolmaster opened up the school that both Silje and the boys attended and 
talked to both children and parents. Stress was placed on how safe children were. 
There was a call for calm and no retribution. After two days, the boys went back to 
school accompanied by psychologists. There were no protests and no parents 
withdrew their own children. The Guardian reported the local paper’s position: 
“...the culprits were just six years old; how did they know what they were doing? In 
Norway, where the age of criminality is 15 -  as opposed to 10 in Britain -  they were 
treated as victims not killers...” (Hattenstone, 2000).
It is difficult to assemble a comprehensive single international overview of the history 
of juvenile justice. Junger-Tas and Decker (2008) have compiled a collection of in- 
depth analyses of the juvenile justice systems in 19 different countries in the EU, 
Canada and USA. Much of what is available looks at European countries or USA 
with a great deal of emphasis on differences between the Anglo-Saxon countries and 
Europe. Others, especially looking at the UK, concentrate on the 19th century (e.g.: 
Hawes, 1971). Goldson and Muncie (2009) include a number of authors who look at 
the history, except that the overview is limited to mainly Europe and North America. 
The rest of the world largely requires country by country examination. Thus this 
research relies on that which is most accessible and relevant.
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Books like Dickens’ Oliver Twist and Henry Mayhew’s London Labour and the 
parliamentary ‘blue books’ helped to generate the overstated notion of a Victorian 
‘criminal class’ in England. There are two dominant popular views of that period. The 
first is of a ‘golden age’ of law and order in which behaviour was generally better 
than over the period since roughly the early Industrial Revolution, when the treatment 
of juvenile criminals was less enlightened than today. The other sees the world as a 
place of chaos in which the administration of law was simultaneously benevolent and 
harsh. It was benevolent in that it acknowledged the state’s duty to provide welfare 
for the poor, but also harsh since it regarded the poor as highly untrustworthy and 
treated them accordingly. Dishonesty by child or adult alike was treated ruthlessly. 
Very few societies had criminal legal systems that can be compared with those of the 
present day or indeed a notion of separation by ages.
The earliest significant theories of childhood criminality developed out of a notion of 
biological determinism in Christian European societies. Pamela Cox and Heather 
Shore (2002) edited a collection of essays examining the development of a notion of 
juvenile delinquency in Britain and mainland Europe between 1650 and 1950. One 
sees that the Christian ethic made it difficult to think of children as being other than 
tainted by ‘original sin’ although not completely devoid of moral reserve. They were 
thus not thought of as inhuman or inherently evil. Although the view of the young 
offender was seriously prejudiced by established theories that saw things in terms of 
biological determinism, they were the first to benefit from the ‘new penology’ of 
redemption. They were the first simply because they were young and could not be 
held morally accountable for their actions. Moreover, because they were considered 
more impressionable than older criminals.
Mary Carpenter (See Manton, 1976) wrote her Reformatory Schools: For the 
Children o f the Perishing and Dangerous in 1851 with which she coined the term 
‘dangerous classes’ in reference to the lower or poor classes being prone to crime. 
That work was influential, having some effect on the drafting of the Youthful 
Offenders Act 1854 which recognised reformatory schools. She started a reformatory 
school in Bristol herself but also advocated good quality free day-schools and feeding 
children in industrial schools as a means of reducing the propensity for wrong doing.
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In the USA (see Platt, 1977) a child-saving ‘movement’ emerged during the 19th 
century and influenced the development of juvenile justice systems. The child-savers 
particularly stressed the value of redemption and prevention through early detection 
of deviance and intervention through education and training. The child savers’ 
intention was to mitigate the roots of child delinquency and furthermore change the 
treatment of juveniles.
The first US juvenile court was convened in Chicago in 1899, founded on two 
principles advocated by child savers. These two principles were founded on the basis 
of juveniles not being ready to be held accountable for their actions and because they 
were not yet fully developed and it would be easier to rehabilitate them than adults.
The quintessence of the juvenile court was recognition of the obligation of the state 
for its neglected and failing children. The intent was not simply to classify them 
criminals and steer them further into a milieu of vice and crime in reaction to severe 
measures and the lessons learned amongst experienced adult criminals. Previously 
‘delinquent’ children had been those who had committed a crime, were tried in adult 
courts and sentenced to adult prisons.
Other children such as street sellers and orphans were generally ignored by courts 
unless they were accused of criminal deeds. Under those circumstances they were 
often treated more harshly than children from poor but ‘respectable’ families. The 
rationale had been that young people who came before courts or other agencies 
appointed to deal with them were being helped instead of punished. They were being 
helped so there was no need for procedural safeguards. The behaviour of young 
people was labelled and categorised and they were stripped of their few rights. 
However, the outcome of reforms in Europe and the USA was that children and 
youth, with the exception of those for whom doli incapax applied, would actually be 
helped. They were therewith acknowledged to be children and any similarity of 
treatment to that of adults very quickly ended. Thus, if anything, juvenile justice 
enforces the separable notions of childhood and innocence, adolescence and youth as 
the end of innocence at the threshold of development into adulthood.
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Cultural definitions of childhood and becoming an adult
Beyond the administration of justice there are also cultural definitions of child and 
adult. In different cultures they may determine that someone is an adult before legal 
ages for adulthood apply. For example, coming of age ceremonies for Jewish 
children, bat or bar mitzvahs occur when a child is 12 or 13 years old. (See Chapter 
Five) Children have a firmly fixed place in Jewish society in which childhood is 
rather short although clearly defined and ending with the b ’nai mitzvah. Their law 
says that every Jewish girl becomes a bat mitzvah automatically at age 12 years and a 
boy becomes a bar mitzvah at age 13 years because boys mature later than girls. As a 
bat or bar mitzvah a child becomes duty-bound by God’s commandments as specified 
in the Torah. Until b ’nai mitzvah parents are liable for their children but subsequently 
participate in all areas of Jewish belief and practice as an adult.
Many local traditions consider a child an adult long before a child is legally 
considered an adult. Latin American families have coming of age parties for their 15 
year old daughters, called quince ahos64 and some others including Mexicans 
celebrate the same calling it quinceaheras. The quince ahos or quinceahera is 
celebrated in a unique and different way from other birthdays. Besides referring to the 
actual festivities it is also used to refer to the young woman whose 15th birthday is 
being celebrated in manner analogous to the bat mitzvah.
The closest equivalent to it in the English-speaking world is perhaps the debutante 
ball for those turning 18 years. Celebration of a 15th birthday is highly ritualised and 
traditionally begins with a religious ceremony. Then a party or reception is held at 
home or in a hall. Festivities include food and music and commonly a dance is 
performed by the quinceanera and her ‘court’. Her court is usually comprised of 
young girls (Damas) and young men (depending where it is they are called 
Chambelan, Escorte or Galan) or a combination of both. There are traditionally 14 
persons in the court, which with the celebrant totals 15. It is the point at which there 
is recognition of her journey from childhood to maturity and therewith a girl is 
considered a woman and ready for all the responsibilities of adulthood. A ‘last doll’ is 
used as part of the ceremony, often in the form of a decoration and token of the event.
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In some versions of the custom the doll represents the last thing of childhood now 
that the celebrant will focus on other things such as having her own children. In some 
places capias (printed ribbons with the celebrant’s name and date of birth) are pinned 
to the doll whilst the girl mingles with her guests. She thanks them for their 
attendance and gives them a keepsake of the event. There is a considerable number of 
extant and lost traditions that mark such transitions (see Chapter Seven for 
anthropological examination of related issues). Some are formal rites de passage that 
mark events such as menarche, betrothal or ‘first marriage’ (e.g. Fuller, 1965), first 
hunt or acceptance as a form of apprentice. All of them occur before the civil legal 
definition of majority.
A more contentious signpost is that a person may also almost be considered an adult 
if he or she is drafted or volunteers for military service. In most countries this age is 
18, though a few countries set the age at 16 or 17. The Optional Protocol to the CRC 
on the involvement of children in armed conflict (Article 1 and Article 4, 1) stipulates 
that ‘States Parties shall take all feasible measures to ensure that members of their 
armed forces who have not attained the age of 18 years do not take a direct part in 
hostilities.’ However, some countries where there has been civil war or continual 
internal conflict have recruited children as combatants and for other military services 
(there are, for instance, stories about girls taken as prostitutes by the Lord’s 
Liberation Army in Uganda).
Many nations have historical accounts of child heroes, for instance the British 
example of Jack Cornwell VC (see Unknown, 1918). However, apart from Nicaragua 
making all former child guerrillas full citizens at the end of their revolution in 1979 
very few child soldiers were ever viewed as adults but rather more as children who 
had lost their innocence.
Welfare
It has, if anything, been for a large part the outcome of children as they are perceived 
by those who make and administer laws that led to the form of child welfare 
operational today. Welfare itself is not absolutely the same as child welfare although 
both have the same origins. Welfare was originally delivered collectively and free of 
the state. In mediaeval times in Europe hospitals were commonly church run and the
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word hospital should not be understood in today’s terms. Then they were 
communities where the elderly and feeble particularly were cared for (Williams, 
2007). Until the Reformation, it was a religious duty for all Christians to undertake 
seven corporal works of mercy. These were acts aimed at relieving physical suffering.
In accordance with the teaching of Christ (Matthew 25, 32-46, Unknown, 1971:62-3) 
people were required to feed the hungry, give drink to the thirsty, welcome the 
stranger, clothe the naked, visit the sick, visit prisoners and bury the dead. Christian 
parishes were the earliest basic administrative units in Europe and also had 
responsibility for their poor (Williams, 2007). The nearby Islamic countries had 
zakat, or the giving of alms, which is a legal concept and the third of the Five Pillars 
o f Islam. There are rules attached to zakat, although generally it is obligatory to give 
away 2.5% of one’s income and savings and 5% to 10% of the harvest to the poor. 
Beneficiaries include the impoverished, low paid, people unable to pay debts, 
stranded travellers and anybody else needing assistance. The principle of zakaah 
charges that the rich should look after the poor. In Judaism charity is similarly 
embodied in tzedakah, justice, whereby the poor are entitled to charity as a right 
rather than benevolence. Tzedakah is regarded an extension of the ancient maser ani, 
poor-tithe, as well as practices including allowing the poor to glean a field, gather 
harvest during shmita (sabbatical year) and other benevolent practices. Voluntary 
charity, alongside prayer and atonement, is regarded as penance for the outcome of 
bad deeds.
With the introduction of ‘poor laws’ as the medieval age ended, the responsibility in 
Europe passed on to secular parishes (see Slack, 1990). In England, for example, 
Elizabethan Poor Laws enshrined this right. In 1572 an Act made provision for the 
punishment of sturdy beggars who were then sent back to their parish of origin, 
ostensibly for help, and the relief of the impotent poor. The 1574 Act in Scotland 
duplicated the English Act although it remained in force in Scotland until 1845. In 
England it was superseded in 1598 and 1601 with an Act that provided for a 
compulsory poor rate, creation of ‘overseers’ of relief and provision for ‘setting the 
poor on work’. There was no general apparatus for enforcement and Poor Law 
operation was inconsistent between places.
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This system, with modifications, remained largely intact until a campaign initiated by 
Utilitarian reformers. They considered fiddling with the facts beyond the pale. The 
new poor law of 1834 was the result of their campaign, and where a principle of ‘less 
eligibility’ was enforced support in the new system would only be offered if a person 
went into a ‘Poor House’ or ‘Work House’65. There the standard of living awaiting 
them was below that on which the poorest labourer could survive. There was no 
distinction between adult and child recipients of this form of assistance.
As the 19th century drew to a close, a new notion of welfare began to develop. One 
aspect of that was unemployment insurance whereby contributions and benefit levels 
were laid down by parliaments. The insurance principle was preferred for the finance 
of this new welfare, since some governments were anxious about raising income tax. 
In Germany, for instance, Bismarck faced enormous resistance to a tax-based welfare, 
complicated because he did not have the power to levy taxes on income. Until they 
became national institutions friendly societies and mutually-owned bodies operated 
health schemes that complimented unemployment benefits.
In 1889 the first Act of Parliament for the prevention of cruelty to children, the
Children’s Charter, was passed in the UK. It enabled the state to intervene in
relations between parents and children for the first time ever. The police were given 
powers to arrest anyone found ill-treating a child and enter a home if a child was 
thought to be in danger. The Act included additional guidelines on the employment of 
children66 and outlawed begging. In 1894 it was amended and extended and allowed 
children to give evidence in court, recognition of mental cruelty and it became an
offence to refuse an ill child medical attention. Thus, in the UK as was also
happening elsewhere, regulation of employment, education and new protective 
measures were separating the domains of adulthood and childhood. It was also 
happening at a time when campaigns for equal contract and property rights for 
women, opposition to ‘chattel’ marriage and virtual ownership of married women and 
children by husbands and crusade for political franchise was at its height. Thus the 
nature of separatism by age that still persists in most places became entrenched.
Child welfare essentially emerged as a set of government and private services 
designed to protect them and promote family stability. The notion of a state approved
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child welfare system dates back to Plato’s Republic (1998:65). His account of a
discussion between Socrates, Adeimantus, Glaucon and Thrasymachus surmised that
the interests of the child could be best served by removing children from the custody
of parents and placing them under state care. To prevent an uprising from
dispossessed parents:
We shall have to invent some ingenious kind of lots which the less worthy 
may draw on each occasion of our bringing them together, and then they 
will accuse their own ill-luck and not the rulers.
Furthermore:
The proper officers will take the offspring of the good parents to the pen 
or fold, and there they will deposit them with certain nurses who dwell in 
a separate quarter; but the offspring of the inferior, or of the better when 
they chance to be deformed, will be put away in some mysterious, 
unknown place, as they should be.
However, since the advent of modem child welfare those who come to the attention 
of welfare workers most frequently do so because of situations that are generally 
collectively termed child abuse or neglect. The former is more or less made up of 
physical, emotional and sexual abuse and anything that can be classified as one or 
more of those. Thus, child employment may be physical abuse as well as economic 
exploitation but will probably be comprised of all three if a child is working in any 
part of the ‘sex industry’. The latter, neglect, includes failure to take adequate 
measures to protect a child from harm as well as all forms of oversight in their care.
The CRC, Article 3 (see Appendix I for full text) sees child welfare as part of 
the ‘best interests’ principle:
1. In all actions concerning children...
2. States Parties undertake to ensure the child such protection and care as 
is necessary for his or her well-being...
3. States Parties shall ensure that the institutions, services and facilities 
responsible for the care or protection of children shall conform with the 
standards established by competent authorities...
The most detailed expression of the vision the CRC includes is given in Article 19 
(see Appendix I), where who is responsible and what that entails are described.
Given that all nation states member of the UN have ratified the CRC without 
reservation or declaration to the contrary, the assumption projected is that welfare is
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provided on a comparatively equitable basis. In point of fact, the comments on many 
of the initial and subsequent reports to the Committee on the Rights of the Child show 
enormous variance in availability, delivery and, above all else, understanding of the 
concept of welfare. However, the common standard is that the distinguishing 
characteristics of social work practice in child welfare are derived from the nature of 
children. In particular, they recognise the characteristics of dependency and 
development and also special concern and responsibility for children that all social 
groups demonstrate. Moreover, it appears to be universally recognised that the years 
of childhood are of particular significance for future development. Whatever occurs 
during the developmental process is of concern because it may discourage, interfere 
with or adversely influence the kind of development considered desirable. 
Furthermore, community, society or state have a stake in this, by producing the kind 
of person it needs or wants and who maintains its traditions, values and ideals the 
provision of welfare shapes the social order. As its basic unit, the family has, through 
parents particularly, assured the child of the close and continuing individual 
relationships, attention, concern, special interest and love which are promoted as the 
most important stimulants of healthy development.
Child welfare assumes that the primary and unique need of the child is parental care 
but provides alternatives where this fails in most countries. This is encapsulated in 
CRC Article 20 (alternative care)67 and Article 21 (adoption). However, these 
distinctions within welfare reinforce the division into adulthood and childhood 
because they assume and underpin the notion of dependency that is further reinforced 
by the CRC principle of ‘evolving capabilities’ (Article 5).
The impact of global economy and national social policies on welfare and changes in 
the established social order and care as such are in need of introspective, pragmatic 
appreciation from the point of view of children’s welfare. That is especially so in the 
context of particular new forms of social control targeted at young people’s norm- 
violations in which some of the typical features of the modem welfare state model 
have been questioned. As such, there is much discussion about present contradictions 
and challenges in the field of social work related with young people. It bears in mind 
that as part of the process of modernisation, the regulation of the family and 
childrearing has acquired an important place in the production of social order.
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One of the results of this has been the creation of a system of control and care (penal- 
welfare complex, Garland 1985 and 2001) that has been gradually built around the 
theme of childrearing. This system comprises of an interesting, ongoing dynamic of 
endeavour to achieve a balance between punishments and support (see Skehill, 2004).
There is a gradual transformation of the social context of social work with children 
and youth, which is an essential for the production and maintenance of social order 
and cohesion between adults and the young. Early intervention, risk-assessment and 
multi-professional collaboration have dominated service sectors such as maternity 
and neonatal clinics, day care facilities, schools and the fields of child welfare, youth 
work and social work. That is in accordance with international, particularly Anglo- 
American, models that are being used to modernise welfare delivery (for instance see 
Lister, 2006; Such et al, 2006; Schtitter, 2006). Social work thus operates as a 
function of governance that has the explicit role of transferring objective legislation 
and policy to the subjective sphere of individuals and families through mediation in 
the ‘social space’ between the two domains (Donzelot, 1980). Traditionally, social 
work had a strong ethical commitment to the accrual of social capital and the 
maintenance of social solidarity and the status quo generally.
In turn, social policy on children reflects how welfare is designed and delivered 
alongside education, health, housing, poverty and social security. Social policies for 
children have risen high on the agenda for governments across the world in recent 
years as they seek to promote successful outcomes for children as ‘beings’ and 
‘becomings’. It also, one should add, for less well off nations periodically attracts 
generous funding from international organisations such as the World Bank.
Recently, links between children’s rights, poverty and development have led to 
renewed examination of international policies, particularly globalisation, and also 
looking at causes and not only consequences of programmes to eliminate child labour 
and poverty. The structural problems of market globalisation and social polarisation 
in the 21sl century and human rights theories are being used as a basis for 
international and social policies with international agencies and NGOs. They are also 
being analysed in relation to children. The needs of disabled and institutionalised
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children and the right to social security in line with CRC Article 26 are also being 
given particular attention.
The future for children
Lorenz (2006:138) has argued that the impact of neo-liberal policies, 
individualisation of risks, the privatisation of social solidarity and the emphasis on 
economy are being felt in every European welfare state. Consequently, he claims, the 
basic instruments used to produce social order and social solidarity have all 
undergone varying degrees of reorientation. This is, in fact, disseminating worldwide.
As global vision gradually displaces localised development of social policy
‘worldwide’ efforts are being made. In May 2002 the United Nations General
Assembly Special Session (UNGASS) on Children was held to follow-up the 1991
Summit for Children. It brought together all signatory governments to reaffirm
commitment to the CRC and also focus on emerging issues essential for securing the
human rights of children. The outcome of this meeting was A World Fit fo r  Children
which outlines commitments for achieving the aims of the CRC promises made in
1991 and also a set of ‘Millennium Development Goals’. Under the heading
‘Partnerships and participation’, Item 32 (UNICEF, 2006:23-24) states:
In order to implement the present Plan of Action, we will strengthen our 
partnership with the following actors, who have unique contributions to 
make, and encourage the use of all avenues for participation to advance 
our common cause - the well-being of children and the promotion and 
protection of their rights:
(1) Children, including adolescents, must be enabled to exercise their right 
to express their views freely, according to their evolving capacity, and 
build self-esteem, acquire knowledge and skills, such as those for conflict 
resolution, decision-making and communication, to meet the challenges of 
life. The right of children, including adolescents, to express themselves 
freely must be respected and promoted and their views taken into account 
in all matters affecting them, the views of the child being given due 
weight in accordance with the age and maturity of the child. The energy 
and creativity of children and young people must be nurtured so that they 
can actively take part in shaping their environment, their societies and the 
world they will inherit. Disadvantaged and marginalized children, 
including adolescents in particular, need special attention and support to 
access basic services, build self-esteem and to prepare them to take 
responsibility for their own lives. We will strive to develop and 
implement programmes to promote meaningful participation by children, 
including adolescents, in decision-making processes, including in families 
and schools and at the local and national levels.
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(2) Parents, families, legal guardians and other caregivers have the 
primary role and responsibility for the well-being of children, and must be 
supported in the performance of their child-rearing responsibilities. All 
our policies and programmes should promote the shared responsibility of 
parents, families, legal guardians and other caregivers, and society as a 
whole in this regard.
(3) Local governments and authorities, through, inter alia, strengthened 
partnerships at all levels, can ensure that children are at the centre of 
agendas for development. By building on ongoing initiatives, such as 
child-friendly communities and cities without slums, mayors and local 
leaders can significantly improve the lives of children.
(4) Parliamentarians or members of legislatures are key to the 
implementation of this plan of action, the success of which will require 
that they promote awareness raising; adopt necessary legislation; facilitate 
and appropriate the financial resources needed for this purpose; and 
monitor their effective utilization.
The inclusion of children
This is, of course a highly idealised document that aims to direct policy toward a 
more child inclusive environment and in some respects runs counter to social controls 
aimed at young people’s norm-violations. Children’s civic engagement is held to be 
essential for achieving the Millennium Development Goals and other development 
commitments including universal education and eradication of poverty. In the view of 
the UN, children’s contributions are said to improve services and policies and their 
involvement in social organisations and political decisions improves the quality, 
efficiency and integrity of services. Community participation in public decisions may 
help improve public services, hold public officials accountable, ensure justice and 
reinforce the rule of law.
The achievement of the Millennium Development Goals requires the participation of 
all groups in society. However, there is a trade off that demands high standards from 
children and penalties for those who do not conform. Those might, for instance, 
include the kind of ‘anti-social behaviour orders’ (see Squires, 2008) recently 
introduced in Britain that occasionally restrain the ability of children to exercise their 
right to express their views freely because their manner of doing so does not conform 
with adult standards of what is acceptable and responsible.
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The Crick Report (DfEE, 1998) stipulates that children and young people should be
made aware of their responsibilities toward themselves and others in regard to duties
and obligations to family, friends, school, community, state and society. The concept
of responsibility itself is defined in broad terms as:
(a) care for others; (b) premeditation and calculation about what effect 
actions are likely to have on others; and (c) understanding and care for the 
consequences. (Ibid.:l3)
It also states that social and moral responsibility is promoted by:
...children learning from the very beginning self-confidence and socially 
and morally responsible behaviour both in and beyond the classroom, both
towards those in authority and towards each other guidance on moral
values and personal development are essential preconditions of 
citizenship. (Ibid.:l \)
Morality embraces values we maintain about what is right or wrong and good or bad. 
In Good Thinking: Education for Citizenship and Moral Responsibility (The 
Citizenship Foundation, 2001:3) moral responsibility is described as involving values 
such as:
Social justice; political equality; respect for difference; human rights; co­
operation; civility; respect for the rule of law; and a commitment to 
negotiation and debate as the proper way to resolve disagreements over 
public policy.
This, the Crick Report says, occurs even at primary school age when:
...children are already forming through learning and discussion, concepts 
of fairness, and attitudes to law, to rules, to decision-making, to authority, 
to their local environment and social responsibility etc (Ibid.: 11)
In the European Union, policy is that children should be considered citizens and 
treated accordingly (Schuurman and Sutton, 2004). In a democratic Europe the vision 
is for guaranteed participation of all citizens including children. Within the EU the 
guiding principle is that children’s rights should be ensured and that it should be 
possible for them to participate in all decisions that affect them. In order to achieve 
this goal, some attempts to involve children as active citizens in policy and planning 
have been made at local and national levels.
A programme and policy guide ‘Children as Active Citizens’ was the outcome of a 
meeting held in Bangkok in January 2007. The topic under discussion by experts and 
organisations working in that part of the world was that more than one third of the
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world’s children live in East Asia, South Asia and the Pacific. Whereas in the West it 
is normal to place stress on individual rights, in most of Asia societies place greater 
emphasis on the responsibility of each individual towards family, community and 
society. Their starting point was that by definition civil rights are protections and 
privileges given to citizens. Citizenship itself means a collection of rights and duties 
that define membership of a community and within that community civil rights 
essentially describe individual rights. However, in societies where individuals exist as 
part of the whole and individual rights are not a priority, ensuring civil rights for 
those children is a considerable challenge. Thus their starting point is (LAWGCP, 
2008:8):
Just like any other set of rights, there is a long distance between ratifying 
an international convention and reforming national legislation to fulfil, 
implement and monitor the rights of all citizens. Children’s civil rights are 
among the least-understood and least-realized rights. Implementing 
children’s civil rights is the most challenging aspect of the CRC, a 
challenge that applies equally to resource-rich countries... Starting 
positions are extremely low for most children. This should not, however, 
discourage decisive actions. The progressive realization of children’s civil 
rights requires a long-term vision and a plan with concrete benchmarks for 
achieving this vision -  even if it takes a generation to transform relations 
between children and adults.
The IAWGCP wrote the guide bearing in mind that civil rights and citizenship are 
closely linked to country specific political, social and cultural contexts. Consequently, 
two key chapters in Part Three of the guide (7.) ‘Citizenship competencies and civic 
engagement’ (7&/d.:49-58) and (9.) ‘Children influencing public decisions’ {Ibid.: 65- 
74) look at incorporating the contexts into how this might be done. Perhaps more 
importantly, it allows for the fact that it may take an entire generation to transform 
the relations between children and adults.
There is no claim that having waited, only that generation will see the goals achieved. 
However, it projects a minimum realistic value in seeing children contribute to 
governance in that region of the world. Therefore the approach is to look at children’s 
civil rights in the broader governance context rather than to look at children in 
isolation. It ensures that children and young people will be represented in local and 
national governance bodies albeit allowing for the fact that children are not normally 
considered part of public decision making and the public arena tends to be hostile to
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their inclusion. They feel that participation by itself is insufficient for improvement of 
the performance of government services.
Constraints on the availability of resources, socio-political context and political and 
decentralised structures affect government performance and without accountability 
and resources, participation can deliver little (Crook and Manor, 1998:8-10). 
Children’s opportunity to influence public decisions (IAWGCP, 2008:66) is governed 
extensively by a country’s political system and degree of democratisation, the level of 
devolution of political authority, influence and character of civil society and the 
independence of the media and justice.
Davila-Ortega and Freeburg (2006:11) say: “Training young people for democracy 
and governance is a growing area of interest for NGOs and governments. Young 
people often lack information about electoral reforms and parliamentary 
development, which impacts their capacity to be effectively engaged in democratic 
governance.” One assumption is that devolution may open up opportunities for 
children’s involvement in governance. However, at the same time local authorities are 
frequently more uninformed about international obligations than devolved agencies 
and may consequently feel less bound by the CRC than national authorities do.
It must be borne in mind that vertical relationships between patrons (the ‘political 
class’) and clients are the foundation of both an authoritarian social order and 
horizontal networks based on trust between equals are the source democratic social 
order (Putnam, 1993). However, as societies change and the primacy of the individual 
increases, for child and youth inclusive policies to work the decline in social trust that 
is associated with increasing self-interest over the past few decades (for instance see 
Rahn and Transue, 1998). Thus, a key question will be how to design policies that are 
aimed at bottom up strategies that will circumvent the barriers such as the ‘distance’ 
between local and national governance and allow for the self-interest that is 
undermining young people’s agency {Ibid.).
Children’s inclusion in governance
One of the models one might suggest is children’s involvement in governance. In 
France children’s municipal councils have existed since the 1980s. In 1990 when
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France ratified the CRC there were at least 200, two years later the number had
doubled68. At present there is something in the region of 1600. The possibility of
young people aged nine to 16 years (although there are councils with participants up
to age 25 years) and contributing to local affairs has been made possible by the
councils. At the congress of the French association of children’s councils anacej
(association nationale des conseils d’enfants et de jeunes) in October 1998 a
constitution was formulated in which one of the fundamental principles was that:
La participation a la vie publique locale et regionale des enfants et des 
jeunes, citoyens d'Europe et du monde, est une exigence car elle est 
source de socialisation, d'echanges, de paix etde solidarite.
(The participation of children and youth in local and region public life,
(as) citizens of Europe and the world, is a condition because it is a 
foundation of socialisation, communications, peace and solidarity. [My 
translation])
This sets a far more universal aim than most (adult) grassroots public representation
and may, thus, impose a notion of a rather superficial activity for young people
entirely separated from adult governance. However, in 2000 anacej and DIV
(Delegation Interministerielle a la Ville) carried out an exploratory study of the
participation of children and youth councils in three communes: Acheres, Clichy sous
Bois and Evry. In conclusion they found:
En cela, et nous retrouvons la un propos recurrent dans tout ce document, 
les conseils pourraient alors vraiment, dans le cadre de cette 
collaboration a la politique de la ville, etre un element reel et moteur 
d ’une demarche participative sur la commune.
(Given that we find a recurrent observation throughout this document, 
councils could really seriously consider this a driving force for 
participatory initiative within the framework of collaboration in 
communal politics. [My translation])
Their argument is often anchored in the European Union’s argument that every 
individual, irrespective of age, is formally a citizen according to Article 17 of the EC 
Treaty (European Union, 2002):
1. ...Every person holding the nationality of a Member State shall be a 
citizen of the Union. Citizenship of the Union shall complement and not 
replace national citizenship.
2. Citizens of the Union shall enjoy the rights conferred by this Treaty and 
shall be subject to the duties imposed thereby.
It is also supported by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
(2000) in which:
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Article 20
Equality before the law 
Everyone is equal before the law.
Article 21
Non-discrimination
1. Any discrimination based on any ground such as sex, race, colour, 
ethnic or social origin, genetic features, language, religion or belief, 
political or any other opinion, membership of a national minority, 
property, birth, disability, age or sexual orientation shall be prohibited.
EU policy has moved in the direction of child and youth inclusion whereby the active 
participation of young people in decisions and actions at local and regional level is 
considered essential if the EU is ever to be able are foster more democratic, inclusive 
and successful societies. The general view is that participation in the democratic life 
of any community is about far more than voting or standing for election to any kind 
of (political) office albeit they are recognised as important elements in this sphere. It 
is not only in Europe though, Eliana Guerra (2005:151-68) described children’s 
participation in governance and setting the municipal budget in Barra Mansa, Brazil.
Every year since 1998 large numbers of children took part in discussions to elect 
child councillors and discuss children’s priorities. Those elected learn how to 
represent peers within democratic structures, prioritise use of available resources and 
develop projects within the complex and frequently slow and very bureaucratic 
political process of city governance. The initiative came in 1997 when the 
municipality instigated activities entitled Citizenship Knows No Age for local children 
aged between nine and 15 years. An evaluation found that children’s councils were 
‘emerging as important mechanisms for the expansion of citizen participation in 
public policy and management’ {Ibid.: 166). It was felt that their role could be 
strengthened if the children could be persuaded to take a more active role within the 
project management committee. It is part of a progressive view of children’s political 
roles in Brazil where the communal franchise is already 16 although mandatory 
suffrage from is agel8 (although military conscripts do not have a vote).
The EU similarly views participation and active citizenship as having the right, 
means, space and opportunity and, when and where necessary, the support to 
participate in and influence decisions and become engaged in activities that should
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contribute towards creating a better society. To that effect some countries are 
beginning to lower communal and even general electoral rights down to age 16 (see 
also Chapter Eight). The German federal states of Lower Saxony, Mecklenburg- 
Western Pomerania, North Rhine-Westphalia, Saxony-Anhalt and Schleswig- 
Holstein have already lowered the age to 16 years for municipal elections. Austria has 
already voted to do so and in Scotland the SNP adopted a policy of reducing the 
voting age for all elections to 16 as soon as possible. Other countries and parts of 
countries have also done the same or are in the process of changing voting ages. 
However, there is neither noticeable enthusiasm for lowering the minimum age at 
which individuals are eligible to stand for political office or the idea of lifelong 
electoral franchise.
Whether we are looking at existing laws, the process of law making, policy that 
directs law making, welfare provision or any form of governance in which all or any 
of those occur, the general impression is of some moves to lower ages in some 
domains that appear to be almost diametrically opposite to each other such as 
communal voting ages and criminal responsibility69. Alongside those extremes there 
is an apparent growing tendency to invest less trust in the capabilities of an 
increasingly educated and informed young population. Protection seems to be 
increasing because of fears for their wellbeing. If this all taken to be part of what one 
understands to be ‘social justice’ then a theoretical route to understanding this can be 
extrapolated out of John Rawls (1971) A Theory o f Justice.
All of those aspects of the control of state authority over children is consistent with 
Rawls’ proposition70 in that at least a set of procedural principles of justice on which 
society should be founded. They should be extended to children as well as adults. 
Taking Rawls’ position as describing ‘social justice’ in a very broad sense, his theory 
corroborates a view that the application of children’s rights may not always be left to 
children themselves. They should though, be supposed to be able to exercise their 
rights unless society as a whole agrees that someone else should make decisions for 
them. His system of justice calls for people understanding the necessity and 
preparedness to support a distinctive set of principles for conveying basic rights and 
duties and the determination of what is understood to be appropriate distribution of 
benefits and complexities of social cooperation. The objective is to allow the
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individual to act in keeping with a personal conception of his or her best interests 
although that must not be to the detriment of others.
Thus, individuals participate in a common development of evolving principles that 
consists of fair treatment for everyone in the present and future. This concurs with use 
of Kohlberg’s ideas (see Chapter Seven), which allow for lowering the threshold at 
which an evolving capacities argument is valid.
The central notion is all of society must contribute to deciding on these principles and 
that they are selected in a hypothetical state in which individuals are unaware of 
specific interests and circumstances in real life. The assumption is that all of members 
of society are self-interested in decision making. However, unawareness of their 
situation and the specific configuration of their society guarantee the Rawlsian notion 
that individuals decide on principles of justice open-mindedly, with equality in mind. 
Thus no individual has to act as an instrument of the interests of other individuals. 
Everybody would be a human being rather than a ‘human becoming’ who would need 
to evolve his or her capabilities and pass through the liminal phase of increasing 
‘privileges’ accumulated through adolescence to early adulthood. These are what 
David Oldman (1991:25) illustrates as a drawn out rite de passage.
Of course, it would naturally require a global ‘level playing field’ for the distinctions 
adult individuals and child individuals to be merged. Only then would the principles 
of justice deliver all aspects of citizenship including duties, responsibilities, 
complexities and shortcomings equally. Unfortunately the proposition itself is highly 
unlikely on account of the degree to which the proverbial ‘playing field’ is uneven.
Therefore, for instance, there is disparity where welfare is well established and at the 
heart of one nation’s social structures. Another nation may have achieved no more 
than adopting a notion of welfare that it can neither afford to operate nor has had prior 
experience of. Despite a shared set of principles, the differences will arise anyway. 
Shared principles such as almost universal ratification of the CRC are assumed to 
create a set of common standards worldwide. Yet practice of governance from base to 
the highest level of political office and the cultures and traditions that influence law,
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policy and moreover the perception of the role of children itself is seldom likely to 
reach the ideal Rawls’ theory expounds.
Attempts to precipitate global actions such as the Millennium Development Goals 
and A World Fit fo r Children's plans for partnerships and participation, previously 
detailed in examination of Item 32, to deliver children’s rights are doubtless 
overambitious. On the other extreme, the attempt by ventures such as the large 
numbers of children’s councils in France, and similar initiatives in other countries, to 
be influential in communal political life is encouraging. Whilst they do not 
specifically name citizenship as their specific goal for children, there is good reason 
to believe those efforts contribute positively toward that end.
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Chapter Eleven: Supplementary areas that contribute to notions of 
children’s citizenship
This chapter looks at some ‘loose ends’. That notion often implies what has been 
overlooked erroneously (or deliberately). In fact nothing substantial has been 
forgotten. Nonetheless, in an attempt to balance other chapters without taking 
diversionary routes to explain the relevance of some issues, these have been kept 
back as examples of matters that are very germane. They do not deal categorically 
with citizenship but have great bearing on how we think of it. Children’s, thus 
human, rights are at the core of this entire work. The first issue here is how there is 
both a global view and a regional or continental view.
The African Children’s Charter
The African Charter on the Rights and Welfare o f the Child (ACRWC), sometimes 
known as the African Children’s Charter (ACC) was adopted by the Organisation for 
African Unity in 1990. It entered into force on November 29, 1999. By the end of 
2008, 43 of the 53 countries in Africa had signed the ACRWC (see Appendix II) and 
it had been ratified by 37 although some countries which ratified did not sign and 
others have signed but not ratified. It was the first regional treaty on children’s rights. 
How it differs from the CRC is in that member states of the African Union believed 
the CRC missed important socio-cultural and economic issues particular to Africa.
Emphasis is on African cultural values and experience when dealing with the rights of 
the child in instances that challenge traditional African views. Those often conflict 
with the CRC in areas such as child marriage, parental rights and obligations towards 
children and those bom out of wedlock. Many African campaigners felt that 
specifically saying that the CRC is higher than customs, traditions, culture or 
religious practice did not correspond with rights, duties and obligations in the 
ACRWC. It also has a clearer definition of the child as every human being aged less 
than 18 years. Article 1 CRC allows for exceptions, Article 2 ACRWC does not. It 
also tackled particular African issues affecting children such as the abolition of 
apartheid and similar systems. Now that apartheid is over the same provision applies 
for children living under regimes practicing ethnic, religious or other forms of 
discrimination. It protects expectant mothers and those with infants and young
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children in prisons, allows girls the right of return to school after childbirth, prohibits 
marriage or betrothal of children, promotes constructive action for girls’ education 
and makes special reference to care of the child by extended families. It also prohibits 
the use of children as beggars, recruitment of children into the armed forces or armed 
conflict, protects internally displaced and refugee children, disabled children and 
encourages state parties to provide support for parents in ‘times of need’.
Unlike the CRC there is a means by which children can petition the ACRWC’s 
Committee of Experts regarding infringements of their rights (Articles 44 and 45). 
Thus its nature is both very complementary to and contrasts with the CRC. Moreover, 
it illustrates a quite different concept of personhood that suggests a very different 
approach to citizenship to that which emerges out of most other human rights 
documents. Those are usually very distinctly European conceptually. Articles 12, 13, 
14 and 16 express some views such as freedom of expression and religion or a view 
of privacy that is essentially alien to societies that do not understand a concept of 
personalised private spheres (see also ENDA editions, 2001:21-89).
However, Europe also has a vision that projects a European notion of childhood and 
children’s rights through the European Convention on the Exercise o f Children's 
Rights (see Appendix III) that was adopted by the Council of Europe in 1995 and 
entered into force on 1 July 2000. Thus far 24 countries have signed the convention 
and 10 have ratified.
Each ratifying country is required to specify at least three types of family proceedings 
before judicial authorities to which the Convention will apply which include care 
procedures and removal and restriction of parental responsibilities. It is, thus, very 
different to the ACRWC and more concerned with collecting and offering 
information on the exercise of children’s rights, obtaining the views of children and 
raising awareness about their rights. Everything relates to their guardianship and 
representation in all cases or legal acts concerning them or their property. In essence 
it is more about families than the rights of individual children as per the CRC. It also 
goes a long way toward advocating a uniformity of European approaches to looked 
after children without giving them the degree of participation the CRC describes. It 
places a very different emphasis on children’s needs rather than on their active role as
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citizens within society more broadly. It does not go as far as the CRC in any respect 
and also fails to thoroughly address children themselves as those who bear rights that 
are safeguarded by adults.
The influence of religion
It is not only continental and regional notions of what children are. Their status and
such issues as protection and provision for them can also define them. In states that
are theocratic or very much influenced by religion there are other questions arising
that influence any move toward a universal notion of the child citizen. Savitri
Goonesekere (Ali, Goonesekere, Garcia Mendez and Rois-Kohn, 2007:16) has the
following to say about the influence of Islam:
Legislative reform takes the form of reviewing old laws or enacting new 
ones. Participation rights are addressed incidentally in this context, as 
when laws of evidence and procedure are modified so as to facilitate 
children’s access to justice and protect child witnesses and victims. 
(...)The age of majority is often addressed as a topic for reform because 
‘protection’ requires identification of children by an appropriate age 
cohort. Law reforms do not in general adopt a holistic approach to 
definition of childhood in terms of the CRC’s overarching concept of 
child rights. Inconsistencies in the definition of childhood for varying 
purposes remain untouched, even when legislation clarifies an age of 
majority.
Family law and personal status is also an area that has been addressed in 
law reform. (...) There is in general a reluctance to address (...) 
citizenship (...) for law reform. A few countries in Islamic jurisdictions 
and mixed legal systems have reviewed the approach to passport laws, 
citizenship and visas from the perspective of women’s and children’s 
rights. The plural legal systems and Islamic law studies show how 
women’s rights and issues of discrimination on the basis of gender have 
been addressed to only a limited extent in law reform. We have noted that 
both women and children were denied legal rights in all four legal 
traditions. Despite the changes in the law that have occurred over time, 
some reform on women’s rights continues to interface with reforms on 
child law. This is seen in the area of criminal laws on sexual exploitation 
and trafficking, domestic violence, harmful customary practices, 
citizenship and immigration, HIV/AIDS, guardianship and custody and 
forced marriage.
The reform initiatives on women’s rights and children’s rights have been 
pursued invariably as parallel projects and not on the basis of connected 
approaches to realizing the standards of both CEDAW and the CRC. (...)
The plural mixed legal system study shows that law reform has not 
touched a range of discriminatory colonial and customary laws.
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Whilst this looks specifically at Islam, the same can be said to an extent for other 
religions. The family is more often than not the locus of their vision of the child, 
protected by their adult caretakers rather than as bearers of rights as individuals, thus 
‘guardianship and custody’ take centre stage. Also, where Goonesekere refers to 
citizenship it is in the context of nationality. It is a concept that is sometimes at odds 
with the notion of a global religious community (for instance, the idea of a ‘Nation of 
Islam’) that places individual rights behind the collective ones of the belief group, 
thus often relegating the principle of the individual civil and human rights of each 
person when referring to adults let alone children. Whilst most states operate secular 
legal systems, some are more influenced by others than one or more religions within 
their boundaries.
The USA and children’s rights
In the USA a number of conservative religious organisations including the Christian 
Coalition, Concerned Women for America, Eagle Forum, Family Research Council, 
Focus on the Family, John Birch Society, National Center for Home Education, and 
Rutherford Institute have been at the forefront of opposition to the CRC. These and 
other organisations made a considerable effort to represent the CRC as a threat with 
the greater part of opposition claims arising from unsubstantiated concerns about 
national sovereignty, states’ rights and the parent-child relationship. Some opponents 
believed the CRC arrogates national and state sovereignty, would undermine parental 
authority and inevitably allow and encourage children to sue parents, join gangs, have 
abortions and dictate how people raise and teach their children.
Those claims and assessments were a result of misconceptions, incorrect information 
and lack of understanding about the implementation of international human rights 
treaties in the USA. Extraordinarily, opponents of the CRC criticised provisions 
added by the Reagan and Bush Senior administrations during the drafting process that 
attempted to reflect rights American children have under their Constitution and were 
those that effectively prompted the need to have explicitly participatory rights. Right 
wing, fundamentalist Christian, Republican Senator Jesse Helms expressed an 
opinion that: “...the Convention on the Rights of the Child is incompatible with the 
God-given right and responsibility of parents to raise their children” and that “the 
Convention has the potential to severely restrict States and the Federal Government in
252
their efforts to protect children and to enhance family life”. Thus, in a doctrine that 
essentially teaches tolerance and respect for each other, US fundamentalists have used 
Christianity to underline the moral duties of the family above the possibility of 
protected personal rights ensured constitutionally. In fact the US Constitution never 
specifically mentions children as bearers of the rights it protects. In their recent book 
comparing children’s rights in the USA with countries where it is widely accepted 
that children should have more rights, Albertson Fineman and Worthington (2009) 
call the tension between religion and human rights ‘competing paradigms’.
It seems quite extraordinary that when one turns to the travaux preparatories for the 
CRC, during the early 1980s the USA was profoundly involved in drafting what were 
to become participation articles 12, 13, 14 and 15 (Detrick, 1992: 224-96). Those are 
the wholly human rights based notions, mostly based on the International Bill of 
Human Rights. It is those the religious right finds most threatening. In roughly a 
decade and a half the USA went from being at the very heart of driving the drafting 
process to full adoption to becoming the most notorious objector to the CRC. They 
signed in 1995 but as yet have not signalled when they might ratify. Worldwide they 
are only matched by Somalia who signed in 2002 but have no internationally 
recognised government who would be able to ratify. In the USA the competing 
paradigms continue to dominate the lobby for unconditional ratification.
In other countries, including the UK, there has been protest, attempts to derogate or 
be exempted from legislation prohibiting corporal punishment by Christian groups. 
They often justify their stance by citing Old Testament passages in 2 Samuel and 
Proverbs. The key New Testament text cited in support of harsh physical punishment 
of children is usually Hebrews 12:6-771. The argument essentially supports a notion 
of the need for hard discipline as an important part of learning to be a ‘decent’ and 
‘virtuous’ adult. That line of reasoning most certainly keeps children subservient to 
the will of parents and elders.
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The influence of the CRC
Despite religious barriers, in fact most countries have ratified the CRC and children’s 
rights have improved somewhat as reports to the Committee on the Rights of the 
Child tend to indicate. The exception is no notably great steps forward in civil and 
human rights terms that would give good measure of children being integrated into 
their societies as equal members. If anything, they are now somewhat more protected 
in the name of children’s rights than previously and are more easily identifiable as a 
‘group’ with needs for special provisions and protection than before.
This separation of people into identity groups is one of the issues that appear to 
inhibit the integration of people into a more consistent identity as equal citizens 
irrespective of age, gender or other status within nation states. Most recently, the 
Convention on the Rights o f Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) (see Appendix III) 
was adopted on 13 December 2006 by the United Nations in New York and opened 
for signature on 30 March 2007. It received its twentieth ratification on 3 April and 
entered into force on 3 May 2008. It attempts to secure full membership of society for 
those it represents.
States parties must guarantee that persons with disabilities enjoy inherent rights to 
life on an equal basis with others (Article 10), ensure equal rights and the 
advancement of women and girls with disabilities (Article 6) and protect children 
with disabilities (Article 7). They shall have equal rights and not be separated from 
parents against their will, except when authorities determine that this is in their best 
interests. They should never be separated from parents on the basis of the disability 
of either child or parents (Article 23). Countries must also recognise that all persons 
are equal before the law, prohibit discrimination on the basis of disability and 
guarantee equal legal protection (Article 5). In short, it goes somewhat further than 
the CRC towards equality that begins to address issues similar to citizenship as an 
expression of full membership of society. Despite the guiding principle that all 
human rights are indivisible as with other treaties such as the CRC or those dealing 
with women’s or ethnic rights, it does have an element of what critics of human 
rights treaties consider to be separation into particular human typologies and interest 
groups working a little counter the indivisibility principle.
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On the other hand, repeating and reinforcing principles through specialised treaties 
reinforces stand alone ones like the CRC by placing principles in more than one 
context to make indivisibility make sense within diversity. Whether or not that 
contributes toward delivering full membership of any society depends on how many 
of the treaties are signed and ratified by a particular state. With regard to citizenship 
this probably contributes very little at all. The examples in this chapter are in fact 
clear illustration of the dichotomies that probably work against universal principles 
ever being entirely possible. Indeed, one might go further and look the kind of view 
of citizenship propounded by Ruth Lister (1997, 1998, 2006a and b and 2008) and 
other feminist scholars. Those, however, are predicated on the provenance of the 
progress of women in Western society. Whilst they advocate for women worldwide, 
they tend to be more uncompromising than conciliatory and do not work well for the 
kind of continental regional identity the ACRWC promotes and where religion is a 
force majeur in resisting societal change in the first place.
This chapter has taken these examples of ‘loose ends’ in order to fill in some gaps in 
preceding chapters. They have been consciously separated into this chapter with a 
very clear objective. That is to exemplify the difficulty in applying any kind of 
universal principle to begin with and more so when a more abstract concept such as 
children’s citizenship is the question to be resolved. It also rounds off foregoing 
chapters and moves data toward analysis and conclusion.
255
Chapter Twelve: Conclusion
History, philosophy and theology give us clear enough pictures of childhood in a few 
but significant sample places over the last two and a half thousand years to see that it 
is not entirely different at any point in that time to the present. Children have almost 
without exception gone through a period between birth and adulthood that whilst 
different in form and range of ages has always been the time in which the skills of 
adulthood are learned. Within those different childhoods there have been some shared 
responsibilities for many of them. Often those came in the form of economic roles 
ranging from minor domestic duties to full engagement in the labour force. Even 
where the latter occurred, there are only a few early industrialised countries where 
children worked fulltime in factories, mills and mines with little apparent time for 
leisure. Historically, many of those were children with no alternative care at home 
who accompanied parents to their workplaces. Child labour itself is as laden with 
assumptions and insinuations that make exceptions appear to be rules72 as the view of 
the child of equal status to adult is full of romantic notions.
The three descriptive representations of childhood that emerged toward the end of the 
18th century and were identified by Julia (2004:85) persisted into the 20th century. 
The concept of ‘the changing social value o f children’ expressed by Viviana Zelizer 
(1994) applies to children who are not ‘abandoned and reared by animals’, ‘prodigies’ 
and ‘heroes’ particularly. In other, it applied to the vast majority of children (in the 
Western world73) as the 20th century began. That was when what had been more or 
less ‘chattels’ for centuries were capitalised, given a financial value and were being 
increasingly ‘sacralised’. It was the period when there was unprecedented change for 
children. The child ‘sciences’ that now include developmental psychology, 
paediatrics and child psychiatry came into their own. As children ceased to merely be 
the property of parents and were gradually becoming individual bearers of rights, 
‘childhood’ as we now know it appeared. It was often driven by new knowledge 
coming out of those child sciences. Some of the most significant steps toward 
creating child protection and welfare happened then, including contradictions 
between protection and participation that often stop them being full citizens.
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In part these contradictions drove the incentive to give children a comprehensive set 
of rights that were both ‘guaranteed’ by being in the form of a convention that makes 
states parties duty bound to incorporate it into nation laws and allowed them guided 
participation in civil society alongside ensured protection and provision. However, no 
amount of examination reveals any attempt to embed full citizenship in the CRC (see 
Detrick, 199274). Thus, despite contrary views from some aficionados of children’s 
participation, those rights are an end in themselves that have been achieved, which 
whilst fuelling moves in that direction are not the driving force.
Analytic induction of texts examined for this work does not draw toward a 
conclusion that there are historic indicators that may lead us to a view that children 
have ever enjoyed what we today consider full citizenship. Philosophy has 
occasionally alluded to the notion but never pursued it conclusively. When looking at 
the contribution of the child sciences and social sciences there are few indicators that 
point to child citizens in any place or at any time throughout history. Anthropology 
offers examples of what we would regard to be children fulfilling adult roles in their 
society. These are very frequently determined by the kind of economy and survival 
strategies they include. Similarly, there are issues relating to life cycle that include 
longevity, child bearing age, marriage age, symbolic adulthood and initiation ages 
that make those definitions unlike those we regard typical. Whilst citizenship 
describes membership, it is often difficult to apply that principle in a society that is 
idealised as egalitarian but on close inspection will almost certainly be far more 
layered and structured than first imagined.
When looking at governance, law and policy making and ‘politics of childhood’, 
although there are changes such as the lowering of electoral franchise in a growing 
number of countries, there are also countervailing forces that are reinforcing 
separateness. In the first instance, ages are being lowered by usually two years 
without other aspects of citizenship bestowed on youth. Furthermore, a range of 
measures for the protection of children against abuse and neglect, raising the age at 
which military service may begin and so on are more clearly defining the line 
between childhood and adulthood. Bringing together notions of children and 
citizenship is very recent and limited mainly to the children’s rights world.
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Morphological analysis of motif and event types revealed that there appeared to be no 
more than 12 generic narratemes. Whereas some were frequently present, many texts 
did not present functions necessary to construct an account of children’s citizenship 
in either varying or unvarying sequence. The functions can be reproduced as:
1. Child as helpless infant (including tabula rasa and similar concepts).
2. Child needing nurturance and guidance.
3. Child needing good order and discipline (for instance, see conduct books or 
Hobbes).
4. Child should be educated (both meaning schooling and social and economic 
training for their future).
5. Adults (parents and others) bear responsibility for the child’s life including 
their protection, actions, events and general demeanour (this includes 
‘ownership’ of children; filial hierarchies such as the Confucian view, etc).
6. Adults guide a child in choice of direction (education, career, choice of life 
partner and so on).
7. A child carries over traditions, family ‘duties’ and allegiances or loyalty (to 
church, partisan alignment with a political group or party, friendships, 
business, etc).
8. A child grows up, gains privileges (or rewards), often in return for increased 
responsibilities, as he or she becomes more skilled (Locke and Rousseau).
9. A child learns the value and demands of their role described in 7 and begins to 
display loyalty to other adults such as community leaders, those ruling or 
governing them (aristocracy, monarchy, parliament, etc) and their god or gods 
(except in ‘atheist’ states and the most secular societies).
10. The child learns the value of material and financial things (‘children’s 
businesses’).
11. He or she assumes increasing responsibility to both family and society (for 
instance, AIDS orphans in parts of Africa).
12. He or she begins to prepare and plan for their own adulthood (initiation events 
and rites de passage, conscription into military as the ‘gateway’ to adulthood 
and citizenship; pre-university examinations, etc).
Thereafter adulthood and citizenship are an assumed state with exceptional reasons 
for exclusion of the kind described in Chapter Three.
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The 12 functions that are the outcome of morphological analysis describe the 
commonalties between different childhoods from all sources of data over the entire 
period this research considers and all cultural variants included over that time. They 
also describe most childhoods today. That is an age of children’s rights and 
increasing awareness of the vulnerability of children that is seeing layer upon layer of 
protection build up. The consequence is that childhood, rather than becoming part of 
the lifelong continuum between birth and death, is now becoming increasingly 
sacralised75. As childhood becomes globalised76, values often instituted in the West 
are being disseminated globally. Thus reasons for child protection vary from 
universal birth registration (see Plan International 2005 and 2006), all forms of child 
abuse and injury (see Peden, et al, 2008, United Nations General Assembly, 2002, 
United Nations, 2006, Howe, 2005, etc.) to increasing anxieties about issues 
predominating in the West77 such as overprotection and ‘demonization’ (for instance, 
see Goldson, 2000). The demonization of children seems to be very present 
throughout British society and increasing elsewhere. The murder of James Bulger 
(see Chapter Ten) was good example of a key event in the British context.
In the UK and increasingly around the world, children are becoming either more 
protected or demonised as phenomena such as child murders, drug use, vandalism 
and other events attract increasingly accessible media events. The very British notion 
of the anti-social behaviour order or ASBO (see Squires, 2008) as a ‘criminalisation 
of nuisance’ has exacerbated the negative representation of children and youth who 
are not controlled and contained. This allows such notions as ‘good’ and ‘bad’ 
citizens (see Chapter Three; also Milne, 2005: 277-83) that justify restriction or 
withdrawal of rights from adults. It also attempts to contain young people who are a 
nuisance. Strikingly, a report commissioned by the security firm ADT (ADT, 
2006:26) shows that of the six European countries surveyed, Great Britain came 
behind Spain and France in respect of the public’s feeling that anti-social behaviour 
was growing. Around 90% of Spanish and 77% of French respondents against 65% of 
British people felt that was the case. There was a ‘universal’ attribution of the anti­
social behaviour problem to young people (Ibid.:28).
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Working in countries dispersed across the world over roughly the last decade has 
brought with it the experience of seeing increased concern about anti-social 
behaviour. There have been comparable views to those held in the UK expressed in 
Baku, Hanoi and Tbilisi. Children and youth are rejecting older values. Alcohol and 
drug abuse alongside increased violence including gang ‘wars’ and muggings are 
attracting media and governmental attention. Not only do the views of informants 
compare with, but also reproduce the British experience of the 1990s.
Child protection is a far more complicated matter. The range of issues it entails takes 
in all aspects of child abuse, neglect and exploitation. Thus every issue from localised 
child care within families to global issues such as child labour and trafficking is 
included. Recently, in order to separate domains dealt with under the broad heading 
‘child protection’, the expression well-being has become part of the language of 
protection. Thus, those children who are either potential victims of the violence and 
disorder or who need to be secluded from these threats require increased protection.
A 2007 report on well-being by UNICEF placed the UK bottom in a list of 21 
countries. The report’s authors said that they used the most up-to-date information to 
assess whether children felt loved, special, valued and supported within the family 
and community. They also looked at whether the family and community were being 
supported in this task by public policy and resources. British society appeared very 
unequal with high levels of poverty leading to children having low esteem of 
themselves and their lives. It portrayed a generation of young people who are 
unhappy, unhealthy and who engage in risky behaviour. They also have poor 
relationships with their family and their peers, low expectation of life and do not feel 
safe much of the time.
Whilst this report looked at 20 European nations and the USA, the picture of a 
number of other European countries is only marginally more encouraging. Much of 
the developing world still looks to the West as a model for their development. 
Children and youth are also influenced by the West to some degree. Some of the 
negative aspects of young lives are also giving rise to demonization of young people. 
As a countervailing force, protection against both allowing children to become like
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counterparts in the West, and against those who are already demonised, is adopting 
Western methods of dealing with so-called ‘problems’.
To some extent these protecting, overprotecting and demonising measures are 
disenfranchising young people. Thus, as the ‘global child’ becomes more protected, 
the contradictory nature of the intent to extend greater participation in civil society to 
them becomes more complicated. It is also here that the emphasis sometimes placed 
on rights and participation in particular lacks persuasive qualities.
There is a second morphology that works only for more recent perceptions of the 
development of the individual that includes ‘experiments’ (one might, for instance, 
include Korczak’s orphanages or Bhima Sangha in Bangalore as examples here). It 
applies to projects and programmes employing recent trends in children’s rights and 
participation particularly. The morphemes one can bring together to assemble a 
taxonomy consisting of functions reproduce as follows:
1. The controlled or manipulated child who is an onlooker in an adult led project 
with no active role or share in decision making (many countries’ family courts 
where the presence of children is required).
2. Present but inactive, thus as a spectator with a definable place and role but no 
influence of activities and decisions (typically adult sports events as a 
‘supporter’, attending political events such as rallies or demonstrations).
3. As a member of an informed group taking part in an activity but with a latent 
or partial input rather than direct influence in decisions and steering actions 
(for instance, a typical school trip to see a municipal council or national 
parliament at which children meet and are allowed to questions politicians).
4. As an active participant in an adult designed event, consulted and informed 
(possibly trained) and having influence over part of the situation (children’s 
rights conferences and meetings in which adults and children co-organise, 
both are committee members and speakers; environmental activities such as 
designing ‘eco-gardens’ in public places).
5. As an initiator and organiser with responsibility shared with other children 
and one or more adult participants and direct influence and input into the 
event (‘children’s conferences’ where adults participate and there are usually 
adult observers).
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6. As a sole organiser who has direct and sole authority for the event which may 
also be shared with other children and in which child-initiated decisions will 
be shared with one or a number of adults (exclusively ‘children’s conferences’ 
with adult attendance or participation but no observers, etc).
In Korczak’s orphanages one would recognise both 4 and 5 depending entirely on 
what the activity and degree of adult involvement was. Bhima Sangha's child 
members’ activities extend over a range of 4, 5 and 6 according to the particular event 
and whether it is an own event or one they are attending organised by others. Beyond 
this there are child only events which are excluded since they reproduce adult only 
actions that are not all-age-inclusive.
The latter taxonomy is based on what is almost certainly a small literature about the 
exception rather than the rule because most participation ‘measurement’ has been 
done in projects that do not tend to reproduce real life situations. As a consequence, it 
is very difficult to either combine the two taxonomies, if indeed any purpose might be 
served by attempting to do so. What does not emerge from either is an indicator en 
route to establishing what either tells us about the state of children being full citizens.
It is strikingly similar to Hart’s eight rung ladder (1992:9). His essay attempts to 
address citizenship as the second part of his title, ‘From tokenism to citizenship’ 
makes very clear. However, he does not achieve that. In his concluding pages he 
locates “the family as the primary setting for development of children’s sense of 
social responsibility” (Ibid.:44) and sees schools as the potential domain for “the 
venue for fostering young people’s understanding and experience of democratic 
participation” (Ibid.:43). However, schools do not yet achieve that. All in all, his 
analysis does not draw toward a notion of children’s citizenship as his title promises.
The problem with many attempts to move beyond this kind of taxonomy is that, in 
common with Hart, they examine the Western world and generally look at projects 
and programmes in operation. Studies in ‘other cultures’ of the kind that have been 
carried out in India, Peru and throughout West Africa and looked at in this study tend 
to be set apart. There is perhaps a stigmatic view that assumes that democratic 
processes in developing nations, some of which have a less than perfect record of
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maintaining democracy, cannot contribute. Nonetheless, where they are included here 
the morphemes generated are actually very similar, thus are incorporated in the 
taxonomy above.
Content analysis of material used for this work also fails to reveal significant clues or 
indeed evidence for an argument for the existence of children having the benefit of 
anything at all similar to modem citizenship. Early in this work, Chapters Four and 
Six examined antiquity and particularly looked at what has been said about childhood 
in two places approximately 2500 years ago. In point of fact, much of what is known 
is little more than a ‘snapshot’ of a small part of all childhoods in those places. Plato 
recounting Socrates’ thoughts only tells us a significant amount about a particular 
class and group but not about the entire population. The texts used for this work that 
describe childhood also do not achieve this end, thus what is written rather than being 
evidence based seems to be derived from the known conditions of adults at that time 
from which a certain amount of knowledge about children has been extrapolated.
Likewise, what we take from the Confucian tradition is as much reconstructed as the 
Socratic/Platonic world. Much of the social history of the time of K’ung Fu Tzu 
appears to be drawn from an equally narrow spectrum of the many different cultures, 
classes and social statuses and then packed out with his philosophy and interpretation 
and reproduction thereafter. Consequently, we know mainly about the social 
environment in which either philosopher lived and from which both drew their ideas. 
The majority of both populations consisted of people of lower class or caste who 
were also free but without the privileges of the elite and are almost entirely absent 
from history. Outsiders such as ‘foreigners’, servant and slave classes and outcasts 
are mentioned almost in passing but never adequately described in a manner that 
allows us to substantively know about them. In fact we know far more about free, 
privileged men than anybody else.
Historians have largely deconstructed and reconstructed what little detail there is to 
describe those populations. Thus children play a relatively minor role in history. 
However, there is enough said about them that we know they were not full citizens 
and in their respective ways acquired that status in a manner that has generally not 
changed in its essence. Children still grow up and become citizens through very clear
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processes. In the larger masses of the population in the Confucian world the same 
standard applied even where cultural practice differed and in the Hellenic world what 
a Socrates, Plato or Aristotle saw was the measure of how people should be. No 
amount of examination of texts suggests that even Spartan children had anything like 
equivalence to contemporary citizenship status since boys particularly and girls only 
slightly less were taken from parents soon after birth. For those who would gain full 
membership of Spartan society life became effectively a lengthy rite de passage until 
membership began. The others were left to die or became slaves.
Later in history, there is the story of St Anselm, Archbishop of Canterbury from 1093 
to 1109. It tells how an abbot told Anselm about difficulties bringing up boys under 
his charge. He was severe, beating boys for every misdemeanour. Anselm could not 
contain dislike for that treatment and reprimanded the abbot for unreasonable and 
cruel treatment of the boys. He believed that compassion and reason would succeed 
instead and thus came to be regarded a ‘pioneer’ of child protection. The entire story 
is handed down rather than an actual record, first written by his biographer Eadmer 
(Southern, 1972) in about 1124.
It is a very brief, basically anecdotal, account that time has embellished and 
contributed to the ‘spare the rod and spoil the child’ debate that persists to the 
present. The conduct books that appeared around two centuries later show that little 
had changed and made the incongruous character of the ‘little adult’ view 
transparent. Although children were expected to behave like adults and doubtless 
played a key role in the economic survival of families with specific responsibilities, 
they were nonetheless being ‘brought up’. The regime was severe and Anselm’s 
recommended compassion and reason was going to have to wait until the second half 
of the 20th century before it became an ‘expected’ standard.
Between the Anselm story and the extensive data that can be taken from conduct 
books we have the contrast of an anecdote upon which little reconstruction and 
elucidation of another side of history is virtually impossible. The conduct books 
explicitly describe and warn of the weak nature and bad behaviour of children 
without rigid control and often severe regime. It does not at all suggest objectivity but 
is consistent, replicable and its contribution to testing the hypothesis is toward
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disproving rather than proving children had a citizen-like status in any sense in 
European societies. Elsewhere so many cultural traits are constant that, when there 
are eventually exceptions such as different notions of childhood in pre-modem 
societies such as hunter gatherers, pastoralists, itinerant and nomadic groups or 
isolated island communities, they are more exceptional that normative. Nevertheless, 
whenever closely scrutinised they contain sufficient breaks, diversions and omissions 
to suggest missing causes and formative structures in ethnographies that do not set 
out to look at children. That makes it possible to reconstruct and expound another 
dimension in which enough data has usually been found. It proves often that whilst 
generally shorter than contemporary western equivalents, there is nonetheless a very 
distinct childhood.
It is only when we draw near the contemporary world and an embryonic notion of 
children’s rights that appears in the work of visionaries such as Montessori, Korczak 
or Dewey that there are indicators toward a concept of the child as citizen. As the 20th 
century progressed it becomes particularly strongly reinforced by those looking at 
moral development such as Kohlberg. Children’s liberationists attempted to deliver 
an egalitarian notion that children should have the right to decide for themselves in 
matters that directly concern them. It was a radical proposition advanced by 
children’s liberationists in the 1970s (for instance: Firestone, 1970, Farson, 1974 and 
Holt, 1975) that did not enter the thoughts of lawmakers until the mid-1980s by when 
drafting of the CRC was well advanced. In due course, Articles 13 to 16 were to be 
taken in as a modified form of the same principles in the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights and International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights that deliver children the same basic human rights as everybody else. 
At this point in time analysis takes one in the other direction and where there are 
omissions particularly, but also breaks and diversions in children’s rights literature, 
we are drawn toward ‘participation’ texts particularly.
Whilst on the surface promoting age-free values and apparent egalitarianism within 
those texts, there is much indicative of separatism in the way projects are clearly set 
up for  children. There is a new set of values that describe participation in a manner 
that, quintessentially, mirrors variables that could apply equally as well to adults. 
Following the example of Hart’s eight rungs on his ‘ladder’ one can very easily
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transpose participation from ‘token participation’ to ‘full inclusion and participation’ 
in most western democracies. Bearing in mind that Hart (1992: 8) tells us “the ladder 
metaphor is borrowed from an article on adult participation...”, we already know that 
the situation of children is compared to that of adults. In the original version 
(Amstein, 1969: 216-24) the article looks at what was then a controversy that had 
been disputed mainly in terms of aggravated rhetoric and disingenuous euphemisms.
The debate was chiefly over ‘citizen participation’, ‘citizen control’ and the 
‘maximum feasible involvement of the poor’. Amstein’s article was written to 
stimulate an enlightened discourse in which typologies of citizen participation were 
proposed using examples from three federal social programmes in the USA. Those 
were urban renewal, anti-poverty and model cities. Her typology was designed to be 
provocative and set out as a ladder pattern. Each rung corresponded to the extent of 
citizens’ power in determining their part in particular plan or programme elements.
Hart’s version is a modification in which most possible degrees between exclusion 
and inclusion are found. Whilst this suggests that the situation of children is 
comparable with adults, the separate nature of projects and models demonstrating 
how that operates makes it exactly that: comparable but not equal.
Thus, when we draw together conclusions drawn from three analytical methods we 
find only scant evidence for there ever having been an equal status for adults and 
children in the past or present and only very few experiments and projects at present 
moving toward that goal.
There are however domains in which children are increasingly gaining a foothold and 
sharing decision making. In medicine, informed consent and the kind of study carried 
out with premature neonates and siblings of ill and dying children (Alderson, 1993 
and Alderson et al, 2005a and b; Bluebond-Langner, 1980, 1989 and 1996) is 
drawing children into responsibility for their own lives. They are treated as the patient 
and even at age five if they have the wish are drawn into the process. As with adults, 
the choice is with them. The last word is with adult caretakers, but as Bluebond- 
Langner so eloquently describes them, they are capable of expressing their desire to
7Rdie rather than undergo prolonged and sometimes painful treatment that may only
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buy a little time rather than give them the chance to grow into adulthood. She also 
uses the concept of the ‘shadow’ of illness on families, especially siblings and shows 
how they too share in decision making, taking responsibility and attempting, also like 
adults, to understand impending bereavement.
Education now has school councils active in many countries in which varying degrees 
of responsibility (See Edwards, 2001, and The Citizenship Foundation, 1998) are 
shared with teachers and governors79. Many are probably more of an ‘alibi function’ 
than a bona fide partnership between adults and children, although there are 
discussions, shared decisions and some schools now put candidates for teaching posts 
to the test by having them interviewed by children80. Despite the increased share in 
decision making, the role of children in governance and operation of schools remains 
generally limited.
Thus medicine and education are giving children some duties for themselves and 
others that also carry great responsibilities. Children sometimes do things some, if not 
many, adults find difficult or even impossible to do. They have the attributes that 
theoretically qualify them whilst many adults might be disqualified from citizenship 
if such criteria were the measure of who is or is not fully accepted as a citizen.
Where there is an enormous barrier to overcome is where social theory, law and 
policy making and political ideology have the greatest potential for driving change. 
The tabula rasa notion that persists almost unchallenged despite the work of such 
people as Kohlberg (1984) or Alderson et al (2005a and b) justifies a preference for a 
perception of the human or citizen becoming as a means of permitting only minor and 
slow change. Indeed little seems to have changed since Jean-Jacques Rousseau wrote 
in Book Two of Emile that:
Nature wants children to be children before they are men. If we try to 
pervert this order we shall produce a forced fruit that will have neither 
ripeness nor flavour and that will soon spoil. We will have young doctors 
and old children. Childhood has its ways of seeing, thinking, and feeling 
that are proper to it. Nothing is less sensible than to try and substitute our 
ways. I would like no more to require a young child be five feet tall than 
that he have judgement at the age of ten. Indeed, what use would reason
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be to him at that age? It is the curb of strength, and the child does not need 
this curb. (1979:258)
Some objections to an idea of a child as an equal to an adult were also expressed in 
his Preface, whereby he says:
We know nothing of childhood, and with our mistaken notions the further 
we advance the further we go astray. The wisest writers devote themselves 
to what a man ought to know without asking what a child is capable of 
learning. They are always looking for the man in the child without 
considering what he is before he becomes a man. (Ibid.:3)
Examination of two and a half millennia of history, philosophy, theology and the 
more recent contribution of literature, child sciences, the social sciences and other 
sources show how close Rousseau still is to the truth. We know little of childhood. 
One of the main reasons for this is that there is no single childhood, as too there is no 
single standard by which to measure or define what it is.
In some ways children’s rights are the ‘red herring’ here since the framework they 
exist within gives an impression of a standard. This too contributes to the weakness of 
the child participation approach. It takes ‘samples’ of children in very few places, 
thus contributes little to developing a notion of the young citizen. One of the greatest 
flaws is the lack of a definitive statement. There is an open question: what are 
children participating in? Since most work on participation is related to ‘projects’ it 
does not tend to look at civil society broadly. Citizenship, on the other hand, means 
full membership of civil society with its attendant privileges, rights along with duties
o  1
and responsibilities. The CRC draws on the International Bill of Human Rights for 
civil and human rights for children, with only the exception of Article 12 (See 
Appendix I) that assures children who are capable of forming views the right to 
express them. It does not seek to extend economic and political rights to them. 
Furthermore, it is very restrained in how far it proposes a share of duties and 
responsibilities that are part of citizenship to children. An ‘evolving capacities’ 
principle in Article 5 also makes that a conditional matter that belief, custom, law and 
the maturity of each individual regulate. Children’s rights and the proposition of most 
participation projects, including those in the CRC, fall short of describing or leading 
to full citizenship.
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Thus said, it is most certain that a large part of the answer to the question here is 
within the different childhoods and social environments in which they exist. Whilst 
childhood, like citizenship, is not homogeneous there is little likelihood that despite 
the encroaching use of ‘global citizenship’ as a term to describe the adoption of some 
universal values, particularly in areas of child protection such as prevention of 
various forms of exploitation of children, in fact any single nation state will extend 
the full rights of citizen to its children in the foreseeable future. It remains, in that 
sense, far more a romantic notion. However, what is imaginable is that, as with 
medicine and education, children will slowly gain greater access to citizen-like 
qualities and privileges. Therewith, as one nation observes change in others it will 
diffuse with time. Beyond that there also needs to be radical change worldwide so 
that adults who are excluded from citizenship, meaning both nationality and full 
participation in civil society as bearers of all rights, are given full membership so that 
their children may inherit the same.
In order to fully explain, and perhaps even to justify, the exclusion of children from 
full citizenship one is confronted with a teleological rationalisation of what inclusion 
might mean. When looking at an essentially western, democratic version of what 
citizenship is in a modem secular world, the development of civil, social and political 
rights in liberal democracies that have a relatively short history beginning with the 
French and American Revolutions provide answers in both directions. Arguably 
children already share virtually all cultural rights and many social rights with adults. 
It is in the areas of economic and political rights, thus their agency in those domains, 
that inclusion becomes a ‘loaded’ issue. In the economic sphere children are heavily 
protected against the inexorable burden of fiscal duties and responsibilities that would 
fall on them if they had full economic rights. They are also protected against 
exploitation on the basis of their immaturity and inexperience. However one might 
argue that in both cases even adults do not always appear to be adequately able to 
deal with either. However deeply one looks into the question of children as economic 
actors it is unlikely that the answers deviate very far from a protection motif.
However politics are not actually much better. Here children are not comparably 
protected from the political domain, but are generally seen as lacking in the necessary 
skills to understand it. Thus it remains easy to exclude them from political franchise
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with small concessions to lower voting ages but not as often the ages at which 
children can assume political office. Simultaneously we have the paradox of the 
growing global trend toward schools councils, children’s municipalities and so on 
that expose children to the type of political process that is the limit of most citizens’ 
experience. Ironically children tend to be closer to the people they elect in their 
schools and communities than most adults are to people they elect. Therefore children 
have greater opportunities for learning about the consequences of bad choices than 
adult counterparts. Thus it is difficult to see where inclusion is not justifiable. 
However, the weight of history tends to come down on the side of inexperience as the 
final word. Furthermore, as the morphological analysis of history describes, it shows 
the necessity for a continuation of a view of childhood as a period of ‘becoming’ in 
which the evolving capacities of the child prove the need for prudence rather than 
impetuous change. Of course, to the discerning historian this may be familiar since it 
bears many of the properties of resistance to the emancipation of women.
How far does the romantic view of a past in which there was little or no difference 
between children and adults contribute to these conclusions? Firstly, history as 
presented by authors such as Aries is too selective to warrant much more examination 
than has been afforded in this work. Secondly, Golden Age and utopian views appear 
to contribute even less. They either describe imagined pasts when a search for eternal 
youth blurs the distinctions between children and adults or generally fail to include 
children at all. They also tell of ‘egalitarian’ societies that are often anything but that, 
as indeed Utopia very specifically does.
Particularly useful elements of Golden Age and utopian ideas have been used as 
principles by political extremes such as the German and Italian fascist movements 
from the 1920s to 1940s and socialist societies like the Soviet Union or People’s 
Republic of China. Hannah Arendt (1962: for instance: 348, 366 [footnote 66]) 
analysed the origins of totalitarian regimes. She observed that children’s and youth 
movements were used to underpin social control, reaching into family and 
community. Those movements and organisations set them aside by their ages in order 
to groom them for the adulthood the state desired them to reach. In such societies 
youth is highly valued but inclusion controlled. Citizen’s rights are usually not among 
the principles on which those societies were founded to begin with. In them children
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are usually very far from being full citizens. There are numerous exclusions from 
citizenship for all ages anyway. Otherwise, apart from small groups of ‘hippies’, 
‘New Agers’ and their ilk, there is little application of those notions.
It is perhaps then not extraordinary that a work of literature, Les Miserables, gives an 
appropriate closing note. It is set at the time of the French Revolution when all people 
were considered equal by revolutionaries who gave France the motto Liberte, Egalite, 
Fraternite (Liberty, Equality, Fraternity). Petit Gavroche is an exemplar of a child, 
albeit a fictional character, who was never referred to or addressed as citizen (citoyen) 
although it was the form of address between adult revolutionaries of both sexes. 
When he is shot dead (Hugo, 1994:822), he is simply a “little great soul”. That death 
is heroic but his final actions are shown as defiant and playful. He epitomises 
Dominique Julia’s (2004:85) hero typology, in many respects it describes all of the 
positive and courageous qualities the exemplary child should bear. However, he was 
different, an outsider and street child, frivolous and childish. He was never the citizen 
and whilst the hero, never acknowledged for that quality. Egalite and Fraternite were 
not for children, only for citizens -  adults. As it was then, so it is today and will 
almost certainly remain so for the immediate future.
Is children’s citizenship thus consigned to being a romantic notion rather than a future 
reality? Two centuries ago the best informed people would have said women would 
never have gained full citizenship rights. It may have been their opinion that women 
should be ‘liberated’. They certainly had access to knowledge of parts of the world 
and history that evidenced the need for change. Children have neither. However, we 
live in a world where a basic principle of human rights is that all people are equal. 
Since that includes age, the principle must be that we work toward that end. The 
question is resolved by assuming that if we arrive at a stage when egalitarian human 
rights principles are all operational, that it is a natural outcome. If human rights in 
general follow the course of women’s rights then we may conclude that with time it 
should be an inevitable outcome.
In Chapter Two Gorgias’ On Non-Existence which examines the notion that ‘nothing 
exists’ was used as part of my basis for raising the initial question. The session in 
which it was debated concluded that since nothing could be the subject of debate it
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must exist. In that sense, the fact that children's citizenship is receiving attention 
would signify that it likewise exists. A lively debate is required in order to put 
substance to it, make it an incontrovertible right and in time to amend such 
instruments as the CRC to fully acknowledge that reality.
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Notes:
1 Victor was the ‘wild’ boy found in Aveyron in southern France in 1797who has become the subject 
of several books and films (see also note 25).
2 See Mills and Mills, 2002: 27.
3 Petit Gavroche is the street boy who fights in the French Revolution and dies delivering grapeshot to 
comrades manning a barrier in revolutionary Paris in Victor Hugo’s Les Miserables (1862).
4 He is better known as The Artful Dodger, the pickpocket and ‘natural’ leader of Fagin’s boys who 
has earned his nickname for his skill and cunning, in Charles Dickens’ Oliver Twist (1838).
5 ‘Potential citizens’ assumes that children will survive to be adults and also overcome any possible 
barriers to them assuming full citizenship such as not having nationality of the country they live in.
6 See George Cardonas’ work (1998: 260-67) on Panini, the fourth century BC Indian linguist who is 
thought to have formulated 3,959 rules of Sanskrit morphology in the text of the Astadhyayl ( the eight 
chapters) of Classical Sanskrit by using a constituency grammar.
7 The reservations were withdrawn in September 2008 during writing this work.
8 Nothing written by Socrates survives so that whilst much is attributed to him, all of ‘his’ work is 
either the work of Plato, Xenophon or a later interpreter.
9 This very brief description of children in Ancient Greece has been drawn together from the four texts 
listed where Plato and Socrates are not used. The fourth book was written for children as an 
educational text and provides much of the substance for this ‘thumbnail sketch’.
10 Helots farmed land owned by Spartans to remove the burden of sustaining Sparta from citizens of 
the city-state. This left them free to commit themselves to the art of war. Helots accompanied Spartans 
in battles and provide support as archers who Spartans thought of as not true warriors. They also set up 
camps and performed other work for the Spartans during campaigns.
11 Perioeci, or perioikoi, were the members of a self-governing group of free but non-citizen 
inhabitants of the Perioikis (TJepioiKig) territory that belonged to the Lacedaemonian State within 
Sparta. They were the only people allowed to travel to other cities, which Spartans could not without 
permission. They had the right to own land and belonged to the army without being part of the 
aristocratic warrior class. They could neither participate in political decisions nor marry Spartans.
12 Literally it is ‘of a son’ but has become a generic term much like the use of ‘he’, ‘him’ and ‘his’ that 
have been used as generic for children, even where the gender is known, for many years and, indeed, 
‘man’ for the human species.
13 The brief recount of children in the Roman Republic and Empire has been drawn together from 
seven texts: Albasi, 1991; Dixon, 2001; Evans, 1991; Rawson, 1991 and 2005, Schulz, 1943 and 
Wiedemann, 1989. In fact, most of them are primarily concerned with patria potestas, whereby as 
head of the family a father had power over his wife, slaves, house and other personal and family 
property including the power to sell a child into slavery as well as holding power over life and death 
known as ius vitae ac necis in the early Empire. Although most titles infer direct reference, little is said 
about children themselves leaving a very selective precis the most appropriate means of examining all 
that may be salient for this work.
14 The Latins are estimated to have settled in the wider area of Rome around 1000 BC. The Greeks 
were settling southern Italy, founding cities like Cumae and Tarentum, brought their form of 
civilisation to the country and it was from them that the Romans learned basic skills such as reading 
and writing with even religion derived from Greek mythology (i.e. Jupiter is Zeus, Venus is Aphrodite, 
etc.). The Etruscans to the north of Rome in Etruria (modem Tuscany) were primarily an urban 
society. Their substantial wealth came from seaborne trade. Although the Romans considered 
Etruscans to be decadent and weak they were highly influential in formation of Roman society. 
Although a distinct society the Etruscans owed much of their culture to the Greeks. Around 650 to 600 
BC the Etruscans crossed the Tiber and occupied Latium (part of modem Lazio). Latium is considered 
to be the cradle of the Roman Empire and Rome. The Islamic Turks considered themselves proper 
heirs to the Byzantine Empire until the demise of the Ottoman Empire in the early 20 century. 
However, the heirs to the Eastern Orthodoxy who became the Tsars of Russia (tsar, or czar, derives 
from the Latin caesar) held a view that Moscow was the rightful successor to Rome and 
Constantinople. The notion of the Russian Empire as the ‘Third Rome’ continued until the Russian 
Revolution in 1917 thus extending the possibility another 460 or so years.
15 The migration included the Ostrogoths, Visgoths, Huns, Vandals, Franks, Alans, Suebi and other 
Germanic, Persian (Iranian) and Slavic groups.
16 Trying to condense China’s history into appropriate form for this work, thus covering approximately 
5000 years with comparatively little reference to children appears a Sisyphus task, therefore a single
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book, John King Fairbank’s China: a new history (1992) has been used for this and later chapters 
except where any direct reference to other authors may be required.
17 This naturally depended on the nature of the offence and who was trying a child. However, for 
crimes such as arson, burglary, theft, murder or treason the only punishment was death and forfeit of 
property to the king. The Church advocated mutilation, as this gave the guilty person a chance to make 
amends for a crime in this world and thus save his soul. Children were occasionally mutilated or put to 
death for the most serious crimes.
18 There are many versions of the story of the Mongols and Genghis Khan. This brief examination uses 
spelling as per Marshall, 1993, and uses a combination of that work with Weatherford, 2004, rather 
than a more exhaustive examination of a large number of books. The purpose here is an example rather 
than an ‘exact’ history.
19 Pleas for help from the Byzantine Emperors began in about the 1060s although the first actions 
against the Islamic forces were against the Moors by Iberian Christians in what is now Spain. Pleas 
made during the 1070s after the fall of most of Anatolia (modem Turkey) except for the area around 
Constantinople and another small part of western Anatolia. The first Crusade was preached in 1095 
after the first successful reoccupation of Toledo by the Iberians.
20 Pleas from Byzantine Emperors who were threatened by the Seljuks originally fell on deaf ears. 
When in 1074 Emperor Michael VII appealed to Pope Gregory VII and again in 1095 Emperor Alexios 
I Komnenos appealed to Pope Urban II the position changed and may have adopted a stance similar to 
1063 when Pope Alexander II, had blessed Iberian Christians’ for their wars against Muslim Moors.
21 The exact numbers are contentious. To give two examples of the range of estimates, Stephane Barry 
and Norbert Gualde, 2006:45, say “between one-third and two-thirds” whereas Gottfried, 1983: 257, 
claims the lower number of “between 25 and 45 percent”. Demographic historians note a considerable 
amount of geographic variation. On the whole the balance is probably in the range of in Mediterranean 
Europe, Italy, the South of France and Spain where the plague reoccurred during four consecutive 
years and was probably close to 80% to 75% of the population whereas in England, Germany and the 
Lowlands where the space between outbreaks was longer it was probably closer to 20%.
22 European history from the 14th century onward here and for most of the rest of this chapter is based 
on a synthesis of the work of Braudel, 1973, McNeill, 1963, Ogg and Sharp, 1926 and Rice, 1970.
23 Malthusian ‘positive checks’ were famine, misery, plague and war that were necessary because 
‘preventative checks’ had not limited the numbers of the poor. Malthus thought that positive checks 
were indispensable for that task. He believed that if positive checks were unsuccessful, famine would 
inevitably be the consequential means of keeping a population down. Moral discipline, vice and birth 
control were primary preventative checks. Moral restraint was the means by which higher ranking 
people limited family size so as not to dissipate wealth among too many heirs. For lower ranking 
people vice and birth control were means by which numbers could be contained although he believed 
they were insufficient to limit vast numbers of poor people.
24 ‘us’d ’ is used.
25 Victor (of Aveyron) also known as the Wild Boy of Aveyron seemingly lived his childhood naked 
and alone before being found wandering in the woods near Saint-Semin-sur-Rance, near Toulouse in 
France in 1797. He escaped soon after being captured but was captured again and placed in the care of 
a local woman for a few days before escaping again. On 8 January 1800 he came out of the forest 
alone and stayed in human care until he died in 1828. His age was unknown but local people estimated 
that he was about 12 years old. The fact he could not speak and his food preferences suggested that he 
had been in the wild for most of his life. His story has become the subject of several books and films.
26 Mowgli originally appeared in Rudyard Kipling’s short story ‘In the Ruk’ in Many Inventions 
(1893), then became the main character in The Jungle Book (1894) and The Second Jungle Book 
(1895). He is the child of British parents in the Indian jungle lost during a tiger attack. The human 
baby is adopted by wolves who call him Mowgli (Frog) because he has no fur. Kipling tells us some of 
the stories about his childhood until he returns to human society where many other adventures begin.
27 Tarzan (Tarzan of the Apes, Edgar Rice Burroughs, 1914) is John Clayton, bom in western 
equatorial Africa to John and Alice Clayton, a marooned couple from England, who are also Lord and 
Lady Greystoke. The infant child is adopted by Kala the she-ape after his parents died and named 
‘Tarzan’ ( ‘White Skin’ in ape language) and raised by the band of apes. In his youth he feels alienated 
by his peers because of physical differences and then discovers his human parents’ cabin where he 
finds out about others like himself from books which he teaches himself to read.
28 Petit Gavroche is the street boy who fights in the French Revolution and dies manning a barrier 
when students revolt and erect barricades in the narrow streets of Paris in Paris in Hugo’s Les 
Miserables (1862).
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29 Dawkins, aka the Artful Dodger, appears to possess very mature qualities.
30 Huckleberry Finn first appeared in Mark Twain’s The Adventures o f Tom Sawyer (1876) but was so 
successful that Adventures o f Huckleberry Finn followed in 1884 with Huck as the hero.
31 His four volumes of London Labour and the London Poor appeared between 1851 and 1861 
chronicled the lives of the poor in London and gave a graphic account of children’s lives as they 
probably were throughout Europe and probably elsewhere in the world at that time.
32 In Bleak House (1853) his descriptions of the life and fate of Jo the crossing sweeper are a stark 
portrayal of a miserable life and many attitudes toward such children and the fictional headmaster of 
Dotheboys Hall school, Wackford Squeers, in The Life and Adventures o f Nicholas Nickleby (1839) 
illustrates, whilst also exaggerating to an extent the cruel attitudes toward them.
33 In fact priest marriage in the Roman church has never entirely disappeared for a number of reasons 
irrelevant to this work and the question of male priests fathering children and occasionally even 
through to extraordinarily ‘scandalous’ relationships with nuns who bear children, is a history worthy 
of a thesis in its own right.
34 Feudalism is used more or less as it was described by Karl Marx as the dominant economic situation 
before the inexorable rise of capitalism. It was defined as the power of the ruling class (aristocracy) 
based on their control of farming land, leading to a class society whose structure was predicated on 
exploitation of peasants who farmed these lands as serfs or similar. I am quite aware that it is a term 
that entered into common usage after European feudalism had virtually ended. It is, thus, used as a 
disambiguation, thus describing pre-modem (pre-capitalist) economic and social organisation that 
bears characteristics of what European feudalism was held to have been with emphasis on fealty and 
serfdom.
35 Claude Gueux is a short story written by Hugo in 1834. It is regarded as an early example of ‘true 
crime’ fiction and is written around his early thoughts on societal injustice which 30 years later he 
brought to life in Les Miserables. Gamin appears on the second of the three page story in this sentence: 
Rien ne pouvait faire que cet ancien gamin des rues n ’eut point par moments Vodeur du ruisseau de 
Paris, and describe Claude Gueux as an ‘old (former) street urchin’.
36 I have visited the Ospedale degli Innocenti in Florence on numerous occasions (the UNICEF 
Innocenti Research Centre is in the Ospedale) and have seen the carefully kept records of children 
taken in since the 15th century. I also know the door with the rotating horizontal wheel that took babies 
into the Innocenti without parents being seen and was used until the foundling hospital closed in 1875.
37 Childhood Studies is a relatively new academic discipline. It is interdisciplinary and consists of areas 
of contemporary study that ask questions, attempt to resolve problems and find the solutions that 
contribute to improving the quality of childhood experienced by the all children. It draws on the social 
sciences (anthropology, criminology, economics, history, human geography, social psychology and 
sociology), the humanities (especially literature and religions with some input from fine arts and the 
behavioural sciences (chiefly psychology but also appropriate domains of education, socio-linguistics 
and medicine).
38 Most of the account of child psychiatry has been drawn together from Porter, 1997, and Timimi, 
2002, with a limited amount of examination of websites describing early child psychiatry.
39 In fact I was a residential social worker with the National Children’s Home at a residential school in 
the mid 1970s when ESN and SSN were still the standard classification of such children.
40 At the extreme end and not included here was the treatment of many people with any form of 
physical or mental abnormality in National Socialist Germany between 1933 and 1945.
41 During fieldwork in Iraq, Kyrgyzstan, The People’s Republic of China and Viet Nam I have visited 
mental health institutions where children are still placed -  some of them were street children who were 
classified as though ‘ill’ or ‘unstable’ because of their ‘deviant’ lifestyles and others simply there for 
relatively minor, adolescent behavioural problems at school or home.
42 In the USA, for instance, many people under mental health orders have virtually no civil rights and 
the transition from age of minority to majority may well only be marked by transfer from one class of 
accommodation to another.
43 Most of the biographical detail has been taken from Kozulin, 1990, Wertsch, 1985, and Van der 
Veer, and Valsiner, 1994, with further detail added from a brief examination on the 1987 edition of 
The Collected Works o f L. S. Vygotsky.
44 See Miller, 1993, Chapter 1, and Gruber and Voneche, 1977.
45 Malacology is the branch of invertebrate zoology that studies molluscs,
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46 Deontological methods of ethics are normally those opposed to consequentialist methods whereby 
they insist that the moral value of an action is wholly independent from the consequences of an action. 
Rather than focusing on consequences, deontological methods emphasise duty as the basis of moral 
value. Deontological theories emphasise a principle of the right over good. Two well-known 
deontological theories are Kant’s Formalism and William Ockham’s Divine Command Theory. Both 
base a conception of right action on a conception of duty for duty’s sake. Deontological theories are 
often criticised for being too legalistic and not providing an accurate account of human impulses.
47 Eudaimonia comes from the Greek and is usually translated as happiness or well-being, but it has 
some of the same connotations as ‘success’, since in addition to living well it includes doing well. For 
example, it can be devalued by events that happen after the subject’s death and it is not a state that 
children can possess. It is complete and self-sufficient, to be attained for no other end than itself, thus 
includes all other ends that are pursued for themselves and includes pleasure but goes beyond it. In the 
Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle extols the life of study as the essential realization of eudaimonia.
48 In Childhood and Society, Erik Erikson (1950) claimed that every human being goes through a 
number of stages to reach full development. He theorised eight stages that somebody goes through 
from birth to death (however, his widow Joan Serson Erikson added the ninth stage, old age, later). 
Erikson was developing Sigmund Freud’s theory of a genital stage through to adolescence to which he 
added three stages of adulthood. Neo-Freudians will almost certainly argue that this justifies and
evolving capabilities thesis.
49 See Appendix I
50 Family and Kinship in East London appeared as a key reference in studies of urban communities in 
the 1960s and well into the 1970s; however it still appears in such countries as Brazil and Peru where 
life in cities is constantly in flux and what the authors saw over 50 years ago is still relevant although 
notably one annotated bibliography I know does so beside references to Mayhew and Dickens.
51 Rudyard Kipling’s Mowgli, the ‘wild boy of Aveyron’ (Lane, 1979) and similar accounts of children 
raised by animals have sometimes given credence to the notion of animism. Mowgli and other fictional 
characters were held to possess almost superhuman qualities that came from the animals they grew up 
with. Victor, the ‘wild boy of Aveyron’ was found in 1800when he emerged from the woods of the 
Aveyron District. He was naked and behaved like an animal, probably aged about 12 years, it was 
estimated that he had lived wild since about age four. Dr Jean-Marc-Gaspard Itard invented a 
programme of training for him but with only limited success. Children with learning difficulties who 
attend Montessori nurseries are taught the method of hands-on play devised by Itard for Victor that 
tends to maintain if not reinforce the ‘animal nature’ argument.
52 Wolfenstein was a psychoanalyst who used ethnographic methods, especially observation, for her 
studies unlike Mead who was an anthropologist who used psychoanalysis as a complementary research 
method for analysis of her field data.
53 The English Bill of Rights is one of the fundamental documents of English constitutional law, is 
substantially different in form and intent from the American Bill of Rights. It was intended to focus on 
the rights of citizens represented by Parliament against the monarchy. However, some of its basic 
tenets were adopted in the American Bill of Rights. James Madison, the author of the American Bill, 
incorporated the ideas of John Locke, whose Two Treatises o f Government (1698) argued that civil 
society was created for the protection of property (that which is one’s own: ‘life, liberty, and estate’). 
He also put forward the notion that each individual is free and equal in the state of nature and also that 
natural rights that are inherent to all individuals, a concept Madison mentioned in his speech presenting 
the Bill of Rights to the 1st Congress.
54 Somalia has been in a state of civil unrest with no single, internationally accepted government for 
over 30 years. Consequently there is no single authority or government recognised by the UN that 
could sign and ratify the CRC.
55 The USA played an active role in drafting the CRC and signed it on 16 February 1995, but has still 
to ratify it. Opposition is partly due to ‘potential conflicts’ with the Constitution and some political and 
religious conservatives. Two reasons frequently given for not ratifying were that Texas allows capital 
punishment of children which the CRC does not allow and that it could undermine parents’ rights. The 
Heritage Foundation views the conflict as an issue related to national control over domestic policy. 
President Obama described the failure to ratify the CRC as “embarrassing” and promised to review 
this. The USA has however signed and ratified both optional protocols.
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56 At present some countries are beginning to lower communal and occasional general electoral rights
to age 16. Nicaragua lowered the voting age from 21 to 16 in November 1984. Over recent years in
Germany the states of Lower Saxony, Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, North Rhine-Westphalia, 
Saxony-Anhalt and Schleswig-Holstein have lowered the age to 16 years for municipal elections. The 
Isle of Man changed from 18 to 16 in July 2006 with legislation in force in time for the General 
Election of 23 November 2006. The Austrian Council of Ministers adopted a plan to lower the 
electoral age to 16 during March 2007. The motion passed into law on 1 July 2007. During May 2007 
the Swiss canton of Glarus voted to reduce the voting age from 18 to 16 for cantonal and local 
elections. In Scotland the SNP’s annual conference voted unanimously on 27 October 2007 in favour 
of a policy of reducing the voting age to 16 as soon as possible.
57 Describing ‘child led’ organisations such as MANTHOC in Peru, the Concerned fo r  Working 
Children/Bhima Sangha in India, ENDA-Jeunesse throughout West Africa or the Movimento Nacional 
de Meninos e Meninas de Rua in Brazil in detail would be a wasteful indulgence here, however these 
and numerous other organisations have websites and have produced a sizeable number of publications 
over the last 30 or so years.
58 These can be birth parents, adoptive parents or legal guardians.
59 This is the first option in countries with fostering schemes although in many of those a placement in 
an institution will precede that. In countries with no alternative care systems, homes are the usual 
option although placement with approved relatives is also a possibility.
60 Much of what is said here is self-critical. A large part of my income over the last two and a half 
decades was earned as an evaluator. Rapid appraisal has been the only viable choice since such 
situations as evaluation visits to several communities in a number of geographical dispersed provinces 
within a few days with terms o f reference that stipulate a participatory approach demand it. I have 
always been the first to acknowledge the fact that it is categorically not research and is as prone to its 
failings as it is often useful.
61 Rather than develop this here, I would recommend looking at the International Labour 
Organisation’s International Programme on Elimination o f Child Labour (IPEC) resources database. 
Since they began work in the 1980s they have lacked sensitivity toward the children they intend to 
‘save’ as participants in programmes with opinions that sometimes also include explicit arguments for 
being allowed to work. One notable omission from those resources is: McKechnie, Jim, and Sandy 
Hobbs (Eds.), 1998, Working children: Reconsidering the Debates: Report o f the International 
Working Group on Child Labour. Although the report was published by Defence for Children 
International Netherlands, IPSCAN and ILO/IPEC were commissioning partners and donors. This 
report went against the grain of ILO policy and has been notable for the fact that the ILO has always 
disowned their part in its existence. For other dimensions of the issue see Woodhead, 2007.
62 This is and may always be a contentious notion since adulthood is a subjective cultural notion where 
assumptions are often made on the basis of Northern values. It is also a legal standard that is usually 
incorporated into constitutions, basic laws and other laws. In contrast there are numerous examples of 
traditions in which age is classified not by chronological age but by generation or age related status. 
Thus here we are guided by the children’s rights standard that describes childhood as zero to 18 years 
of age as the norm.
63 The following ages are mainly taken from United Nations and NGO websites but have been cross­
checked through comparison of the given ages between two or more sites. One, however, comes from 
a single site -  in this case ages of consent are taken from the AIDS charity AVERT on 
http://www.avert.org/aofconsent.htm.
641 had a number of aijados (godchildren) in Lima, Peru. As their compadre (co-parent, equivalent to 
godparent) I was expected to contribute generously to the celebration and give the young woman my 
blessing. I never attended an aijada's quince ahos celebration but went to others and, being a stranger, 
took the time to find out about the event which I attempt to recall here.
65 Often referred to as the ‘House’.
66 In 1833 the Government passed the first Factory Act to improve conditions for children working in 
factories for very long hours in places where conditions were often appalling. It set out that no child 
under nine years of age could work, employers required a medical or age certificate for child workers, 
children between the ages of nine and 13 could work no longer than nine hours and those aged 13 to 18 
worked no more than 12 hours a day, they could no longer work at night, at least two hours schooling 
had to be given each day and four factory inspectors appointed to enforce the law throughout England 
and Wales. Further Acts in 1844, 1847, 1850, 1853, 1867, 1874 and 1901 eventually brought the 
working age to a minimum of 12 years. The Education Act of 1870 effectively created the modem
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system of education in England. It gave rise to a national system of compulsory state education that 
assured the existence of a dual system of voluntary denominational schools and non-denominational 
state schools. Elementary education became to all intents and purposes free with the 1891 Education 
Act. Both processes limited children’s availability for employment.
67 Article 20, part 3 states: Such care could include, inter alia, foster placement, Kafala of Islamic law, 
adoption, or if necessary placement in suitable institutions for the care of children. When considering 
solutions, due regard shall be paid to the desirability of continuity in a child’s upbringing and to the 
child’s ethnic, religious, cultural and linguistic background.
This particularly takes into account other forms of alternative care beyond the fostering and adoption 
model held as the norm in Western countries although it only expressly acknowledges Kafala.
68 In 1993 I had a contract to write a working paper ‘Children’s Participation in Education for 
Democracy and Peace in Europe’, for UNICEF ICDC, Florence, Italy, published by UNICEF Chile in 
1994. It came in the wake of Roger Hart’s Children’s Participation: From tokenism to citizenship in 
1992 that had oriented a great deal of interest in children’s participation. As a result the French 
children’s councils were a major item in this paper. At that time there were just over 300 of them.
69 In some federal states in Mexico the minimum ages at which children are subject to penal law it is 
six years although in most states 11 or 12 years and age 11 for federal crimes. In Bangladesh, India, 
Myanmar, Nigeria, Pakistan, South Africa, Sudan and Tanzania it is age seven. In Belgium, Brazil, 
Colombia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Peru and the International Criminal Court the official 
age of criminal responsibility is age 18, although in Brazil, Colombia and Peru there are separate 
juvenile laws from age 12 that do not ‘criminalise’ young offenders. In the UK the ages are eight years 
in Scotland (it is possible for children even younger than eight, in rare cases, to appear in court, 
although the Lord Advocate must intervene before anyone under 16 years can be charged before an 
adult court) and age 10 in England and Wales and Northern Ireland. However, there is a campaign for 
raising criminal responsibility to 18 in all parts of the UK.
70 On page 460 of A Theory o f Justice he acknowledges both Piaget and Kohlberg (see Chapter Eight) 
as the intellectual source of his view that by and large shuns a long, drawn out process of becoming a 
full human being.
71 For more details look at the Global Initiative to End All Corporal Punishment o f Children's website 
on www.endcorporalpunishment.org for more details on religious groups in this context.
72 Recent child labour studies have moved away from the historical notion of the fully employed child 
without a childhood. Even where they worked they were less well paid, were not represented by unions 
as they emerged, had no workplace tenure as assured employment appeared and far more. Likewise, 
when one examines data from the period between the Factories Acts and the beginning of compulsory 
education in 19th century England one sees that one of the reasons for having compulsory school 
attendance was the increased numbers of idle children and youth who politicians felt threatened by, 
which tells us they were already there (For instance, see Corrigan, 1979).
73 Zelizer was mainly writing about the USA but her work can be extended to advanced industrial 
societies at comparable stages.
74 This requires examination of the entire book, which is a Sisyphean task given its length 712 pages.
75 The world sacralisation originated in the province of religion and is used when an object, idea or 
person is basically regarded as vulnerable or untouchable. Depending on how it is used its antonym 
can be either secularisation or diabolisation which both seem very far removed from the position of 
the child, although the latter may well describe the ‘threats’ to children in the world around them. It is 
perhaps notable that demonization of young people has become an issue on the contemporary agenda.
76 There are several organisations including Global Children’s Movement, Global Movement fo r  
Children and Global Children’s Foundation already using the expression and Childhood: A journal o f 
global child research published by Sage which is one of the most influential journals of its kind.
77 In my own work in Viet Nam increasing drug use, violence and vandalism is public places, 
materialism (child ‘must have’ MP3 players, computers, etc) and things we are well acquainted with in 
the West are becoming major issues, not yet documented but always infusing domains I have worked 
in such as street child and the physical and emotional punishment of children.
78 Myra Bluebond-Langner has not only worked with dying children (1978) but the reason she uses the 
expression ‘private worlds’ in her title becomes patently clear when one reads the interviews and how 
wise those sick children appear to be.
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791 am using the British term governor, in fact schools boards take a large variety of forms that include 
teachers, administrators, parents, local politicians and officials, etc, and increasingly have either a link 
to the school council or (as in Welsh secondary schools for example) that council has representation on 
the board of governors, directors or whatever form it takes who share varying degrees of decision 
making with at least full share in the Netherlands and parts of Germany at the pinnacle of that role.
80 The Swansea school where I had two children and formerly served as parent governor and link 
governor to the school council, children from Year 1 (age six) upward have interviewed all permanent 
post candidates for at least three years.
1 This is made up of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Optional Protocol to the latter (see also 
Chapter 7).
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Appendix I
Convention on the Rights of the Child
Adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 20 November 1989 
Preamble
The States Parties to the present Convention,
Considering that, in accordance with the principles proclaimed in the Charter of the United Nations, 
recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human 
family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world,
Bearing in mind that the peoples of the United Nations have, in the Charter, reaffirmed their faith in 
fundamental human rights and in the dignity and worth of the human person, and have determined to 
promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom,
Recognizing that the United Nations has, in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in the 
International Covenants on Human Rights, proclaimed and agreed that everyone is entitled to all the 
rights and freedoms set forth therein, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, 
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status,
Recalling that, in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the United Nations has proclaimed that 
childhood is entitled to special care and assistance,
Convinced that the family, as the fundamental group of society and the natural environment for the 
growth and well-being of all its members and particularly children, should be afforded the necessary 
protection and assistance so that it can fully assume its responsibilities within the community,
Recognizing that the child, for the full and harmonious development of his or her personality, should 
grow up in a family environment, in an atmosphere of happiness, love and understanding,
Considering that the child should be fully prepared to live an individual life in society, and brought up 
in the spirit of the ideals proclaimed in the Charter of the United Nations, and in particular in the spirit 
of peace, dignity, tolerance, freedom, equality and solidarity,
Bearing in mind that the need to extend particular care to the child has been stated in the Geneva 
Declaration of the Rights of the Child of 1924 and in the Declaration of the Rights of the Child 
adopted by the United Nations on 20 November 1959 and recognized in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (in particular in articles 23 
and 24), in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (in particular in article 
10) and in the statutes and relevant instruments of specialized agencies and international organizations 
concerned with the welfare of children,
Bearing in mind that, as indicated in the Declaration of the Rights of the Child, "the child, by reason of 
his physical and mental immaturity, needs special safeguards and care, including appropriate legal 
protection, before as well as after birth",
Recalling the provisions of the Declaration on Social and Legal Principles relating to the Protection 
and Welfare of Children, with Special Reference to Foster Placement and Adoption Nationally and 
Internationally; the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice 
("The Beijing Rules"); and the Declaration on the Protection of Women and Children in Emergency 
and Armed Conflict,
Recognizing that, in all countries in the world, there are children living in exceptionally difficult 
conditions, and that such children need special consideration,
Taking due account of the importance of the traditions and cultural values of each people for the 
protection and harmonious development of the child, Recognizing the importance of international co­
operation for improving the living conditions of children in every country, in particular in the 
developing countries,
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Have agreed as follows:
Part I
Article 1
For the purposes of the present Convention, a child means every human being below the age of 18 
years unless, under the law applicable to the child, majority is attained earlier.
Article 2
1. States Parties shall respect and ensure the rights set forth in the present Convention to each child 
within their jurisdiction without discrimination of any kind, irrespective of the child's or his or her 
parent's or legal guardian's race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national, 
ethnic or social origin, property, disability, birth or other status.
2. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to ensure that the child is protected against all 
forms of discrimination or punishment on the basis of the status, activities, expressed opinions, or 
beliefs of the child's parents, legal guardians, or family members.
Article 3
1. In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare 
institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child 
shall be a primary consideration.
2. States Parties undertake to ensure the child such protection and care as is necessary for his or her 
well-being, taking into account the rights and duties of his or her parents, legal guardians, or other 
individuals legally responsible for him or her, and, to this end, shall take all appropriate legislative and 
administrative measures.
3. States Parties shall ensure that the institutions, services and facilities responsible for the care or 
protection of children shall conform with the standards established by competent authorities, 
particularly in the areas of safety, health, in the number and suitability of their staff, as well as 
competent supervision.
Article 4
States Parties shall undertake all appropriate legislative, administrative, and other measures for the 
implementation of the rights recognized in the present Convention. With regard to economic, social 
and cultural rights, States Parties shall undertake such measures to the maximum extent of their 
available resources and, where needed, within the framework of international co-operation.
Article 5
States Parties shall respect the responsibilities, rights and duties of parents or, where applicable, the 
members of the extended family or community as provided for by local custom, legal guardians or 
other persons legally responsible for the child, to provide, in a manner consistent with the evolving 
capacities of the child, appropriate direction and guidance in the exercise by the child of the rights 
recognized in the present Convention.
Article 6
1. States Parties recognize that every child has the inherent right to life.
2. States Parties shall ensure to the maximum extent possible the survival and development of the 
child.
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Article 7
1. The child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have the right from birth to a name, 
the right to acquire a nationality and, as far as possible, the right to know and be cared for by his or her 
parents.
2. States Parties shall ensure the implementation of these rights in accordance with their national law 
and their obligations under the relevant international instruments in this field, in particular where the 
child would otherwise be stateless.
Article 8
1. States Parties undertake to respect the right of the child to preserve his or her identity, including 
nationality, name and family relations as recognized by law without unlawful interference.
2. Where a child is illegally deprived of some or all of the elements of his or her identity, States Parties 
shall provide appropriate assistance and protection, with a view to speedily re-establishing his or her 
identity.
Article 9
1. States Parties shall ensure that a child shall not be separated from his or her parents against their 
will, except when competent authorities subject to judicial review determine, in accordance with 
applicable law and procedures, that such separation is necessary for the best interests of the child. Such 
determination may be necessary in a particular case such as one involving abuse or neglect of the child 
by the parents, or one where the parents are living separately and a decision must be made as to the 
child's place of residence.
2. In any proceedings pursuant to paragraph 1 of the present article, all interested parties shall be given 
an opportunity to participate in the proceedings and make their views known.
3. States Parties shall respect the right of the child who is separated from one or both parents to 
maintain personal relations and direct contact with both parents on a regular basis, except if it is 
contrary to the child's best interests.
4. Where such separation results from any action initiated by a State Party, such as the detention, 
imprisonment, exile, deportation or death (including death arising from any cause while the person is 
in the custody of the State) of one or both parents or of the child, that State Party shall, upon request, 
provide the parents, the child or, if appropriate, another member of the family with the essential 
information concerning the whereabouts of the absent member(s) of the family unless the provision of 
the information would be detrimental to the well-being of the child. States Parties shall further ensure 
that the submission of such a request shall of itself entail no adverse consequences for the person(s) 
concerned.
Article 10
1. In accordance with the obligation of States Parties under article 9, paragraph 1, applications by a 
child or his or her parents to enter or leave a State Party for the purpose of family reunification shall be 
dealt with by States Parties in a positive, humane and expeditious manner. States Parties shall further 
ensure that the submission of such a request shall entail no adverse consequences for the applicants and 
for the members of their family.
2. A child whose parents reside in different States shall have the right to maintain on a regular basis, 
save in exceptional circumstances personal relations and direct contacts with both parents. Towards 
that end and in accordance with the obligation of States Parties under article 9, paragraph 1, States 
Parties shall respect the right of the child and his or her parents to leave any country, including their 
own, and to enter their own country. The right to leave any country shall be subject only to such 
restrictions as are prescribed by law and which are necessary to protect the national security, public 
order (ordre public), public health or morals or the rights and freedoms of others and are consistent 
with the other rights recognized in the present Convention.
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Article 11
1. States Parties shall take measures to combat the illicit transfer and non-return of children abroad.
2. To this end, States Parties shall promote the conclusion of bilateral or multilateral agreements or 
accession to existing agreements.
Article 12
1. States Parties shall assure to the child who is capable of forming his or her own views the right to 
express those views freely in all matters affecting the child, the views of the child being given due 
weight in accordance with the age and maturity of the child.
2. For this purpose, the child shall in particular be provided the opportunity to be heard in any judicial 
and administrative proceedings affecting the child, either directly, or through a representative or an 
appropriate body, in a manner consistent with the procedural rules of national law.
Article 13
1. The child shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, 
receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or 
in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of the child's choice.
2. The exercise of this right may be subject to certain restrictions, but these shall only be such as are 
provided by law and are necessary:
(a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others; or
(b) For the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public), or of public health or 
morals.
Article 14
1. States Parties shall respect the right of the child to freedom of thought, conscience and religion.
2. States Parties shall respect the rights and duties of the parents and, when applicable, legal guardians, 
to provide direction to the child in the exercise of his or her right in a manner consistent with the 
evolving capacities of the child.
3. Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs may be subject only to such limitations as are 
prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health or morals, or the 
fundamental rights and freedoms of others.
Article 15
1. States Parties recognize the rights of the child to freedom of association and to freedom of peaceful 
assembly.
2. No restrictions may be placed on the exercise of these rights other than those imposed in conformity 
with the law and which are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or 
public safety, public order (ordre public), the protection of public health or morals or the protection of 
the rights and freedoms of others.
Article 16
1. No child shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his or her privacy, family, 
home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his or her honour and reputation.
2. The child has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.
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Article 17
States Parties recognize the important function performed by the mass media and shall ensure that the 
child has access to information and material from a diversity of national and international sources, 
especially those aimed at the promotion of his or her social, spiritual and moral well-being and 
physical and mental health. To this end, States Parties shall:
(a) Encourage the mass media to disseminate information and material of social and cultural benefit to 
the child and in accordance with the spirit of article 29;
(b) Encourage international co-operation in the production, exchange and dissemination of such 
information and material from a diversity of cultural, national and international sources;
(c) Encourage the production and dissemination of children's books;
(d) Encourage the mass media to have particular regard to the linguistic needs of the child who 
belongs to a minority group or who is indigenous;
(e) Encourage the development of appropriate guidelines for the protection of the child from 
information and material injurious to his or her well-being, bearing in mind the provisions of articles 
13 and 18.
Article 18
1. States Parties shall use their best efforts to ensure recognition of the principle that both parents have 
common responsibilities for the upbringing and development of the child. Parents or, as the case may 
be, legal guardians, have the primary responsibility for the upbringing and development of the child. 
The best interests of the child will be their basic concern.
2. For the purpose of guaranteeing and promoting the rights set forth in the present Convention, States 
Parties shall render appropriate assistance to parents and legal guardians in the performance of their 
child-rearing responsibilities and shall ensure the development of institutions, facilities and services for 
the care of children.
3. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to ensure that children of working parents have the 
right to benefit from child-care services and facilities for which they are eligible.
Article 19
1. States Parties shall take all appropriate legislative, administrative, social and educational measures 
to protect the child from all forms of physical or mental violence, injury or abuse, neglect or negligent 
treatment, maltreatment or exploitation, including sexual abuse, while in the care of parent(s), legal 
guardian(s) or any other person who has the care of the child.
2. Such protective measures should, as appropriate, include effective procedures for the establishment 
of social programmes to provide necessary support for the child and for those who have the care of the 
child, as well as for other forms of prevention and for identification, reporting, referral, investigation, 
treatment and follow-up of instances of child maltreatment described heretofore, and, as appropriate, 
for judicial involvement.
Article 20
1. A child temporarily or permanently deprived of his or her family environment, or in whose own best 
interests cannot be allowed to remain in that environment, shall be entitled to special protection and 
assistance provided by the State.
2. States Parties shall in accordance with their national laws ensure alternative care for such a child.
3. Such care could include, inter alia, foster placement, Kafala of Islamic law, adoption, or if necessary 
placement in suitable institutions for the care of children. When considering solutions, due regard shall 
be paid to the desirability of continuity in a child's upbringing and to the child's ethnic, religious, 
cultural and linguistic background.
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Article 21
States Parties that recognize and/or permit the system of adoption shall ensure that the best interests of 
the child shall be the paramount consideration and they shall:
(a) Ensure that the adoption of a child is authorized only by competent authorities who determine, in 
accordance with applicable law and procedures and on the basis of all pertinent and reliable 
information, that the adoption is permissible in view of the child's status concerning parents, relatives 
and legal guardians and that, if required, the persons concerned have given their informed consent to 
the adoption on the basis of such counselling as may be necessary;
(b) Recognize that inter-country adoption may be considered as an alternative means of child's care, if 
the child cannot be placed in a foster or an adoptive family or cannot in any suitable manner be cared 
for in the child's country of origin;
(c) Ensure that the child concerned by intercountry adoption enjoys safeguards and standards 
equivalent to those existing in the case of national adoption;
(d) Take all appropriate measures to ensure that, in intercountry adoption, the placement does not 
result in improper financial gain for those involved in it;
(e) Promote, where appropriate, the objectives of the present article by concluding bilateral or 
multilateral arrangements or agreements, and endeavour, within this framework, to ensure that the 
placement of the child in another country is carried out by competent authorities or organs.
Article 22
1. States Parties shall take appropriate measures to ensure that a child who is seeking refugee status or 
who is considered a refugee in accordance with applicable international or domestic law and 
procedures shall, whether unaccompanied or accompanied by his or her parents or by any other person, 
receive appropriate protection and humanitarian assistance in the enjoyment of applicable rights set 
forth in the present Convention and in other international human rights or humanitarian instruments to 
which the said States are Parties.
2. For this purpose, States Parties shall provide, as they consider appropriate, co-operation in any 
efforts by the United Nations and other competent intergovernmental organizations or non­
governmental organizations co-operating with the United Nations to protect and assist such a child and 
to trace the parents or other members of the family of any refugee child in order to obtain information 
necessary for reunification with his or her family. In cases where no parents or other members of the 
family can be found, the child shall be accorded the same protection as any other child permanently or 
temporarily deprived of his or her family environment for any reason, as set forth in the present 
Convention.
Article 23
1. States Parties recognize that a mentally or physically disabled child should enjoy a full and decent 
life, in conditions which ensure dignity, promote self-reliance, and facilitate the child's active 
participation in the community.
2. States Parties recognize the right of the disabled child to special care and shall encourage and ensure 
the extension, subject to available resources, to the eligible child and those responsible for his or her 
care, of assistance for which application is made and which is appropriate to the child's condition and 
to the circumstances of the parents or others caring for the child.
3. Recognizing the special needs of a disabled child, assistance extended in accordance with paragraph 
2 of the present article shall be provided free of charge, whenever possible, taking into account the 
financial resources of the parents or others caring for the child, and shall be designed to ensure that the 
disabled child has effective access to and receives education, training, health care services, 
rehabilitation services, preparation for employment and recreation opportunities in a manner conducive 
to the child's achieving the fullest possible social integration and individual development, including his 
or her cultural and spiritual development.
286
4. States Parties shall promote, in the spirit of international co-operation, the exchange of appropriate 
information in the field of preventive health care and of medical, psychological and functional 
treatment of disabled children, including dissemination of and access to information concerning 
methods of rehabilitation, education and vocational services, with the aim of enabling States Parties to 
improve their capabilities and skills and to widen their experience in these areas. In this regard, 
particular account shall be taken of the needs of developing countries.
Article 24
1. States Parties recognize the right of the child to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of 
health and to facilities for the treatment of illness and rehabilitation of health. States Parties shall strive 
to ensure that no child is deprived of his or her right of access to such health care services.
2. States Parties shall pursue full implementation of this right and, in particular, shall take appropriate 
measures:
(a) To diminish infant and child mortality;
(b) To ensure the provision of necessary medical assistance and health care to all children with 
emphasis on the development of primary health care;
(c) To combat disease and malnutrition including within the framework of primary health care, 
through inter alia the application of readily available technology and through the provision of adequate 
nutritious foods and clean drinking water, taking into consideration the dangers and risks of 
environmental pollution;
(d) To ensure appropriate pre-natal and post-natal health care for mothers;
e) To ensure that all segments of society, in particular parents and children, are informed, have access 
to education and are supported in the use of basic knowledge of child health and nutrition, the 
advantages of breast-feeding, hygiene and environmental sanitation and the prevention of accidents;
(f) To develop preventive health care, guidance for parents and family planning education and 
services.
3. States Parties shall take all effective and appropriate measures with a view to abolishing traditional 
practices prejudicial to the health of children.
4. States Parties undertake to promote and encourage international co-operation with a view to 
achieving progressively the full realization of the right recognized in the present article. In this regard, 
particular account shall be taken of the needs of developing countries.
Article 25
States Parties recognize the right of a child who has been placed by the competent authorities for the 
purposes of care, protection or treatment of his or her physical or mental health, to a periodic review of 
the treatment provided to the child and all other circumstances relevant to his or her placement.
Article 26
1. States Parties shall recognize for every child the right to benefit from social security, including 
social insurance, and shall take the necessary measures to achieve the full realization of this right in 
accordance with their national law.
2. The benefits should, where appropriate, be granted, taking into account the resources and the 
circumstances of the child and persons having responsibility for the maintenance of the child, as well 
as any other consideration relevant to an application for benefits made by or on behalf of the child.
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Article 27
1. States Parties recognize the right of every child to a standard of living adequate for the child's 
physical, mental, spiritual, moral and social development.
2. The parent(s) or others responsible for the child have the primary responsibility to secure, within 
their abilities and financial capacities, the conditions of living necessary for the child's development.
3. States Parties, in accordance with national conditions and within their means, shall take appropriate 
measures to assist parents and others responsible for the child to implement this right and shall in case 
of need provide material assistance and support programmes, particularly with regard to nutrition, 
clothing and housing.
4. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to secure the recovery of maintenance for the child 
from the parents or other persons having financial responsibility for the child, both within the State 
Party and from abroad. In particular, where the person having financial responsibility for the child 
lives in a State different from that of the child, States Parties shall promote the accession to 
international agreements or the conclusion of such agreements, as well as the making of other 
appropriate arrangements.
Article 28
1. States Parties recognize the right of the child to education, and with a view to achieving this right 
progressively and on the basis of equal opportunity, they shall, in particular:
a) Make primary education compulsory and available free to all;
b) Encourage the development of different forms of secondary education, including general and 
vocational education, make them available and accessible to every child, and take appropriate 
measures such as the introduction of free education and offering financial assistance in case of need;
(c) Make higher education accessible to all on the basis of capacity by every appropriate means;
(d) Make educational and vocational information and guidance available and accessible to all children;
(e) Take measures to encourage regular attendance at schools and the reduction of drop-out rates.
2. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to ensure that school discipline is administered in a 
manner consistent with the child's human dignity and in conformity with the present Convention.
3. States Parties shall promote and encourage international co-operation in matters relating to 
education, in particular with a view to contributing to the elimination of ignorance and illiteracy 
throughout the world and facilitating access to scientific and technical knowledge and modem teaching 
methods. In this regard, particular account shall be taken of the needs of developing countries.
Article 29
1. States Parties agree that the education of the child shall be directed to:
(a) The development of the child's personality, talents and mental and physical abilities to their fullest 
potential;
(b) The development of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and for the principles 
enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations;
(c) The development of respect for the child's parents, his or her own cultural identity, language and 
values, for the national values of the country in which the child is living, the country from which he or 
she may originate, and for civilizations different from his or her own;
(d) The preparation of the child for responsible life in a free society, in the spirit of understanding, 
peace, tolerance, equality of sexes, and friendship among all peoples, ethnic, national and religious 
groups and persons of indigenous origin;
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(e) The development of respect for the natural environment.
2. No part of the present article or article 28 shall be construed so as to interfere with the liberty of 
individuals and bodies to establish and direct educational institutions, subject always to the observance 
of the principles set forth in paragraph 1 of the present article and to the requirements that the 
education given in such institutions shall conform to such minimum standards as may be laid down by 
the State.
Article 30
In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities or persons of indigenous origin exist, 
a child belonging to such a minority or who is indigenous shall not be denied the right, in community 
with other members of his or her group, to enjoy his or her own culture, to profess and practise his or 
her own religion, or to use his or her own language.
Article 31
1. States Parties recognize the right of the child to rest and leisure, to engage in play and recreational 
activities appropriate to the age of the child and to participate freely in cultural life and the arts.
2. States Parties shall respect and promote the right of the child to participate fully in cultural and 
artistic life and shall encourage the provision of appropriate and equal opportunities for cultural, 
artistic, recreational and leisure activity.
Article 32
1. States Parties recognize the right of the child to be protected from economic exploitation and from 
performing any work that is likely to be hazardous or to interfere with the child's education, or to be 
harmful to the child's health or physical, mental, spiritual, moral or social development.
2. States Parties shall take legislative, administrative, social and educational measures to ensure the 
implementation of the present article. To this end, and having regard to the relevant provisions of other 
international instruments, States Parties shall in particular:
(a) Provide for a minimum age or minimum ages for admissions to employment;
(b) Provide for appropriate regulation of the hours and conditions of employment;
(c) Provide for appropriate penalties or other sanctions to ensure the effective enforcement of the 
present article.
Article 33
States Parties shall take all appropriate measures, including legislative, administrative, social and 
educational measures, to protect children from the illicit use of narcotic drugs and psychotropic 
substances as defined in the relevant international treaties, and to prevent the use of children in the 
illicit production and trafficking of such substances.
Article 34
States Parties undertake to protect the child from all forms of sexual exploitation and sexual abuse. For 
these purposes, States Parties shall in particular take all appropriate national, bilateral and multilateral 
measures to prevent:
(a) The inducement or coercion of a child to engage in any unlawful sexual activity;
(b) The exploitative use of children in prostitution or other unlawful sexual practices;
(c) The exploitative use of children in pornographic performances and materials.
289
Article 35
States Parties shall take all appropriate national, bilateral and multilateral measures to prevent the 
abduction of, the sale of or traffic in children for any purpose or in any form.
Article 36
States Parties shall protect the child against all other forms of exploitation prejudicial to any aspects of 
the child's welfare.
Article 37
States Parties shall ensure that:
(a) No child shall be subjected to torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment. Neither capital punishment nor life imprisonment without possibility of release shall be 
imposed for offences committed by persons below 18 years of age;
(b) No child shall be deprived of his or her liberty unlawfully or arbitrarily. The arrest, detention or 
imprisonment of a child shall be in conformity with the law and shall be used only as a measure of last 
resort and for the shortest appropriate period of time;
(c) Every child deprived of liberty shall be treated with humanity and respect for the inherent dignity 
of the human person, and in a manner which takes into account the needs of persons of his or her age. 
In particular every child deprived of liberty shall be separated from adults unless it is considered in the 
child's best interest not to do so and shall have the right to maintain contact with his or her family 
through correspondence and visits, save in exceptional circumstances;
(d) Every child deprived of his or her liberty shall have the right to prompt access to legal and other 
appropriate assistance, as well as the right to challenge the legality of the deprivation of his or her 
liberty before a court or other competent, independent and impartial authority, and to a prompt 
decision on any such action.
Article 38
1. States Parties undertake to respect and to ensure respect for rules of international humanitarian law 
applicable to them in armed conflicts which are relevant to the child.
2. States Parties shall take all feasible measures to ensure that persons who have not attained the age of 
15 years do not take a direct part in hostilities.
3. States Parties shall refrain from recruiting any person who has not attained the age of 15 years into 
their armed forces. In recruiting among those persons who have attained the age of 15 years but who 
have not attained the age of 18 years, States Parties shall endeavour to give priority to those who are 
oldest.
4. In accordance with their obligations under international humanitarian law to protect the civilian 
population in armed conflicts, States Parties shall take all feasible measures to ensure protection and 
care of children who are affected by an armed conflict.
Article 39
States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to promote physical and psychological recovery and 
social reintegration of a child victim of: any form of neglect, exploitation, or abuse; torture or any 
other form of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; or armed conflicts. Such recovery 
and reintegration shall take place in an environment which fosters the health, self-respect and dignity 
of the child.
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Article 40
1. States Parties recognize the right of every child alleged as, accused of, or recognized as having 
infringed the penal law to be treated in a manner consistent with the promotion of the child's sense of 
dignity and worth, which reinforces the child's respect for the human rights and fundamental freedoms 
of others and which takes into account the child's age and the desirability of promoting the child's 
reintegration and the child's assuming a constructive role in society.
2. To this end, and having regard to the relevant provisions of international instruments, States Parties 
shall, in particular, ensure that:
(a) No child shall be alleged as, be accused of, or recognized as having infringed the penal law by 
reason of acts or omissions that were not prohibited by national or international law at the time they 
were committed;
(b) Every child alleged as or accused of having infringed the penal law has at least the following 
guarantees:
(i) To be presumed innocent until proven guilty according to law;
(ii) To be informed promptly and directly of the charges against him or her, and, if appropriate, 
through his or her parents or legal guardians, and to have legal or other appropriate assistance in the 
preparation and presentation of his or her defence;
(iii) To have the matter determined without delay by a competent, independent and impartial authority 
or judicial body in a fair hearing according to law, in the presence of legal or other appropriate 
assistance and, unless it is considered not to be in the best interest of the child, in particular, taking into 
account his or her age or situation, his or her parents or legal guardians;
(iv) Not to be compelled to give testimony or to confess guilt; to examine or have examined adverse 
witnesses and to obtain the participation and examination of witnesses on his or her behalf under 
conditions of equality;
(v) If considered to have infringed the penal law, to have this decision and any measures imposed in 
consequence thereof reviewed by a higher competent, independent and impartial authority or judicial 
body according to law;
(vi) To have the free assistance of an interpreter if the child cannot understand or speak the language 
used;
(vii) To have his or her privacy fully respected at all stages of the proceedings.
3. States Parties shall seek to promote the establishment of laws, procedures, authorities and 
institutions specifically applicable to children alleged as, accused of, or recognized as having infringed 
the penal law, and, in particular:
(a) the establishment of a minimum age below which children shall be presumed not to have the 
capacity to infringe the penal law;
(b) whenever appropriate and desirable, measures for dealing with such children without resorting to 
judicial proceedings, providing that human rights and legal safeguards are fully respected.
4. A variety of dispositions, such as care, guidance and supervision orders; counselling; probation; 
foster care; education and vocational training programmes and other alternatives to institutional care 
shall be available to ensure that children are dealt with in a manner appropriate to their well-being and 
proportionate both to their circumstances and the offence.
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Article 41
Nothing in the present Convention shall affect any provisions which are more conducive to the 
realization of the rights of the child and which may be contained in:
(a) The law of a State Party; or
(b) International law in force for that State.
Part II
Article 42
States Parties undertake to make the principles and provisions of the Convention widely known, by 
appropriate and active means, to adults and children alike.
Article 43
1. For the purpose of examining the progress made by States Parties in achieving the realization of the 
obligations undertaken in the present Convention, there shall be established a Committee on the Rights 
of the Child, which shall carry out the functions hereinafter provided.
2. The Committee shall consist of eighteen experts of high moral standing and recognized competence 
in the field covered by this Convention1.
The members of the Committee shall be elected by States Parties from among their nationals and shall 
serve in their personal capacity, consideration being given to equitable geographical distribution, as 
well as to the principal legal systems.
3. The members of the Committee shall be elected by secret ballot from a list of persons nominated by 
States Parties. Each State Party may nominate one person from among its own nationals.
4. The initial election to the Committee shall be held no later than six months after the date of the entry 
into force of the present Convention and thereafter every second year. At least four months before the 
date of each election, the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall address a letter to States 
Parties inviting them to submit their nominations within two months. The Secretary-General shall 
subsequently prepare a list in alphabetical order of all persons thus nominated, indicating States Parties 
which have nominated them, and shall submit it to the States Parties to the present Convention.
5. The elections shall be held at meetings of States Parties convened by the Secretary-General at 
United Nations Headquarters. At those meetings, for which two thirds of States Parties shall constitute 
a quorum, the persons elected to the Committee shall be those who obtain the largest number of votes 
and an absolute majority of the votes of the representatives of States Parties present and voting.
6. The members of the Committee shall be elected for a term of four years. They shall be eligible for 
re-election if renominated. The term of five of the members elected at the first election shall expire at 
the end of two years; immediately after the first election, the names of these five members shall be 
chosen by lot by the Chairman of the meeting.
7. If a member of the Committee dies or resigns or declares that for any other cause he or she can no 
longer perform the duties of the Committee, the State Party which nominated the member shall appoint 
another expert from among its nationals to serve for the remainder of the term, subject to the approval 
of the Committee.
8. The Committee shall establish its own rules of procedure.
9. The Committee shall elect its officers for a period of two years.
10. The meetings of the Committee shall normally be held at United Nations Headquarters or at any 
other convenient place as determined by the Committee. The Committee shall normally meet annually. 
The duration of the meetings of the Committee shall be determined, and reviewed, if necessary, by a
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meeting of the States Parties to the present Convention, subject to the approval of the General 
Assembly.
11. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall provide the necessary staff and facilities for the 
effective performance of the functions of the Committee under the present Convention.
12. With the approval of the General Assembly, the members of the Committee established under the 
present Convention shall receive emoluments from the United Nations resources on such terms and 
conditions as the Assembly may decide.
Article 44
1. States Parties undertake to submit to the Committee, through the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations, reports on the measures they have adopted which give effect to the rights recognized herein 
and on the progress made on the enjoyment of those rights:
(a) Within two years of the entry into force of the Convention for the State Party concerned,
(b) Thereafter every five years.
2. Reports made under the present article shall indicate factors and difficulties, if any, affecting the 
degree of fulfilment of the obligations under the present Convention. Reports shall also contain 
sufficient information to provide the Committee with a comprehensive understanding of the 
implementation of the Convention in the country concerned.
3. A State Party which has submitted a comprehensive initial report to the Committee need not in its 
subsequent reports submitted in accordance with paragraph 1(b) of the present article repeat basic 
information previously provided.
4. The Committee may request from States Parties further information relevant to the implementation 
of the Convention.
5. The Committee shall submit to the General Assembly, through the Economic and Social Council, 
every two years, reports on its activities.
6. States Parties shall make their reports widely available to the public in their own countries.
Article 45
In order to foster the effective implementation of the Convention and to encourage international co­
operation in the field covered by the Convention:
(a) The specialized agencies, the United Nations Children's Fund and other United Nations organs 
shall be entitled to be represented at the consideration of the implementation of such provisions of the 
present Convention as fall within the scope of their mandate. The Committee may invite the 
specialized agencies, the United Nations Children's Fund and other competent bodies as it may 
consider appropriate to provide expert advice on the implementation of the Convention in areas falling 
within the scope of their respective mandates. The Committee may invite the specialized agencies, the
United Nations Children's Fund and other United Nations organs to submit reports on the
implementation of the Convention in areas falling within the scope of their activities;
(b) The Committee shall transmit, as it may consider appropriate, to the specialized agencies, the 
United Nations Children's Fund and other competent bodies, any reports from States Parties that 
contain a request, or indicate a need, for technical advice or assistance, along with the Committee's 
observations and suggestions, if any, on these requests or indications;
(c) The Committee may recommend to the General Assembly to request the Secretary-General to 
undertake on its behalf studies on specific issues relating to the rights of the child;
(d) The Committee may make suggestions and general recommendations based on information 
received pursuant to articles 44 and 45 of the present Convention. Such suggestions and general
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recommendations shall be transmitted to any State Party concerned and reported to the General 
Assembly, together with comments, if any, from States Parties.
Part III
Article 46
The present Convention shall be open for signature by all States.
Article 47
The present Convention is subject to ratification. Instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations.
Article 48
The present Convention shall remain open for accession by any State. The instruments of accession 
shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
Article 49
1. The present Convention shall enter into force on the thirtieth day following the date of deposit with 
the Secretary-General of the United Nations of the twentieth instrument of ratification or accession.
2. For each State ratifying or acceding to the Convention after the deposit of the twentieth instrument 
of ratification or accession, the Convention shall enter into force on the thirtieth day after the deposit 
by such State of its instrument of ratification or accession.
Article 50
1. Any State Party may propose an amendment and file it with the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations. The Secretary-General shall thereupon communicate the proposed amendment to States 
Parties, with a request that they indicate whether they favour a conference of States Parties for the 
purpose of considering and voting upon the proposals. In the event that, within four months from the 
date of such communication, at least one third of the States Parties favour such a conference, the 
Secretary-General shall convene the conference under the auspices of the United Nations. Any 
amendment adopted by a majority of States Parties present and voting at the conference shall be 
submitted to the General Assembly for approval.
2. An amendment adopted in accordance with paragraph 1 of the present article shall enter into force 
when it has been approved by the General Assembly of the United Nations and accepted by a two- 
thirds majority of States Parties.
3. When an amendment enters into force, it shall be binding on those States Parties which have 
accepted it, other States Parties still being bound by the provisions of the present Convention and any 
earlier amendments which they have accepted.
Article 51
1. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall receive and circulate to all States the text of 
reservations made by States at the time of ratification or accession.
2. A reservation incompatible with the object and purpose of the present Convention shall not be 
permitted.
3. Reservations may be withdrawn at any time by notification to that effect addressed to the Secretary- 
General of the United Nations, who shall then inform all States. Such notification shall take effect on 
the date on which it is received by the Secretary-General.
Article 52
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A State Party may denounce the present Convention by written notification to the Secretary-General of 
the United Nations. Denunciation becomes effective one year after the date of receipt of the 
notification by the Secretary-General.
Article 53
The Secretary-General of the United Nations is designated as the depositary of the present Convention. 
Article 54
The original of the present Convention, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and 
Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations.
In witness thereof the undersigned plenipotentiaries, being duly authorized thereto by their respective 
Governments, have signed the present Convention.
1 The General Assembly, in its resolution 50/155 of 21 December 1995, approved the amendment to article 43, paragraph 2, of 
the Convention on the Rights of the Child, replacing the word “ten” with the word “eighteen”. The amendment entered into force 
on 18 November 2002 when it had been accepted by a two-thirds majority of the States parties (128 out of 191).
The text of Article 43, part 2 originally read:
2. The Committee shall consist o f ten experts o f high moral standing and recognized competence in the field  
covered by this Convention. The members o f the Committee shall be elected by States Parties from among their 
nationals and shall serve in their personal capacity, consideration being given to equitable geographical 
distribution, as well as to the principal legal systems.
There are also two options protocols:
Optional Protocol on the involvement of children in armed conflict
Optional Protocol on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography
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Appendix II
African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, OAU Doc. 
CAB/LEG/24.9/49 (1990), entered into force Nov. 29,1999. (Extracts)
PREAMBLE
The African Member States of the Organization of African Unity, Parties to the present 
Charter entitled ‘African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child’,
CONSIDERING that the Charter of the Organization of African Unity recognizes the 
paramountcy of Human Rights and the African Charter on Human and People's Rights 
proclaimed and agreed that everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms recognized and 
guaranteed therein, without distinction of any kind such as race, ethnic group, colour, sex, 
language, religion, political or any other opinion, national and social origin, fortune, birth or 
other status,
RECALLING the Declaration on the Rights and WeLfare of the African Child (AHG/ST.4 
Rev.l) adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of 
African Unity, at its Sixteenth Ordinary Session in Monrovia, Liberia, from 17 to 20 July 
1979, recognized the need to take appropriate measures to promote and protect the rights and 
welfare of the African Child,
NOTING WITH CONCERN that the situation of most African children, remains critical due 
to the unique factors of their socio-economic, cultural, traditional and developmental 
circumstances, natural disasters, armed conflicts, exploitation and hunger, and on account of 
the child's physical and mental immaturity he/she needs special safeguards and care,
RECOGNIZING that the child occupies a unique and privileged position in the African 
society and that for the full and harmonious development of his personality, the child should 
grow up in a family environment in an atmosphere of happiness, love and understanding,
RECOGNIZING that the child, due to the needs of his physical and mental development 
requires particular care with regard to health, physical, mental, moral and social development, 
and requires legal protection in conditions of freedom, dignity and security,
TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION the virtues of their cultural heritage, historical 
background and the values of the African civilization which should inspire and characterize 
their reflection on the concept of the rights and welfare of the child,
CONSIDERING that the promotion and protection of the rights and welfare of the child also 
implies the performance of duties on the part of everyone,
REAFFIRMING ADHERENCE Lo the principles of the rights and welfare of the child 
contained in the declaration, conventions and other instruments of the Organization of African 
Unity and in the United Nations and in particular the United Nations Convention on the 
Rights of the Child; and the OAU Heads of State and Government's Declaration on the Rights 
and Welfare of the African Child.
HAVE AGREED AS FOLLOWS:
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PART 1: RIGHTS AND DUTIES
CHAPTER ONE: RIGHTS AND WELFARE OF THE CHILD 
Article 1: Obligation of States Parties
1. Member States of the Organization of African Unity Parties to the present Charter shall 
recognize the rights, freedoms and duties enshrined in this Charter and shall undertake to the 
necessary steps, in accordance with their Constitutional processes and with the provisions of 
the present Charter, to adopt such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to give 
effect to the provisions of this Charter.
2. Nothing in this Charter shall affect any provisions that are more conductive to the 
realization of the rights and welfare of the child contained in the law of a State Party or in any 
other international Convention or agreement in force in that State.
3. Any custom, tradition, cultural or religious practice that is inconsistent with the rights, 
duties and obligations contained in the present Charter shall to the extent of such 
inconsistency be discouraged.
Article 2: Definition of a Child
For the purposes of this Charter, a child means every human being below the age of 18 years.
Article 3: Non-Discrimination
Every child shall be entitled to the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms recognized and 
guaranteed in this Charter irrespective of the child's or his/her parents' or legal guardians' race, 
ethnic group, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national and social 
origin, fortune, birth or other status.
Article 4: Best Interests of the Child
1. In all actions concerning the child undertaken by any person or authority the best interests 
of the child shall be the primary consideration.
2. In all judicial or administrative proceedings affecting a child who is capable of 
communicating his/her own views, and opportunity shall be provided for the views of the 
child to be heard either directly or through an impartial representative as a party to the 
proceedings, and those views shall be taken into consideration by the relevant authority in 
accordance with the provisions of appropriate law.
Article 5: Survival and Development
1. Every child has an inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by law.
2. States Parties to the present Charter shall ensure, to the maximum extent possible, the 
survival, protection and development of the child.
3. Death sentence shall not be pronounced for crimes committed by children.
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Article 6: Name and Nationality
1. Every child shall have the right from his birth to a name.
2. Every child shall be registered immediately after birth.
3. Every child has the right to acquire a nationality.
4. States Parties to the present Charter shall undertake to ensure that their Constitutional 
legislation recognize the principles according to which a child shall acquire the nationality of 
the State in the territory of which he has been bom if, at the time of the child’s birth, he is not 
granted nationality by any other State in accordance with its laws.
Article 7: Freedom of Expression
Every child who is capable of communicating his or her own views shall be assured the rights 
to express his opinions freely in all matters and to disseminate his opinions subject to such 
restrictions as are prescribed by laws.
Article 8: Freedom of Association
Every child shall have the right to free association and freedom of peaceful assembly in 
conformity with the law.
Article 9: Freedom of Thought, Conscience and Religion
1. Every child shall have the right to freedom of thought conscience and religion.
2. Parents, and where applicable, legal guardians shall have a duty to provide guidance and 
direction in the exercise of these rights having regard to the evolving capacities, and best 
interests of the child.
3. States Parties shall respect the duty of parents and where applicable, legal guardians to 
provide guidance and direction in the enjoyment of these rights subject to the national laws 
and policies.
Article 10: Protection of Privacy
No child shall be subject to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family home 
or correspondence, or to the attacks upon his honour or reputation, provided that parents or 
legal guardians shall have the right to exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of 
their children. The child has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or 
attacks.
Article 31: Responsibility of the Child
Every child shall have responsibilities towards his family and society, the State and other 
legally recognized communities and the international community. The child, subject to his age 
and ability, and such limitations as may be contained in the present Charter, shall have the 
duty;
(a) to work for the cohesion of the family, to respect his parents, superiors and elders 
at all times and to assist them in case of need;
(b) to serve his national community by placing his physical and intellectual abilities 
at its service;
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(c) to preserve and strengthen social and national solidarity;
(d) to preserve and strengthen African cultural values in his relations with other 
members of the society, in the spirit of tolerance, dialogue and consultation and to 
contribute to the moral well-being of society;
(e) to preserve and strengthen the independence and the integrity of his country;
(f) to contribute to the best of his abilities, at all times and at all levels, to the 
promotion and achievement of Afhcan Unity.
CHAPTER THREE: MANDATE AND PROCEDURE OF THE COMMITTEE 
Article 42: Mandate
The functions of the Committee shall be:
(a) To promote and protect the rights enshrined in this Charter and in particular to:
(i) collect and document information, commission inter-disciplinary 
assessment of situations on African problems in the fields of the rights and 
welfare of the child, organize meetings, encourage national and local 
institutions concerned with the rights and welfare of the child, and where 
necessary give its views and make recommendations to Governments;
(ii) formulate and lay down principles and rules aimed at protecting the 
rights and welfare of children in Africa;
(iii) cooperate with other African, international and regional Institutions and 
organizations concerned with the promotion and protection of the rights and 
welfare of the child.
(b) To monitor the implementation and ensure protection of the rights enshrined in 
this Charter.
(c) To interpret the provisions of the present Charter at the request of a State Party, 
an Institution of the Organization of African Unity or any other person or Institution 
recognized by the Organization of African Unity, or any State Party.
(d) Perform such other task as may be entrusted to it by the Assembly of Heads of 
State and Government, Secretary-General of the OAU and any other organs of the 
OAU or the United Nations.
Article 43: Reporting Procedure
1. Every State Party to the present Charter shall undertake to submit to the Committee through 
the Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity, reports on the measures they have 
adopted which give effect to the provisions of this Charter and on the progress made in the 
enjoyment of these rights:
(a) within two years of the entry into force of the Charter for the State Party 
concerned: and
(b) and thereafter, every three years.
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2. Every report made under this Article shall:
(a) contain sufficient information on the implementation of the present Charter to 
provide the Committee with comprehensive understanding of the implementation of 
the Charter in the relevant country; and
(b) shall indicate factors and difficulties, if any, affecting the fullfilment of the 
obligations contained in the Charter.
3. A State Party which has submitted a comprehensive first report to the Committee need not, 
in its subsequent reports submitted in accordance with paragraph I (a) of this Article, repeat 
the basic information previously provided.
Article 44: Communications
1. The Committee may receive communication, from any person, group or non-governmental 
organization recognized by the Organization of African Unity, by a Member State, or the 
United Nations relating to any matter covered by this Charter.
2. Every communication to the Committee shall contain the name and address of the author 
and shall be treated in confidence.
Article 45: Investigations by the Committee
1. The Committee may, resort to any appropriate method of investigating any matter falling 
within the ambit of the present Charter, request from the States Parties any information 
relevant to the implementation of the Charter and may also resort to any appropriate method 
of investigating the measures the State Party has adopted to implement the Charter.
2. The Committee shall submit to each Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State 
and Government every two years, a report on its activities and on any communication made 
under Article [44] of this Charter.
3. The Committee shall publish its report after it has been considered by the Assembly of 
Heads of State and Government.
4. States Parties shall make the Committee's reports widely available to the public in their 
own countries.
CHAPTER FOUR: MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS 
Article 46: Sources of Inspiration
The Committee shall draw inspiration from International Law on Human Rights, particularly from the 
provisions of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, the Charter of the Organization of 
African Unity, the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, the International Convention on the Rights 
of the Child, and other instruments adopted by the United Nations and by African countries in the field 
of human rights, and from African values and traditions
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Appendix III
European Convention on the Exercise of Children’s Rights (Extracts)
Strasbourg, 25.1.1996
PREAMBLE
The member States of the Council of Europe and the other States signatory hereto,
Considering that the aim of the Council of Europe is to achieve greater unity between its members;
Having regard to the United Nations Convention on the rights of the child and in particular Article 4 
which requires States Parties to undertake all appropriate legislative, administrative and other measures 
for the implementation of the rights recognised in the said Convention;
Noting the contents of Recommendation 1121 (1990) of the Parliamentary Assembly on the rights of 
the child;
Convinced that the rights and best interests of children should be promoted and to that end children 
should have the opportunity to exercise their rights, in particular in family proceedings affecting them;
Recognising that children should be provided with relevant information to enable such rights and best 
interests to be promoted and that due weight should be given to the views of children;
Recognising the importance of the parental role in protecting and promoting the rights and best 
interests of children and considering that, where necessary, States should also engage in such 
protection and promotion;
Considering, however, that in the event of conflict it is desirable for families to try to reach agreement 
before bringing the matter before a judicial authority,
Have agreed as follows:
CHAPTER I -  SCOPE AND OBJECT OF THE CONVENTION AND DEFINITIONS 
Article 1 -  Scope and object of the Convention
This Convention shall apply to children who have not reached the age of 18 years.
The object of the present Convention is, in the best interests of children, to promote their rights, to 
grant them procedural rights and to facilitate the exercise of these rights by ensuring that children are, 
themselves or through other persons or bodies, informed and allowed to participate in proceedings 
affecting them before a judicial authority.
For the purposes of this Convention proceedings before a judicial authority affecting children are 
family proceedings, in particular those involving the exercise of parental responsibilities such as 
residence and access to children.
Every State shall, at the time of signature or when depositing its instrument of ratification, acceptance, 
approval
or accession, by a declaration addressed to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe, specify at 
least three categories of family cases before a judicial authority to which this Convention is to apply. 
Any Party may, by further declaration, specify additional categories of family cases to which this 
Convention is to apply or provide information concerning the application of Article 5, paragraph 2 of 
Article 9, paragraph 2 of 
Article 10 and Article 11.
Nothing in this Convention shall prevent Parties from applying rules more favourable to the promotion 
and the exercise of children's rights.
Article 2 -  Definitions
For the purposes of this Convention:
the term "judicial authority" means a court or an administrative authority having equivalent powers; 
the term "holders of parental responsibilities" means parents and other persons or bodies entitled to 
exercise some or all parental responsibilities;
the term "representative" means a person, such as a lawyer, or a body appointed to act before a judicial 
authority on behalf of a child;
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the term "relevant information" means information which is appropriate to the age and understanding 
of the child, and which will be given to enable the child to exercise his or her rights fully unless the 
provision of such information were contrary to the welfare of the child.
CHAPTER II -  PROCEDURAL MEASURES TO PROMOTE THE EXERCISE OF
CHILDREN’S
RIGHTS
A. PROCEDURAL RIGHTS OF A CHILD
Article 3 -  Right to be informed and to express his or her views in proceedings
A child considered by internal law as having sufficient understanding, in the case of proceedings 
before a judicial authority affecting him or her, shall be granted, and shall be entitled to request, the 
following rights:
to receive all relevant information;
to be consulted and express his or her views;
to be informed of the possible consequences of compliance with these views and the possible 
consequences of any decision.
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Appendix IV
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (Extracts)
Preamble
The States Parties to the present Convention,
(a) Recalling the principles proclaimed in the Charter of the United Nations which recognize the 
inherent dignity and worth and the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family as 
the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world,
(b) Recognizing that the United Nations, in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in the 
International Covenants on Human Rights, has proclaimed and agreed that everyone is entitled to all 
the rights and freedoms set forth therein, without distinction of any kind,
(c) Reaffirming the universality, indivisibility, interdependence and interrelatedness of all human rights 
and fundamental freedoms and the need for persons with disabilities to be guaranteed their full 
enjoyment without discrimination,
(d) Recalling the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Racial Discrimination, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women, the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and the International Convention on the 
Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families,
(e) Recognizing that disability is an evolving concept and that disability results from the interaction 
between persons with impairments and attitudinal and environmental barriers that hinders their full and 
effective participation in society on an equal basis with others,
(/) Recognizing the importance of the principles and policy guidelines contained in the World 
Programme of Action concerning Disabled Persons and in the Standard Rules on the Equalization of 
Opportunities for Persons with Disabilities in influencing the promotion, formulation and evaluation of 
the policies, plans, programmes and actions at the national, regional and international levels to further 
equalize opportunities for persons with disabilities,
(g) Emphasizing the importance of mainstreaming disability issues as an integral part of relevant 
strategies of sustainable development,
(h) Recognizing also that discrimination against any person on the basis of disability is a violation of 
the inherent dignity and worth of the human person,
(/') Recognizing further the diversity of persons with disabilities,
(j) Recognizing the need to promote and protect the human rights of
all persons with disabilities, including those who require more intensive support,
(it) Concerned that, despite these various instruments and undertakings, persons with disabilities 
continue to face barriers in their participation as equal members of society and violations of their 
human rights in all parts of the world,
(/) Recognizing the importance of international cooperation for improving the living conditions of 
persons with disabilities in every country, particularly in developing countries,
(m) Recognizing the valued existing and potential contributions made by persons with disabilities to 
the overall well-being and diversity of their communities, and that the promotion of the full enjoyment 
by persons with disabilities of their human rights and fundamental freedoms and of full participation 
by persons with disabilities will result in their enhanced sense of belonging and in significant advances 
in the human, social and economic development of society and the eradication of poverty,
(n) Recognizing the importance for persons with disabilities of their individual autonomy and 
independence, including the freedom to make their own choices,
(o) Considering that persons with disabilities should have the opportunity to be actively involved in 
decision-making processes about policies and programmes, including those directly concerning them, 
ip) Concerned about the difficult conditions faced by persons with disabilities who are subject to 
multiple or aggravated forms of discrimination on the basis of race, colour, sex, language, religion, 
political or other opinion, national, ethnic, indigenous or social origin, property, birth, age or other 
status,
(q) Recognizing that women and girls with disabilities are often at greater risk, both within and outside 
the home, of violence, injury or abuse, neglect or negligent treatment, maltreatment or exploitation,
(r) Recognizing that children with disabilities should have full enjoyment of all human rights and 
fundamental freedoms on an equal basis with other children, and recalling obligations to that end 
undertaken by States Parties to the Convention on the Rights of the Child,
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(5) Emphasizing the need to incorporate a gender perspective in all efforts to promote the full 
enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms by persons with disabilities,
(/) Highlighting the fact that the majority of persons with disabilities live in conditions of poverty, and 
in this regard recognizing the critical need to address the negative impact of poverty on persons with 
disabilities,
(u) Bearing in mind that conditions of peace and security based on full respect for the purposes and 
principles contained in the Charter of the United Nations and observance of applicable human rights 
instruments are indispensable for the full protection of persons with disabilities, in particular during 
armed conflicts and foreign occupation,
(v) Recognizing the importance of accessibility to the physical, social, economic and cultural 
environment, to health and education and to information and communication, in enabling persons with 
disabilities to fully enjoy all human rights and fundamental freedoms,
(w) Realizing that the individual, having duties to other individuals and to the community to which he 
or she belongs, is under a responsibility to strive for the promotion and observance of the rights 
recognized in the International Bill of Human Rights,
(.x) Convinced that the family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to 
protection by society and the State, and that persons with disabilities and their family members should 
receive the necessary protection and assistance to enable families to contribute towards the full and 
equal enjoyment of the rights of persons with disabilities,
(y) Convinced that a comprehensive and integral international convention to promote and protect the 
rights and dignity of persons with disabilities will make a significant contribution to redressing the 
profound social disadvantage of persons with disabilities and promote their participation in the civil, 
political, economic, social and cultural spheres with equal opportunities, in both developing and 
developed countries,
Have agreed as follows:
Article 1 
Purpose
The purpose of the present Convention is to promote, protect and ensure the full and equal enjoyment 
of all human rights and fundamental freedoms by all persons with disabilities, and to promote respect 
for their inherent dignity. Persons with disabilities include those who have long-term physical, mental, 
intellectual or sensory impairments which in interaction with various barriers may hinder their full and 
effective participation in society on an equal basis with others.
Article 2 
Definitions
For the purposes of the present Convention:
“Communication” includes languages, display of text, Braille, tactile communication, large print, 
accessible multimedia as well as written, audio, plain-language, human-reader and augmentative and 
alternative modes, means and formats of communication, including accessible information and 
communication technology;
“Language” includes spoken and signed languages and other forms of non spoken languages; 
“Discrimination on the basis of disability” means any distinction, exclusion or restriction on the basis 
of disability which has the purpose or effect of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or 
exercise, on an equal basis with others, of all human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, 
economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field. It includes all forms of discrimination, including 
denial of reasonable accommodation;
“Reasonable accommodation” means necessary and appropriate modification and adjustments not 
imposing a disproportionate or undue burden, where needed in a particular case, to ensure to persons 
with disabilities
the enjoyment or exercise on an equal basis with others of all human rights and fundamental freedoms; 
“Universal design” means the design of products, environments, programmes and services to be usable 
by all people, to the greatest extent possible, without the need for adaptation or specialized design. 
“Universal design” shall not exclude assistive devices for particular groups of persons with disabilities 
where this is needed.
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Article 3
General principles
The principles of the present Convention shall be:
(a) Respect for inherent dignity, individual autonomy including the freedom to make one’s own 
choices, and independence of persons;
(b) Non-discrimination;
(c) Full and effective participation and inclusion in society;
id) Respect for difference and acceptance of persons with disabilities as part of human diversity and 
humanity;
(e) Equality of opportunity;
(/) Accessibility;
(g) Equality between men and women;
(h) Respect for the evolving capacities of children with disabilities and respect for the right of children 
with disabilities to preserve their identities.
Article 4
General obligations
1. States Parties undertake to ensure and promote the full realization of all human rights and 
fundamental freedoms for all persons with disabilities without discrimination of any kind on the basis 
of disability. To this end, States Parties undertake:
(a) To adopt all appropriate legislative, administrative and other measures for the implementation of 
the rights recognized in the present Convention;
(b) To take all appropriate measures, including legislation, to modify or abolish existing laws, 
regulations, customs and practices that constitute discrimination against persons with disabilities;
(c) To take into account the protection and promotion of the human rights of persons with disabilities 
in all policies and programmes;
(d) To refrain from engaging in any act or practice that is inconsistent with the present Convention and 
to ensure that public authorities and institutions act in conformity with the present Convention;
(e) To take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination on the basis of disability by any 
person, organization or private enterprise;
(/) To undertake or promote research and development of universally designed goods, services, 
equipment and facilities, as defined in article 2 of the present Convention, which should require the 
minimum possible adaptation and the least cost to meet the specific needs of a person with disabilities, 
to promote their availability and use, and to promote universal design in the development of standards 
and guidelines;
(g) To undertake or promote research and development of, and to promote the availability and use of 
new technologies, including information and communications technologies, mobility aids, devices and 
assistive technologies, suitable for persons with disabilities, giving priority to technologies at an 
affordable cost;
(h) To provide accessible information to persons with disabilities about mobility aids, devices and 
assistive technologies, including new technologies, as well as other forms of assistance, support 
services and facilities;
(0 To promote the training of professionals and staff working with persons with disabilities in the 
rights recognized in the present Convention so as to better provide the assistance and services 
guaranteed by those rights.
2. With regard to economic, social and cultural rights, each State Party undertakes to take measures to 
the maximum of its available resources and, where needed, within the framework of international 
cooperation, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of these rights, without 
prejudice to those obligations contained in the present Convention that are immediately applicable 
according to international law.
3. In the development and implementation of legislation and policies to implement the present 
Convention, and in other decision-making processes concerning issues relating to persons with 
disabilities, States Parties shall closely consult with and actively involve persons with disabilities, 
including children with disabilities, through their representative organizations.
4. Nothing in the present Convention shall affect any provisions which are more conducive to the 
realization of the rights of persons with disabilities and which may be contained in the law of a State 
Party or international law in force for that State. There shall be no restriction upon or derogation from 
any of the human rights and fundamental freedoms recognized or existing in any State Party to the 
present Convention pursuant to law, conventions, regulation or custom on the pretext that the present 
Convention does not recognize such rights or freedoms or that it recognizes them to a lesser extent.
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5. The provisions of the present Convention shall extend to all parts of federal States without any 
limitations or exceptions.
Article 5
Equality and non-discrimination
1. States Parties recognize that all persons are equal before and under the law and are entitled without 
any discrimination to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law.
2. States Parties shall prohibit all discrimination on the basis of disability and guarantee to persons 
with disabilities equal and effective legal protection against discrimination on all grounds.
3. In order to promote equality and eliminate discrimination, States Parties shall take all appropriate 
steps to ensure that reasonable accommodation is provided.
4. Specific measures which are necessary to accelerate or achieve de facto equality of persons with 
disabilities shall not be considered discrimination under the terms of the present Convention.
Article 7
Children with disabilities
1. States Parties shall take all necessary measures to ensure the full enjoyment by children with 
disabilities of all human rights and fundamental freedoms on an equal basis with other children.
2. In all actions concerning children with disabilities, the best interests of the child shall be a primary 
consideration.
3. States Parties shall ensure that children with disabilities have the right to express their views freely 
on all matters affecting them, their views being given due weight in accordance with their age and 
maturity, on an equal basis with other children, and to be provided with disability and age-appropriate 
assistance to realize that right.
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